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iPreface
In recent years the world has been awakening to the realities of the Arctic region. The Arctic is facing challenges which, unless prop-
erly mitigated, will have an impact on the entire globe. The realities in the Arctic are changing, and changing fast. Governments and 
other actors must keep up with this pace.
It is our responsibility to take action to curb the negative developments in the region and take advantage of the new opportunities.
Many governments, both in the Arctic and beyond, have recently adopted Arctic strategies or updated existing ones. Many more 
will develop strategies in the near future. This is also the case in Finland which in fall 2019 will begin work on elaborating a new 
Arctic strategy.
The wheel does not need to be reinvented anywhere, but it is useful to know what makes all the wheels turn. For that, this study 
will provide a useful contribution.
I am confident that this publication will become a topical and useful reference book for all those involved in the drafting of Arctic 
strategies. I am very pleased that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland has been in a position to financially contribute to the 
publication of this study.
Helsinki 23 September 2019
Petteri Vuorimäki
Ambassador for Arctic and Antarctic Affairs
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Finland
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Abstract 
The scientific report Arctic Policies and Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis and Trends delivers a holistic analysis of the policies, strat-
egies, and declarations of the relevant Arctic stakeholders. It also includes new and/or emerging trends of Arctic governance and 
geopolitics in the early 21st century. The analysis, using quantitative and qualitative methods, is based on a coding of the text of 
56 policy documents (in 1996-2019), namely: i) the strategies and policies of the Arctic States and the Arctic Council Observer 
States; ii) the policies and declarations of the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants); and iii) the main 
Arctic Council chairmanship programs and ministerial declarations. It considers how different Arctic actors define and address 
issues around the following: the human dimension, governance, international cooperation, environmental protection, pollution, 
climate change, security, safety, economy, tourism, infrastructure, and science & education. Each document was read and analyzed 
thoroughly; quotes were selected and coded and then used to compare and contrast (percentage-wise) how the different documents 
address the above issues. For each category of stakeholder, the findings are compared within the category and then discussed with 
each other category-wise. Our study shows that the most-coded quotes of the Arctic States’ policy documents relate to the Gov-
ernance, Economy, International Cooperation, and Human Dimension indicators, as well as to a new Environmental Protection 
indicator (composed of Environmental Protection coupled with Pollution and Climate Change). The policy documents of the four 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations explicitly address issues surrounding Indigenous rights, although in different contexts, and also 
those related to the Governance indicator, both broadly and in detail. Unsurprisingly, all these documents emphasize the impor-
tance of ‘Traditional knowledge.’ The most-quoted indicator in the Arctic policies/strategies of the nine Arctic Council Observer 
states is the Science and Education indicator, followed by the International Cooperation and Economy indicators. The fourth 
most-quoted is the new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental Protection coupled with Pollution and 
Climate Change). 
The analyses generated a separate list of new/emerging trends for each stakeholder, summarizing the current main themes and 
concluding trends. Based on these, there here follows a short list of the overall new and/or emerging trends of the future of Arctic 
governance and geopolitics: i) Ambivalence of Arctic development, including ‘political inability,’ whenever a balance is  sought be-
tween environmental protection and economic activities; ii) The domination of States within the Arctic territory due to geopolitical 
stability and sovereignty vis-à-vis internationalization/globalization, and due to international treaties and self-determination; iii) 
Focus on science, with all Arctic stakeholders being dependent on scientific research and international cooperation in science  for 
problem-solving due to climate change; and iv) Close interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g., digital security, satellites, 
meteorology) due to globalization and rapidly advancing climate change in the Arctic. 
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Executive Summary
The scientific report Arctic Policies and Strategies – Analysis, Synthesis and Trends delivers a holistic analysis of the policies, 
strategies, and declarations of relevant Arctic stakeholders. It also includes new and/or emerging trends of Arctic governance 
and geopolitics in the early 21st century. 
Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the study delivers a holistic and systematic analysis and synthesis of the existing 
policies and strategies of the Arctic states (Member States), Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants), 
and non-Arctic countries (Observer States), as well as Arctic Council chairmanship programs and ministerial declarations. 
The analysis is based on coding the text of 56 policy documents: the strategies and policies of the Arctic States in 2008/10–2017; 
the relevant Arctic Council chairmanship programs and ministerial declarations in 1996–2019; the policies and declarations 
of the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants) in 2010–2019; and the strategies and policies of the 
Arctic Council Observer states in 2013–2018.
Fourteen indicators, or themes, were selected at the beginning of the work to look at a broad range of governance issues that 
would or could be addressed by the Arctic states, Permanent Participants, Arctic Council Observer States, and other (Arctic) 
stakeholders. The purpose was twofold: to illuminate the different or similar priorities of these stakeholders, and to assess from 
a holistic standpoint how different states and Indigenous peoples’ organizations define and address issues concerning the Arctic.
A description and understanding of how perceptions and (re)mapping of the Arctic have changed over time is the first indicator, 
and implementation of policies the last. In between are the following 12 indicators, which were coded: the human dimension; 
governance; international cooperation; environmental protection; pollution; climate change; security; safety; economy; tourism; 
infrastructure; and science & education. 
Each document was carefully read and the quotes were added to columns in a spreadsheet. The quotes were then coded, and 
used to compare and contrast (percentage-wise) how the different documents address these issues. For each category of stake-
holder, the findings are: i) compared within the category, and ii) discussed with each other category-wise. Then, based on all the 
analyses, new and emerging trends are recognized and formulated, as a final synthesis, to describe and define the state of the 
Arctic in the 2020s.
All the Arctic states, except the United States of America, clearly state that the economy, or (socio)economic development, is a pri-
ority, and have climate change or environmental protection as another priority, which is striking. All countries, except Canada and 
Sweden, state that international cooperation is a priority, which is relevant. As an overall conclusion, a comparison of the current 
official national strategies and policies shows economy/economic development, international cooperation, and environmental pro-
tection to be the overarching priorities of the Arctic states. While according to our coding of different indicators, the most-coded 
quotes are ordered as follows: Governance, the new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental Protection 
coupled with Pollution and Climate Change), Economy, International Cooperation, and Human Dimension.
The Arctic Council chairmanship programs tend to focus on issues pertaining to the Environmental Protection indicator. In the 
past few years, there has also been a focus on pollutants, which contribute to climate change. As for the social aspect, there is an 
overall focus on health and wellbeing, and also on culture and/or language protection. Gender equality shows up on the agenda 
every few years or so. Maritime safety, as a part of the Safety & SAR (search and rescue) indicator has also emerged as a safety con-
cern over the past few Arctic Council chairmanship programs. 
The content of the ministerial declarations of the Arctic Council tends to prioritize issues around the International Cooperation, 
Governance, Human Dimension and Environmental Protection indicators, showing these to be the most-quoted indicators over 
time. They all mainly deal—directly or indirectly—with the two main functions of the Arctic Council: environmental protection 
and sustainable development. Under the Human Dimension indicator there is also a focus on ensuring issues relating to the health 
Arctic Policies and Strategies — 
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and wellbeing of Northerners. Issues related to the Economy and Infrastructure indicators are also discussed, although not to the 
same extent as the others. 
The policy documents of the four Indigenous peoples’ organizations, which are Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council, 
are somewhat fragmented. They do not cover all the indicator fields in full detail, as their focus varies. There is a striking simi-
larity in that all policy documents explicitly address issues surrounding Indigenous (individual and collective) rights as a part 
of the Human Dimension indicator (although in different contexts), and also those related to the Governance indicator, both 
broadly and in detail. Moreover, the importance of the International Cooperation (and treaties) indicator is highlighted. Unlike 
environmental protection, pollution and/or climate change is not explicitly covered by all documents. Unsurprisingly, all the 
documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples to use/utilize the resources of their homelands and also the im-
portance of ‘Traditional knowledge.’
Based on the quantitative measuring carried out in this study, the indicator most-quoted by the national Arctic policies and strat-
egies of the nine observer states of the Arctic Council is the Science & Education indicator, followed by the International Cooper-
ation and Economy indicators. The fourth is the new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental Protection 
coupled with Pollution and Climate Change). These top four indicators accord more or less with the official priorities, or policy 
goals/aims/principles, of these states’ national policies.
Finally, there is a separate list of new/emerging trends for each stakeholder: the Arctic States; the Arctic Council chairman-
ship programs; the Arctic Council ministerial declarations; the Permanent Participants; and the Observer States. These five 
lists summarize the current main themes and conclude with new and emerging trends of each category of these Arctic ac-
tors. Based on these, a brief list has been compiled of overall new and emerging trends of the future of Arctic governance 
and geopolitics, as identified by the present scientific report, which follows here:
1) Ambivalence of Arctic development, including ‘political inability,’ whenever a balance is sought between environmental protec-
tion and (new) economic activities; 
2) The domination of States within the Arctic territory due to geopolitical stability and sovereignty vis-à-vis internationalization/
globalization based on international maritime law & the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and 
on self-determination;
3) Focus on science, with all Arctic stakeholders being dependent on scientific research and international cooperation in science 
for problem-solving because of climate change; 
4) Close interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g., digital security, satellites, and meteorology as a new priority area) 
due to globalization and rapidly advancing climate change in the Arctic. 
This scientific report is a research activity of the Arctic Futures Initiative of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA). It is supported by the Arctic Circle Assembly and the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) at the 
University of Helsinki as the major partners. It is co-funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and IIASA. 
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In the national strategies of the Arctic states, the ‘Arctic’ is de-
scribed as being remote, scattered, and having a sparse pop-
ulation. Its ecosystem is considered as vulnerable, fragile, or 
unique. While there is no strict definition of the (Arctic) region, 
there is broad agreement that if there is a southern border to the 
region, it is the 60th parallel north. 
The ‘Arctic States’ today are group of states located in the cir-
cumpolar Arctic around the Arctic Ocean. The countries in the 
far North, whose territories go beyond the Arctic Circle, are: 
Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland), 
Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States of 
America (Alaska) (see Figure 1. The Arctic States, Permanent 
Participants, Arctic Council Observer States). These states first 
came together at ministerial level in June 1991 to sign the Arc-
tic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS 1991). Since then, 
they have continued their intensive, mainly functional, cooper-
ation on environmental protection in the Arctic region, as well 
as working together for sustainable development of the north-
ernmost regions and communities of the globe. (see Figure 1)
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  Arctic Member States: 
Canada, Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark 
(including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Norway, 
Russian Federation, Sweden, United States of America.
  Arctic Council Observer States: 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
People's Republic of China, Poland, Republic of 
India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, 
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
  Permanent Participants:
Aleut International Association (AIA) – USA, RUS
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) – CAN, USA
Gwich'in Council International (GCI) – CAN, USA
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) – CAN, Greenland/DNK, RUS, USA
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North 
(RAIPON) – RUS
Saami Council (SC) – FIN, NOR, RUS, SWE
Figure 1. Map of the Arctic States, Permanent Participants, and the Arctic 
Council Observer States Credit: Daniel R. Strebe for the base map (July 17th 
2019) and IIASA for all edits.  
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Initiated by the first gathering of Parliamentarians of the Arctic 
Region in 1993 (Reykjavik Final Document 1993) and support-
ed by Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations, the eight Arctic 
states established the Arctic Council (AC) in 1996 as a high-level 
forum for multilateral cooperation on the Arctic, in particular, 
for environmental protection. The Arctic Eight (A8) became the 
members of the Council. It is important to recognize that the 
Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS) preceded the 
Arctic Council, and that four declarations were produced under 
its auspices between 1991 (in Rovaniemi) and 1997 (in Alta). 
The Arctic Council has a rotating chairmanship whereby each 
state serves as chair for two years. At the start of each chair, a 
program is produced by the government of the chairmanship 
country outlining its agenda. Each chairmanship then con-
cludes with a Ministerial meeting and a declaration that pro-
vides guidance for the following chair (Arctic Council 2015d) 
based on a consensus of the eight member states. Since the Ot-
tawa Declaration (1996) which provides the foundation for the 
work of the Arctic Council, there have been eleven Ministeri-
al Declarations from Iqaluit in 1998 to Rovaniemi in 2019, al-
though the latter Ministerial, for the first time, failed to produce 
a signed declaration, as consensus could not be reached on the 
issue of climate change.
When establishing the Arctic Council, the Arctic states unan-
imously agreed to recognize six Indigenous Peoples Organiza-
tions (IPOs) as ‘Permanent Participants’ (PPs) in the Council. 
While, in principle, a PP position is equally open to other Arc-
tic organizations of Indigenous peoples with a majority Arctic 
Indigenous constituency, six Indigenous Peoples Organizations 
have, so far, obtained PP status. These are: the Aleut Interna-
tional Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in 
Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Rus-
sian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the 
Saami Council. 
While no more categories of the Arctic Council structure have 
been created, in their Joint Communiqué on its Establishment 
(1996), the Arctic states’ governments recognized the need to 
provide an opportunity to non-Arctic countries, governmental, 
and non-governmental organizations with Arctic interests to 
participate actively in the work of the Council. Following this, 
the Declaration of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic 
Council in 1998 (Iqaluit Declaration 1998) approved Observer 
status for several committed intergovernmental and interna-
tional non-governmental organizations and non-Arctic states. 
Although there are certain criteria for admitting observers, as 
well as restrictions to their rights, the position of a (permanent) 
observership at the Arctic Council has become attractive among 
several non-Arctic states, in particular, those with scientific in-
terest in the polar regions, and those with global economic in-
terests. By the 11th Ministerial of the Arctic Council in May 2019 
altogether 39 states and organizations—13 non-Arctic states, 14 
intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and 
12 international non-governmental organizations—have been 
approved as Observers of the Arctic Council. The non-Arctic 
states with an observer status are France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of 
India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzer-
land, and United Kingdom. 
Policies, strategies, and other policy documents of the Arctic 
states, the Permanent Participants, and the AC Observer states, 
as well as those of the Arctic Council ministerial meetings, are 
all the focus of this comprehensive study. Just as none of the 
entities and actors in the Arctic sphere live in a vacuum, but are 
cooperating with each other, and integrated with several organi-
zations as members, as well as signatories of several internation-
al agreements (see Figure 2. International Organizations and 
Treaties, p.19). So this study is also not conducted in a vacuum. 
The present scientific report has been produced by the Arctic 
Futures Initiative (AFI)—a new-generation research project 
coordinated by the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA). It is supported by the Arctic Circle Assem-
bly, and the Institute for Atmospheric Earth System Research 
(INAR) at the University of Helsinki as the major partners, 
and co-funded by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
IIASA. Its aim is to map, compare, and analyze the existing 
Arctic policies and strategies, and the chairmanship programs 
and declarations of the Arctic Council with a view to support-
ing public and private policymaking in Arctic and non-Arctic 
countries, Arctic residents, and civil society. 
The scientific report will begin with a brief overview of the 
state of Arctic governance and geopolitics. 
Overview Of Arctic Governance  
And Geopolitics
Even against a background of the general uncertainties in 
world politics and continuing rhetoric on ‘Great Power rival-
ries,’ the post-Cold War Arctic has high geopolitical stability. 
This can be stated quite objectively, in spite of different per-
ceptions, discourses, and certain mis-/disinformation about 
the Arctic and arctic affairs disseminated in the media and by 
policy makers. This stability is based on the constructive coop-
eration affirmed by the Arctic states and Indigenous peoples’ 
organizations. Indeed, the first preamble of the recent joint 
ministerial meeting declarations and statements of the Arctic 
Council reaffirms “the commitment to maintain peace, stabili-
ty and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (e.g., Fairbanks 
Declaration 2017; Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement 
2019). Moreover, after the confusion as to how to interpret 
the first-ever crewed descent to the ocean bottom at the North 
Pole by a Russian expedition in 2007, the five Arctic littoral 
states declared that cooperation over the Arctic Ocean, “which 
is based on mutual trust and transparency” (Ilulissat Declara-
tion 2008), would be strengthened. 
 
This high stability seems to be resilient, having been main-
tained despite recent, turbulent international politics (e.g., 
Clifford 2017) (see Figure 3. Arctic Events – International 
Introduction and Methods
19
Introduction and Methods
Figure 2. International Organizations and Treaties
Events, p. 20). It is due, on the one hand, to the common interest 
the Arctic states have in decreasing military tension and increas-
ing political stability in the region by transforming the Cold War 
period into an era of functional environmental cooperation. It 
is due, too, to certain features of Arctic geopolitics in the 1990s: 
the fact that the original militarization of the Arctic was based on 
achieving a balance of global nuclear deterrence; the high degree 
of legal certainty in land claim agreements involving Indigenous 
peoples; and the ‘Home Rule’ model and other applications of the 
‘Nordic devolution’ of power (Heininen 2018). 
It has been in the common interest of the member states of 
the Arctic Council—the leading policy-shaping body for Arc-
tic cooperation (e.g., Arctic Yearbook 2016)—and also of mu-
tual benefit to them to cooperate across borders and maintain 
good (formal and informal) bilateral and multilateral dialogues 
among themselves and the other Arctic actors, namely, the Arc-
tic Indigenous peoples, the committed non-Arctic states, the 
scientific community, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). The post–Cold War Arctic is probably exceptional in 
international politics and relations in being more politicized 
than ever before but lacking armed conflicts or serious disputes 
over national borders. Instead, there is functional cooperation 
in several fields and dialogue between the Arctic states, Indige-
nous peoples, and AC observer states,  as well as between them 
and other Arctic actors and those from outside the region. This 
is clearly indicated in the policy documents that have been cod-
ed and analyzed in this study. 
While there is increasing uncertainty related to the scale of 
global warming, the estimation of the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC 2018) is that the Arctic will warm, on 
average, at a faster overall rate than the Earth itself. Moreover, 
for decades the region and its communities has been heavi-
ly influenced by long-range air and water pollution, persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs), heavy metals, and radioactivity (e.g., 
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Figure 3. Arctic Events – International Events
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AMAP 1997), and more recently micro-plastics. The well-known 
natural resources of the Arctic (e.g., fishes and marine mammals, 
timber/wood & pulp, hydrocarbons and other minerals) have 
been exploited for the benefit of the global economy. Intangible 
Arctic values are also useful as examples, if not models, in world 
politics—knowledge of Indigenous/traditional konwledge, devo-
lution of power, geopolitical stability (based on transboundary 
cooperation), confidence-building (based on the interplay be-
tween science, politics, and business), and productive dialogue 
among diverse stakeholders.
In the present study, this unique space with its harsh conditions 
and resource-richness is analyzed as a functionally and multidi-
mensionally ‘changing Arctic.’ 
The current state of the Arctic—and the entire circumpolar 
North—is distinctive in that it is much more susceptible to cli-
mate change than most other parts of the Earth system. That 
said, in the sparsely populated Arctic region itself, the human 
responses to those changes are, by definition, very limited. The 
warming Arctic ecosystem is becoming simultaneously more 
fragile and vulnerable at a time when the region is rapidly open-
ing up to new, possibly mass-scale, economic and societal ac-
tivities. The changes taking place will materialize as a complex 
mixture of direct climate impacts and indirect socio-economic 
and political impacts, with the related uncertainty greatly affect-
ing the populations and communities of the region. Changes in 
the Arctic will have multiple feedbacks in the Earth system. 
 
From the perspective of global climate change mitigation, in-
creased access to new hydrocarbon sources, with their associat-
ed CO2 and other emissions, represents a serious drawback for 
the Arctic. New and shorter global shipping routes through the 
region offer significant economic and emission savings, but in-
creasing transportation brings severe environmental risks, caus-
ing an ‘Arctic Paradox’ and decreasing societal security. From a 
nation state perspective, the Arctic states face an array of mul-
tidimensional challenges and risks in reacting and adapting to 
accelerating climate change, as do non-arctic countries shaping 
their national policies and strategies on the Arctic. With their 
sovereign status, the Arctic states have quite different footholds in 
the region than the observer states further south in Europe (e.g., 
France and Germany), and Asia (e.g., China and Japan) whose 
increasing interest in Arctic research, marine transport and other 
economic activities, and in the environment and climate change, 
is actively involving them in international Arctic cooperation. 
From the regional perspective, and that of Indigenous popula-
tions and other local communities of the circumpolar North, 
increasing economic activity, based on the neoliberal and ne-
orealist approach, is tending to outweigh the environment and 
environment concerns and geopolitics is a double-edged sword: 
Increased economic activity, together with a growing need for 
new expertise on the environment and climate, may lead to a 
more diversified and robust economy if, for example, climate 
change itself, and climate research, create new employment op-
portunities. However, emerging influence from southern lati-
tudes due to better access to Arctic resources, without proper 
and more strict environmental regulations, emerging influence 
of powerful international actors from outside of the region could 
not only impair traditional livelihoods, values, and culture, but 
also cause environmental, health, and other social problems. 
This situation could all too easily increase uncertainty among 
Arctic populations, making it more difficult to create func-
tioning local communities and sustainable livelihoods, and to 
achieve a higher level of self-determination. 
In fact, in addition to regional development problems, the Arc-
tic has been facing other significant and fundamental changes 
in its geopolitical and security dynamics since the end of the 
Cold War due to globalization and global (‘wicked’) problems, 
including climate change (e.g. Globalization and the Circum-
polar North 2010; The Fast-Changing Arctic 2013; Durfee and 
Johnstone 2019). 
Although climate change is interpreted as the most severe trig-
ger it is neither the only nor first one. Before climate change, 
there were other problems mostly from lower latitudes, such 
as long-range pollution from radioactive contaminants, Arctic 
haze, and heavy metals, all of which were sources of concern 
to Indigenous and other local peoples, NGOs, and the research 
community. Nuclear safety was defined as the main environ-
mental problem and trigger (e.g., AMAP Report 1997). This 
concern was transformed first into pressure on the Arctic states’ 
governments and then into functional cooperation among them 
(Climate Change and Arctic Security 2019). 
A ‘globalized Arctic’ is being interpreted as a new geopolitical 
context and as part and parcel of the overall Earth and ocean 
systems, bringing with it global political, economic, technolog-
ical, cultural, and environmental changes (see, e.g., The Global 
Arctic Handbook 2018). 
Although the Arctic as a region is the product of global pro-
cesses and impacted by them, it also has global significance 
due to immaterial issues, such as cultural diversity, biodiversity, 
knowledge about the environment and climate, stemming from 
both Indigenous peoples and scientific research and expertise, 
regional and international and cooperation, and the broader is-
sues of political stability and peace. 
In the influential global studies discourse on ‘interdependence,’ 
the Arctic is a perfect case in point: not only in terms of the 
impacts of global changes within the region, but also in how the 
region affects the rest of the planet and the feedbacks it caus-
es to the global changes themselves. It is possible to argue that 
the ‘wicked’ problem of combined pollution and climate change 
puts pressure on the Arctic states and other Arctic actors to ac-
celerate their cooperation as well as reconstructing their reality 
and going beyond traditional power and hegemony game by 
redefined environmental protection as the ultimate aim, imple-
mented discursive devolution of power (based on knowledge) 
and soft-law, and applied the interplay between science, politics 
and business into a dialogue across sectors (Heininen 2018; also 
AHDR 2004). 
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This can also be inferred from the above-mentioned commit-
ment of the Arctic states “to maintain peace, stability and con-
structive cooperation,” as will be discussed later in this report. 
Following from this, there are twelve coded indicators in this 
Report, in addition to (Re)defining and (Re)mapping the Arc-
tic and Implementation. These are: Human Dimension, Gov-
ernance, International Cooperation and Treaties, Environmen-
tal Protection, Pollution, Climate Change, Security, Safety and 
Search and Rescue, Economy, Tourism, Infrastructure, Science 
and Education. They were selected to represent the most cur-
rent, relevant, and important features of Arctic governance and 
geopolitics so that a holistic picture of a state of the governance 
and geopolitics of the region could be drawn up. 
Earlier Studies And Aim Of  
This Study
The existing social sciences literature on the Arctic has two fo-
cuses. The first, inspired by national policies and intergovern-
mental cooperation, is on geopolitics, security, institutions, the 
resource potential, (e.g., Young 1992; Heininen 1992; Interna-
tional Relations and the Arctic 2014) and on climate change, hu-
man security, Arctic governance, and Indigenous peoples (e.g., 
Yearbook of Polar Law 2013). The second focus is covered by a 
few multidisciplinary studies and publications on global-related 
issues and the globalized Arctic as a part of global dynamics 
in the environmental, societal, political, and economic spheres 
(e.g., Globalization and the Circumpolar North 2010; Nordic 
Council of Ministers 2011; The Global Arctic Handbook 2018). 
This study considers the global significance and implications of 
this changing geopolitical context. 
In the 2010s, the first comparative studies and analysis of Arctic 
strategies, mainly on the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, 
were published. Brosnan et al. (2011) discuss how cooperation 
and conflict appear in the Arctic strategies of these states. Sum-
mers (2010) studies the littoral states and their relations, with 
a focus on energy and the environment and on China and the 
European Union as new players in the Arctic. The first compre-
hensive inventory and comparative study, including eleven indi-
cators, on the national policies and strategies of the eight Arctic 
states and the European Union (Heininen 2011) is the basis for 
this deeper analysis and synthesis.1 
However, there have been no in-depth analyses of any of the 
national strategies and policies of the Arctic states. There have 
been only a couple of brief overviews on the priority areas of 
the strategies (e.g., Schulze 2017) of the Arctic Council observ-
er countries. There has been no analysis of the Arctic policies 
1  See also Bailes and Heininen (2012). A more detailed inventory and comparative (unpublished) study on the national strategies and policies of the Arctic states 
(Heininen and Lempinen, 2012) was made for the ‘Kiruna Statement’ on the Vision for the Arctic (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013) at Arctic Council Ministe-
rial Meeting in May 2013 ordered by Foreign Ministry of Sweden.
of the Permanent Participants and declarations of the confer-
ences of the Arctic Indigenous peoples organizations. There are 
no studies on connections between the contents of the Arctic 
Council chairmanships and national strategies, and between the 
national strategies and the AC ministerial declarations. These 
various gaps in research related to Arctic policies and strategies 
were seen an opportunity for the the Arctic Futures Initiative to 
examine all these policy documents to define the points of sim-
ilarity and difference among them, analyze interesting research 
findings, and, based on those, identify the potential and emerg-
ing trends of Arctic governance and geopolitics. 
Furthermore, the ultimate aim of this research is thus to deliver 
a systematic analysis and synthesis of existing policies and strat-
egies of the Arctic states, the Permanent Participants, and the 
observer states. This, in turn, will allow a synthesis to be made 
of the entire set of Arctic policies and strategies and a holistic 
approach to Arctic governance and geopolitics to be drawn up. 
The work for the study has been organized and carried out from 
a broad range of regional, national and international perspec-
tives, as follows:
1. All material relevant to the aims of the projects was systemat-
ically collected, inventoried, mapped, and analyzed: findings 
were studied to elicit points of similarity and difference; 
2. A determination was made of the priorities and common in-
terests of the Arctic states (Arctic Council members), Arctic 
Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants), 
and non-Arctic states (AC observer countries) to understand 
the stance of these entities in terms of the future develop-
ment of the Arctic region and their understanding of the 
high level of political stability of the region;
3. The relevant themes/titles, main objectives and recommen-
dations of the Arctic Council declarations and chairmanship 
programs were recognized, coded and analyzed; 
4. Based on this work, a synthesis was made of the entire 
body of Arctic policies and strategies—this allowed a ho-
listic approach to be taken to clarifying the current, new 
and emergingtrends in Arctic governance and geopolitics. 
The Documents 
The policy documents used as a foundation for the analysis and 
synthesis on national strategies and policies, and declarations 
and chairmanship programs, from 1996 to 2019, are as follows:
• The national strategies and policies of the Arctic states, and 
their priorities/priority areas, objectives/goals, as well as im-
plementation, organizational bodies and possible budgets;
• The policies, agendas and declarations of the Permanent Par-
ticipants of the Arctic Council (Arctic Indigenous peoples’ 
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organizations), and their priorities/priority areas, objectives/
goals, as well as implementation, organizational bodies;
• The national strategies and policies of the observer states of 
the Arctic Council (non-Arctic states), and their priorities/
priority areas, objectives/goals, as well as implementation, 
organizational bodies, possible budgets;
• The Arctic Council chairmanship programs, and the declara-
tions of the Council’s Ministerial meetings (1996–2019).
Arctic States 
The main Arctic actors are the eight Arctic states: Canada, Fin-
land, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Russian Feder-
ation, Sweden, and United States of America. Table 1 lists the 
documents analyzed for each state in reverse chronological or-
der. Note, for Canada the 2009 document is the primary Strat-
egy, as the 2010 foreign Policy deals with developing the do-
mestic priorities internationally. For the Kingdom of Denmark, 
even though the Faroes Island document is the most recent, it 
is not a primary state document, and thus not analyzed here. 
Arctic State Strategies
Canada
• Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage,  
Our Future (2009)
• Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising  
Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s NORTHERN  
STRATEGY Abroad (2010)
Finland • Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 (2013)• Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2010)
Iceland
• A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy (2011)
• Iceland’s Position in the Arctic. Report of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs in Iceland on Sustainable Development in  
the Arctic (2009)
Kingdom of 
Denmark
• Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 (2011) 
• The Arctic at a Time of Transition: Draft Strategy for Activities 
in the Arctic Region (2008)
Norway
• Norway’s Arctic Strategy: Between Geopolitics and Social 
Development (2017)
• Norway’s Arctic Policy: Creating Value, Managing Resources, 
Confronting Climate Change and Fostering Knowledge (2014)
Russian  
Federation
• Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian 
Federation and National Security Efforts for the Period up  
to 2020 (2013)
• Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in  
the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond (2009)
Sweden • Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region (2011)
United States  
of America 
• National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013)
• National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 and  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 (2009)
Table 1. Arctic State Strategies 
Permanent Participants 
There are six Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations as Perma-
nent Participants (PPs) in the Arctic Council: the Aleut In-
ternational Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the 
Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Coun-
cil, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North 
(RAIPON), and the Saami Council. The PPs play an important 
role in the Arctic Council and “have full consultation rights 
in connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions” 
(Arctic Council 2015a, para. 1). That is why they are included 
in this analysis. 
Not all of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Organizations have 
produced governance documents. Only the four PPs that have—
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich’in Council Interna-
tional, Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and Saami Council —
are discussed in this report. Table 2 provides a list of the PPs and 
their documents. Unlike the Arctic states, the documents of the 
PPs are a combination of strategies, declarations, and reports. 
Permanent Participant Documents 
Arctic Athabaskan Council
• Arctic Athabaskan Council Arctic Policy (2017)
• Europe and the Arctic: A View from the Arctic 
Athabaskan Council (2008)
Gwich’in Council  
International
• Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging  
Practices of Indigenous-Led Review (2018)
Inuit Circumpolar Council • Inuit Arctic Policy of ICC (2010)• Utqiagvik Declaration (2018)
Saami Council • Sami Arctic Strategy (2019)• Tråante Declaration (2017)
Table 2. Permanent Participant Documents 
Observer States 
The Arctic Council offers Observer status to “non-arctic states,” 
“inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, 
global and regional,” and “non-governmental organizations” 
(Arctic Council 2015b, para 1). There are currently 13 Observ-
er states in the Arctic Council: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Republic of 
India, Republic of Korea, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Switzer-
land, and United Kingdom (Arctic Council 2015b). However, 
not all the Observers have produced Arctic policies or strategies. 
This analysis is concerned only with the policy documents on/
for/towards the Arctic produced by states, as they have the ca-
pacity to create and implement national policies, namely those 
non-arctic states which have the status of (permanent) observes 
of the Arctic Council. 
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Table 3 provides a list of the Observer States that do have strat-
egies, and only these states will be referenced in the analysis. 
Observer States Documents 
France The Great Challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for  the Arctic (2015)
Italy Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines (2015, updated 2016)
Germany Guidelines of the Germany Arctic Policy:  Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities (2013)
Japan Japan’s Arctic Policy (2015)
The Netherlands Pole Position – NL 2.0: Strategy for the Netherlands  Polar Programme 2016-2020 (2014)
People’s Republic  
of China (PRC) China’s Arctic Policy (2018)
Republic of Korea 
(ROK) Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (2013)
Spain (ESP) Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy (2016)
United Kingdom 
(UK)
Beyond the Ice: UK Policy Towards the Arctic (2018)
Adapting to Change: UK Policy Towards the Arctic (2013)
Table 3. Observer State Documents
Arctic Council Documents 
The eight Arctic States are members of the Arctic Council (see, 
Ottawa Declaration 1996). As members they all participate in 
the governance of the Arctic Council, and each of them act 
as a chair of the Council, taking on two-year chairmanships 
(Arctic Council 2015c). The AC Chairmanship is rotated in 
alphabetic order. Before, or at the latest, at the start of each 
chairmanship, the state produces a program (with a brochure) 
that outlines their two-year agenda and in most cases the pri-
orities/priority areas of the chairmanship. At the end of the 
chairmanship, there is a Ministerial meeting where the Senior 
Arctic Officials (SAOs) from each state meet and create a dec-
laration that concludes the chairmanship and details its major 
outcomes, as well as describing the state of the Arctic Council.
Table 4 lists the chairmanships and the subsequent ministerial 
declarations. Note: the first Canadian chairmanship program 
is not available and was thus not included in this analysis. 
All other documents were publically available on the Arctic 
Council website. 
Arctic Council  
Chairmanship Program Arctic Council Ministerial Declaration 
- Declaration on the Establishment of the  Arctic Council (1996), Ottawa Declaration (1996)
Canada 1996–1998 Iqaluit Declaration (1998)
United States of America 
1998–2000 Barrow Declaration (2000)
Finland 2000–2002 Inari Declaration (2002)
Iceland 2002–2004 Reykjavík Declaration (2004)
Russian Federation 
2004–2006 Salekhard Declaration (2006)
Norway 2006–2009 Tromsø Declaration (2009)
The Kingdom of Denmark 
2009–2011 Nuuk Declaration (2011)
Sweden 2011–2013 Kiruna Declaration (2013)
Canada 2013–2015 Iqaluit Declaration (2015)
United States of America 
2015–2017 Fairbanks Declaration (2017)
Finland 2017–2019 Statement by the Chair (2019) Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement (2019)
Iceland 2019–2021 -
Table 4. Arctic Council Documents 
In total, 56 documents were read, coded, and analyzed. The 
large time span over which the documents were produced 
(1996-2019) allows for a comprehensive overview of Arctic gov-
ernance priorities and how these priorities change over time.
The Procedure 
Even considering the breadth and depth of information avail-
able and the large number of documents to be coded and ana-
lyzed, a holistic approach and systematic analysis were deemed 
feasible. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used 
in the examination of the information to perform the different 
types of analyses required. 
The methods used were as follows:
i) Select certain variables as indicators (with sub-indicators) to 
measure each strategy/policy, and declaration, emphasizing 
the priorities/priority areas of each strategy/policy (either 
explicitly mentioned, referred to or discussed, or implicit); 
ii) Code the indicators in each document of an actor (mem-
ber states, PPs, observer states, AC chairmanship programs 
and ministerial declarations) and based on that compare the 
two documents of each actor between each other, if there is 
more than one document, compare them between each oth-
er, searching for points of similarity and difference, as well 
as priority areas. And analyse the current strategy/policy of 
each actor using applied systems analysis; 
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iii) Compare and discuss the strategies/policies of each actor 
(member states, PPs, observer countries, AC chairmanship 
programs and declarations) with each other, and on that ba-
sis analyze and conclude each category; 
iv) Based on the coding, comparative studies, and analyses, rec-
ognize and identify new and emerging main themes; 
v) Based on the document analysis and the priorities, synthe-
size the current state of Arctic governance and of Arctic ge-
opolitics, as well as new and emerging trends of Arctic de-
velopment for the near future. 
The Indicators 
Fourteen indicators, or themes, were selected by the research team 
when beginning work to address a broad range of governance is-
sues and interests that would or could be addressed by the Arctic 
tates, Permanent Participants, Arctic Council observer states and 
other (Arctic) stakeholders. The purpose was i) to illuminate the 
different (or similar) priorities of the stakeholders, and ii) to have 
as holistic an approach as possible to national policies. Table 5 
provides an overview of the main indicators and sub-indicators to 
provide a more nuanced understanding of the topic. 
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(Re)defining and  
(Re)mapping the Arctic 
• Which state(s) were the first to create an Arctic policy or strategy,  
and in what order did the other states follow? 
• How is the Arctic defined as a geographical location?
• How is the Arctic described (e.g., High North, Arctic, etc.) and  
how has this changed over time?
• Who are the Arctic stakeholders? Which national government  
ministries are responsible for the region and and what are the names  
of the ministers?
Human Dimension • Indigenous Peoples
• Other inhabitants/residents
• Equality 
• Culture and Languages
• Demography 
• Human rights
• Migration 
• Health and Wellbeing
Governance • What are the existing governance structures globally, internationally, 
nationally, regionally, and locally?
• Self-governance and self-determination.
• Involvement in international and transboundary cooperation.
• Role of Arctic Council and its working groups, and related procedures.
• Governance of natural resources (including fish), the blue economy, 
and the licensing process.
• Public consultations, environmental impact assessments.
• Conflict of interest between stakeholders.
• Decision-making processes.
International  
Cooperation and  
International Treaties
• What is the role of international cooperation and how important is it?
• What are the major Arctic-related agreements or fora?
• What are the global perspectives (globalization)?
• What countries are members (or observers) of EU, NATO, UN, BEAC?
• UN Sustainable Development Goals and how much are they considered 
in relation to the Arctic?
Environmental  
Protection
• How the Arctic is defined (e.g., fragile, unique, etc.)
• What are the priorities, how are they defined, what sectors?
• Does using the term ‘environmental’ mean environmental protection?
• What agencies are in charge of implementation, and how much budget 
is allocated?
• Are protected areas discussed?
• Flora and fauna, invasive species, north–south movements of species 
(e.g., migrating fish, polar bears etc.), and what topics are taken 
seriously?
• Biodiversity.
• Assessment/monitoring sea for pollutants.
Pollution • Within and outside of the region and which is more important?
• What are the pollutants in the Arctic?  
• How many times is a pollutant mentioned before there  
is action; what needs to happen before the pollutant is taken seriously?
• Who are the polluters?
• What international treaties are mentioned and what are the  
problem-solving tactics at the different levels?
Climate Change • Mitigation vis-a-vis adaptation.
• What agreements and frameworks are mentioned?
• If Asia is mentioned there?
• Are the voices of the scientific community heard, and if so, how?
• What are the consequences, both positive and negative?
• What is the societal impact?
• Environmental refugees.
• Climate change as a security factor.
Security • How is security defined, and what are the security priorities?
• Is sovereignty mentioned, and if so, how is it defined?
• How are borders defined?
• Is (high) stability/stability-building mentioned, and how is it  
defined and possibly linked to security?
• How has the interpretation of security changed over time?
• Role of armed forces.
• What measures are implemented/needed to increase security?
• Is NATO mentioned, and if so, what kind of role does NATO play?
• Is it addressed that the Arctic Council does not include  
military security?
• Is military spending mentioned?
• Military capabilities.
• Is the role of the Coast Guard mentioned, and if so, what is it?
Safety and Search and 
Rescue (SAR)
• How is safety defined and what terms are used?
• Is safety in tourism addressed?
• When did safety become a concern?
• How are SAR agreements defined and is implementation mentioned,  
is the Polar Code mentioned?
• Are national safety systems integrated?
• What kind of infrastructure or capabilities do the countries  
have for safety?
• Is there mapping and monitoring of sea ice, depth, etc.?
• Who are the different authorities (e.g., levels of government)  
involved and what role do they have?
• Is Coast Guard cooperation discussed?
continue on next page
26
(Re)defining and (Re)mapping the Arctic relates to under-
standing how the different actors define and describe the Arc-
tic region. Do they self-identify as Arctic actors/stakeholders 
and/or redefine their country/state related to the Arctic, and 
if so how? It also seeks to understand who the different stake-
holders are and which government ministries have regional 
responsibilities. 
The Human Dimension indicator addresses the different as-
pects of human life in the Arctic. It focuses on: the role of Indig-
enous peoples and how culture and language are preserved and 
protected; how other inhabitants/residents are noted and identi-
fied; the demographics of the different states and whether there 
is regional migration; if and how equality and human rights are 
addressed; and health and wellbeing. 
The Governance indicator looks at the different ways the Arc-
tic is governed. This identifies what structures are currently in 
place, how much cooperation takes place, and in what contex-
t(s); it looks, in particular, at the Arctic Council and its proce-
dures. It examines how self-governance and self-determination 
are addressed and supported by state actors, what mechanisms 
are in place for natural resources utilization, the extent to which 
public consultations and environmental impact assessments are 
encouraged, how decisions are made, and if there are any con-
flicts of interest among the different stakeholders. 
 
The International Cooperation and International Treaties in-
dicator reflects the role and importance of international coop-
eration. It also includes the major agreements and/or forums. 
The indicator attempts to address the global perspectives— 
globalization— in the strategies. Moreover, this indicator high-
lights whether the particular state is a member (or observers) to 
EU, NATO, UN, BEAC and/or potentially other international 
organizations. The indicator also considers the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals and if (and how much) they are reflected in 
the strategies. 
The Environmental Protection indicator assesses the extent to 
which the strategy actually advocates for environmental pro-
tection and how this work is prioritized. It also addresses the 
amount of discussion on protected areas, flora and fauna (in-
cluding invasive species and migration),the importance of bio-
diversity, and if there are plans for monitoring the sea for pol-
lutants. This indicator also looks for a description of the Arctic 
from an environmental perspective (e.g., fragile, etc.). 
The Pollution indicator seeks to elicit how the different strate-
gies recognize various pollutants, where they come from, and 
who are polluters. What is being done to address pollution 
through either international treaties or other problem solving 
actions? Additionally, how long does it take for a state to take 
action against pollution?
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Economy • How are resources utilized, including fisheries?
• Energy. 
• Sustainable development. 
• What kind of economic activities are mentioned and what is prioritized? 
• Who are the actors (e.g., State, state-owned businesses, transnational, 
local entrepreneurs, Indigenous, etc.)?
• What are the  economic volumes in terms of dollar amounts and number 
of businesses?
• How much does the North contribute to the national economy? 
• How is the economy/business prioritized in the national strategies? 
• Are economic activities are regulated and, if so, how?
• Is there recognition of the Arctic Economic Council? 
• Are sanctions and counter sanctions addressed and, if so, how? 
• Trade, imports and exports.
Tourism • How are safety and security defined in this context?
• How tourism is defined (e.g., industry, adventure, etc.)?
• Who runs tourism and how is it organized?
• Who are the actors (e.g., foreign businesses, Indigenous businesses, etc.)?
• What is the scale of the industry (e.g., income generation), the volumes, 
and where do the tourists come from? 
• In the cruise industry, what are the different types of activities  
(e.g., transit vs. destination)?
• What is the impact of tourism with regard to the environment, society, 
economy, culture?
• How much does the state support tourism?
• What are the possible side-effects (e.g., cultural conflicts) and how can 
they be mitigated (e.g., sustainability)?
Infrastructure • Transportation.
• Icebreakers.
• Telecommunications and ICT.
• Housing.
• Innovation and technology.
• Shipping.
• Energy.
Science and Education • What does the science infrastructure consist of (e.g., research stations)?
• What are the purpose and aims of science (e.g., having a presence in  
the region)?
• What are the drivers of science (e.g., pollution, climate change, etc)?
• How big are the research budgets?
• How is knowledge defined, what is the role of traditional knowledge,  
and what is the interplay between the two?
• What is access to higher education like; is there an education gap?
• What are the educational attainment levels?
• Is the UArctic mentioned, what importance is it given, and how are 
courses used?
• Are there options for distance learning?
• How are innovation and technology addressed?
• Is space factored into these agendas?
Implementation • Does the strategy have a list of action items for implementation?
• Is there a budget for the different action items, or for the  
strategy overall?
• Is there follow-up?
• Is there evaluation?
Table 5. Indicator and Sub-indicator Overview 
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The Climate Change indicator identifies the consequences, both 
positive and negative, of climate change on the region and how 
this may impact Arctic societies. Similarly, has climate change 
affected maritime safety, become a security factor, decreased 
access to freshwater, or created environmental refugees? It also 
asks what states are doing with regard to mitigation vis-a-vis ad-
aptation, what climate agreement or frameworks are identified, 
and if and how the scientific community is being heard.
Due to Environmental Protection, Pollution and Climate 
Change often being written about together as single issues in 
the documents, these three indicators will be later interpreted 
and discussed as a new meta-indicator. 
The Security indicator addresses how security is defined, and 
what the security priorities are. It also covers if/and how sover-
eignty is mentioned and defined by individual states. It includes 
reflection on borders and how they are addressed/defined. The 
indicator tries to capture if (high) stability and stability-build-
ing are mentioned. One of the key phenomena is how the inter-
pretation of security has changed over time. It also enquires into 
the role of armed forces and what the listed military capabilities 
are, including the Coast Guard (in some states, this is outside 
the armed forces). The indicator also reflects measures being 
taken to increase security. Last, but not least, the indicator fo-
cuses on whether NATO is mentioned, and if so, what kind of 
role it plays in the Arctic.
The Safety and Search and Rescue (SAR) indicator captures 
the different safety and emergency issues identified in the doc-
uments. It also seeks to better understand what safety and SAR 
agreements are in place (or being developed), what capabilities 
the different states have, whether integration of safety at a re-
gional level is desired, and what authorities are involved in safe-
ty and SAR, including the role of the Coast Guard. 
The Economy indicator seeks to identify various economic ac-
tivities in/concerning the Arctic region of the different states, 
including resources, energy, transport and trade. It also looks at 
what contributions these activities make to the national econ-
omy. Other important economic considerations are the role of 
sustainable development, how economic activities are regulated, 
if sanctions are addressed, what economic actors are involved, 
and additionally, how economic activities are prioritized in the 
documents. 
The Tourism indicator seeks to understand how tourism is de-
fined in the Arctic context, who the tourism actors are and how 
tourism is organized. The indicator looks at whether and how 
safety is defined in connection to tourism. It aims to capture the 
scale and volume of the industry. In the cruise industry, it looks at 
the different types of activities and how much the state supports 
tourism. Importantly, the indicator targets the impact of tourism 
with regard to the environment, society, economy, and culture—
what the possible side-effects are and how to mitigate them.
The Infrastructure indicator identifies the different agendas 
and priorities for infrastructure projects, including transporta-
tion, icebreakers, telecommunications and ICT, housing, ship-
ping, and projects to ensure northerners have access to energy. 
This indicator also addresses how innovation and technology 
can help facilitate investments in these areas. 
The Science and Education indicator addresses science and 
education separately. For science, the indicator asks what sort 
of science infrastructure exists or is being planned (this in-
cludes material goods and networks); what drives science and 
what purpose or aims science serves; how research budgets are 
addressed; how knowledge and traditional/Indigenous knowl-
edge are discussed and if there is any interplay between the 
two; the role of innovation and technology; and if space (not 
satellites) is a factor in any of these agendas. The education 
component looks for discussion on access to education, edu-
cation attainment levels, and if the UArctic and other forms of 
distance learning are mentioned. 
The Implementation indicator identifies the different ways the 
state plans to implement the strategy. This includes the pro-
vision of recommendations or action items, if any additional 
budgets have been created, if and how the state will follow-up 
on the strategy, and if there will be any evaluation processes. 
Coding and Analysis 
As there were many documents and indicators/sub-indicators 
and to be analyzed, a spreadsheet was used to organize the 
information by document type and country. For the Arctic 
states, for example, each country had its own tab with a ta-
ble to capture the coding by document and by (sub)indicator. 
Figure 4 provides an example of a blank sheet for the human 
dimension indicator that provides for the capture of quantita-
tive and qualitative data. 
Figure 4. Coding the Documents 
Each document was carefully read and the quotes were added 
to the middle column and any thoughts or comments about the 
quote were added to the comments column. The quotes were 
then used to compare and contrast how the different documents 
address these issues. 
The column on the left for ‘scale’ was used to calculate how many 
quotes were assigned to each sub-indicator and totaled for each 
indicator. Figure 5 provides an example of the scaling for Cana-
da’s 2009 and Finland’s 2013 national strategies. The table shows 
both the total number of quotes for each indicator and docu-
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ment, and the percentage of total quotes for each indicator. The 
percentage is the important number. For example, if only the to-
tal number of quotes is compared, it shows that Finland speaks 
to the Human Dimension more than Canada does. However, as 
the Finnish document is longer than the Canadian one and has 
more than twice as many quotes coded for the entire document, 
this kind of comparison is misleading. For a more accurate com-
parison, the focus must be on the percentage of quotes. 
Figure 5. Scaling the Indicators 
Note: the percentages have been rounded to the closest full number and may 
thus not equal exactly 100  % due to a rounding error. 
The total number of quotes paints a different picture. Figure 
5 shows that Canada actually spoke more to the Human Di-
mension (15 %) than Finland (9 %). As all the documents are 
different lengths, turning the actual number of quotes into 
percentages allows for a comparison between documents to 
more accurately identify which document prioritizes certain 
indicators and which do not. These numbers are then turned 
into bar graphs for easy comparison to show trends over time 
and across countries. 
Four factors must be taken into consideration for this analysis:
First, one quote may be used in more than one indicator based 
on its complexity. For example, the current strategy for Finland 
states that 
“For the Arctic regions, it is vital to be able to reconcile tradi-
tional livelihoods with the modern industrial-scale exploita-
tion of natural resources. For example, reindeer husbandry 
is of deep-seated social and cultural significance while at the 
same being a source of income. For the Saami, reindeer hus-
bandry is an integral part of the Indigenous language and 
culture. Yet the area designated for reindeer husbandry in 
Finland is much larger than the Saami region extending far 
south of the Polar Circle.” (Finland. Prime Minister’s Office 
[PMO]. 2013, 12)
This quote was assigned to both the Human Dimension and the 
Economy indicators and would thus be counted twice. 
Second, not all (sub)indicators can provide quantitative analy-
sis. In particular, the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic 
and the Implementation indicators are qualitative in nature, as 
they seek to capture only descriptive information. They provide 
better insights into how the region is defined and understood, 
what actors are involved, and the different approaches to strate-
gy implementation. 
Third, many of the strategies provide recommendations or 
‘action items’ throughout the document, such as that of the 
Kingdom of Denmark. These quotes were usually applied to 
the most relevant (sub)indicator(s) and are accounted for in the 
scaling and indicator percentage for each document. In con-
trast, both the Finnish and Russian documents provide more 
detailed implementation plans at the end of their strategies than 
most of the other documents. As such, this information was ac-
counted for in the comments section of the coding sheets and 
not counted in the total number of quotes; it will, however, be 
discussed in the Implementation indicator discussion. 
Fourth, note that although we use U.S. spelling, in quotes the 
spelling reflects the original text. 
As a conclusion, several rounds of coding, description, com-
parative study (points of similarity and difference), analysis 
and conclusion have been carried out for each category of Arc-
tic States’ policies and strategies, Permanent Participants’ pol-
icies and declarations, Arctic Council Observer States’ policies 
and strategies, and Arctic Council chairmanship programs 
and ministerial declarations. Based on these analyses there is 
a synthesis and conclusion, as well as a list of main themes 
in each category that can be seen and interpreted as new and 
emerging trends of the state of Arctic governance and geopol-
itics at the early 21st century. 
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Part I:
Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States
The Arctic States are a group of countries located in the entire 
North, at the top of the world. Territories extending into the Arc-
tic Circle, as the main criteria of an Arctic country, are Canada, 
Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands), Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, 
and the United States of America (due to Alaska). 
These states first came together at the government ministerial 
level in June 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland, to sign the Declaration 
on the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi Dec-
laration 1991) and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strate-
gy (AEPS 1991). Since then, they have cooperated intensively to 
protect the Arctic environment and to promote the sustainable 
development of the northernmost regions of the globe. In 1996, 
supported by Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations, they es-
tablished the Arctic Council, a high-level forum for multilateral 
cooperation. The eight Arctic states, also called the Arctic Eight 
(A8), are the members of the Arctic Council. 
The first section of this scientific report deals with the national 
strategies and policies of the eight Arctic states with respect to 
Arctic regions and Arctic affairs. It provides a holistic, multi-di-
mensional understanding of current Arctic governance and geo-
politics through an examination of the national strategies and 
policies of the Arctic States. Each state is analyzed individually—
indicator by indicator—so that a comparison can be made be-
tween states’ strategies and policies and how these have evolved 
over time. This detailed comparison helps to elicit the similarities 
and differences between the current governance priorities of the 
policies of the Arctic Council members, first indicator by indica-
tor, and then more generally. 
As all eight Arctic states are primary actors in the Arctic Coun-
cil and ultimately responsible for governing the Arctic region, a 
deep holistic analysis of this kind is essential information for de-
cision-makers, politicians, civil servants, businesses, researchers, 
and planners, not just in the Arctic community but worldwide. 
The analysis also contains data that will be of value and interest 
from the scientific and educational point of view—both ‘lessons 
learned’ to date and lessons to-be-learned for the future.
Canada
The Arctic has long been a political priority for the Canadian gov-
ernment (see, e.g., Cavell and Kropf 2016). In 2000, the Cana-
dian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
(DFAIT) published a paper entitled The Northern Dimension 
of Canada’s Foreign Policy which was to form an important 
part of Canada’s foreign policy (Canada DFAIT 2000). The 
guiding principles of the paper are: “to enhance the security 
and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and Ab-
original peoples [and] to assert and ensure the preservation of 
Canada’s sovereignty in the North”, as well as “to establish the 
circumpolar Region as a vibrant geopolitical entity” and “pro-
mote the human security of northerners and the sustainable 
development of the Arctic (2000, 2). 
However, it was not until 2009 that Canada created its first 
Arctic strategy, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our 
Heritage, Our Future (Canada INAC 2009) with 41 pages, in-
cluding maps and pictures. In 2010, the government released 
its Arctic foreign policy with the Statement on Canada’s Arctic 
Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s 
Northern Strategy Abroad, with 27 pages, no maps or pictures 
(Canada DFAIT 2010). 
Canada began the process of updating its Arctic policy in 2017 
with the release of the Arctic Policy Framework Discussion 
Guide (Canada INAC 2017). This was used as the foundation 
for a series of public consultations that would inform the final 
policy document. The new policy is also partly influenced by 
A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model (Simon 2017). Canada’s 
Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, with eight empha-
sized pillars, was finally published in September 2019. Thus, 
due to this late release, the 2009 and 2010 documents remain 
the most current and are the focus of the analysis here. 
The 2009 northern strategy (here the 2009 Strategy) is taken as 
Canada’s primary strategy document as the 2010 foreign policy 
(here the 2010 Policy) was designed to facilitate the same over-
arching themes, but at an international level (2010, 4). The four 
priority areas outlined in the 2009 Strategy are: “exercising our 
Arctic sovereignty; promoting social and economic development; 
protecting the North’s environmental heritage; and improving 
and devolving northern governance” (2009, paragraph 3 of Min-
ister’s message). 
The 2010 Policy repeats these priorities, but also states that “in 
pursuing each of these pillars in our Arctic foreign policy, Can-
ada is committed to exercising the full extent of its sovereignty, 
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sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the region” (2010, 4), sug-
gesting that sovereignty is of the utmost importance in the glob-
al arena. The 2010 Policy lists 13 additional items to facilitate 
Canada’s Arctic agenda that cover issues including improving 
the living conditions and wellbeing of northerners, trade, ad-
dressing environmental concerns, and a range of international 
governance issues. 
Comparison by Indicator 
The quotes in the (Re)defining and (Re)mapping the Arctic in-
dicator provide insights into how the federal government under-
stands the region and what it means for Canada’s identity. For 
example, the 2009 Strategy states that “Canada’s far North is a 
fundamental part of Canada – it is part of our heritage, our fu-
ture and our identity as a country” (2009, 1). Similarly, the 2010 
Policy states that “the Arctic is fundamental to Canada’s national 
identity...The Arctic is embedded in Canadian history and cul-
ture, and in the Canadian soul. The Arctic also represents tre-
mendous potential for Canada’s future” (2010, 3). This suggests 
that the government sees the Arctic as more than just an eco-
nomic opportunity and that there should be interest in all aspects 
of Canada’s northern governance actions (see Berger 1977). 
Both documents use the terms the “Arctic” and the “North” to 
describe the region in question. This is not surprising as the 
2009 Strategy primarily focuses on the three northern territories 
(Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut) which generally start 
at or around the 60th parallel. At the same time, the document 
acknowledges that many of Canada’s northern Indigenous com-
munities are not found solely within political boundaries and 
that “the lands just south of the Arctic Circle have been occu-
pied for thousands of years by the ancestors of today’s Aboriginal 
peoples including the Dene, Gwich’in, Cree and Métis. Today, 
these Aboriginal peoples live in communities across the Yukon, 
southern Northwest Territories and northern border regions of 
mainland provinces” (2009, 3). The map on page 29 of the 2009 
Strategy also shows that Inuit land treaties have been settled not 
only in Nunavut and parts of the Northwest Territories, but in 
northern Quebec and Labrador. This broader definition of the 
North is found in the 2010 Policy as the region “is home to many 
Canadians, including Indigenous peoples, across the Yukon, the 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut, and the northern parts of 
many Canadian provinces” (2010, 3). There are also other “small 
populations” (2009, 31). The documents recognize other de-
scriptors that are used for the region, such as “fragile and unique 
ecosystems” (2009, 24), “unique and fragile environment” and 
“magnificent ecological region” (2010, 16, 17). 
Both documents identify some of the federal ministries with re-
gional responsibilities, but there are differences as to how these 
are discussed in the two documents. The 2009 (northern) Strat-
egy identifies Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
and Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada as minis-
tries with Arctic responsibilities, along with the Canadian Coast 
Guard, and Defence Research, and Development Canada as oth-
er government bodies playing a role (2009). In contrast, the 2010 
(Arctic foreign) Policy states: “we are taking a whole-of-gov-
ernment approach. Since taking office, the Prime Minister and 
many federal cabinet ministers have made regular visits to Can-
ada’s North” (2010, 6), although there is no mention of which 
cabinet ministers were included in these visits. 
To understand where the Canadian government places its prior-
ities, Figure 6 provides a comparison of how many quotes were 
assigned to the different indicators, given as a percentage of the 
total number of coded quotes in the document (rounded to the 
nearest whole number), thus allowing for the identification of 
priority changes. 
Figure 6. Comparing Canada’s 2009 Strategy and 2010 Policy Documents
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator, which accounts for 15 % of 
the total coded quotes of the 2009 Strategy and 6 % for the 2010 
Policy (see Figure 6), has three major themes: i) demographic 
issues and their effect on regional equality; ii) Indigenous culture 
and language; and iii) health and wellbeing. 
With respect to Canada’s northern demographics and equality 
in the 2009 Strategy, the federal government states that there is 
“a small population in communities spread over vast distances” 
(2009, 31). There are also inequalities between the Canadian ter-
ritories and between northern and southern Canada, generally. 
These three northern territories “have very different economies 
and very different infrastructure requirements, which is why 
Canada is working closely with the territorial governments to 
develop tailored responses to local needs” (2009, 17). It is also 
why the federal government is “continuing to ensure North-
erners in remote and isolated communities have access to good 
quality, nutritious food at affordable prices” (2009, 22). In con-
trast, efforts to address regional inequalities of the North, com-
pared to southern Canada, is not addressed in the 2010 Policy. 
The 2009 Strategy discusses the land claim process for Indige-
nous peoples, stating that “Aboriginal people throughout the 
North have negotiated land claim and self-government agree-
ments that give them the institutions and resources to achieve 
greater self-sufficiency” (2009, 4). 
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The 2009 Strategy further comments on the economic opportu-
nity provided to Indigenous peoples through northern mining 
projects, especially through the Mackenzie Gas Project (2009, 
15). The document also acknowledges that “Canada works close-
ly with the six international Indigenous peoples groups that have 
Permanent Participant status—three of which have strong roots 
in Canada: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council 
International, and the Inuit Circumpolar Council” (2009, 13). 
The 2009 Strategy also addresses Indigenous culture and recog-
nizes that “long before the arrival of Europeans, Inuit hunters, 
fishers and their families moved with the seasons and developed 
a unique culture and way of life deeply rooted in the vast land” 
(2009, 3). Furthermore, “the Government of Canada recognizes 
its responsibility to preserve and protect Canada’s rich Northern 
heritage in the face of new challenges and opportunities” (2009, 
39). Interesting here is the lack of discussion around current 
cultural practices and how the Indigenous peoples themselves 
would identify. 
Similarly, the 2010 Policy acknowledges the importance of land 
claims as “Indigenous communities are developing made-in-the-
North policies and strategies to address their unique economic 
and social challenges and opportunities” (2010, 22). Unlike the 
2009 Strategy, the 2010 Policy recognizes the importance of lan-
guage preservation, stating that “the 2008 Arctic Indigenous Lan-
guages Symposium ... underlined the importance of preserving 
and strengthening Indigenous languages” (2010, 15). However, 
the majority of quotes about Indigenous peoples in the 2010 Pol-
icy were in the context of supporting the Permanent Participants 
at the Arctic Council. For example, the document states that 
“Canada will encourage other Arctic Council states to support the 
participation of their Permanent Participant organizations” and 
that “as interest by non-Arctic players in the work of the Coun-
cil grows, Canada will work to ensure that the central role of the 
Permanent Participants is not diminished or diluted” (2010, 23). 
The 2010 Policy differs from the 2009 Strategy in its discussions 
around protecting the human rights of Indigenous peoples. For 
instance, the document recognizes that “Canada is taking steps to 
endorse the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples in a manner fully consistent with Canada’s Con-
stitution and laws” (2010, 22), although Canada did not actually 
support the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples (UNDRIP) until 2016 (INAC 2017). The Policy 
stresses, too, that “Canada is committed to defend sealing on the 
international stage” (DFAIT 2010, 16), presumably in response 
to the 2009 European Seal ban that came into effect in 2010 (see: 
European Commission 2019). 
Health and wellbeing are addressed in both documents. In the 
2009 Strategy, it relates to increased access to health services, es-
pecially through funding transfers from the federal government 
to the territories. For example, the Strategy states that “in order 
to support healthy and vibrant communities, the Government of 
Canada today provides annual unconditional funding of almost 
$2.5 billion … which enables territorial governments to fund pro-
grams and services such as hospitals, schools, infrastructure and 
social services” (2009, 19). The federal government will also “con-
tinue to work collaboratively with Northerners on issues such as 
health promotion and disease prevention” (2009, 22). Wellbeing 
is also linked to economic prosperity; among other things, “the 
territories also receive federal support for targeted initiatives to 
address specific challenges in the North, such as for labour mar-
ket training” (2009, 21). 
The 2010 Policy also discusses the health and wellbeing of north-
erners and on the role the Arctic Council. For instance, it stress-
es that “Canada has been supporting efforts through the Arctic 
Council and International Polar Year research to better under-
stand the issues and then develop and implement appropriate 
health policies” (2010, 15). Additionally, “Canada will continue 
to encourage a greater understanding of the human dimension 
of the Arctic to improve the lives of Northerners, particularly 
through the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council’s Arctic Human 
Development Report was the first comprehensive assessment of 
human well-being to address the entire Arctic region” (2010, 15). 
The quotes in the Governance indicator, which accounts for 14 % 
of the total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 19 % for the 
2010 Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30) capture the existing governance 
structures mentioned in the two documents, including forms of 
self-governance/determination, approaches to natural resources 
and blue economy governance, and the extent to which interna-
tional and transboundary cooperation is depicted. 
The 2009 Strategy mentions a few of the existing governance 
structures. These include the Ilulissat Declaration, the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), and the Arctic Council (2009, 36, 37). Consid-
ering Canada’s role in the formation of the Arctic Council, the 
Strategy states, not surprisingly, that “the Arctic Council is an im-
portant venue for deepening global understanding of the Arctic 
and has played a key role in developing a common agenda among 
Arctic states” (2009, 35). This statement indicates Canada’s con-
tinued support for the Council and the value it has for the region. 
The 2010 Policy mentions a few more governance structures 
than the northern Strategy does, in particular, the Arctic 
Council, the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians for the 
Arctic Region, Northern Forum, IMO, United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, UNCLOS, United Na-
tions Convention on Biological Diversity, the Inuit Circumpo-
lar Council, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, the Copenhagen Accord, the Migratory Bird Treaty 
(Canada–USA), and the Agreement on the Conservation of 
Polar Bears (Canada–Kingdom of Denmark–Norway–Russia–
USA) (2010, 8, 13, 18, 19, 20, 26).
The Policy also recognizes that in general, more and more ac-
tors are becoming involved in the region, which will inevitably 
have governance implications. At the same time, it makes clear: 
“While many of these players could have a contribution to make 
in the development of the North, Canada does not accept the 
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premise that the Arctic requires a fundamentally new gover-
nance structure or legal framework. Nor does Canada accept 
that the Arctic nation states are unable to appropriately manage 
the North as it undergoes fundamental change” (2010, 9). 
Both documents have a section on ‘Improving and Devolving 
Northern Governance’ which addresses the increasing role of 
the territorial governments and Canada’s northern Indigenous 
peoples. The 2009 Strategy explains that “in the past few decades 
Northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for 
many aspects of their region’s affairs. One exception was con-
trol over lands and resource management, which stayed with the 
federal government” (2009, 28). This means that the Northern 
governments do not yet have full economic self-responsibility. 
Similarly, the 2010 Policy states: “In recent decades, Canada’s 
Northern governments have taken on greater responsibility for 
many aspects of their region’s affairs” (2010, 22). 
On Indigenous self-governance, both documents make similar 
statements that land-claim settlements are leading to increased 
autonomy for Indigenous peoples (2009, 30; 2010, 22). In the 
context of land claims, the 2009 Strategy notes that progress has 
been made in all three Territories as “11 of 14 Yukon First Na-
tions have signed self-government agreements. A majority of the 
Northwest Territories is covered by Comprehensive Land Claims 
Agreements that give Aboriginal people the authority to manage 
their lands and resources. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
led to the creation of Canada’s newest territory in 1999, provid-
ing Inuit of the Eastern Arctic with some 350,000 square kilome-
ters in the largest Aboriginal land claim settlement in Canadian 
history” (2009, 30); it also mentions land claims in Labrador. 
Natural resources and the blue economy are also subject to dif-
ferent governance practices. However, neither document pays 
much attention to this. The 2009 Strategy only addresses the 
continental shelf extension and notes that “research will ensure 
Canada secures recognition for the maximum extent of its conti-
nental shelf in both the Arctic and Atlantic oceans when we pres-
ent our submission to the United Nations Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf by the end of 2013” (2009, 12). 
The 2010 Policy also mentions the continental shelf and possible 
changes to oil extraction processes. In particular, it states that “in 
the wake of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, we are furthering 
our collaboration at the appropriate levels, in particular with the 
United States and Denmark/Greenland in light of our common 
interests in the Arctic marine environment” (2010, 13). Gover-
nance of resources, therefore, includes control over access and 
environmental protection. 
Both documents address the need for public consultations and/
or environmental impact assessments in some capacity. The 2009 
Strategy states that “any company now undertaking industrial 
development in the North must undertake a rigorous environ-
mental assessment, establish a site closure and remediation plan, 
meet standards for operational and environmental safety and 
satisfy the requirements of various laws including the Fisheries 
Act” (2009, 28). It also covers the creation of a new northern re-
search station, stating that “extensive consultations at home and 
abroad about the role of this new research facility and a feasi-
bility study is being conducted to determine where the facility 
will be located” (2009, 25–6). However, for the latter, the extent 
to which the public (i.e., local residents) was engaged is unclear. 
The 2010 Policy makes clear the importance of consultations 
and states that “the Government of Canada is moving forward 
in consultation with communities and industry to add nearly 
70,000 square kilometres to Canada’s Northern protected ar-
eas network…The creation of the majority of existing national 
parks in the Arctic proceeded hand-in-hand with land claim 
negotiations, as are all of the new national park proposals” 
(2010, 19). The document mentions increasing consultations 
with the Arctic Council’s Permanent Participants, stating that 
“Canada will engage with Northerners on Canada’s Arctic for-
eign policy. Through the Canadian Arctic Council Advisory 
Committee, Northern governments and Indigenous Perma-
nent Participant organizations in Canada will have the oppor-
tunity to actively participate in shaping Canadian policy on 
Arctic issues” (2010, 23). Additionally, the document states that 
“Canada will engage with Northern governments and Perma-
nent Participants to ensure that the Arctic Council continues 
to respond to the region’s challenges and opportunities, thus 
furthering our national interests” (2010, 25). The decision to 
use the word ‘engage’ in the first and third quotes is interesting 
because engagement is suggestive of greater collaboration (see: 
Open University n.d.). 
Despite the previous statements on consultation and increased 
self-governance capabilities for Indigenous peoples, these 
groups may not have much influence in federal-level decision 
making. For example, the 2009 Strategy and the 2010 Policy 
state that science is integral to the decision-making process 
(2009, 24; 2010, 22). That said, the 2010 Policy notes that “Can-
ada recognizes and values the important role Northern govern-
ments, Arctic Indigenous organizations at the Arctic Council ... 
and other Northerners have played, and will continue to play, 
in shaping Canada’s international actions” (2010, 23). Thus, at 
a domestic level, at least, the territories and Indigenous peoples 
are gaining the ability to make their own decisions. However, 
they may not be able to affect federal-level decisions. Thus, co-
operation is a key factor in Arctic regional governance. 
The International Cooperation and International Treaties in-
dicator, accounting for 11 % of the total coded quotes of the 
2009 Strategy and 13 % of the 2010 Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30), 
demonstrates the importance of international cooperation to 
Canada’s Arctic efforts. Indeed, both documents state that “co-
operation, diplomacy and international law have always been 
Canada’s preferred approach in the Arctic” (2009, 33; 2010, 
27). The 2009 Strategy also remarks that “Canada has a strong 
history of working with our northern neighbours to promote 
Canadian interests internationally and advance our role as a re-
sponsible Arctic nation” (2009, 33), yet at the same time, “as in-
ternational interest in the region increases, effective Canadian 
stewardship of our sovereign territory and the active promo-
tion of Canadian interests internationally are more important 
than ever before” (2009, 33). Similarly, the 2010 Policy states 
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that “the rapid pace of change and growing importance of the 
Arctic requires that we enhance our capacity to deliver on Can-
ada’s priorities on the international scene” (2010, 24). 
International cooperation is important as Canada has “common 
interests with, and things to learn from, our other Arctic neigh-
bours – Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland” (2009, 
35). For example, the 2009 Strategy discusses different forms of 
cooperation with Arctic partners, such as Canada’s “long histo-
ry of effective collaboration and cooperation with the United 
States and [will] continue to deepen cooperation on emerging 
Arctic issues, bilaterally and through the Arctic Council and 
other multilateral institutions” (2009, 34). The document also 
mentions cooperation with “non-Arctic states on Arctic issues. 
For example, Canada and the United Kingdom signed a Mem-
orandum of Understanding for cooperation in polar research” 
(2009, 35). Cooperation, therefore, is an important aspect of 
regional governance. 
The 2010 foreign Policy addresses cooperation with the USA in 
military terms through Operation Nanook and through polar 
bear management (2010, 7, 18). This relationship is important 
because “the United States is our premier partner in the Arctic 
and our goal is a more strategic engagement on Arctic issues” 
(2010, 24). Canada is also working on the continental shelf de-
limitation (2010, 9) and the government is “working with Rus-
sia, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland to advance 
shared interests such as trade and transportation, environmen-
tal protection, natural resource development, the role of Indig-
enous peoples, oceans management, climate change adaptation 
and scientific cooperation” (2010, 24). Canada also wishes to 
work with its Arctic Council partners on organizational change. 
In particular, “Canada will work with other member states to 
address the structural needs of the organization. While the cur-
rent informal nature of the body has served Canada well for 
many years, the growing demands on the organization may re-
quire changes to make it more robust” (2010, 26). 
As discussed in the governance indicator, a number of interna-
tional agreements or forums in which Canada partakes, such 
as the Arctic Council, the IMO, UNCLOS, the UNFCCC, are 
identified by both documents. Canada also works bilaterally 
with other states on shared issues; for example, the 2009 Strat-
egy stresses that “the United States remains an exceptionally 
valuable partner in the Arctic. Canada and the United States 
share a number of common interests in the Arctic, such as en-
vironmental stewardship, sustainable resource development 
and safety and security” (2009, 34). There is also cooperation 
at the government ministry level between countries, with the 
Strategy specifically mentioning that “the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding signed between the Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada and the Russian Ministry 
of Regional Development to examine cooperative projects with 
Indigenous Peoples is a recent example of Canada’s bilateral ef-
forts with Russia, which include new trading relationships and 
transportation routes, environmental protection and Indige-
nous issues” (2009, 34). 
The 2010 Policy also recognizes the importance of cooperation 
at all levels. For example, the document states that “facing the 
challenges and seizing the opportunities that we face often re-
quire finding ways to work with others: through bilateral rela-
tions with our neighbours in the Arctic, through regional mech-
anisms like the Arctic Council, and through other multilateral 
institutions” (2010, 24).
The Environment Protection indicator, which accounts for 9 % 
of the total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 10 % of the 
2010 Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30). Both documents position the 
Arctic environment and ecosystems as “fragile” and “unique” 
(2009, 24; 2010, 16), while the 2010 Policy also recognizes the 
Arctic as a “magnificent and unspoiled region” (2010, 17). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that both documents make statements 
about prioritizing environmental protection. For example, the 
2009 Strategy states that “Canada is committed to helping en-
sure these ecosystems are safeguarded for future generations” 
and that “the Northern tradition of respect for the land and 
the environment is paramount and the principles of responsi-
ble and sustainable development anchor all decision-making 
and action” (2009, 24, 1). The 2010 foreign Policy stresses that 
“Canada is committed to planning and managing Arctic Ocean 
and land-based activities domestically and internationally in an 
integrated and comprehensive manner that balances conser-
vation, sustainable use and economic development—ensuring 
benefits for users and the ecosystem as a whole” (2010, 17). 
Furthermore, the 2009 northern Strategy states that “the Gov-
ernment of Canada is introducing measures to ensure that reg-
ulatory systems across the North protect the environment in a 
predictable, effective and efficient manner” (2009, 15). The 2010 
foreign Policy stresses Canada’s history of maritime pollution 
prevention through the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(AWPPA). Its continuing protection efforts through meteoro-
logical monitoring “will also enhance environmental protection 
of the Arctic marine environment, support Northern residents 
in their maritime activities, and provide necessary services for 
coastal and marine-based resource development” (2010, 14). 
Additionally, the 2010 Policy recognizes that “as part of its man-
date, the Arctic Council has been playing a lead role in identify-
ing large marine ecosystems in the region and determining best 
practices in ocean management” (2010, 18). 
The commitment to environmental protection is further ad-
dressed through recognition of Canada’s efforts to develop pro-
tected areas. The 2009 Strategy states that “Canada is taking a 
comprehensive approach to the protection of environmentally 
sensitive lands and waters in our North, ensuring conservation 
is keeping pace with development” (2009, 26); this includes col-
laboration with Indigenous peoples in Labrador and Nunavut. 
Furthermore, “in the Northwest Territories, Canada has pro-
tected large areas from development through land withdrawals 
and work is underway on a number of conservation initiatives” 
(2009, 26). The 2010 Policy recognizes Canada’s domestic com-
mitment to environmental protection, stating that “Canada has 
made significant progress in establishing protected areas in over 
10 percent of our North, designating 80 protected areas cover-
ing nearly 400,000 square kilometres” (2010, 19). 
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Initiatives also include animal protection. The 2010 Policy states 
that “Canada has signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the United States for the conservation and management of 
a shared polar bear population. In addition, Canada has devel-
oped agreements with other Arctic nations to jointly manage po-
lar bears, narwhals and belugas” (2010, 18). Further to this, “the 
Council has recently developed the Arctic Species Trend Index, 
which provides decision-makers with a valuable tool for manag-
ing and predicting Arctic wildlife populations. Tracking the in-
dex over time will facilitate this prediction of trends and identify 
species and groups experiencing rapid change” (2010, 18). 
The topic of biodiversity is a point of difference between the two 
documents as the term ‘biodiversity’ is not mentioned in the 
2009 Strategy. The 2010 foreign Policy mentions that “Canada 
will continue to lead the Arctic Council’s Circumpolar Biodi-
versity Monitoring Program to ensure information on pop-
ulation status and trends for Arctic species and ecosystems is 
available and supports initiatives such as the Arctic Biodiversity 
Assessment” (2010, 18). 
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 5 % for the 2010 Policy (see 
Figure 6, p. 30), provides insights into Canada’s understanding 
of, and approach to, pollution in the Arctic, although to different 
extents. For example, the 2009 Strategy identifies mining waste 
and pathogens (2009, 28, 11), whereas the 2010 Policy recogniz-
es oil, black carbon, carbon dioxide, mercury, greenhouse gas-
es, and Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) (2010, 12, 20, 21). 
Both documents recognize that some pollutants come from out-
side of the region. The 2009 Strategy recognizes the harm from 
ballast waters and has “also amended the Arctic Waters Pollu-
tion Prevention Act to extend the application of the Act from 
100 to 200 nautical miles from our coastline...This amendment 
gives us pollution prevention enforcement jurisdiction over an 
additional half million square kilometres of our waters” (2009, 
11-12). The 2010 Policy further recognizes that the “persistent 
organic pollutants and mercury, released far from the Arctic, 
have had serious impacts on Arctic peoples” (2010, 21).
Both documents name the extractive resources industry as the 
source of pollutants. The 2009 Strategy states that “new devel-
opment projects may increase the number of pollutants, threat-
ening Northerners’ health and the region’s fragile ecosystems” 
and that “just as important are our clean-up programs to repair 
or remediate environmental damage at abandoned mines and 
other contaminated sites throughout the North” (2009, 8, 28). 
The 2010 Policy notes that mercury and greenhouse gases often 
come “from coal-fired electricity generating plants” (2010, 21), 
but does not say if these are from Canada, other Arctic states, or 
from other parts of the world. 
Both documents also identify different approaches to address-
ing Arctic pollution. For instance, the 2009 Strategy identifies 
various different domestic efforts, such as the previously men-
tioned AWPPA extension, “Canada’s Health of the Oceans ini-
tiative, which strengthens the ability of Northern communities 
to respond to pollution and fosters greater cooperation with do-
mestic and global partners” (2009, 27), and also the introduc-
tion of “new ballast water control regulations that will reduce 
the risk of vessels releasing harmful aquatic species and patho-
gens into our waters” (2009, 11). 
The 2010 Policy recognizes both domestic and international ef-
forts, such as the role of AWPPA (2010, 16), and by “providing 
$3.5 billion over 15 years to address federal contaminated sites, 
with the majority of resources directed to contaminated sites in 
the North” (2010, 21) as part of the Federal Contaminated Sites 
Action Plan. Canada’s international effort is “committed to con-
tributing to the global effort by taking action to reduce Canada’s 
greenhouse gas emissions through sustained action domesti-
cally to build a low-carbon economy, working with our North 
American partners and constructively engaging with our inter-
national partners to negotiate a fair, environmentally effective 
and comprehensive international climate change regime based 
on the Copenhagen Accord” (2010, 20). The 2010 Policy also 
states that “Canada and the Inuit Circumpolar Council played 
an important role in the negotiation of the Stockholm Conven-
tion on Persistent Organic Pollutants” (2010, 21).
For the Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 4 % of 
the total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 8 % of the 2010 
foreign Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30), both documents recognize 
different consequences of climate change. For example, the 2009 
Strategy states that “the North also has fragile and unique eco-
systems which are being negatively affected by the impacts of 
climate change” (2009, 24) and that “the effects of environmen-
tal change, such as shifting and melting permafrost, melting gla-
ciers, shrinking ocean ice and a shortened season for ice roads 
could have significant cultural and economic consequences for 
the people of the North, and the entire nation” (2009, 8). Sim-
ilarly, the 2010 Policy states that “the resulting rapid reduction 
in Arctic multi-year sea ice has had, and will continue to have, 
profound consequences for the peoples and communities of the 
Arctic. What happens in the Arctic will have global repercus-
sions on accelerating climate change elsewhere” (2010, 16). Fur-
thermore, “decreasing ice cover will lead, over time, to increases 
in shipping, tourism and economic development in the Arctic 
Ocean region.” Therefore, “Canada and other Arctic Ocean 
coastal states must begin to prepare for greater traffic into the re-
gion, with sometimes negative effects” (2010, 9, 10). To this end, 
the 2010 Policy also acknowledges the security consequences of 
an increasingly accessible Arctic Ocean. 
Both documents recognize the need for mitigation vis-à-vis 
adaptation. In the 2009 Strategy, the federal government states 
that this may include learning from other Arctic states, and 
also come through scientific contributions like the 2007–2008 
International Polar Year (IPY) that “focused on two key priori-
ties: climate change impacts and adaptation; and the health and 
well-being of Northerners and Northern communities” (2009, 
24). The 2010 Policy also recognizes some of Canada’s domestic 
efforts, for example: “over 60 projects have been funded in the 
Canadian Arctic that have led to the development of commu-
nity and regional adaptation plans, increasing knowledge and 
understanding of climate-related implications and the develop-
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ment of strong partnerships essential to implementing adapta-
tion action” (2010, 21). 
More formal international climate action structures are also 
mentioned in both documents. For instance, the 2009 Strategy 
states that “there are other forums that provide opportunities 
to raise Arctic issues. These include … discussions and nego-
tiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change” (2009, 36). The 2010 Policy recognizes the Co-
penhagen Accord, the “Arctic Council’s recent Vulnerability and 
Adaptation to Climate Change in the Arctic project,” and “the 
International Maritime Organization and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change [which are work-
ing] towards global solutions to issues like polar shipping regu-
lations and climate change” (2010, 20, 26). 
Finally, both documents recognize the importance of scientific 
research. Indeed, the 2009 Strategy, as mentioned above, ac-
knowledges the contributions made to climate change knowl-
edge through the IPY, and the 2010 Policy also mentions that 
“the Arctic Council’s 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
heightened global awareness of the problem” (2010, 19). 
The Security indicator accounts for 10 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 12 % of the 2010 Policy (see 
Figure 6, p. 30) and shows that security is very much linked to 
sovereignty; both documents define regional security in this 
context. Indeed, rather than having a section on security, the 
first section of both documents is about sovereignty. To this 
end, the 2009 Strategy states that “we patrol and protect our 
territory through enhanced presence on the land, in the sea 
and over the skies of the Arctic” (2009, 2); similarly, the 2010 
Policy states that “since 2007, the Government of Canada has 
announced a number of initiatives to enhance our capacity in 
the North and to exercise, responsibly, our sovereignty there” 
(2010, 6). To facilitate these efforts, “Canadian Forces will also 
take advantage of new technologies to enhance surveillance 
capacity of our territory and its approaches” (2010, 7).
As sovereignty is a significant component of both documents, 
they further explain how sovereignty is practiced. The 2009 
Strategy explains that “Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is long-
standing, well-established and based on historic title, founded 
in part on the presence of Inuit and other Aboriginal peoples 
since time immemorial,” and that “in a dynamic and chang-
ing Arctic, exercising our sovereignty includes maintaining a 
strong presence in the North, enhancing our stewardship of 
the region, defining our domain and advancing our knowledge 
of the region” (2009, 9). The document also recognizes the 
boundary disputes over Hans Island and the Lincoln Sea with 
Denmark and in the Beaufort Sea with the USA, but explains 
that “all of these disagreements are well-managed and pose no 
sovereignty or defence challenges for Canada In fact, they have 
had no impact on Canada’s ability to work collaboratively and 
cooperatively with the United States, Denmark or other Arc-
tic neighbours on issues of real significance and importance” 
(2009, 13). The 2010 Policy also stresses the importance of 
sovereignty, stating that “protecting national sovereignty, and 
the integrity of our borders, is the first and foremost respon-
sibility of a national government. We are resolved to protect 
Canadian sovereignty throughout our Arctic” (2010, 10). It 
is therefore not surprising that the document makes similar 
statements about Canada’s sovereignty: “Canada’s sovereignty 
is the foundation for realizing the full potential of Canada’s 
North, including its human dimension. This foundation is 
solid: Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is long-standing, well es-
tablished and based on historic title, founded in part on the 
presence of Inuit and other Indigenous peoples since time 
immemorial” (2010, 5). Furthermore, “Canada exercises its 
sovereignty daily through good governance and responsible 
stewardship. It does so through the broad range of actions it 
undertakes as a government—whether related to social and 
economic development, Arctic science and research, environ-
mental protection, the operations of the Canadian Forces or 
the activities of the Canadian Coast Guard and Royal Canadi-
an Mounted Police” (2010, 6). The document also recognizes 
the well managed boundary disputes and reasserts Canada’s 
sovereignty, stating that “through our Arctic foreign policy, 
we are also sending a clear message: Canada is in control of 
its Arctic lands and waters and takes its stewardship role and 
responsibilities seriously” (2010, 27).
There is a heavy focus on the role of the Canadian Forces for 
security and sovereignty purposes. For example, the 2009 
Strategy states that “the Canadian Forces, in cooperation 
with other federal departments and agencies, will continue 
to undertake operations in the North, such as Operation NA-
NOOK, conduct regular patrols for surveillance and security 
purposes, monitor and control Northern airspace as part of 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 
and maintain the signals intelligence receiving facility at CFS 
Alert, the most northern permanently inhabited settlement in 
the world” (2009, 11). Additionally, “significant investments 
in new capabilities on the land include establishing an Army 
Training Centre in Resolute Bay on the shore of the Northwest 
Passage, and expanding and modernizing the Canadian rang-
ers – a reserve Force responsible for providing military pres-
ence and surveillance and for assisting with search and rescue 
in remote, isolated and coastal communities of Northern Can-
ada” (2009, 10).
Correspondingly, the 2010 Policy states that “the Canada First 
Defence Strategy will give the Canadian Forces the tools it 
needs to provide an increased presence in the Arctic” and that 
“Canada and the United States work together to better moni-
tor and control Northern airspace through our cooperation in 
NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defence Command” 
(2010, 6, 7). Investments are also being made to increase op-
erational capabilities, for example, “Canada is investing in 
new patrol ships that will be capable of sustained operation 
in first-year ice to ensure we can closely monitor our waters 
as they gradually open up and maritime activity increases” 
(2010, 6) Furthermore, “Canada is also expanding the size and 
capabilities of the Canadian Rangers, drawn primarily from 
Indigenous communities, that provide a military presence and 
Canada’s “eyes and ears” in remote parts of Canada” and that 
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“a new Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre is also being 
established in Resolute Bay” (2010, 7). 
Unlike the 2009 Strategy, the 2010 Policy also addresses the role 
of NATO and expresses that “the increasing accessibility of the 
Arctic has led to a widespread perception that the region could 
become a source of conflict. This has led to heightened interest 
in the Arctic in a number of international organizations includ-
ing NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe” (2010, 26). It also recognizes that “Canada does not 
anticipate any military challenges in the Arctic and believes that 
the region is well managed through existing institutions, partic-
ularly the Arctic Council” (2010, 26). 
Finally, the foreign Policy is different from the northern Strate-
gy, in recognizing the civilian aspect of security: as mentioned 
earlier, the government “will need to consider how to respond 
to issues such as emergency response and search and rescue ca-
pability and potential future problems related to emergencies 
(including environmental), organized crime, and illegal traf-
ficking in drugs and people” (2010, 10). 
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the 2009 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 Policy (see 
Figure 6, p. 30). The documents show that safety is understood 
in different ways: they mention search and rescue (SAR), as well 
as maritime and environmental safety, including marine pollu-
tion. For SAR, the 2009 Strategy states that “Canada is working 
with Northern communities and governments to ensure that its 
search and rescue capacity meets the needs of an ever-changing 
North” (2009, 12). In the 2010 Policy, SAR is mentioned in the 
context of other safety issues, which will be addressed shortly. 
Regarding the environment, the 2009 Strategy explains that “any 
company now undertaking industrial development in the North 
must undertake a rigorous environmental assessment, establish 
a site closure and remediation plan, meet standards for oper-
ational and environmental safety and satisfy the requirements 
of various laws including the Fisheries Act” (2009, 28). It also 
explains that “Transport Canada continues to assess Canada’s 
capacity to respond to marine pollution in the Arctic and ensure 
that the Canadian Coast Guard and communities have the nec-
essary equipment and response systems in place for emergen-
cies” (2009, 27–28). The 2010 Policy mentions environmental 
safety in a longer list of other safety issues (also addressed short-
ly) and that “in August 2009, the application of the AWPPA was 
extended from 100 to 200 nautical miles. In addition, regula-
tions requiring vessels to report when entering and operating 
within Canadian Arctic waters have been finalized and are in 
force from July 1, 2010” (2010, 16). 
Shipping safety is mentioned in the 2009 Strategy: “we are es-
tablishing new regulations under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 
to require all vessels entering Canadian Arctic waters to report 
to the Canadian Coast Guard’s NORDREG reporting system” 
(2009, 12) which applies to vessels over 300 tonnes or “carrying 
as cargo a pollutant or dangerous good” (Northern Canada Ves-
sel Traffic Services Zone Regulations 2010, s.3(c)) through Cana-
da’s northern waters. Yet “although the Northwest Passage is not 
expected to become a safe or reliable transportation route in the 
near future, reduced ice coverage and longer periods of naviga-
bility may result in an increased number of ships undertaking 
destination travel for tourism, natural resource exploration or 
development” (2009, 5).
The 2010 Policy, as part of the Canadian sovereignty agenda ad-
dresses “Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as 
public safety” (2010, 9), which can have a broad meaning. The 
document also mentions that increased maritime activity can 
lead to “an increase in environmental threats, search and res-
cue incidents, civil emergencies and potential illegal activities” 
(2010, 3) which the government will need to take into consider-
ation, as mentioned earlier (2010, 10). 
Only the 2010 Policy addresses formalized safety and search-
and-rescue agreements. In particular, it states that “the current 
negotiation of a regional search and rescue agreement (the first 
ever attempt at a binding instrument under the rubric of the 
Arctic Council) will serve as an important test case and will in-
form the scope for future policy endeavours” (2010, 25). It also 
mentions that “the 2009 Arctic Council Ministerial supported 
the development of a mandatory polar code for shipping by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO)” (2010, 13). 
Within the circumpolar context, Canada appears to support co-
operation and collaboration rather than large-scale integrated 
safety efforts. Indeed, the Policy states that “regional solutions, 
supported by robust domestic legislation in Arctic states, will be 
critical. Canada will work in concert with other Arctic nations 
through the Arctic Council ... with the five Arctic Ocean coastal 
states on issues of particular relevance to the Arctic Ocean, and 
bilaterally with key Arctic partners” (2010, 10). 
Finally, both documents address Canada’s safety capabilities. 
The 2009 Strategy, for example, comments that “Transport Can-
ada continues to assess Canada’s capacity to respond to marine 
pollution in the Arctic and ensure that the Canadian Coast 
Guard and communities have the necessary equipment and 
response systems in place for emergencies” (2009, 27–28). As 
for the 2010 Policy, “within the IMO context, Canada has also 
assumed responsibility for providing navigational warning and 
meteorological services to facilitate the safe management of ma-
rine traffic in two Arctic areas …. Through this initiative, Can-
ada will deliver services that help mitigate the risks associated 
with increased Arctic shipping” (2010, 14). Furthermore, “Can-
ada is playing a key role in the creation of the Arctic Regional 
Hydrographic Commission to improve our understanding of 
the features of the Arctic Ocean and its coastal areas [which is] 
essential knowledge for safe navigation” (2010, 14). There is no 
mention of the Coast Guard in the context of safety.
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 11 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2009 Strategy and 11 % of the 2010 Policy 
(see Figure 6, p. 30) provides insights into Canada’s northern 
economy. That said, the 2009 Strategy gives more information 
on the breadth of economic activities in the region. Notably, it 
states that “from the development of world-class diamond mines 
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and massive oil and gas reserves, to the growth of commercial 
fisheries, to a thriving tourism industry that attracts visitors 
from around the globe, the enormous economic potential of the 
North is being unlocked” and that “the North is also home to 
vast renewable and cultural resources that make important con-
tributions to its economy and society” (2009, 5, 16). Canada is 
also working on developing “new trading relationships” (2009, 
34) with Russia. The 2010 Policy mentions, too, the importance 
of “resource development,” including the “responsible and sus-
tainable development of oil and gas in the North” (2010, 3, 12). 
Other economic activities also include “living marine resources 
such as fisheries,” ecotourism, and other “trade and investment 
opportunities” (2010, 11, 14, 19). 
Resources and energy are important economic activities in both 
documents. The 2009 Strategy notes that “mining activities and 
major projects such as the Mackenzie Gas Project are the cor-
nerstones of sustained economic activity in the North” (2009, 
15). Moreover, the Strategy recognizes that “the full extent of 
the natural resources potential in the Arctic is still unknown” 
and because of this, “the Government of Canada announced a 
significant new geo-mapping effort – Geo-Mapping for ener-
gy and Minerals – that will combine the latest technology and 
geoscientific analysis methods to build our understanding of 
the geology of Canada’s North” (2009, 16). The 2010 Strategy 
also discusses the importance of resource development, but also 
notes that “Canadians and our Arctic neighbours can be assured 
that no drilling will occur in Canada’s deep Beaufort Sea until at 
least 2014,” apparently for “safety and environmental” (2010, 12) 
reasons. The 2010 Policy also recognizes that the “seal hunt is an 
economic mainstay for numerous rural communities in many 
parts of Canada including the North” (2010, 16). 
Despite this diverse range of economic activities, there is little 
discussion about how the regional economy contributes to Can-
ada’s national economy. Only the 2009 Strategy broaches this 
topic and only in relation to the mining and gas industries. In 
particular, the document explains that “diamond mining in the 
North is now a $2-billion-per-year industry, which is about half 
of the economy of the Northwest Territories. The Mackenzie 
Gas Project – now estimated at over $16 billion – will provide 
direct benefits to Aboriginal communities through the develop-
ment of a new model for Aboriginal participation” (2009, 15). 
Both documents address the importance of sustainable devel-
opment. The northern Strategy wishes “the vast potential of the 
Arctic region is realized in a sustainable way” and states that in 
terms of offshore oil and gas activities, “Canada will continue to 
support the sustainable development of these strategic resource 
endowments” (2009, 14, 16). Similarly, the 2010 Policy mentions 
the importance of sustainable development of natural resources, 
but focuses on how sustainable development will be practiced. 
Indeed, it states that “ensuring sustainable development in the 
Arctic involves working closely with territorial governments 
and Northerners and through key international institutions like 
the Arctic Council to build self-sufficient, vibrant and healthy 
communities” (2010, 12), and that “Canada will play a leader-
ship role in the Arctic Council’s Arctic Ocean Review which 
aims to strengthen and ensure the sustainable development of 
the Arctic Ocean” (2010, 18). 
The 2009 Strategy prioritizes Canada’s interests in two differ-
ent ways. First, the Canadian government seeks to support in-
creased employment opportunities through skills development 
and has “invested in a range of supportive programs … to create 
sustainable employment for Aboriginal people across Canada in 
major industries like mining, oil and gas, and hydro-electricity” 
(2009, 19–21). Second, “a new economic development agency 
for the North is being established. A core activity for this agency 
will be delivering the renewed Strategic Investments in North-
ern Economic Development Program” (2009, 14). At the inter-
national level, the 2010 Policy seeks to improve northern Cana-
da’s trade opportunities, stating, for example, that “Canada will 
enhance its trading ties with other Arctic states. We have recent-
ly implemented a free trade agreement with the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) member countries, which include 
Iceland and Norway” (2010, 14). Additionally, “these Northern 
commercial relationships can serve as conduits to expand trade 
and investment relations not only with our immediate Northern 
neighbours but also with other states such as those in central 
Asia and Eastern Europe” (2010, 15). 
Economic activities are not without regulation. The 2009 Strat-
egy recognizes existing regulatory practices and mechanisms 
like “the Northern Regulatory Improvement Initiative” that is 
“helping resolve the complex approval process for development 
projects, to ensure new projects can get up and running quickly 
and efficiently” (2009, 15). The Strategy also notes efforts made 
to “improve the regulatory environment under which develop-
ment can occur” (2009, 14). The 2010 Policy recognizes Cana-
da’s regulatory efforts. It stresses the need for regulation in the 
energy and resources sectors (2010, 12). One such example is 
that “the Arctic Council, with significant Canadian participa-
tion, updated its Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in 
2009. These guidelines recommend standards, technical and en-
vironmental best practices, management policy and regulatory 
controls for Arctic offshore oil and gas operations” (2010, 13). 
The Tourism indicator accounts for 1 % of the total coded quotes 
for the 2009 Strategy and 1 % of the 2010 Policy (see Figure 6, 
p. 30). Although much of this discussion is generally mentioned 
in passing, the 2009 Strategy notes that there may be some safe-
ty concerns associated with cruise ship tourism. It also appears 
that its primary focus is on supporting Indigenous cultural 
tourism. For instance, “the Government is providing increased 
funding for tourism promotion and for local and community 
cultural and heritage institutions” (2009, 16). 
The 2010 foreign Policy states that “Canada will continue to es-
tablish terrestrial and marine protected areas in the Arctic and 
monitor biodiversity and ecological integrity” and that “they 
also provide significant ecotourism opportunities to an expand-
ing market of Canadians and international visitors” (2010, 19). 
In this case, the focus is on ecotourism, whereas the 2009 Strat-
egy mentions cruise ship and cultural tourism. 
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The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 8 % of the total 
coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 4 % of the 2010 Poli-
cy (see Figure 6, p. 30). The two documents identify multiple 
areas where improvements could be made. For transportation 
infrastructure, the 2009 Strategy stresses that “modern public 
infrastructure will contribute to a stronger economy, a cleaner 
environment, and safer and more prosperous communities in 
the North. Northerners also need crucial infrastructure to move 
their goods to markets in southern Canada and other parts of 
the globe” (2009, 17), especially with the “opening of new trans-
portation routes” (2009, 5) in the Arctic. The economic aspect 
of transportation infrastructure is further emphasized in a joint 
report by Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Government of 
Nunavut, according to which, “a commercial fisheries harbour 
is being constructed in Pangnirtung to help support the devel-
opment of fisheries in the territory” (2009, 17). The 2010 Policy 
also recognizes the economic aspect of transportation in that 
“improving air and sea transportation links to create enhanced 
access across the polar region can help encourage Arctic trade 
and investment opportunities. For instance, investments have 
been made to upgrade the Port of Churchill, Manitoba” (2010, 
15). Both documents also mention that investments are being 
made for a “berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik” (2009, 
10; see also: 2010, 6), although this appears to be primarily in 
the context of security. 
Shipping is another aspect of transportation infrastructure. The 
2009 Strategy recognizes this, stating, for instance, that “re-
duced ice coverage and longer periods of navigability may result 
in an increased number of ships undertaking destination travel 
for tourism, natural resource exploration or development” and 
that structures like “the International Maritime Organization 
[are] where guidelines are being developed for Ships Operat-
ing in Arctic Ice-covered Waters” (2009, 5, 36). The 2010 Policy 
recognizes the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment which notes 
“that Arctic shipping has increased significantly, with more voy-
ages to the Arctic and between Arctic destinations” (2010, 13).
Despite the Northwest Passage becoming more accessible and 
shipping needs growing, icebreakers are only mentioned once 
in each document in the sections on security and sovereignty. 
The 2009 Strategy states that “in the sea we are establishing a 
deep-water berthing and fueling facility in Nanisivik and pro-
curing a new polar icebreaker, the largest and most powerful 
icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast Guard fleet” (2009, 10). 
The 2010 Policy similarly states that “within the next decade, 
Canada will launch a new polar icebreaker. This will be the larg-
est and most powerful icebreaker ever in the Canadian Coast 
Guard fleet” (2010, 6).
Technology, specifically telecommunications and ICT services, 
are only addressed in the 2009 Strategy, which states: “Territo-
rial governments and communities in the North are benefitting 
greatly from investments in a range of infrastructure programs, 
including Broadband, recreational and Green infrastructure, to 
lay a much-needed foundation for a growing North” (2009, 17). 
It appears that broadband is connected to economic growth. 
Housing infrastructure is also addressed in both documents. 
The 2009 Strategy stresses the importance of housing, stating 
that “working with the territories, significant investments have 
been made to improve the quality and availability of housing, 
particularly in Nunavut where core housing need is the great-
est. These investments are helping reduce the problems of over-
crowding and substandard housing and improving the health 
and well-being of Northerners” (2009, 19). The document also 
connects housing (and other forms of infrastructure) to eco-
nomic opportunities (2009, 5). The 2010 Policy links housing 
to the economy, stating that “the Government of Canada has 
made a wide variety of recent commitments related to promot-
ing Northern social and economic development. These include 
measures to … address infrastructure needs including housing” 
(2010, 11). 
Neither document addresses energy infrastructure. 
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 8 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2009 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 
Policy (see Figure 6, p. 30). Quotes can generally be divided by 
topic—science or education. For science, in the 2009 Strategy, 
the drivers behind Canada’s scientific activity appear to be re-
lated to health and climate. For instance, the Strategy states that 
“increasing our understanding of and attention to Arctic hu-
man health issues continues to be an emerging priority among 
circumpolar countries. Canada has been at the forefront of 
these issues and will continue to support domestic and interna-
tional research on Arctic human health” (2009, 22). Further, as 
part of the IPY 2007–2008, Canada financed “the largest-ever 
global program dedicated to polar research... focused on two 
key priorities: climate change impacts and adaptation; and the 
health and well-being of Northerners and Northern communi-
ties” (2009, 24). The 2010 Policy also mentions health research 
through the IPY (2010, 15), as well as research about the envi-
ronment and animal management. In terms of the environment 
and animals, the document states that “these activities fall under 
international conventions and agreements such as the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, the Migratory Bird 
Treaty, and the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. 
International collaborative Arctic science and research is a fun-
damental aspect of the Government of Canada’s participation in 
such agreements” (2010, 18).
Research can also have different purposes. The 2009 Strategy 
suggests that science can contribute to Canada’s regional sover-
eignty through “scientific studies to determine the full extent of 
our continental shelf as defined under UNCLOS. This research 
will ensure Canada secures recognition for the maximum extent 
of its continental shelf in both the Arctic and Atlantic oceans” 
(2009, 12). Additionally, the document suggests that science 
is useful for building relationships. Indeed, “through scientific 
collaboration with organizations such as the United Nations, 
World Meteorological Organization, International Maritime 
Organization and the Arctic Council, Canada is building the 
baseline of knowledge on the Arctic environment and forming 
important partnerships around the world” (2009, 25). In the 
2010 Policy, research is used to support economic decisions. 
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For example, “Canada will take steps to create the appropriate 
international conditions for sustainable development” as Arctic 
research and traditional knowledge have indicated (2010, 12). 
Moreover, the document recognizes the importance of research 
to the Arctic Council, stating that “Canada will also work to en-
sure that the research activities of the Council continue to focus 
on key emerging issues to ensure that solid knowledge under-
pins the policy work of the Council” (2010, 25). Regarding policy 
development, both documents make almost identical statements 
about the outcomes of science being used for “the knowledge 
necessary for sound policy and decision-making” (2009, 24; see 
also: 2010, 22). 
To support this work, both documents briefly mention devel-
oping science infrastructure. In particular, the future of the Ca-
nadian High Arctic Research Station (Government of Canada 
Polar Knowledge Canada, n.d.). The 2009 Strategy states: “our 
vision is that the new Arctic research station will serve as the 
hub for scientific activity in our vast and diverse Arctic,” and 
therefore “there have been extensive consultations at home and 
abroad about the role of this new research facility” (2009, 26). 
The 2010 Policy states that “to ensure that Canada remains a 
global leader in Arctic science, the Government of Canada has 
committed to establishing a new world-class research station in 
the High Arctic that will serve Canada and the world” (2010, 22). 
Both documents also mention other kinds of support for science 
infrastructure. For example, the 2009 Strategy mentions “an Arc-
tic Research Infrastructure Fund” (2009, 26) and the 2010 Policy 
notes that “Canada has also invested in upgrading existing re-
search facilities in over 30 sites across the Arctic” (2010, 22). The 
2010 Policy further mentions that “Arctic-specific organizations 
such as the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians for the Arc-
tic Region, the Northern Forum, and the University of the Arctic 
are important partners on a variety of issues” (2010, 26), which 
suggests that networks are a form of infrastructure as well. 
Technology and innovation are an important aspect of science. 
For example, the 2009 Strategy states that geo-mapping will be 
used “to build our understanding of the geology of Canada’s 
North, including in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago” (2009, 
16). The 2010 Policy notes that “autonomous underwater vehi-
cles—with Canadian technology at their heart—are being used 
to collect some of the needed data” (2010, 8).
As mentioned above, science, and thus knowledge, is used to 
help inform decision-making. Both documents recognize the 
importance of Indigenous knowledge in scientific practice. The 
2009 Strategy remarks that “Aboriginal people and Northerners 
played a significant role in the planning, coordination and im-
plementation of IPY and were actively engaged in science and 
research activities” (2009, 24–25). The 2010 Policy recognizes 
the importance of Indigenous knowledge, stating that “Canada’s 
commitment to Northern economic and social development 
includes a deep respect for Indigenous traditional knowledge, 
work and cultural activities” and “recognizes the importance 
of Indigenous knowledge and the need to use it in tandem with 
Western science in our efforts to better understand polar bears 
and their habitat” (2010, 16, 18). 
In terms of education, only the 2009 Strategy addresses issues of 
educational attainment and access to education. With regard to 
attainment, the document does not discuss actual educational 
attainment levels. Rather, the focus is on ensuring people have 
skills training. 
As for access to education, in a statement about federal transfers 
to the territories, education is mentioned in passing. Indeed, 
the 2009 Strategy states that “The Canada Social Transfer pro-
vides territories with substantial on-going and growing funding 
in support of social programs, including programs for children 
and for post-secondary education” (2009, 21). The 2009 Strate-
gy also mentions that the government is “establishing graduate 
student fellowships on Canada’s role in the circumpolar World” 
(2009, 22), although there is no mention of whether the fellow-
ships are specifically for students from Northern Canada. 
It is not surprising that the 2010 Policy does not address educa-
tion, as this is a national and provincial/territorial issue. How-
ever, it does recognize the University of the Arctic, in passing, in 
the context of cooperation and partnership (2010, 26).
Both documents cover much ground, as seen. However, where 
they are lacking is in Implementation. The 2009 Strategy states 
only that “Canada’s Northern Strategy sets out a clear action 
plan for the North that will leave a lasting legacy and enrich 
the lives of Canadians for generations to come” (2009, 39); yet, 
it does not provide any clear recommendations or courses of 
action the government should take to achieve its goals. There 
is, however, a statement about funding tourism (2009, 16), but 
it is not clear if this funding is a result of a tourism strategy or 
other funding priorities. Similarly, the 2010 foreign Policy says 
nothing about how such measures would be implemented. 
To sum up
Figure 6 at the beginning of the Canada section also shows that 
between the 2009 Strategy and 2010 Policy, discussions declined 
on the Human Dimension and increased on Governance. The 
figure also shows that in 2009 Human Dimension and Gover-
nance were the two most coded indicators, with International 
Cooperation tying with Economy in third place. In 2010 the 
three most-coded indicators are Governance, International Co-
operation, and Economy. This is not very surprising, as the 2009 
Strategy focuses on domestic issues and the 2010 Policy on in-
ternational issues. Figure 6 also shows that the three least-coded 
indicators in 2009 are Tourism, Pollution and Climate Change, 
and Safety and SAR, while the three least-coded in 2010 are 
Tourism, Infrastructure, and Pollution. 
The documents show that the North is a vital part of Canada’s 
national identity and that asserting and maintaining sovereign-
ty is a key aspect of Canada’s domestic strategy and foreign 
policy. Yet, the most important theme for the Canadian gov-
ernment in the 2009 Strategy is the Human Dimension which 
includes discussions on Indigenous peoples. This is followed 
by the Governance, International Cooperation and Economy, 
and then Security indicators (see Appendix). This suggests that 
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the priorities of “social and economic governance” are met, al-
though the economic governance discussion primarily focuses 
on the extractive resource industry. The priority of “improving 
and devolving governance” is reflected in the Governance indi-
cator through quotes on land-claim agreements. It is, howev-
er, difficult to determine the extent to which devolving north-
ern governance is addressed in relation to other governance 
topics because the indicator is not analyzed by percentages of 
sub-indicators. Nevertheless, the strategy provides a detailed 
description of the then current state of Canada’s land claims and 
explains how land-claim settlement can provide greater auton-
omy for Canada’s northern Indigenous peoples. “Exercising our 
Arctic sovereignty” is another priority of the 2009 Strategy and 
is addressed in the Security indicator. Although analysis is not 
performed at the sub-indicator level and security is not one of 
the top three quoted indicators, it does come a close fourth in 
the 2009 Strategy and, as previously mentioned, sovereignty is 
clearly of utmost importance to the Canadian government. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Tourism is the least discussed 
theme in the 2009 Strategy, followed by Climate Change and 
Pollution. As the Economy indicator focuses on resource de-
velopment, it is not surprising that tourism is overlooked. It is 
surprising, however, that climate change and pollution are not 
discussed in more detail, especially as Canada demonstrated 
environmental leadership through the creation of the Arctic 
Council. That said, the Strategy does demonstrate a commit-
ment to protected areas, and when the percentage of quotes in 
the Environmental Protection, Pollution, and Climate Change 
indicators are added together, and quoted as a percentage of the 
total coded quotes, they come higher than the Human Dimen-
sion, indicating that the priority of “protecting the North’s en-
vironmental heritage” is also met. There could, however, have 
been more discussion around pollution and Canada’s plans for 
climate change action. 
There are also some connections between the different indicators 
and themes. For example, positive consequences of economic 
activity, such as improved wellbeing and infrastructure devel-
opment are found in the Human Dimension and Infrastructure 
indicators, while negative consequences of increased activity are 
addressed in the Pollution, Climate Change, and Safety Indica-
tors. There are also less obvious connections, such as between 
the Human Dimension and Security and between Indigenous 
peoples and Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. The Science and Ed-
ucation indicator is also connected to the Governance and In-
ternational Cooperation indicators, as research is used to build 
relationships and inform governance activities. These examples 
show that different issues are not found in a vacuum and that 
decisions made in one area can affect those in another. 
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant sim-
ilarities and the three most relevant differences are discussed. 
The two similarities are now discussed. First, neither the Strat-
egy nor the Policy provides information on how they will be 
implemented. Although the 2009 Strategy claims that the doc-
ument itself “sets out a clear action plan for the North” (2009, 
39) and mentions a handful of government ministries, it speaks 
more to issues rather than providing concrete steps to achieve 
Canada’s regional priorities. As mentioned, the 2010 Policy does 
not mention anything in this regard. This could be problematic 
for Canada when it comes to actually achieving its priorities and 
goals, especially as there is no clear plan for action or account-
ability. Second, both documents address a variety of infrastruc-
ture needs, but fail to address an energy infrastructure to better 
serve northern residents. This is a surprising omission because 
at the time these two documents were produced, regional ener-
gy infrastructure needed improvement due to the high cost of 
energy for northerners (National Energy Board 2011; Canadian 
Polar Commission 2014).
There are also some differences between the two documents, 
and three examples are discussed here. First, the 2010 Policy 
makes clear statements about Canada’s support for UNDRIP at 
the international level, but UNDRIP was omitted from the 2009 
Strategy. Although the government of Canada did not formally 
support UNDRIP at the time, support for it at the international 
level sends different and conflicting messages as to how Canada 
supports Indigenous peoples domestically and internationally. 
Moreover, the omission of UNDRIP from the 2009 Strategy 
could have implications for the Strategy’s support for self-gov-
ernance and the recognition of land-claims agreements. Second, 
the 2010 Policy’s approach to understanding pollution is more 
comprehensive than the 2009 Strategy. While the 2009 Strategy 
mentions only two pollutants, the 2010 Strategy names six. It is 
almost as if the 2009 Strategy is removing Canada from the larg-
er circumpolar context in this regard. Third, both documents 
recognize similar safety issues and the importance of maritime 
regulation, albeit in different ways. Although both documents 
recognize the importance of AWPPA, the 2009 Strategy focus-
es on the role of the domestic NORDREG program while the 
2010 Policy discusses the IMO and the development of the Polar 
Code. While this division is not surprising based on the domes-
tic/international nature of the two documents, it reads as if the 
domestic and international safety structures are each in a vacu-
um and do not affect one another.
Overall, the two documents provide a consistent message with 
regard to Canada’s Arctic priorities, even if the priorities are to 
be achieved differently at the domestic and international lev-
els. However, as previously mentioned, Canada only recently 
released their new policy. Further analysis is required to deter-
mine if, and how much, priorities have changed over the past 
decade, as the “new Arctic Policy Framework [was] co-devel-
oped in collaboration with Indigenous, territorial and provincial 
partners” (Canada Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern 
Affairs n.d.), or, when the new priorities will be implemented.
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Finland
Finland has produced two national Arctic strategies. The first, 
Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, was released in 2010 
(Finland PMO 2010). This was followed in 2013 by Finland’s 
Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 (Finland PMO 2013). Both 
documents are considered in this analysis. In addition, the 
Government of Finland in an evening session in October 2012 
adopted the main principles for Arctic policy—Finland as an 
active, responsible, and capable Arctic actor that respects sus-
tainable development principles and the environment, and is 
active in international Arctic cooperation (Finnish Government 
Tiedote 309/2012—10.10.2012 17.51; also, Finland PMO 2013, 
17). In 2017 Finland also released the Action Plan for the Update 
of the Arctic Strategy that “concerns the following priorities in 
the update: Finland’s foreign and EU policy in the Arctic re-
gion, Finland’s arctic expertise, sustainable tourism, and infra-
structure solutions that support these” (Finland PMO 2017, 1). 
However, because this is not yet a strategy, it is not considered 
in this analysis. 
The two strategies take somewhat different approaches to 
Finland’s Arctic. According to the 2010 Strategy (94 pages in-
cluding maps and appendices), “the purpose of the policy con-
cerning the Arctic Region is to focus mainly on the aspect of 
external relations in Arctic policy” (2010, 57). The 2013 Strat-
egy (67 pages including maps and appendices) is based on the 
above-mentioned main principles of Arctic policy, and differs 
in that “the new strategy is more wide-reaching in scope” (2013, 
7). As its priorities, the 2013 Strategy “examines the possibilities 
for bolstering Finland’s position regarding the Arctic region; 
the creation of new business opportunities; the Arctic environ-
ment and the region’s security and stability; the position of the 
northern parts of Finland; international cooperation; and Arc-
tic expertise in the widest sense of the term” (2013, 7). This lines 
up with the “four pillars of policy outlined by the Government: 
an Arctic country, Arctic expertise, Sustainable development and 
environmental considerations and International cooperation” 
and “it is Finland’s objective to promote growth and actions to 
enhance competitiveness in the region with due regard to its 
environment” (2013, 7). 
The table of contents for the 2010 document identifies the fol-
lowing section headings: “Fragile Arctic Nature, Economic 
Activities and Know-How, Transport and Infrastructure, In-
digenous Peoples, Arctic Policy Tools, The EU and the Arctic 
Region” (2010, 5)—these can also be taken to be Finnish priori-
ties. The 2013 Strategy identifies the following section headings: 
“Vision for Arctic Finland, Finland’s Arctic population, Educa-
tion and research, Finland’s business operations in the Arctic, 
Environment and stability, International cooperation in the 
Arctic” (2013, 5). As the 2013 Strategy is an update of the 2010 
Strategy, similar issues are addressed in both documents. The 
analysis that follows, however, will uncover the similarities and 
differences between the two policy documents. 
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator ex-
plains how Finland defines the region in both documents. The 
2013 Strategy, for example, recognizes that “there are various 
definitions of the Arctic region in different contexts, one be-
ing the area demarcated by the Polar Circle. Although Finland 
has no coastline on the Arctic Ocean, much of its territory lies 
north of the Polar Circle” (2013, 8). Here, both the Arctic Ocean 
and the Polar Circle could be used to define the region. Yet, the 
Strategy also states that the Arctic can have multiple definitions 
depending on the context, although smaller communities are 
typically found in Lapland (2013, 10, 19). Despite recognizing 
Lapland as the most northerly part of Finland, the Strategy’s 
flexibility in defining the region allows Finland to suggest that 
the entirety of Finland is situated in the Arctic. The document 
states that “Finland as a whole is a truly Arctic country: after 
all, one third of all the people living north of the 60th paral-
lel are Finns” (2013, 17). This is a shift from the 2010 Strategy 
which differentiates between the Arctic and subarctic parts of 
the country (2010, 8). In other words, the 2013 Strategy consid-
ers almost all of Finland to be in the Arctic, whereas the 2010 
Strategy narrows this down to the northern parts of the country.
In terms of how the region is referred to, both strategies use 
the “Arctic” and “circumpolar” when discussing more than one 
Arctic state (2013, 14; 2010, 9). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy 
uses the “North,” and the “High North” that originally used in 
the Norwegian terminology (2013, 19, 35). The 2013 Strategy 
goes on to describe that the Arctic environment as “one of the 
purest and best preserved in the world” and “highly exception-
al” (2013, 8, 38). It also remarks that the region is “strategic” for 
economic and security reasons (2013, 8, 19, 38). Similarly, the 
2010 Strategy recognizes the strategic and economic value of the 
region, but considers the Arctic environment to be “fragile”, a 
term that is not used in the newer strategy (2010, 8, 9). 
A similar process was used to prepare each strategy: “the stra-
tegic review was prepared by a working group appointed by the 
Prime Minister ... in which all the ministries were represented” 
(2013, 17; see also: 2010, 7). In addition to a representative from 
the Prime Minister’s Office, the working group comprised rep-
resentation from the eleven ministries, among others 
• Ministry for Foreign Affairs
• Ministry of Justice
• Ministry of the Interior
• Ministry of Defence 
• Ministry of Finance 
• Ministry of Education and Culture
• Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
• Ministry of Transport and Communications 
• Ministry of Employment and the Economy
• Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (2013 only)
• Ministry of the Environment (2013, 64; 2010, 58)
Certainly, Finland appears to take a whole-of-government ap-
proach to the Arctic. One interesting observation is that that 
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Ministry of Defence was not initially a part of the 2010 work-
ing group and the representative was appointed after work had 
commenced (2013, 64; 2010, 58, 64). 
To begin the analysis of the Finnish strategies, Figure 7 provides 
a comparison of how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Figure 7. Comparing Finland’s 2010 Strategy and 2013 Strategy
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 9 % for the 2010 
Strategy (see Figure 7), provides information on the Arctic and 
the Finnish Arctic’s demography. The numbers they provide are 
similar. The 2013 Strategy recognizes that “the Arctic region has 
a total population of about four million, of whom Indigenous 
peoples account for about 10 per cent. There are over 180,000 
inhabitants in Finnish Lapland,” approximately 5,000 of whom 
are Saami (2013, 20, 23; 2010, 30). Considering the regional 
demographics, it is not surprising that both strategies address 
topics related to Indigenous peoples. 
Protecting Indigenous culture and language is raised in both 
strategies. For instance, both documents stress that preserv-
ing the different Saami languages and cultures through revival 
programs is considered a right (2013, 22; 2010, 32). The 2013 
Strategy further states that efforts to do this are under way as 
“in March 2012, a working group appointed by the Ministry 
of Education and Culture submitted its proposals for a pro-
gramme to revive the Saami language. Efforts to reinforce the 
Saami language and culture need to be continued” (2013, 23). 
The 2010 Strategy also addresses preservation efforts across 
borders. For instance, “for 16 years, Finland’s Kindred Peoples 
Programme has supported the languages and cultures of Fin-
no-Ugric peoples living in Russia by means of grassroots-level 
cooperation projects in the target areas” (2010, 31). Both docu-
ments also recognize the need to protect Indigenous culture and 
livelihoods in the wake of a growing natural resources industry 
(2013, 12; 2010 15). The 2010 Strategy notes that this balance is, 
in part, assisted through the EU. In particular, “the Treaty on the 
accession of Finland to the European Union includes Protocol 
3 on the Sámi, which recognises the obligations and commit-
ments of Finland and Sweden with regard to the Sámi under 
national and international law and considers that traditional 
Sámi culture and livelihood are dependent on natural sources of 
livelihood, such as reindeer husbandry in the traditional areas 
of Sámi settlement” (2010, 32–33).
Both documents address different ways in which the Indigenous 
rights are protected. For instance, the strategies comment that 
the Finnish Constitution guarantees the rights of the Saami, and 
mention the desire to ratify ILO Convention No. 169 (2013, 11, 
22, 23; 2010, 8, 32). Furthermore, both strategies recognize that 
government consultation with Indigenous peoples is of the ut-
most importance, and they support Indigenous involvement in 
the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic council (2013, 
22; 2010, 30, 31). International cooperation is important for 
rights protection, and the 2010 Strategy remarks that “Finland 
participated actively in the drafting process of the Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the UN Gener-
al Assembly in September 2007” (2010, 31; 2013, 10). 
The issue of health and wellbeing is also addressed in both docu-
ments. The 2013 Strategy acknowledges that with “global warm-
ing and increased economic activity, the conditions in the Arc-
tic have changed in a way that will have implications for health, 
well-being and the living environment” (2013, 20). To address 
this, the government uses the term ‘welfare,’ which according to 
the 2013 Strategy “encompasses mental and material well-being, 
access to work, efficient basic services, equality, security and ed-
ucation” and must be “tailored for northern conditions” (2013, 
11). The document also recognizes that “the Partnership in Pub-
lic Health and Social Well-being has made a great contribution 
towards limiting epidemics (HIV, TB) and promoting healthy 
lifestyles” (2013, 45-46). The 2010 Strategy also recognizes the 
consequences of pollution and climate change, especially in 
relation to the wellbeing of Indigenous peoples, and that “the 
Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Social 
Well-being (NDPHS) has been supplemented with an expert 
group promoting the health and well-being of Indigenous peo-
ples” (2010, 49, 30). 
Only the 2013 Strategy addresses equality in the context of re-
gional differences (e.g., north vs south Finland), and connects this 
to migration. The Strategy states that “life in northern Finland is 
complicated by long distances, an ageing population, labour mar-
ket issues and the inadequacy of the resources necessary for pro-
viding government services” (2013, 20). The solution, it seems, 
is that increased economic opportunities in the North may help 
reduce some of these challenges. Thus, labour migration seems to 
be a solution (Finland. PMO 2013, 20). To this end, the Strategy 
suggests that “as neighbouring countries, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway can advance in many areas important to the Arctic by 
facilitating the movement of experts and employees proficient in 
languages across the national borders” (2013, 21). The possibility 
of an increased labor force also comes from “potential visa-free 
travel between the EU and Russia, the intensifying economic ac-
tivity in the Arctic and the growing population” (2013, 36).
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The Governance indicator accounts for 13 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 19 % for the 2010 Strategy (see 
Figure 7, p. 42). The indicator focuses on the existing structures, 
as well as to support decision-making institutions and proce-
dures. “The recommendations given by the Arctic Council pro-
vide a sound basis for political decision making” (2013, 44). As, 
“it is vital for society as a whole, including the policy makers, to 
understand what this transition in the Arctic is all about”, here, 
“research plays a key role in the area of planning, licensing pro-
cedures and evaluation of risks and threats in connection with 
the various activities.” (2013, 13, 24). 
As, “one of Finland’s key objectives is to bolster its position as 
an Arctic country and to reinforce international Arctic cooper-
ation”, the country is actively involved in “multilateral cooper-
ation at the global and regional levels to achieve its own Arctic 
goals and to pre-empt global threats” (2013, 43). Furthermore, 
since the “treaty system is fragmented” which may “lead to am-
biguities regarding liability for damages”, Finland aims for con-
sistent regulation and action based on “cooperation outlined in 
international conventions”. Therefore, “it is advisable to review 
the adequacy of the existing conventions regarding the region. 
Finland plays an active role in drafting supplementary regula-
tions” (2013, 43, 44). Furthermore, on the national level “a more 
active dialogue is required between the parties representing the 
research community, business and industry, local communities 
and the civic society - internally and with the public sector” 
(2013, 12) to support decision making. 
For Finland, foundations of preparedness lie on “a comprehen-
sive concept of security, which consists in securing the vital 
functions of society through close cooperation between the au-
thorities, industry, NGOs and citizens” (2013, 14, 40). The 2013 
Strategy further highlights that “aside from cooperation in the 
context of the Barents region, regions and municipalities are not 
truly represented in Arctic cooperation” (2013 10). Therefore, 
Finland advocates for a policy that would support their position 
as regional actors. Further, the Strategy recognizes “the North-
ern Dimension Partnership on Transport and Logistics [which] 
provides a useful platform for the development of northern 
transport services” (2013, 10). The 2013 Strategy also refers to 
the Coastnet which is “a government communications network 
primarily intended for border authorities but [that] can also be 
used for non-urgent sea rescue operations and the prevention of 
environmental damage” (2013, 41).
A considerable part of the governance indicator is dedicated to 
the issue of protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, especial-
ly, “the rights of the Saami [which shall] be promoted through 
active participation in the international cooperation geared to 
enhance the legal and actual protection of Indigenous peoples.” 
In terms of human rights, Finland strongly supports the rights 
of Indigenous peoples. Domestically, “the duties related to au-
tonomy are managed by the Saami Parliament elected by public 
ballot. Finland seeks to improve the living conditions of Indige-
nous peoples so as to allow communities and cultures to survive 
and evolve on their own terms” (2013, 10, 22, 23). At the interna-
tional level, “Finland seeks to ensure the participation of Indig-
enous peoples when issues affecting their status are addressed.” 
Therefore, “Finland finds it important to guarantee that the or-
ganisations of the Indigenous people represented in the Arctic 
Council are able to participate in the work of the Council at the 
various levels” (2013, 11). Finland also highlights “the need to 
consult Indigenous peoples and to offer them adequate oppor-
tunities to be involved in various actions, particularly when they 
have a direct impact on their living conditions” (2013, 22). At 
global level, Finland takes part in cooperation concerning In-
digenous peoples especially within the United Nations Perma-
nent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII), which “promotes the 
status of Indigenous peoples in cooperation with governments.” 
Additionally, “The Permanent Forum is an advisory body to the 
UN Economic and Social Council” (2010, 31, 37).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total coded quotes for the 
2013 Strategy and 11 % of the 2010 Strategy (see Figure 7, p. 42), 
highlights the priority of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
as “an essential element of Finnish foreign policy” as well as be-
ing one of the four pillars of Finland’s Arctic policy. Here the 
objectives of “Finland’s Arctic policy are associated with its gen-
eral policies regarding the promotion of stability, cooperation 
and sustainable development. At the same time, they are linked 
to the interests of Finnish business and research communities” 
(2013, 8, 14; 2010, 52). One of those key objectives, as well as a 
“foundation for Finland’s activities in the Arctic” is “to bolster its 
position as an Arctic country and to reinforce international Arc-
tic cooperation” (2013, 14, 43). Finland underlines, that “pend-
ing issues and any disputes need to be settled in accordance with 
international law”. At the same time, “all claims concerning con-
tinental shelves [need to be dealt with] in accordance with the in-
ternational law of the sea” (2013, 19, 44; 2010, 10, 11). By focus-
ing on international organisations and agreements dealing with 
the Arctic in which Finland is a member, the 2010 Strategy also 
“emphasizes external relations”, in particular on the forms, “that, 
either directly or indirectly, apply to Finland’s northern regions 
and population, as well as their environment, climate, business, 
culture, social relations, security and stability” (2010, 7).
Finland participates in several international fora (e.g. Arctic 
Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, European Union, United 
Nations and its sub-organisations), scientific and other expert 
networks, as well as in bilateral relations. Here, Finland consid-
ers “the Arctic Council as the primary cooperation forum for 
addressing Arctic matters”. For this reason, “Finland supports 
the plan to establish the Council as an international treaty-based 
organisation”. The Council also provides equal representation of 
the Arctic Indigenous peoples (2013, 8, 14, 19, 44; 2010, 9, 34, 
37, 38, 39). The 2013 Strategy recognizes that “Finland has been 
an active member of the Arctic community for a long time. It 
played a key part in calling the first ever minister-level meet-
ing for Arctic countries (1991), which marked the beginning 
of international environmental cooperation in the region, to be 
followed by the ‘Rovaniemi process’ which eventually led to the 
establishment of the Arctic Council” (2013, 8), as mentioned 
earlier. Hence, “Finland will build on this foundation and con-
tinue to pursue a proactive and responsible role in the context 
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of international cooperation in the Arctic” (2013, 15). Further, 
in 1997, Finland also initiated the Northern Dimension policy, 
“subsequently adopted by the European Union”, and is “based 
on an equal partnership between the EU, Russia, Norway and 
Iceland. In Nordic cooperation, it remains the only forum for a 
coordinated formulation of EU policies” (2013, 8, 45, 48). Fol-
lowed from this, Finland “pursues a proactive role in fostering 
Northern Dimension Partnerships” (2013, 15), as “the Northern 
Dimension and related partnerships offer a forum for address-
ing collaborative issues regarding the northern parts of Europe 
and creating a forum for hands-on cooperation” (2013, 47).
“The European Union plays a key role in Finland’s Arctic 
policy.” Therefore, “it is important to support the formulation 
of the EU’s policy towards the Arctic and the reinforcement of 
its role in the region” (2013, 15, 47; 2010, 7, 9, 11, 44), as well 
as to support the EU to be “approved as an observer member of 
the Arctic Council, and [that] the EU establishes an Arctic In-
formation Centre in conjunction with the Arctic Centre of the 
University of Lapland” (2010, 44).
The ultimate objective of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region is to 
build cross-border “cooperation between Russia and the Nordic 
countries” (2013, 45). International cooperation is crucial for se-
curing “the stability and prosperity of the northernmost” parts 
of Europe, as “climate change and other environmental hazards 
are not contained by national borders, international coopera-
tion ... Russia’s active participation in measures contributing to 
common goals is of special importance for Finland” (2010, 14, 
42, 45). “The Barents Regional Council is often referred to as the 
‘engine’ of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, sustained by local 
expertise and traditions.” This Council introduces “a regional 
perspective to the more general Arctic policies” and has “played 
a part in establishing permanent networks for cross-border 
cooperation” (2013, 15, 19, 45; 2010, 9, 34). Finland is further 
“considering other bilateral Arctic partnerships as well as mul-
tilateral partnerships with Norway and Sweden” (2013, 15, 45). 
Both strategies also highlight the intensified cooperation in for-
eign, security and defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic re-
gions, as well as include cooperation “for crime prevention and 
the fight against organised crime.” In order to assess and prevent 
security threats it is necessary to enhance “cooperation between 
the authorities in the region and internationallly” (2013, 14, 15, 
41; 2010, 11). In regard to rescue operations, “the cooperation 
carried out within the framework of the Council of the Baltic 
Sea States does not address [these] operations.” Nevertheless, 
for the achievement of shared objectives, it is instrumental to 
“implement joint projects and assess the risks all the parties are 
exposed to” (2013, 41).
Finland further recognizes the importance of the United Na-
tions and its various bodies that “promote international coop-
eration in several areas important to the Arctic region” (2013, 
19), including “maritime law, human rights, sustainable devel-
opment, research, education, climate change and the status of 
Indigenous peoples” (2013, 46). Among them is the UNCLOS, 
which “regulates all the resources and uses of the seas, and seeks 
to conciliate the sometimes conflicting interests.” The UNCLOS 
also regulates shipping and “sets out the general principles 
and provides a framework for supplementary regulation at the 
global, regional or national level based on the division of legal 
competencies.” Additionally, “of special relevance to the Arctic 
region in this respect are the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) and the International Seabed Author-
ity (ISA), both organisations formed under UNCLOS” (2013, 
44; 2010, 10, 28, 34, 35). The 2013 Strategy also “addresses the 
resolutions adopted by the UN Rio+20 Conference,” by which 
“the UNCLOS is to be provided with additional tools for pro-
tecting biodiversity” (2013, 44).
Furthermore, both strategies address the role of the Internation-
al Maritime Organization (IMO), which prepares regulations 
and “instructions for vessels operating in ice-covered Arctic 
seas” (2013, 37), as well as handling “maritime regulation, in-
cluding the maritime security, environmental concerns, techni-
cal cooperation and legal matters” (2010, 36). Both strategies 
also refer to the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCMs), which 
“creates a basis for cooperation between other key multi-part-
ner actors, principally the Arctic Council and the Barents Eu-
ro-Arctic Council” (2013, 19, 37, 46; 2010, 9, 28, 34, 35, 41). 
In addition, there are a few other important cooperative orga-
nizations, such as “the North Calotte Council, funded by the 
Nordic Council of Ministers and comprising Finland, Sweden 
and Norway.” This Council “operates by initiating and funding 
various regional cooperation projects … as such, the Council 
can be characterised as a cross-border partnership between the 
authorities and the economy” (2010, 41). The 2010 Strategy fur-
ther recognizes the work of NATO and “its willingness to coop-
erate with Russia and to avoid measures that might give rise to 
confrontation” (2010, 11).
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 6 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the 2010 
Strategy (see Figure 7, p. 42) and addresses Finland’s environ-
mental priorities. According to the 2013 Strategy, “Finland’s 
Arctic policy focuses on understanding the effects of climate 
change and transboundary pollutants; the sustainable use of 
Arctic natural resources; the identification of the constraints 
imposed by the environment; and environmental protection in 
all areas of activity” (2013, 38), which suggests tension between 
the environment and the economy. The 2010 Strategy makes 
similar statements about the cause of environmental damage 
and stresses that, if this is left unchecked, there will be negative 
consequences for those living in the region. The need to balance 
the environment with the economy is also addressed in the 2010 
Strategy because “the protection of Arctic land and sea areas 
and ecologically sustainable economic and social development 
are in Finland’s interests...Environmental issues are not just a 
separate sector of their own; instead, they are an important ele-
ment of a wider whole” (2010, 13–14). 
While both strategies agree on the causes of environmental 
damage, they propose somewhat different solutions for envi-
ronmental protection. For example, the 2013 Strategy stresses 
these sustainable economic practices must occur in all aspects of 
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extractive resource development, and that “an ecosystem-based 
approach makes it possible to assess the impact of the use of 
natural resources and the effects of operations from a wider per-
spective. By doing so, it is possible to consider the reciprocal 
impacts of the economic activities and their combined effect on 
the environment” as well as on Indigenous peoples (2013, 39). 
The 2010 Strategy also mentions using an ecosystem approach 
and stresses that “the environmental perspective must be taken 
into account in all activities in the region” and includes efforts 
such as working with international partners, “community and 
regional planning, as well as land use planning,” nuclear safe-
ty, and maritime monitoring (2010, 16, 13, 27). Despite the 
differences, the overarching approach appears to be rooted in 
ecosystem-based management, meaning that environmental 
protection is actually about ensuring environmental protection, 
regardless of how it is performed. 
Both documents also suggest that protected areas and bio-
diversity are an important part of Finland’s environmental 
program, while simultaneously linking them to economic ac-
tivities. In terms of protected areas, the 2010 Strategy makes 
the above-mentioned linkage between protection and “ecolog-
ically sustainable economic and social development” as being 
in the interest of Finland (2010, 13). This linkage is also ex-
pressed at least twice in the 2013 Strategy. For example, the 
document states that “further development of the network of 
nature conservation areas in the Arctic region is a pragmat-
ic way of improving the protection of the Arctic environment 
and clarifying the framework for economic activity” (2013, 
31). Presumably, this balance would be achieved through eco-
system-based management.
As for biodiversity, both documents recognize the importance 
of the Arctic for difference species, but especially birds. In par-
ticular, the Arctic is part of a migration route and “offers a nest-
ing place for the bulk of the world’s geese and for more than 
half of the world’s waders and it contains unique species, such 
as the polar bear” (2010, 17; 2013, 31). Both documents cau-
tion that economic activity can negatively affect biodiversity. 
For example, the 2013 Strategy states that “biodiversity and the 
preservation of the ecosystem services based on this diversity 
must be secured through the careful planning of the use of nat-
ural resources and land areas,” while the 2010 Strategy mentions 
that “the use of living natural resources entails risks endanger-
ing biological diversity, such as overly intensive fishing. Besides 
the fish species being caught, this may also have an effect on 
the functioning of the entire marine ecosystem” (2010, 17). The 
2010 Strategy also recognizes the legal obligation to include In-
digenous peoples in the protection of biodiversity, as “Article 8 
(j) of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity obligates the 
contracting parties to respect the traditional knowledge of In-
digenous peoples” (2010, 17). 
The Pollution indicator accounts for 2 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 Strategy (see 
Figure 7, p. 42). Both documents recognize that pollution comes 
from within and outside the region (2013, 39; 2010, 13, 15). A 
broad range of pollutants are identified in both documents, in-
cluding greenhouse gases, black carbon, methane, carbon diox-
ide, oil, military waste, and nuclear or radioactive waste (2013, 
13, 34, 39; 2010, 14, 15, 16, 28). In terms of nuclear waste, the 
2010 Strategy suggests that it comes from Russia because “the 
Kola Peninsula has the world’s greatest concentration of nuclear 
reactors” (2010, 16). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy mentions 
mining waste and community waste, while the 2010 Strategy 
mentions nitrogen oxides, and “heavy metals and organic haz-
ardous substances” (2013, 39; 2010, 14, 15). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the two strategies identify similar sources of pol-
lution. Indeed, these include human activities, including those 
associated with the military, the mining and resource industry, 
and the shipping industry (2013, 34, 39; 2010, 15, 16). 
To address this issue, the two strategies have identified different 
approaches to solving these problems, although to varying de-
grees. The 2013 Strategy, for example, mentions the Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
sponse in the Arctic and notes that “increased attention should 
be paid to contingency planning and the prevention of oil spills” 
(2013, 10). Along similar lines, the contribution of economic 
activities to pollution must be considered, while “Arctic coun-
tries must shoulder their responsibility for reducing emissions 
of greenhouse gases and short-lived climate pollutants” (2013, 
39). Pollution cannot be addressed by one state alone and “a tan-
gible example of cooperation in the Arctic region is provided 
by the nuclear safety projects implemented in the Arctic Water 
and wastewater projects [which] arecarried out under the part-
nership programmes in Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Petroza-
vodsk” (2013, 45). 
Although the 2010 Strategy also refers to the nuclear safety 
and wastewater cooperation with Russia (2010, 49), the docu-
ment pays more attention to the issue of Russian nuclear waste 
and safety, as mentioned earlier. Notably, these efforts include 
“preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and taking the envi-
ronment into consideration [which] requires not only the dis-
mantlement of vessels but also the safe disposal and handling of 
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.” They also include sup-
porting the work of the G8 Global Partnership program that, 
in part, seeks “nuclear safety in the area of the former Soviet 
Union” (2010, 16). The 2010 Strategy also mentions the Con-
vention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (2010, 36) 
and the EU’s potential contribution to this issue. For example, 
“the Union’s strength in chemical policy must be utilised to re-
inforce the control and monitoring of chemicals in the Arctic 
Region and to support international cooperation aiming at di-
minished long-range transportation and use of hazardous sub-
stances” (2010, 46). Additionally, new technologies can also be 
used to limit pollution (2010, 15). 
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the 2010 Strategy 
(see Figure 7, p. 42), and both documents discuss the negative 
consequences of climate change. Both documents stress that 
climate change is having negative and increasing consequences 
for sea ice and that within five years, two record lows have been 
reached. The 2010 Strategy notes that “the surface area of Arctic 
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sea ice reached its minimum in 2007” while the 2013 Strategy 
states that in 2012 sea ice again “reached an all-time low since 
the start of satellite monitoring” (2013, 8; 2010, 10). In addition 
to ice, permafrost is also melting and contributing to warming 
temperatures at a global level (2013, 39; 2010, 14). The 2010 
Strategy also positions climate change as a safety issue. For in-
stance, in the context of adaptation, the Strategy states that “an-
other priority is the use and management of water resources, in-
cluding the risks arising from more frequent floods” (2010, 15). 
However, by the time the 2013 Strategy was released, Finland 
had repositioned climate change as a problem for regional secu-
rity. Indeed, the Strategy states that “combating climate change 
and mitigating its impact are vital for the stability and security 
of the Arctic region and serve as the central point of departure 
for the activities being carried out there” (2013, 7). Moreover, 
human security can be affected because “the conditions in the 
Arctic have changed in a way that will have implications for 
health, well-being and the living environment” (2013, 20).
Mitigation and adaptation are addressed in both documents. 
While “ecosystems in the region have poor adaptability” (2010, 
14), the 2010 Strategy has one sentence that sums up the Finn-
ish perspective on mitigation and adaptation, namely, that “the 
Finnish policy for adapting to climate change must pay special 
attention to measures that would support the adaptation of 
livelihoods dependent on the Arctic environment” (2010, 15). 
The 2013 Strategy also addresses mitigation and adaptation in 
the context of economic development, and stresses that “eco-
nomic activity and transport operations are increasing in the 
region... This makes it necessary to pay increased attention to 
actions to mitigate climate change; conserve and protect the 
natural environment; promote the well-being of the local pop-
ulation; and secure the viability of the traditional cultures of 
the Indigenous people” (2013, 8). Interestingly, the 2013 Strat-
egy also addresses the effects of climate change on freshwater, 
stating that “the necessary prerequisites for the use and man-
agement of water resources must also be secured” (2013, 39). 
 
In terms of strategies to address climate change, the 2010 Strat-
egy recognizes different climate change agreements and forums. 
In particular, it mentions the Copenhagen Accord, “the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFC-
CC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer” 
(2010, 15, 36–37). The Strategy also argues that more research 
is needed on climate change—“the estimates of the progress and 
impacts of climate change are based on climate models; their 
regional accuracy needs to be developed so that they would be 
better suited for identifying Arctic changes as well” (2010, 14). In 
contrast, the 2013 document does not provide too much infor-
mation on Finland’s commitment to the different frameworks. 
Instead of re-committing Finland to agreements and frame-
works of which they are a part, the document states that “in 
global climate negotiations, Finland advocates ambitious emis-
sion reduction targets by highlighting issues related to climate 
change in the region” (2013, 13). There is, however, support for 
the scientific community and the role it should play in address-
ing climate change. For example, “it is imperative to intensify the 
dialogue between governments and the scientific community 
regarding the numerous links to other global trends” (2013, 39). 
 
The Security indicator accounts for 7 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 2 % of the 2010 Strategy (see 
Figure 7, p. 42). It is confirmed in both strategies that “stability 
and security in the region” are the most important priorities 
for Finland as these are “in line with its foreign and securi-
ty policies.” They are also “vital for any activities conducted 
there” (2013, 14), including efforts to develop the Arctic econ-
omy. When responding to security challenges Finland’s poli-
cy is to “keeping with its comprehensive concept of security. 
This means a high level of overall preparedness to be achieved 
through close collaboration between the authorities, industry 
and NGOs as well as through international cooperation”. Here 
“a safe and stable living environment is also instrumental to 
improving the welfare of the local populations. Dialogue on 
Arctic security policy is being conducted at different levels to 
identify ways of guaranteeing stability and security in the re-
gion that meet with general acceptance” (2013, 14, 40). 
The 2010 Strategy comments that “in the future, the Arctic may 
become a major energy reserve and transport channel for Eu-
rope” (2010, 9). As a result, “This has heightened the security 
policy importance of the region. Increased shipping and human 
activity increase the risk of serious environmental accidents in 
the Arctic Ocean” (2010, 9). The 2013 Strategy refers to “the 
economic potential of the Arctic (extraction of natural resourc-
es) and the foreseen new transport routes which underline the 
strategic importance of the region in a way that will also have 
implications for security policy” (2013, 19). “As the challenges 
are complex (increasingly multidimensional security threats) 
and closely linked with comprehensive security considerations, 
it is vital to improve the situation awareness of the region and 
monitor developments.” Finland therefore, “must pay close at-
tention to security developments in the Arctic” (2013, 40). In 
addition, “raising awareness of the Arctic Region and its po-
tential and making provision for changes promote safety in the 
wide sense” (2010, 10). 
According to the 2013 Strategy “a military conflict in the Arc-
tic is improbable – the Arctic States have declared that any 
disputes will be settled peacefully and in accordance with in-
ternational law” (2013, 40). Followed from this, “Finland ac-
tively supports the peaceful resolution of pending issues and 
potential disputes in the Arctic region in accordance with in-
ternational law” (2013, 14). For the Arctic, “probably the most 
significant aspects” and recommendations concerning the Arc-
tic region of the Stoltenberg Report (on “closer cooperation in 
Nordic foreign and security policy”) “include air and maritime 
surveillance and closer cooperation for the utilisation of sat-
ellite services and for improving the efficiency of rescue ser-
vice cooperation” (2010, 12). Here, Finland offers “its Arctic 
exercise and training to its international partners, which also 
contributes to its own forces’ interoperability” (2013, 41). In 
addition, among “the priorities of Nordic Defence Coopera-
tion, Nordefco, … is the enhanced cooperation in defence ca-
pability development. It also covers cooperation and expertise 
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in Arctic conditions, prime examples of which are Nordic air 
forces’ cross-border exercises and the participation of Finland 
and Sweden in Iceland’s air-surveillance exercises, together 
with Norway” (2013, 41). 
Finland also emphasizes “the importance of its expertise on in-
ternational rescue operations and the management of such op-
erations that could be exported to other Arctic areas” (2013, 41).
In the sphere of internal security Finland presents three main 
objectives in the 2013 Strategy: “i) Develop international rescue 
cooperation in the Arctic region and improve the efficiency of 
cross-border assistance; ii) Establish efficient cross-border co-
operation between local, regional and national authorities and 
actors; iii) Develop cross-border cooperation in crime prevision 
in order to evaluate and ward off threats to Arctic shipping and 
security risks” (2013, 59). The 2010 Strategy emphasizes that 
“for Finland, it is positive that cross-border cooperation has 
gained new political weight in the EU. Creation of security, sta-
bility and well-being on the EU’s external borders is considered 
to be a common interest for the Union” (2010, 51). Finland is 
also “closely involved in preparing the EU’s integrated maritime 
policy and developing the EU-wide system for the exchange of 
maritime information”, as well as “the existing best practices de-
veloped in the course of sea surveillance cooperation”. Further-
more, in order to assess and prevent security threats it is vital to 
enhance “cooperation between the authorities in the region and 
internationally” (2013, 41).
The 2013 Strategy also addresses the interoperability of Finnish 
armed forces. Behind is that “all service branches of Finland’s 
Defence Forces have considerable cold climate expertise, capa-
bilities” and the “materiel suited for northern conditions.” More-
over, Finland has several “Arctic training and exercise areas in 
Rovajärvi, Sodankylä, Kajaani”, and that for sea operations there 
are “areas on the Quark, the Gulf of Bothnia and Gulf of Fin-
land” (2013, 14, 40, 41). Finnish Defence Forces play a crucial 
part “in supporting civilian safety and rescue authorities in such 
duties as search and rescue operations and the mitigation of 
the effects of potential natural catastrophes and environmental 
damage” (2013, 40). As a result, “Finland is well-placed to offer 
cold climate training and exercise to its international partners, 
which in turn serves to improve Finnish forces’ own interoper-
ability” (2013, 14, 40, 41).
Finally, “Finland offers solid experience from inter-Nordic co-
operation. Finland, Sweden and Norway are engaged in close 
local cooperation in crime prevention in the Circumpolar Re-
gion.” The “Nordic PTN crime prevention framework” could 
serve as an example of “readily employable mechanisms for pre-
paring threat scenarios and cooperating in crime prevention”. 
Furthermore, “the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic 
Sea Region (BSTF) has created a model for inter-disciplinary 
crime prevention that could possibly be applied in the Arctic as 
well” (2013, 41).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 6 % of the total coded 
quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the 2010 Strategy (see Fig-
ure 7, p. 42). The two strategies address some similar safety issues, 
especially in the context of maritime-based economic activity. For 
instance, the 2010 Strategy states that “increased shipping and 
human activity increase the risk of serious environmental acci-
dents in the Arctic Ocean,” while the 2013 Strategy explains that 
“oil spills represent the greatest risks associated with Arctic ship-
ping and oil drilling” (2013, 34; 2010, 9). The two documents also 
speak to different aspects of occupational safety. For example, the 
2013 Strategy mentions the physical conditions that can impact 
safety, such as “low temperatures, harsh weather and the seasonal 
variations in the amount of daylight” (2013, 21). The 2010 Strate-
gy looks more towards IMO regulations that “concern the techni-
cal and structural properties of vessels operating in the Arctic, as 
well as the training and competence of the crew serving on these 
vessels” (2010, 28). The 2010 Strategy also explains that maritime 
safety issues are connected to flooding and growing maritime 
traffic (2010, 15, 28). Additionally, NATO contributes to address-
ing other regional safety such as “in search and rescue operations, 
in the containment of environmental and natural disasters, and in 
raising situational awareness,” to which NATO surprisingly con-
tributes (2010, 11).
As mentioned in the pollution indicator, there is also a point of 
difference between the two documents on the topic of nucle-
ar safety. Passing reference is made to “nuclear safety projects 
implemented in the Arctic” (2013, 45) as one area for regional 
cooperation in the 2013 Strategy. In contrast, the 2010 Strategy 
provides a more detailed discussion, and to this end “Finland 
supports the development of the safety of nuclear power plants 
located in Finland’s neighbouring areas through bilateral coop-
eration” (2010, 13). 
Although neither of the strategies mention the development 
of the Polar Code (2013, 37; 2010, 36), there is a progression 
shown between the two documents regarding growth in Fin-
land’s capabilities. The 2010 Strategy remarks that the 2009 Arc-
tic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) “includes a number 
of important recommendations for improving logistics in the 
Arctic Ocean, such as the launching of measures to negotiate 
an Arctic search and rescue instrument” (2010, 28–29). Addi-
tionally, the strategy states that while “Finland also has solid 
expertise in the charting of seas” that “at present, the region’s 
monitoring, surveillance and rescue systems and research infra-
structure are still underdeveloped” (2010, 28, 45). This means 
that, overall, regional capabilities, need to be improved. 
The 2013 Strategy suggests that the AMSA recommendation has 
been completed; it mentions the Arctic Council’s SAR agree-
ment which “requires Finland to allocate funding to rescue re-
sources north of the Polar Circle and also to international res-
cue cooperation,” and other agreements such as “the Nordred 
and Barents Euro-Arctic agreements on rescue services, under 
which the Barents Rescue exercises are held every two years” 
(2013, 41). The Strategy also recognizes Finland’s capabilities 
with respect to maritime safety issues, from, interestingly, an 
economic perspective. For example, Finland can offer satellite 
monitoring services, “in addition to ship design, construction 
and operation capabilities, environmental and oil spill preven-
tion, and control technologies, Finland is in a position to offer a 
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range of off-the-shelf export products based on the best practic-
es developed on the Baltic Sea” (2013, 30). Additionally, Finland 
has developed solutions to occupational safety issues, although 
this knowledge was gained through cooperation and does not 
appear to be commoditized (2013, 21).
Neither strategy advocates for integration of national safety 
services, but when the two strategies are read together, they 
stress the importance of cooperation at different levels. At the 
circumpolar level, and in addition to the Arctic Council’s SAR 
agreement, “cooperation between national coast guards, in par-
ticular, could combine a number of security and law enforce-
ment components while securing and promoting Arctic actions 
on a broad front” (2013, 42). However, circumpolar cooperation 
“takes place primarily through the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) and the agreements, recommendations and 
standards drawn up under its auspices” (2010, 28). Cooperation 
also takes place at the regional level, specifically in search and 
rescue efforts within the Barents region (2013, 14, 41). Finland 
also cooperates bilaterally with “the United States and Canada in 
enhancing the capabilities to perform under Arctic conditions 
and securing fast response times in the event of impending acci-
dents” (2013, 30). Finland also cooperates bilaterally with Rus-
sia and Canada on different satellite projects, such as GLONASS 
and Radarsat-C, respectively (2010, 29). Finally, within Finland, 
“preparedness is based on a comprehensive concept of security, 
which consists in securing the vital functions of society through 
close cooperation between the authorities, industry, NGOs and 
citizens” (2013, 40). The two strategies demonstrate that safety 
is a complex issue which cannot be handled by one entity alone. 
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 20 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 14 % in the 2010 Strat-
egy (see Figure 7, p. 42), dedicates a fair amount of space to 
economic development issues. The 2013 Strategy acknowledges 
the diversity of Finland’s northern economy, while also recog-
nizing national strengths. For example, “Finland is in a position 
to assume a key role, open up new opportunities and innovate 
in areas such as Arctic and cold climate expertise, construction, 
technology, product development, business operations, research 
as well as in value-added products drawing upon the northern 
environment” (2013, 9), and also through services for the ship-
ping industry (2013, 9, 30). The cold climate creates opportuni-
ties in cloud services, which is already “valued at EUR 1 billion 
annually and is expected to grow substantially” (2013, 37). Oth-
er activities include “small-scale, nature-based businesses, crafts 
and local food production” (2013, 12), and tourism (2013, 30). 
Additionally, Finland exports “maritime technology” (2013, 29) 
such as icebreakers (2013, 9), and other forms of “environmen-
tal expertise” (2013, 26). 
The 2013 Strategy also discusses more ‘conventional’ Arctic 
economic activities in the natural resources and energy sectors. 
Indeed, “mining in the Arctic region is expanding in Finland as 
well as in other Arctic countries” (2013, 9). Mining is important 
for employment as “it is estimated that up to 5,000 new jobs will 
be created in the mining industry over the next few years” (2013, 
32). Forestry is also important because it “plays a crucial role as 
a driver of the low-carbon bioeconomy in providing a basis for 
new products, materials, services and forms of energy” (2013, 
12); it added an “estimated […] EUR 1.4 billion” to the econ-
omy in 2010 (2013, 31) and “employed directly a total of 3,200 
people in Lapland” in 2013 (2013, 12). Certainly, this industry is 
important to the Finnish economy. Reindeer husbandry is also 
important as “some one thousand families in Finland earn all 
or part of their livelihood from reindeer husbandry” (2013, 30). 
The 2010 Strategy also identifies a number of different econom-
ic activities. The document at a more general level states that 
“the region plays a key role especially in terms of energy gener-
ation, fishery, other livelihoods based on natural resources, and 
tourism” (2010, 20), but also focuses on areas of Finnish exper-
tise. A footnote identifies the following sectors of expertise: for 
example, “offshore industries, shipping industries, forest exper-
tise, mining industry, metals industry, tourism, knowledge of 
traditional trades, low-temperature expertise, winter testing, 
measurement technology, power and heat generation and dis-
tribution, energy conservation and energy efficiency, Arctic 
wind power technology, Arctic building and infrastructure, 
environmental engineering and management of environmental 
impacts, sustainable social concepts, northern environmental 
expertise, northern health and well-being, waste management 
technology, information technology and public e-services, in-
novation-oriented development, cold climate research, bio and 
nanosciences, risk analyses, oil spill prevention and response, 
materials engineering” (2010, 20).
With this list in mind, the Strategy also addresses trade, stating 
that “Finnish companies … must focus their export efforts on 
the areas of competence they have selected” (2010, 21), such as 
“environmental technology” (2010, 21), and capabilities in the 
areas of forestry, mining, oil/gas, and shipbuilding (2010, 22), 
for example. 
Similar to the 2013 Strategy, the 2010 Strategy states that “the oil 
and gas reserves in the Arctic Region play a key role for Euro-
pean energy supply” (2010, 19), although access to “the Norwe-
gian Snohvit gas field was restricted to a limited number of sub-
contracts” (2010, 22). Other important natural resource sectors 
are mining and reindeer husbandry (2010, 19, 20). 
Sustainable development is similarly addressed in both strate-
gies. The 2013 Strategy summarizes the sentiment in both docu-
ments, explaining that in the context of sustainable development 
and economic growth “these two goals are not mutually contra-
dictory or exclusive, as long as the economic development in 
the vulnerable Arctic regions takes into account the limitations 
imposed by the natural environment and is sustainable in terms 
of the local communities” (2013, 8), although the 2010 Strategy 
includes cultural responsibility as well (2010, 9).
Generally speaking, economic activities that speak to Finland’s 
strengths will be prioritized; however, environmental protec-
tion and sustainable development will also be adhered to, and 
“the status and rights of Indigenous peoples [will be] respect-
ed” (2010, 18; see also: 2013, 26, 39). In more specific terms, 
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the 2013 Strategy seems to prioritize green resource extraction 
as it is “Finland’s ambition is to become a global pioneer in an 
eco-efficient mineral industry by 2020, an objective supported 
by the 2011–2016 Green Mining Programme launched by Te-
kes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innova-
tion” (2013, 32). The 2010 Strategy also looks at logistical issues 
needed to help prioritize economic activities. The document 
states that Finland will also “improve business opportunities in 
the Arctic by developing transport, communications and logis-
tics networks and border crossings” (2010, 24). 
To support this vast range of economic activities, both strate-
gies refer to a variety of economic actors. For example, the 2013 
Strategy recognizes that “the public sector’s role may consist of 
creating networks, launching and supporting reference proj-
ects or organising visits by corporate delegations” (2013, 27), 
while the private sector can also build their own internation-
al networks (2013, 10, 26). Moreover, “partnerships are being 
established between research institutes, technology centres 
and private companies” and “it is necessary to make use of the 
opportunities offered by international financing institutions” 
(2013, 28). Other actors identified in the strategy include Nord-
Min to provide best practices for the mining industry, and even 
other states, possibly including some from Asia (2013, 26, 31). 
In contrast, the 2010 Strategy does not identify the federal lev-
el public sector, but at a more local level “Northern Finland’s 
regions, central cities, universities and sub-regions for cooper-
ation with the East, founded Barents Centre Finland Company 
to promote the communication of information to companies 
that are interested in business opportunities in the Barents Re-
gion” (2010, 41). The document also recognizes the importance 
of other states, like Russia, to the maritime industry, and the 
role of Finnvera for financing and Finpro for trade consulting 
(2010, 21). 
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 1 % in the 2010 Strategy (see 
Figure 7, p. 42), is reflected in both documents. The 2010 Strategy 
provides brief notes about tourism in general, while the newest 
2013 Strategy looks into more details on the tourism industry. 
The 2010 Strategy recalls that “higher temperatures and changes 
in precipitation have resulted in alterations in snow cover and 
vegetation and species, thus affecting the environment and live-
lihoods (e.g., reindeer husbandry and tourism)” (2010, 14). The 
Strategy further declares that “tourism is also expected to in-
crease in the Barents Region” as “tourist centres have become 
hubs for diverse activities; besides providing services for tour-
ists, they offer a wide range of private and public services for 
both permanent residents and holiday home owners in their 
areas” (2010, 19). Since “most Finnish tourist centres are locat-
ed in Northern Finland, […] they play an important industrial 
policy role, as concerns both the creation of jobs and the region-
al economy” (2010, 19). If the 2010 Strategy recognizes that “in 
Lapland the strategic objectives are related to tourism” (2010, 
10, 11, 12, 19), the 2013 document continues by stating that “the 
growth in adventure and nature tourism is reflected in Lapland’s 
position as a leading Arctic tourist destination” (2013, 11).
Correspondingly according to the 2013 Strategy, Finland’s ob-
jective is to “increase and renew the tourist industry to bring 
well-being to the region in accordance with the principles of 
sustainability” (2013, 55). In particular, the Finnish forest “of-
fers opportunities for a range of activities from game hunt-
ing and picking berries and mushrooms to extensive tourism. 
Lapland’s annual berry harvest is estimated at 350 million ki-
lograms” (2013, 31). Furthermore, “the changing of seasons, 
untouched wilderness, cultural contrast and other unique fea-
tures offer great potential for expanding tourism in northern 
Finland.” Among other factors that contribute to growth is 
“the uncertainty of snow in central Europe and the proxim-
ity of Russia” (2013, 34). In order to “succeed in developing 
and increasing tourism, it is necessary to cherish the natural 
scenery, environment and the uniqueness of the local culture.” 
Since “the infrastructure, level of service, research and train-
ing related to tourism should be of the highest standard” Fin-
land is also striving to “ensure access to sufficient data on the 
industry” (2013, 11, 31). 
The 2013 Strategy emphasizes that the “growth of the mining, 
energy, tourist and adventure industries” and consequently the 
growing “number of people working in the Arctic” “will increase 
the volume of traffic and the provision of ancillary services.” 
Finnish Lapland offers the highest standart of “the infrastruc-
ture, level of service, international orientation as well as tourism 
research and education” (2013, 21, 34). Additionally, in Finland 
“tourism ensures a wider range of better services for the local 
population and helps maintain the basic infrastructure which, 
in turn, enables the development of other businesses.” Never-
theless, “tourism will remain a labour-intensive field of activ-
ity in which jobs cannot be relocated.” Therefore, cooperation 
with Arctic neighbours, such as Norway, could be benefitial for 
tourism, especially for “seasonal work and career development” 
(2013, 21, 34). All this makes “it possible for tourism to grow 
and transform in a responsible manner, steps must be taken to 
ensure the availability of labour, a high level of skills and com-
petence, and a sufficient resource base” (2013, 34).
Finland offers “the unspoilt landscapes, peace and quiet, 
well-managed game and wildlife stocks and unique cultural fea-
tures.” However, “the interests of the various activities—mining, 
forestry and investments in tourism – are to a certain extent 
contradictory”. Therefore, “a balanced evolution of regional live-
lihoods calls for sustainable cooperation between the individual 
fields and a close control of the environmental and social reper-
cussions. All livelihoods need to be perceived as a whole in re-
lation to one another.” Additionally, “nature conservation areas 
and the outdoor and recreation services organised by the state 
increase the appeal of nature tourism in the region.” It is not a 
surprising world trend that “nature-based tourism is generally 
regarded as the fastest growing sector in the tourist industry” 
(2013, 31, 34).
The 2013 Strategy further lists government actions that Fin-
land should undertakes in the field of tourism: 1) “Recognise 
the importance of tourism as a major industry and an interna-
tional export growth sector in the Arctic region, and support it 
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States
50
through goal-oriented preparation, land use planning, invest-
ments and the allocation of sufficient development resources”; 
Here 2) “Improve access to Finnish Lapland (air, rail and feeder 
traffic services) in response to the needs of the tourism indus-
try”; As well as 3) “Develop a model for a sustainable concen-
tration of tourist services to foster economically viable, custom-
er-oriented local communities and cultures as well as resorts of 
international standard respectful of the Arctic environment”; At 
the same time, 4) “Make use of the tourist safety network model 
developed in Finland to improve safety performance through-
out the Arctic region”; Furthermore, 5) “Develop local planning 
for use in the assessment, comparison and reconciliation of the 
interests of the various business sectors and other values… so 
as to maintain the attractiveness of sustainable tourism and 
the operating environment of the sector”; Then, 6) “Support 
and encourage a responsible tourism business through projects 
that take due account of the special features of the sector… and 
through efforts to develop the operating environment”; Further, 
7) “Ensure the increased provision of tourism-related foresight-
ing data, applied research and expertise pertaining to the specif-
ic characteristics of the Arctic”; Finally, 8) “Promote culturally 
sustainable tourism through culture partnerships and coopera-
tion with creative industries” (2013, 55, 56).
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the 
total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2010 
Strategy (see Figure 7, p. 42), addresses different forms of in-
frastructure. In terms of transportation, both documents link 
this infrastructure to the economy. For example, the 2013 Strat-
egy explains that “the foreseen growth of the mining industry, 
tourism, the growing energy industry in the Barents region and 
the opening of the North-East Passage have highlighted issues 
such as the need to develop transports and logistics, and estab-
lish new transport routes in the Arctic” (2013, 9). According to 
the 2010 Strategy, this cannot be achieved alone, and regional 
cooperation is required. The report states that “investments in 
cross-border infrastructure require that Russia, too, is prepared 
to develop its east-west transport networks” (2010, 25). Interest-
ingly, border infrastructure is mentioned in the 2013 Strategy 
as way to facilitate cross-border flows with Russia (2013, 36). 
The 2013 Strategy also explains that even though building new 
transportation will be expensive, new infrastructure “creates fa-
vourable conditions for securing a high quality of life for the 
people living in the northern environment” (2013, 11, 10). 
Shipping, particularly through the “northern sea routes” (2010, 
26) is associated with transportation infrastructure in both 
strategies. The 2010 Strategy explains that safe shipping through 
these routes is rather challenging and that “at present, the 
Northeast Passage is open for navigation for 49 ± 18 days per 
year. Owing to climate change, the navigation season is estimat-
ed to extend to 134 ± 38 days by the end of this century” (2010, 
27). In contrast, the 2013 Strategy takes a more optimistic view 
of the possibilities of shipping through the Arctic. In particular, 
the document states that “some shipping lines have been operat-
ing in the Arctic region for years, for example in Greenland and 
Spitsbergen and along the North-East Passage” and that “open-
ing the North-East Passage will increase the importance of the 
Bering Straits in the future. Similarly, the North-West Passage 
may be increasingly used for shipping in the long term” (2013, 
30). This optimism might stem from Finland’s economic aspira-
tions, as “Finland’s ambition is to be a leading expert in Arctic 
maritime industry and shipping – as it is, Finnish companies are 
already actively involved in projects to develop Arctic sea areas” 
(2013, 9). Safety is also important as Arctic shipping increases. 
The Polar Code will contribute to safety (2013, 37; 2010, 36). 
Meanwhile, “any transport fees that might be collected must not 
become obstacles to traffic; instead, they should be used to sup-
port the safety of shipping” (2010, 27). 
Icebreakers are also associated with transportation infrastruc-
ture, shipping, Finnish expertise, and are addressed in both 
documents, although in different ways. The 2013 document 
mostly discusses icebreakers in an economic context and states 
that “Finland also manufactures advanced, state-of-the-art 
Arctic ice-breakers” that are exported to other states such as 
“Canada, Norway, Russia, the United States and China” (2013, 
9). These vessels can also be used for mining and research pur-
poses (2013, 30, 32). In contrast, the 2010 Strategy addresses 
icebreakers as a way to facilitate Arctic maritime transit. For 
example, “according to estimates, thinning of the ice cover may 
enable sailing across the North Pole in a few decades, or per-
haps already in the next decade by means of icebreaker-assisted 
convoys and double-acting ships” (2010, 26). Yet, despite these 
capabilities, “year-round traffic in these sea routes is not profit-
able because of icebreaking costs” (2010, 27). 
Infrastructure for Telecommunications and ICT is also dis-
cussed in both documents. In the 2013 Strategy, the importance 
is mentioned in three ways: First, in terms of economy, as “aside 
from efficient transport services, reliable, high-capacity infor-
mation networks and digital services are instrumental in boost-
ing economic activity in northern Finland as well as improving 
competitiveness in the country as a whole. The adoption and 
utilisation of smart solutions drawing upon advanced commu-
nications technology need to be promoted in all sectors” (2013, 
11). Second, in terms of safety, as “satellite-based communi-
cations systems are necessary for the Arctic seas, for example 
to transmit weather and maritime safety services to sea-going 
vessels” (2013, 37). Third, in terms of ICT, which is important 
for society, as “electronic communication networks and digital 
services are of key importance to the efficiency of society and 
the welfare of the citizens” (2013, 11, 20). Similarly, the 2010 
Strategy recognizes that “mobile communications networks and 
broadband links improve the operating environment for busi-
ness and industry and promote the well-being of local residents” 
(2010, 25).
Energy infrastructure is discussed to different extents in both 
documents. The 2013 Strategy focuses more on this issue, espe-
cially in the context of transmission lines. More specifically, the 
document states that “the Arctic region needs new electricity 
transmission lines and decentralised energy production” and 
that “the existing power transmission lines in and between Nor-
way and Russia need to be upgraded, which offers interesting 
business opportunities for Finnish expertise” (2013, 10, 28). In 
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contrast, the 2010 Strategy does not focus on transmission lines 
but on energy security for the EU as “it is in the EU’s interest 
that energy reserves in the Arctic Region are linked with Euro-
pean energy networks and serve the security of Europe’s energy 
supply” (2010, 46). 
Much of the infrastructure requirements mentioned above 
will need innovative solutions. The 2013 Strategy comments 
that “solutions conducive to a good quality of life and specifi-
cally tailored for northern conditions are called for. One such 
solution is Arctic design, which refers to design that draws 
upon an understanding of the Arctic environment and cir-
cumstances, while giving due consideration to the peoples’ 
adaptation to Arctic conditions” (2013, 11). The 2010 Strategy 
makes vague statements, for example, “maintenance and fur-
ther development of Arctic know-how, research and special 
expertise require strategic choices and decisions on the part of 
Finland” (2010, 9).
Finally, housing infrastructure is mentioned in both docu-
ments, but only in passing. For example, the 2013 Strategy 
states in the section, Technological Applications, that “other 
elements essential to housing, services and government ac-
tions are to improve risk management, and to secure sufficient 
data communications capacity and performance in the sparse-
ly populated northern regions” (2013, 11). Similarly, in the 
2010 Strategy, the idea of housing infrastructure is suggested 
in a sentence that mentions “housing construction” (2010, 9) 
as part of Finland’s Arctic expertise. Neither document pro-
vides an assessment of the state of housing and of what, if any-
thing, needs to be improved. 
According to the two strategies, the Science and Education 
indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total coded quotes in 
the 2013 Strategy and 7% of the 2010 Strategy (see Figure 7, 
p. 44), notes that regional change and the climate appear to 
drive much of Finland’s research. Both documents recognize 
that regional change occurs, partly due to climate change, 
while the 2013 Strategy also recognizes that change can also 
come from “the exploitation of natural resources and land use. 
As they affect both the environment and society, an inter-dis-
ciplinary approach is required” (2013, 23; 2010, 14). Climate 
is also discussed in relation to climate change, but also in the 
context of “cold climate expertise” (2013, 23, 24). 
In addition to making scientific contributions, the two strate-
gies outline other purposes, or uses, of Finnish research. For 
example, the two documents stress that research can also be 
used for decision making, and economic and social purpos-
es. Indeed, the 2013 Strategy states that “the new knowledge 
generated by research needs to be actively disseminated to 
support decision making, expand business opportunities and 
increase general awareness of the Arctic among the public at 
large” (2013, 24; 2010, 13, 20), while the 2010 Strategy explains 
that, in the case of social issues, “a study on the living condi-
tions, values and attitudes of young people helps outline the 
future of Northern Finland” (2010, 22). The 2013 Strategy also 
explains that research can be used for gaining and maintain 
geopolitical influence in the region because “Finland will be 
able to consolidate its position and increase its appeal as a 
leading world-class expert in the Arctic” (2013, 24).
To facilitate its research, Finland has different types of science 
infrastructure. First, there is physical infrastructure which in-
cludes icebreakers and “infrastructure in Sodankylä and Pal-
las, among other places” (2013, 24; see also: 2010, 22). Second, 
higher education institutions are also considered infrastruc-
ture. Pages 24 through 26 of the 2013 Strategy list the different 
institutions in Finland and their areas of specialization, while 
the 2010 Strategy specifically identifies “the University of Lap-
land and the University of Oulu” because they “have been pro-
filed as experts in Arctic and northern research and education” 
(2010, 23). Third, scientific networks also serve as infrastruc-
ture, such as the National Committee of Arctic and Antarctic 
Research mentioned in the 2010 Strategy, while the 2013 Strat-
egy notes the proposal “that the EU Arctic Information Centre 
be established in the form of a network involving 19 European 
institutions engaged in Arctic research and communications” 
(2013, 47; see also: 2010, 23).
Finnish knowledge is discussed in both strategies, although 
with more detail in the 2013 document. One aspect of knowl-
edge is traditional and local knowledge. The 2013 Strategy 
states that “an important source of Finnish Arctic expertise is 
familiarity with the local conditions” (2013, 24). To this end, 
both strategies stress that traditional knowledge is important, 
especially in the context of biodiversity (2013, 14; 2010, 17). 
Another aspect is ensuring that research takes a multi- or in-
terdisciplinary approach, especially in relation to the changing 
nature of the region (2013, 23; 2010, 22–23). Innovation is re-
lated to knowledge; space technology in the larger context of 
the EU, is also mentioned in the 2013 Strategy because “in EU 
politics, it is important to be able to shape the priorities of the 
EU’s R&D programmes related to the Arctic” (2013, 47). 
Neither document focuses on education as much as on science 
and research. Perhaps, this is because the 2013 Strategy com-
mends the Finnish education system, stating that “Finland’s 
extensive and in-depth Arctic expertise is a result of its high-
ly advanced education system, where its position as an Arctic 
country is taken into account at all levels” (2013, 13). Certainly, 
the quality of education also seems to be linked to Finnish ex-
pertise. The 2010 Strategy also makes this connection, stating 
that “Finland possesses top-level Arctic know-how in many 
sectors. However, maintenance of this know-how requires 
relevant university-level education, correctly targeted invest-
ments, and national and international cooperation” (2010, 20). 
Despite the limited focus on education, the two strategies do 
address access to education in three ways. First, both docu-
ments mention joint university programs, such as “the Nordic 
Mining School, jointly launched by the Universities of Oulu 
and Luleå” in the 2013 Strategy, and that the Universities of 
Lapland and Oulu “have a joint research programme and four 
international Master’s programmes together with Universities 
in Northwest Russia” in the 2010 Strategy (2013, 21; 2010, 23). 
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Second, both documents refer to the University of the Arctic. 
However, instead of discussing the range of programs offered 
or whether this has increased access to higher education, the 
strategies focus on the administration of the network by the 
University of Lapland and the University of Oulu (2010 only) 
(2013, 25; 2010, 23). Finally, the 2010 Strategy mentions the 
“Saamelaisalueen koulutuskeskus (Training Centre for the 
Sámi Region), located in Inari, [which] provides vocational 
basic and further training for the needs of enterprise in the 
Sámi region” (2010, 23). 
For the Implementation, both documents provide extensive de-
tail on this process. The final section of both documents is ded-
icated to strategy implementation. For the 2010 Strategy, this 
section is called “Conclusions: Objectives And Proposals For 
Action” and presents “sector-specific objectives and concrete 
proposals for action” (2010, 52), while also identifying which 
ministries will take responsibility. There is not a great deal of in-
formation on how these objectives will be achieved, nor is there 
any discussion of follow-up. The implementation section in the 
2013 Strategy is called “Objectives And Actions For Attaining 
Them” (2013, 49). The absence of details from the 2010 doc-
ument is addressed in the 2013 Strategy, which acknowledges 
that the “current strategy gives a more comprehensive presenta-
tion of the actions necessary for achieving these goals based on 
revised objectives” (2013, 18). This final section of the strategy 
thus identifies action items for the different objectives, and spe-
cific ministries are assigned for implementation. The ministries 
will also be responsible for follow-up on their actions, while “the 
monitoring and implementation of the strategy is overseen by 
the Arctic Advisory Board” (2013, 49). While the action items 
are brief and do not offer specifics of how they will be imple-
mented, they do, however, seem to be realistic even if there are 
no time frames attached to them. Another observation is that 
the same ministries are mentioned repeatedly, raising questions 
about their capacity to accomplish their goals.
Implementation budgets are not strongly identified in the 2010 
Strategy. For example, the document states that “up until now, 
the scale of operations has been slightly under 800,000 euros 
per year, most of which is provided by the Ministry for For-
eign Affairs. The rest of the funding comes from the Ministry 
of the Environment and the Ministry of Education and Culture” 
(2010, 43). Additionally, funding for regional activities may 
come from regional bodies like the Northern Dimension (2010, 
42). The government also considers other international sources 
of funding. According to the Strategy, “Finland’s Arctic opera-
tions can also be enhanced by creating a more well-defined na-
tional financing approach. It should be pondered whether the 
neighbouring area cooperation funds can increasingly be used 
to finance Finland’s participation in regional cooperation, in-
cluding Arctic cooperation” (2010, 43). For the 2013 Strategy, 
it does not seem as if new funding is provided either. Instead, 
“the Strategy for the Arctic Region will be implemented through 
sector-specific measures in accordance with the central govern-
ment spending limits and budget” and “EU funding will be allo-
cated to the projects subject to EU Programmes and the condi-
tions established for EU support” (2013, 7). Moreover, funding 
may be sought from private sources (2013, 7). The Strategy also 
discusses long-term funding and budgeting and states that “the 
actions to be taken over a longer period of time will be specifi-
cally prioritised in connection with future spending limits de-
cisions and central government budgets, and revised to match 
other developments” (2013, 49).
To sum up
To begin the analysis of the Finnish strategies, Figure 7 at the 
start of the Finland section shows that for the 2013 Strategy the 
three most-coded indicators are Economy, followed by Gover-
nance, and the Human Dimension. Similarly, for the 2010 Strat-
egy, Governance and the Economy are in the top two, while the 
third most-coded indicator is International Cooperation. This 
difference is not surprising, given that the 2010 Strategy focuses 
on external issues. 
The three-least coded indicators in the 2013 Strategy are Pollu-
tion, Climate Change, and Environmental Protection. In con-
trast, the three least-coded indicators in the 2010 Strategy are 
Tourism, Security, and Climate Change. This shows that tour-
ism and security grew in importance for the Finnish govern-
ment following the release of the 2010 Strategy. 
Now that each indicator has been analyzed, it is easier to deter-
mine if the priorities for the 2013 Strategy have been met. The 
document identifies “the creation of new business opportuni-
ties” as a priority, and this would be correlated with the Econo-
my indicator, which is the most-coded indicator for the docu-
ment. This suggests that the priority has been met, especially as 
the Strategy identifies a wide range of economic activities and 
discusses different ways in which the government will prioritize 
the regional economy. The priority of “environment and the re-
gion’s security and stability” is addressed in different indicators. 
As for the environment aspect, the Environmental Protection 
indicator was one of the least-coded indicators in 2013. How-
ever, when Environmental Protection, Pollution, and Climate 
Change are added together, they become the second most-cod-
ed topics (see Appendix), thus showing that environmental con-
cerns are prioritized, especially as the discussions takes envi-
ronmental concerns seriously. As for the security and stability 
aspect, the Security indicator is in the middle in terms of the 
percentage of coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy. However, the 
percentage of coded security quotes grew from 2010 (see Figure 
7, p. 42), suggesting the government is placing more importance 
in this area, as evidenced by a more detailed discussion of it in 
the 2013 Strategy.
The International Cooperation indicator falls in the middle with 
respect to its level of coding. However, cooperation is also par-
tially addressed in the Governance indicator, which is the sec-
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ond most-coded indicator for the 2013 Strategy. This suggests 
that the priority of “international cooperation” is a priority, al-
though the 2013 Strategy does not speak to the issue as much 
as the 2010 Strategy does (see Figure 7, p. 42). This, however, is 
not surprising when one considers that the 2010 Strategy is de-
signed to focus more on external concerns. The priority of “Arc-
tic expertise in the widest sense of the term” is connected to the 
Economy and Science and Education indicators. The Economy 
has the highest percentage of coded quotes, showing an increase 
from the 2010 Strategy. The Science and Education indicator is 
in the middle in terms of the coded quotes. In view of this, it is 
inferred that the priority of [developing] Arctic expertise has 
been met. Finally, the priorities of “bolstering Finland’s position 
regarding the Arctic region” and “the position of the northern 
parts of Finland” can also be accounted for with the Interna-
tional Cooperation, Governance, Science and Education, and 
Economy indicators, which also suggests these priorities are 
met. 
There are also some connections between the different indica-
tors and themes. For example, the Security indicator identifies 
the need for international cooperation, especially as new energy 
developments have the potential to create new security consid-
erations. Additionally, security and stability also contribute to 
the wellbeing of northerners, as noted in the Human dimension. 
Another linkage exists between the Economy, Environment, 
and Pollution indicators as an increase in economy activity can 
cause pollution and damage the environment. At the same time, 
tourism growth, in part, depends on the existence of a healthy 
environment. Governance, too, is connected to the Science and 
education indicator, as research informs governance decisions, 
and also to the International cooperation indicator, as gover-
nance requires that cooperation takes place at different levels; it 
is also connected to the Human dimension through discussions 
on Indigenous governance. 
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant sim-
ilarities and the three most relevant differences are discussed. 
There are many similarities between the two documents, al-
though two points stand out. First, international cooperation is 
an important aspect of Finland’s strategies, and there is continu-
ity between the two documents in relation to the importance of 
international cooperation and the use of international law to re-
solve disputes. The two strategies further identify international 
organizations and structures such as BEAC, the UN, UNCLOS, 
IMO, and the Arctic Council with respect to how they either 
promote cooperation and/ or create legal frameworks that can 
foster cooperation. With regard to the Arctic Council, both 
strategies remark that it should move towards a treaty-based 
system, which could give it more authority. Second, there are 
similarities with regard to economic goals. Both documents 
mention a broad range of economic activities, from energy, to 
natural resource development, forestry, and reindeer herding, to 
name a few. At the same time, the two strategies also stress that 
Finland will prioritize areas in which they have expertise, such 
as cold climate services and goods. Sustainable development 
is also important, especially in connecting the economic, en-
vironmental, and social to sustainability. Both documents also 
highlight the important relationship between the private sector 
and academia for economic development, as well as the role of 
financing companies.
There are also three key differences between the documents 
that stand out. First, is the issue of nuclear safety and waste. As 
mentioned above, both documents remark upon this; however, 
the 2010 Strategy provides a more in-depth look at different ap-
proaches to addressing the issue, including through structures 
like the G8. The reason for this shift in focus away from nu-
clear waste is unclear and raises questions as to why this issue 
was dropped from the agenda. Second, both documents men-
tion the importance of security and regional stability, especially 
through international cooperation. However, the 2013 Strategy 
pays more overall attention to security than the 2010 Strategy 
does. For instance, the 2013 Strategy provides more informa-
tion on Finland’s security objectives, including soft security is-
sues like safety, and stresses the importance of interoperability. 
Additionally, the 2013 Strategy also reflects on civilian security 
issues like crime, thus painting a broader picture of regional 
security concerns. Moreover, the 2010 Strategy positions cli-
mate change as a safety issue while the 2013 Strategy positions 
it as a security issue. This difference can be subtle, as safety can 
sometimes be considered soft security. However, the sentiment 
on climate change did shift between strategies from concerns 
about floods to maintaining regional stability. Third, there is a 
shift between the two documents in the way that the strategies 
address the EU. The 2010 Strategy dedicates an entire section 
to the “THE EU AND THE ARCTIC REGION” with almost 
eight full pages of text (2010, 44). In contrast, the 2013 Strategy 
addresses the “EU’s role in the Arctic” as the final discussion of 
the section on “International Cooperation in the Arctic” and 
dedicates only a little more than one page to this discussion. 
Both strategies are clear that Finland wants to have influence in 
the EU’s Arctic policy, but, there is one key difference between 
the documents – the timing of the EU’s submission for Observ-
er status in the Arctic Council. The 2010 Strategy explains that 
this is a goal for Finland (2010, 44); thus, it is not surprising 
there is much detail regarding the EU’s regional activities. The 
2013 Strategy, in contrast, was released in August 2013, two-
and-a-half months after the Arctic Council decided to delay 
their decision on the EU’s application at the Kiruna Ministerial 
Meeting in May 2013 (see Arctic Council 2015b). 
Overall, the two documents show consistency between Fin-
land’s approach to governing their Arctic, while also updating 
and adapting the country’s course of action to meet new re-
gional challenges. 
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Iceland
There are two main Arctic strategy documents for Iceland: the 
current A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy 
from 2011, and the 2009 document Iceland’s Position in the 
Arctic. The 2009 document, which is in Icelandic and consists 
of 67 pages including pictures, is analyzed here as an unofficial 
2-page English translation. Prior to these documents, the Ice-
landic government produced two reports on Arctic maritime 
transportation. The first, in 2006, was a “report of a working 
group of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs” called North Meets 
North: Navigation and the Future of the Arctic (Iceland MFA 
2006, 1). The second document was conference proceedings 
called Breaking the Ice. Arctic Development and Maritime Trans-
portation: Prospects of the Transarctic Route - Impact and Op-
portunity, “organized by the Icelandic Government” and also a 
“contribution to the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment” (Iceland Government, 2007, cover page). For the 
purposes of this analysis, only the 2009 and 2011 documents 
are analyzed. 
The 2011 A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy, 
with 13 pages of text, starts by clearly laying out, as a strategy, 
12 principles, or priority areas, before exploring them further. 
Iceland’s priorities can be understood based on these 12 princi-
ples which include: 1) “promoting and strengthening the Arctic 
Council”; 2) “securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state”; 3) 
defining the Arctic region’ 4) using UNCLOS for dispute res-
olution; 5) “strengthening and increasing cooperation with the 
Faroe Islands and Greenland”; 6) “supporting the rights of In-
digenous peoples in the Arctic”; 7) “building on agreements and 
promoting cooperation”; 8) “prevent human-induced climate 
change”; 9) “safeguarding broadly defined security interests in 
the Arctic”; 10) “developing further trade relations between 
States in the Arctic region”; 11) “advancing Icelanders’ knowl-
edge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland abroad”; 120 “in-
creasing consultations and cooperation at the domestic level” 
(Iceland Althingi 2011, 1–3). 
The priorities from the short 2009 document are not as clearly 
laid out; however, they are implied based on the different sec-
tion headings including: international cooperation, security, 
resource development and environmental protection, transpor-
tation, people and culture, and science and monitoring (Iceland 
MFA 2009, 1, 2). 
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides a good understanding of how Iceland views its position in 
the Arctic. The 2011 Strategy, for example, explains that Iceland 
does not put strict boundary limits on the region. For example, 
2  These two quotes are included because the unofficial translation makes clear Iceland’s views on their position in the region. 
“the Arctic region should therefore be regarded as a single vast 
area in an ecological, political, economic and security-related 
sense, but not in a narrow geographical sense with the Arctic 
Circle, tree line or a temperature of 10 degrees centigrade in July 
as a reference point” (2011, 7). Yet, the document also seems to 
justify Iceland’s status in the region based on one such defini-
tion. It states that “Iceland is geographically located by the Arc-
tic Circle and is therefore within the Arctic” (2011, 6). Regard-
less of how the Arctic is defined in this strategy, it is a departure 
from the 2009 document. While we are generally not quoting 
the unofficial translation, the document is clear in stating that 
Iceland is “on the periphery of the Arctic in the centre of the 
North Atlantic Ocean” (2009, 2). At the same time, the docu-
ment also states that “Iceland is the only country located entirely 
within the Arctic region and its prosperity relies heavily on the 
sustainable utilization of its resources” (2009, 1).2 
The Arctic is described similarly in both documents. For ex-
ample, they both comment about the fragility of the ecosystem, 
environment, and the region’s resources (2011, 2, 6; 2009, 1). 
The 2011 Strategy also suggests the region has become geopolit-
ically important. According to the Strategy, “the importance of 
the Arctic region in international affairs has increased consider-
ably in recent years on account of debate about climate change, 
natural resources, continental shelf claims, social changes and 
new shipping routes” (2011, 3). The two strategies primarily re-
fer to the region as the “Arctic,” although the 2011 Strategy uses 
the term “North” a couple of times (2011, 4, 6) and the 2009 
document refers to the “High North” in the context of resource 
development near Jan Mayen Ridge (2009, 2).
Neither document provides much information on what min-
istries are responsible for the Arctic. For example, the 2011 
Strategy states that “Althingi [Icelandic Parliament] entrusts the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs with the implementation and de-
velopment of the policy in cooperation with other relevant min-
istries, as well institutions and organisation working on Arctic 
Affairs, and in consultation with the Foreign Affairs Committee 
and the Environment Committee of Althingi on the policy de-
sign as necessary” (2011, 3). The 2009 document only mentions 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2009, 2). 
Figure 8 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) for the 2011 Strategy. 
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Figure 8. Iceland’s 2011 Strategy 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole num-
ber and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each doc-
ument. Only the 2011 Strategy is shown here as the 2009 Strategy is a short and 
unofficial translation and cannot be compared quantitatively.
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 7 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8). Both docu-
ments, and especially the 2011 Strategy, spend some time ad-
dressing issues of Indigenous peoples, despite Iceland not hav-
ing a native Indigenous population. The 2011 Strategy provides 
some demographic information and recognizes that “it is be-
lieved that Arctic Indigenous peoples are at least 375,000 and 
divided into around 40 distinct peoples who speak different 
languages” (2011, 9). In terms of human rights, the 2011 Strat-
egy argues that there needs to be more effort to protect Indig-
enous rights, especially as they are not always taken seriously. 
Therefore, “as a small nation and an advocate of human rights, 
Iceland should support the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples 
and promote their involvement in decision-making in all issues 
affecting their communities, whether they entail political, so-
cial, cultural, economic or environmental interests” (2011, 8). 
The 2009 document does not focus on these issues, and instead 
recognizes that culture should be preserved through technolo-
gy. It also notes that Indigenous peoples participate in the Arctic 
Council (2009, 1, 2). 
The 2011 Strategy addresses health and wellbeing in two differ-
ent ways. First, it links health and wellbeing to environmental 
conditions. Efforts must thus be made to address “human-in-
duced climate change and its effects in order to improve the 
wellbeing of Arctic residents and their communities” (2011, 2). 
Second, there is a recognition that economic activities, espe-
cially in the extractive resource sector, will affect northerners 
(2011, 3; 2009, 1). Thus, improving health and wellbeing re-
quires research on different issues such as “economic and social 
development, gender equality, health care issues” (2011, 11). 
Additionally, “contracting businesses from Iceland are working 
in Greenland and cooperation on health care issues has been 
successful” (2011, 8), suggesting an interest in health and well-
being outside of Iceland. 
Migration is mentioned in the 2011 Strategy, albeit in the con-
text of the Hoyvik Free Trade Agreement with the Faroe Islands. 
More specifically, it allows for “movement of persons and right 
of residence” (2011, 8), which is notable, as the Faroe Islands are 
not a part of the EU. 
The Governance indicator, which accounts for 26 % of the to-
tal coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8), focuses 
on “increasing consultations and cooperation at the domestic 
level on Arctic issues” (including the participation of all minis-
tries, local governments, the academic community, industries, 
non-governmental organizations) “to ensure increased knowl-
edge of the importance of the Arctic region, democratic discus-
sion and solidarity on the implementation of the Government’s 
Arctic policy” (2011, 3, 11). Behind as an ultimate aim is that 
“Iceland’s legal position in the North needs to be further se-
cured in order to put Iceland on equal footing with the other 
coastal States in the region, [and] the Government should take 
the initiative of developing arguments in support of this objec-
tive in cooperation with the relevant institutions” (2011, 6). 
The 2009 document emphasizes the importance of cooperation 
in two ways. First, there is discussion about working with Gree-
land and the Faroe Islands on shared issues. Second, it recog-
nizes that science cooperation contributes to decision making, 
especially in light of changes occuring in the region. 
The 2011 Strategy further states that “emphasis should be placed 
on Iceland’s role in the intensified relationship between Arctic 
communities and in increasing economic relations” (2011, 10). 
The 2011 Strategy also recognizes the importance of the Com-
mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) which is 
responsible “to consider submissions by coastal States concern-
ing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical 
miles, and to make recommendations related to those limits”. 
The strategy points out that “the outer limits of the continental 
shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of recommen-
dations by the CLCS shall be final and binding” (2011, 7). Fur-
thermore, the 2011 Strategy addresses IMO and its “established 
guidelines for ship design and safety equipment for ships oper-
ating in ice-covered waters and there is a willingness to make 
the guidelines legally binding” (2011, 9). Correspondingly, the 
2009 Strategy warns that there is a need for IMO to increase 
maritime safety in icy waters, especially as cruise ships are not 
always prepared for these condition (2009, 1).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator, which accounts for 16 % of the total coded quotes for 
the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8), follows up on the governance 
indicator by emphasizing the importance of cooperation on the 
part of all eight Arctic states. The 2009 document stresses that 
regional cooperation is important to Iceland (2009, 1). Further-
more, Iceland argues that “increased cooperation between the 
West Nordic countries will strengthen their international and 
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economic position as well as their politico-security dimen-
sion” (2011, 8). The 2011 Strategy then highlights “increasing 
cooperation with the Faroe Islands and Greenland with the 
aim of promoting the interests and political position of the 
three countries” (2011, 2).
The 2011 Strategy also refers to the meetings of the five Arctic 
States (the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway and Kingdom of Den-
mark) in Ilulissat in 2008 and in Chelsea in 2010, where the rest 
of the Arctic Council member states (Iceland, Finland, Sweden) 
and Arctic Indigenous peoples were excluded. Followed from 
this, it remarks that “if consultation by the five States develops 
into a formal platform for regional issues, it can be asserted that 
solidarity between the eight Arctic States will be dissolved and 
the Arctic Council considerably weakened” (2011, 4, 5, 6). Fur-
thermore, “the Icelandic Government has publicly, as well as in 
talks with the five States in question, protested their attempts 
to assume decision-making power in the region” which would 
be carried out only by the Arctic Five. Therefore, “further ef-
forts that may undermine the Arctic Council and Iceland’s in-
terests in the region must be prevented”. In addition to that, “it 
is also necessary to ensure that Indigenous peoples are able to 
maintain and cultivate their cultural uniqueness, strengthen the 
infrastructure of their own communities and work towards im-
proving their living standards” (2011, 6, 9).
The 2011 Strategy comments that “as an Arctic state and a 
founding member of the Arctic Council” Iceland recognizes 
“the Arctic Council as the most important consultative forum” 
for regional and international cooperation of all the Arctic 
states with the participation of Indigenous organizations focus-
ing on sustainable development in the region (2011, 1, 4, 5, 6). 
Indeed, “Iceland is among the countries that want to increase 
the Arctic Council’s weight and relevance in decisions on the 
region, where necessary.” According to the 2011 Strategy, “the 
role of the Arctic Council needs to be enhanced.” Therefore, it 
is of “great importance that consensus is reached across the po-
litical spectrum on an Arctic policy which aims at positioning 
Iceland among those countries that have the greatest influence 
on future development in the region; safeguarding economic, 
environmental and security-related interests in the North; and 
working towards closer cooperation with other nations, inter-
national organisations, autonomous regions and stakeholders.” 
Importantly, the “individual Member States must be prevented 
from joining forces to exclude other Member States from im-
portant decisions, which would undermine the Arctic Council 
and other Arctic States, including Iceland” (2011, 4, 5, 6; also: 
2009, 1). The Strategy also addresses the “increased interna-
tional interest in the region” demonstrated by high number of 
countries and organizations that have “applied for permanent 
observer status in the Arctic Council” (2011, 5).
In the sphere of international/regional cooperation, Iceland 
further emphasizes good relations with other states, “within 
the Nordic cooperation, defence cooperation with the United 
States, regional defence and security cooperation with Norway, 
Denmark and Canada, cooperation with the other seven Arc-
tic States in the Arctic Council, relations with the European 
Union through participation in the so-called Northern Dimen-
sion (a cooperative forum including Russia, the EU, Iceland and 
Norway) and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council, 
through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and within the North-
ern Dimension” (2011, 7). The 2009 document further supports 
the importance of international cooperation within the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) (2009, 1). 
In addition, “all the Arctic States support the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and have pledged to abide by 
the Convention”. Therefore, “disputes in the field of the law of the 
sea cannot be ruled out, however, for example over the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf.” Both documents further emphasize 
that “it must be ensured that the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea forms the basis for the settlement of possible 
disputes over jurisdiction and rights in the Arctic region” (2011, 
4, 7; 2009, 4). 
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 3 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55). Both 
documents comment on the fragility of the Arctic’s environment, 
and the 2011 Strategy lays out a clear environmental priority. In 
particular, it states that “Iceland will concentrate its efforts fully 
on ensuring that increased economic activity in the Arctic region 
will contribute to sustainable utilisation of resources and observe 
responsible handling of the fragile ecosystem and the conserva-
tion of biota” (2011, 2). The connection between environmental 
protection and economic activities is also made in the 2009 Strat-
egy, particularly in relation to shipping and resource development 
(2009, 1). It is not surprising, therefore, that both documents 
comment on the need to monitor the ocean for pollution (2011, 
10; 2009, 1). The 2011 Strategy suggests that environmental pro-
tection can, in part, be improved through security cooperation as 
well as through economic activity (2011, 2).
Wildlife protection, especially of fish, is addressed in both 
strategies. According to the 2011 Strategy, “the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement established a framework for the cooperation between 
coastal States and States fishing on the high seas within regional 
fisheries management organisations regarding conservation and 
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks” (2011, 9). In contrast to this, the 2009 document seeks to 
protect fish from the damage caused by oil spills (2009, 1). 
The Pollution indicator is addressed only in the 2011 Strategy 
and accounts for 4 % of the total coded quotes in the document 
(see Figure 8). Only greenhouse gases are mentioned as a pol-
lutant, and the document suggests that the shipping industry is 
responsible for this pollution (2011, 9, 10). Although there is 
little mentioned on the sources and types of pollution, the Strat-
egy does identify a number of ways to address the issue. First, it 
recognizes that frameworks such as UNCLOS, the IMO, and the 
UNFCCC provide guidance on “pollution prevention” (2011, 2, 
3, 9). Second, pollution is also positioned as a security concern. 
Interestingly, NATO is also recognized for pollution prevention 
as “a statement [on this] was released in connection with the 
NATO Conference on Arctic issues in Iceland in January 2009” 
(2011, 10). 
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States
57
As previously mentioned, only the 2011 Strategy addresses the 
Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total 
coded quotes (see Figure 8). The Strategy puts forward differ-
ent approaches related to climate action. This in part includes 
conducting climate change research and recognizing that “oth-
er States and alliances, such as China, Japan and the European 
Union, have also wanted to have influence on current develop-
ments, including various cross-national factors such as climate 
change” (2011, 4, 11). Additionally, Iceland will work within 
the UNFCCC framework and follow the sustainable devel-
opment principles, while “cooperating on efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, including utilisation of renewable 
energy sources” (2011, 9). 
The Security indicator is mainly discussed in the 2011 Strategy 
(12 % of the total coded quotes) (see Figure 8). The document 
refers to the peaceful cooperation among the Arctic States since 
the end of the Cold War. At the same time, security relies on 
cooperation, respect for the law, and environmental protection 
(2009, 1). The 2011 Strategy follows up on that by stating that 
“general security must be strengthened in the Arctic region and 
the militarisation of the area prevented.” Furthermore, “coop-
eration must be strengthened and bilateral agreements sought 
with individual Arctic countries, similar to agreements made 
with Denmark, Norway and Canada on specific security issues” 
(2011, 10). The 2011 Strategy further emphasizes “the impor-
tance of the Nordic cooperation, defence cooperation with the 
United States, regional defence and security cooperation with 
Norway, Denmark and Canada, cooperation with the other sev-
en Arctic States in the Arctic Council, relations with the Eu-
ropean Union through participation in the so-called Northern 
Dimension (a cooperative forum including Russia, the EU, Ice-
land and Norway) and cooperation with Russia in the Arctic 
Council, through the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and with-
in the Northern Dimension” (2011, 7). According to the 2011 
Strategy, “there is common willingness among the Arctic States 
to increase cooperation of this kind”. Particularly, “common 
security interests involve surveillance and the capacity for re-
sponse to danger, not least on account of environmental acci-
dents, accidents at sea and maritime activity in connection with 
oil extraction and other resource utilisation” (2011, 10).
Further discussion about improvement of “preparedness and 
monitoring of the region” is provided in the 2011 document 
(2011, 10). The Strategy recognizes the “growing international 
importance of the region which has led to an increasing pre-
paredness on behalf of the Arctic States to guard their sovereign 
interests, without having led to militarisation.” Furthermore, the 
importance of investment in “developing the capacities of res-
cue services, the coast guard and the police” is mentioned (2011, 
10). The Strategy also refers to the Stoltenberg report, which 
“addresses Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy, 
[and] includes numerous ideas related to the common interests 
of the Nordic countries in the Arctic” (2011, 10).
Iceland’s government also addresses potential conflicts in the 
2011 Strategy arising from the Continental shelf claims, stating 
that these claims by Arctic States “have yet to be settled within 
the framework of international law, not least the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Indeed, “all the Arctic States 
support the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
and have pledged to abide by the Convention.” The document 
states that “it must be ensured that the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea forms the basis for the settlement 
of possible disputes over jurisdiction and rights in the Arctic 
region. Although there are few indications that the Arctic will 
be an area of conflict in the near future, it cannot be ruled out 
that disputes arising from continental shelf claims will compro-
mise relations between the Arctic States” (2011, 3,7). The Strat-
egy further mentions “several unresolved issues” in this context 
connected to stability in the Arctic, including: “i) The United 
States and Canada are involved in a dispute over the Northwest 
Passage and a part of the Beaufort Sea which is estimated to 
hold vast oil deposits. The United States considers the North-
west Passage as an international strait whereas Canada consid-
ers the route its internal waters; ii) Denmark and Canada, on 
the one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, disagree on ju-
risdiction over the Lomonosov Ridge in the Arctic Ocean; iii) 
Most nations reject Norway’s claim of a 200 nautical miles zone 
around Svalbard on the basis of conditional sovereignty over the 
island and have refused to recognise their “fisheries protection 
zone” around it; iv) A dispute is ongoing between Canada and 
Denmark over Hans Island, which is located in the strait that 
separates Ellesmere Island from Northern-Greenland and con-
nects Baffin Bay with the Lincoln Sea” (2011, 4). 
The Strategy also emphasizes the importance of “safeguarding 
broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region through 
civilian means and working against any kind of militarisation 
of the Arctic.” At the same time, “Iceland’s cooperation with 
other states should be strengthened on the protection of biota, 
research, observation capabilities, search and rescue, as well as 
pollution prevention in the Arctic region, inter alia to protect 
Icelandic interests in the areas of environmental protection, so-
cial wellbeing and sustainable use of natural resources” (2011, 2). 
By increasing the “cooperation between the West Nordic coun-
tries” their “international and economic position as well as their 
politico-security dimension” will be strengthened (2011, 8).
Last, but not least, the 2011 document points to the role of 
NATO in the Arctic. The Strategy recognizes that NATO is 
“increasingly directing its attention towards the Arctic region 
again, even though the alliance has no plans for a military pres-
ence”. Nevertheless, “the interest in the region is not limited 
to the Arctic States themselves, since other States and organ-
isations maintain that they have direct or indirect interests at 
stake” (2011, 4). For example, in the conference on Arctic issues 
in January 2009 in Iceland “the alliance expressed its willingness 
to monitor and gather information and intelligence, as well as to 
strengthen its capabilities for rescue and pollution prevention at 
sea… It was reiterated that the purpose was not to promote the 
militarisation of the Arctic but to secure the stability that has 
been maintained since the Cold War in successful cooperation 
with Russia and even other nations outside the alliance, such as 
Finland and Sweden” (2011, 10).
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The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55) and identifies 
regional safety issues. First, the two strategies identify the mar-
itime and environmental safety in relation to economic activi-
ty, while the 2011 Strategy securitizes these issues. Indeed, the 
document states that “common security interests involve sur-
veillance and the capacity for response to danger, not least on 
account of environmental accidents, accidents at sea and mar-
itime activity in connection with oil extraction and other re-
source utilisation” (2011, 10; 2009, 1). Second, the 2011 Strategy 
addresses emergency preparedness by recognizing that “most of 
the Arctic States have opted to improve civil preparedness and 
monitoring of the region, inter alia by developing the capacities 
of rescue services, the coast guard and the police” (2011, 10).
 
The 2011 Strategy also identifies three structures that contrib-
ute to Arctic security. First is the Arctic Council and its legal-
ly binding SAR agreement. Second, the strategy suggests that 
NATO could contribute to regional SAR efforts (2011, 5, 10). 
Third, safety is also addressed with regard to the IMO which 
“has established guidelines for ship design and safety equipment 
for ships operating in ice-covered waters and there is a willing-
ness to make the guidelines legally binding” (2011, 9). Based on 
these comments, it seems that Iceland likes the idea of legally 
binding safety agreements and/or provisions. 
Neither document suggests the integration of national safety 
measures. Instead, the focus is on cooperation, especially in the 
context of surveillance. For instance, the 2009 Strategy men-
tions the possibility of Iceland creating an international capac-
ity to address safety (2009, 1). This idea is further discussed 
in the 2011 Strategy which states that “the Stoltenberg report, 
which addresses Nordic cooperation on foreign and security 
policy, includes numerous ideas related to the common inter-
ests of the Nordic countries in the Arctic, such as a joint mar-
itime monitoring and surveillance system that could be devel-
oped further to increase preparedness and surveillance in the 
region” (2011, 10).
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 13 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55), iden-
tifies a variety of economic activities. Both strategies note that 
Iceland is involved in renewable energy, extractive resource de-
velopment, fishing, and tourism (2011, 6, 8; 2009, 1, 2). With 
regard to extractive resources, the 2011 Strategy further ex-
plains that “Iceland enjoys continental shelf rights in the joint 
exploitation area between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island” and 
that “Iceland may for example be able to provide services in 
connection with future oil extraction areas in and off the coast 
of Northeast Greenland” (2011, 6, 8).
The 2011 Strategy identifies two ways to prioritize Iceland’s 
economy. First, Iceland wants to seeks an “intensified relation-
ship between Arctic communities and in increasing econom-
ic relations. The idea [of establishing] an Arctic Chamber of 
Commerce to promote trade cooperation between business-
es and industries in the region is an example” (2011, 10–11). 
Second, Iceland believes it has expertise that will be of benefit 
to the Arctic (2011, 10). However, economic activities are also 
regulated, especially in the case of the oil and gas sector. The 
fishing industry is also regulated, and in addition to the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement, “an agreement between Iceland and 
the Faroe Islands on fisheries within their respective exclusive 
economic zones is also in effect” (2011, 8). The 2009 document 
does not specifically address economic regulation, but it too ex-
presses the need to sustainable development and the protection 
of fish stocks (2009, 1, 2).
Only the 2011 Strategy refers to different economic actors, 
mostly in relation to trade. In particular, it mentions that the 
government creates the political context to facilitate economic 
relations, especially with Greenland. The government has also 
negotiated trade agreements, like the Hoyvik Free Trade Agree-
ment with the Faroe Islands (2011, 8, 11). Moreover, “other 
States and alliances, such as China, Japan and the European 
Union, have also wanted to have influence on current develop-
ments, including various cross-national factors such as climate 
change, possible utilisation of energy and the opening of new 
shipping routes” (2011, 4).
The Tourism indicator is briefly discussed twice in the 2011 
Strategy (1 % of the total coded quotes, see Figure 8, p. 55) 
stating that “Icelanders, more than other nations, rely on the 
fragile resources of the Arctic region, for example the indus-
tries of fishing, tourism and energy production” (2011, 6). The 
other time tourism is mentioned is in connection to coopera-
tion, with the Strategy emphasizing that “cooperation should 
be strengthened with Greenland and the Faroe Islands on Arc-
tic issues regarding trade, energy, resource utilisation, environ-
mental issues and tourism” (2011, 8).
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55). Both docu-
ments discuss different types of transportation infrastructure. 
First, there is a brief mention of air transport to Greenland in 
the 2011 Strategy as “air services between the countries have 
increased” (2011, 8), while the 2009 Strategy recognizes the 
potential for Keflavik International Airport to be a transit hub 
(2009, 2). Second, shipping is generally linked to transporta-
tion and is also discussed in the two strategies. In particular, 
the 2011 Strategy recognizes that “world trade may be subject 
to changes as melting sea ice opens up new Arctic shipping 
routes which connect the North Atlantic, the Arctic Ocean and 
the Pacific” (2011, 3) and that Iceland could become a hub for 
this activity (2009, 2). Of course, this will require safety and 
pollution measures, which have been discussed above in the 
respective indicators. 
The 2009 Strategy also mentions that ICT, and thus communi-
cations infrastructure, can play a role of cultural preservation 
(2009, 2), but does not state if these types of technologies exist 
or are still needed. 
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 6 % of the to-
tal coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy (see Figure 8, p. 55). The 
2011 Strategy provides a long list of topics that research should 
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cover including “climate change, glacier research, marine biolo-
gy, international politics and law, security, oil and gas extraction, 
history and culture, economic and social development, gender 
equality, health care issues and Arctic shipping” (2011, 11). Ad-
ditionally, the 2009 Strategy suggests that research should help 
inform policy (2009, 2).
In terms of facilitating research, both documents recognize 
the University of the Arctic (2011, 11; 2009, 2), while the 2011 
Strategy recognizes Iceland’s different research networks and 
the need to develop them. For example, “there is particular need 
to promote the involvement of Icelandic scholars and institu-
tions in international cooperation on Arctic science, such as the 
International Arctic Science Committee and work carried out 
by the Arctic Council working groups” (2011, 11). Both docu-
ments also comment on the possibility of the University of Ak-
ureyri housing an Arctic Centre (2011, 11; 2009, 2).
The Implementation indicator is addressed only by the 2011 
Strategy. There are twelve related points suggestive of action items; 
the opening sentence of the strategy is that “Althingi resolves to 
entrust the Government, after consultations with Althingi, with 
carrying out the following overarching policy on Arctic issues 
aimed at securing Icelandic interests with regard to the effects 
of climate change, environmental issues, natural resources, navi-
gation and social development as well as strengthening relations 
and cooperation with other States and stakeholders on the issues 
facing the region” (2011, 1). As previously mentioned in the (Re)
mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator, the Minister of 
Foreign affairs has the ultimate responsibility for implementa-
tion (2011, 3). However, there is no information on what kind of 
resources would be allocated to implementation activities, or if 
there will be any sort of evaluation process. 
To sum up
Figure 8 and Appendix show that the top coded indicators for 
Iceland’s 2011 Strategy are Governance, International Coopera-
tion, Economy, and Security. This suggests that the priorities of 
“promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council”; “strength-
ening and increasing cooperation with the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland”; “increasing consultations and cooperation at the 
domestic level”; “building on agreements and promoting coop-
eration”; “securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state”; using 
UNCLOS for dispute resolution; “safeguarding broadly de-
fined security interests in the Arctic”; and “developing further 
trade relations between States in the Arctic region” have like-
ly been met (see: 2011, 1–3). As for the priority of “supporting 
the rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic” and “advancing 
Icelanders’ knowledge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland 
abroad” (2011, 1–3), these are accounted for with the Human 
Dimension and Science and Education indicators, respectively. 
The priority to “prevent human-induced climate change” is ac-
counted for in the Climate Change indicator, which, however, is 
the second least-coded indicator. The final priority, defining the 
Arctic region, is captured in the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining 
the Arctic indicator, with the Strategy seeking to locate Iceland 
in the Arctic. 
There are also some connections between the different indi-
cators. For example, the Human Dimension is connected to 
the Climate Change indicator through discussions around the 
possibility of climate change affecting people’s health. The Gov-
ernance indicator is connected to the Safety indicator through 
discussions about the IMO and shipping safety. The Environ-
mental Protection and Pollution indicators are also connected 
to the Economy indicator, as economic activity affects the envi-
ronment and shipping can cause pollution. 
Making comparisons between these two documents can be diffi-
cult, especially with regard to the percentage of coded quotes, as 
the 2009 document is a translated and shortened version of the 
Icelandic original. Nonetheless, the key ideas are expressed and 
do allow for comparison, revealing two relevant similarities and 
three relevant differences between the two documents. In par-
ticular, two similarities are highly illustrative. First, both doc-
uments take similar approaches to environmental protection. 
As economic activities can negatively affect the environment, 
there needs to be a sustainable economy which also guarantees 
the protection of the fish stocks. Second, both documents ad-
dress transport infrastructure and shipping. The 2009 Strategy 
comments that Iceland could be an air transit hub, while the 
2011 Strategy comments that air services between Iceland and 
Greenland have increased. Similarly, the 2009 Strategy suggests 
the possibility of Iceland becoming a transit hub, while the 
2011 Strategy focuses on the possibility of new shipping routes 
and safety. 
There are also some differences between the two documents, 
three of which are discussed here. First, despite the fact that both 
documents address governance through international coopera-
tion, each focuses on different priorities. For example, the 2011 
document addresses business cooperation and responsibility, 
human rights, and delimiting the continental shelf through the 
CLCS, while the 2009 document mentions research cooper-
ation, and maritime safety through the IMO. In addition, the 
2011 document stresses the importance of cooperation with all 
Arctic states and clearly denounces the fragmentation caused by 
the Ilulissat Declaration. The document expresses a clear state-
ment of Iceland’s displeasure at the Ilulissat Declaration and the 
harm it could cause to Arctic cooperation. Iceland is not the 
only state excluded from Ilulissat, but it is the only state to make 
its displeasure known in such a formal way—neither Finland 
or Sweden commented on their exclusion in their strategies. 
Second, pollution and climate change are addressed only in the 
2011 document. Few pollutants and/or sources of pollution are 
identified; however, more attention is given to institutional ap-
proaches to addressing pollution in general. The climate change 
discussion then generally focuses on climate collaboration 
through formal institutions like the UNFCCC or cooperation 
with other states. Third, while both documents recognize that 
security and stability are achieved through cooperation, securi-
ty is addressed substantially only in the 2011 Strategy. The doc-
ument further develops these ideas by discussing the role of se-
curity organizations like NATO, and also the Arctic Council as a 
place to build and maintain relations. In addition, the document 
refers to NATO as an actor being able to help with pollution. 
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Overall, the key observation of the Icelandic documents high-
lights that Iceland is making special efforts to be convincing 
about its status as an Arctic State, as it definitely is, and even 
redefining its location as an island state in the Arctic and in the 
North Atlantic. This is partly due to the fact that Iceland is not 
among the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean, which became an 
important geographical and geopolitical factor due to, and after, 
the above-discussed Ilulissat Ministerial meeting of 2008.
The Kingdom of Denmark
The Kingdom of Denmark has released two strategies for the 
Arctic. The most current, Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020, 
was released in 2011 and has 58 pages including images and 
maps. Previously, Denmark also released a draft strategy in 
2008 called Arktis I en brydningstid. Forslag til strategi for akti-
viteter I det arktiske område, with 43 pages in Danish (Denmark 
NOU 2008). The document used for this analysis is an unofficial 
translation from 2008, The Arctic in an Upheaval. Draft Strate-
gy for Activities in the Arctic (Denmark 2008), consisting of 42 
pages with no images and, as such, it will be referred to but not 
quoted directly. Additionally, the Faroe Islands, in 2013, pro-
duced its own strategy called The Faroe Islands—A Nation in the 
Arctic: Opportunities and Challenges (Faroe Islands PMO 2013). 
However, as this is not a national strategy, it is not considered in 
the analysis that follows. 
The 2011 Strategy (Denmark MFA 2011) makes a clear state-
ment about Danish priorities in the Arctic, mentioning that 
“in an equal partnership between the three parts of the Danish 
Realm, the Kingdom will work overall for: 
• A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic
• with self-sustaining growth and development
• with respect for the Arctic’s fragile climate,  
environment and nature
• in close cooperation with our international partners”  
(2011, 10–11). 
The purpose of the Strategy is “to focus attention on the King-
dom’s strategic priorities for future development in the Arctic 
towards 2020”, and the “aim is to strengthen the Kingdom’s sta-
tus as global player in the Arctic” (2011, 11). 
The priorities of the unofficial translation can be gleaned from 
the section headings in the title page. These are: Home Rule ar-
rangement; Sovereignty; Arctic and Nordic cooperation; Orig-
inal people of the Arctic; Energy and minerals; Protection and 
sustainable use of natural; Weather, climate, nature and the 
environment; Research; Infrastructure; Commerce and indus-
tries; Joint Committee; Cultural cooperation in the Arctic; and 
Greenlandic higher education (2008, 1–3). 
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides information about how Denmark approaches the region. 
While neither strategy defines the Arctic outright, page 11 of the 
2011 Strategy provides a regional map showing what seems to 
be the 60th parallel, and suggests that this could be the Arctic’s 
boundaries (2011). If so, both Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
are included in this definition. 
The 2011 Strategy also tends to describe the region in relation 
to the environment. For example, it states that the Arctic’s “cli-
mate, environment and nature” are both fragile and vulnerable, 
and that the region has many “unique ecosystems” (2011, 31). 
At the same time, it also comments on the “extreme Arctic con-
ditions” (2011, 13), which seems a little at odds with the other 
descriptions. The Strategy also describes the region in relation 
to its growing geopolitical importance which is due to “the cli-
mate effects in the Arctic” and “the economic potential of the 
region” (2011, 9). Similar sentiments are expressed in the 2008 
Strategy and both documents also acknowledge that the Arctic 
is not heavily populated (2011, 16; 2008, 25). The 2011 Strategy 
uses the term “Arctic” to describe the region, while “circum-
polar” and “North” are each used once in the document (see: 
2011, 9, 36). 
Both documents identify different government ministries that 
will be involved in regional affairs. In both cases, the Gov-
ernments of Greenland and of the Faroe Islands are involved, 
demonstrating their self-governing status. Interestingly, there 
are only four ministries that appear in both documents, which 
are the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Ministry of Transport. Additionally, the 2011 Strategy identifies 
the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, the Ministry 
of Justice, the Faroe Island’s Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
and the Greenland’s Department of Foreign Affairs. The 2008 
document also mentions the Ministry of Environment and 
Food, the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building, and the 
Ministry of Education (2011, 14, 17, 20, 27, 35, 57; 2008, 12, 
13, 30, 32, 39, 41). 
Figure 9 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total 
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber) in the documents. 
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Figure 9. Comparing the Kingdom of Denmark’s 2008 and 2011 Strategies 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension, which accounts for 8 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 docu-
ment (see Figure 9), recognizes that the Arctic has a small and 
sparse population, especially Greenland (2008, 41). Addition-
ally, the 2011 Strategy explains that “the Arctic region is pop-
ulated by people, including more than 30 different Indigenous 
peoples such as the Inuit who originate from the Thule culture” 
(2011, 9). Thus, both documents discuss issues concerning In-
digenous peoples.
Both documents emphasize the Kingdom’s efforts to help pro-
tect the rights of Indigenous peoples, which seems to be a point 
of pride for the country, especially considering that “The Act on 
Greenland Self-Government was granted to Greenland on June 
21, 2009,” thus giving Greenland control over policies pertain-
ing to “education, health, fisheries, environment and climate” 
(Government of Greenland n.d.). This development is apparent, 
as the 2008 document recognizes that Greenland’s self-rule sta-
tus affords it rights and abilities that other Indigenous peoples 
do not have, and that the Kingdom of Denmark and Green-
land desire other Indigenous peoples to have the same rights 
(2008, 20). The 2011 Strategy builds on this, explaining that 
“Greenland’s self-government model, natural resource manage-
ment, climate policy, environmental policy and preservation of 
its cultural heritage is a model of inspiration for many of the 
world’s Indigenous peoples” (2011, 10). Not surprisingly, there-
fore, both documents discuss and support other mechanisms 
to protect Indigenous rights. For example, there are different 
venues within the UN, such as the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the rights of Indigenous peoples, the UN Expert Mechanism on 
Indigenous Peoples Rights, and UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (2011, 51, 52; 2008, 17, 20). 
Additionally, the 2008 document recognizes that the Arctic 
Council is another venue that addresses issues concerning In-
digenous peoples and that there is an Indigenous Peoples Secre-
tariat (2008, 19, 20).
 
Climate change, according to the 2011 Strategy, can contribute to 
rights violations in the Arctic; UNDRIP has a role to play here. 
More specifically, the Strategy states: “The Kingdom will assist 
in reinforcing the rights of Indigenous peoples in negotiations 
towards a new international climate agreement by promoting the 
visibility of Indigenous peoples’ situation and also ensuring that 
the principles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples from 2007 are observed” (2011, 44, 50). In addition to 
climate change, the 2008 document explains that hunting and 
fishing are also rights issues, especially in relation to Inuit cul-
ture (2008, 19–20, 24). The 2011 Strategy further expands on 
these issues, showing support for seal hunting. In particular, the 
Strategy explains: “The Kingdom will work internationally for 
the Arctic Indigenous peoples’ right to conduct hunting and to 
sell products from seal hunting, as long as it is based on sustain-
able principles” (2011, 32). This support is important because, 
even though the UN seal ban has a special provision for the Inu-
it, Greenland’s Inuit still experience challenges selling their furs 
(European Commission 2019; Raspotnik and Østhagen 2016).
The topic of health and wellbeing is discussed, and both strategies 
recognize the different issues that can affect health, especially in 
Greenland. The two documents mention that pollution is caus-
ing harm, while the 2008 document notes it affects breastfeeding 
mothers (2011, 45; 2008, 28). However, it is the 2011 Strategy 
that goes into depth on the situation in Greenland. In particular, 
the Strategy emphasizes that “Greenland today is facing a dual 
challenge from both old patterns of disease characterized by rel-
atively high infant mortality, accidents, and acute and chronic 
infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, as well as a new Western 
pattern of disease dominated by chronic and lifestyle-related dis-
eases” (2011, 40). Greenland has thus made substantial changes 
to its healthcare system that will result in improved access to care 
(2011, 40). Moreover, the 2011 Strategy recognizes that health-
care issues exist throughout the Arctic and can be addressed 
collectively. The document explains that “the cooperation be-
tween Arctic partners on common challenges should be further 
developed, especially based on a Greenland context. Enhanced 
Arctic cooperation could include, research, evaluation and also 
exchange of “good/best practices” regarding infectious diseases, 
public health, telemedicine, a culturally attuned health service 
and environmental medicine” (2011, 40).
The two strategies also comment on the Arctic Council’s con-
tributions to health and wellbeing. For example, the 2008 doc-
ument notes that the Council was associated with the Survey of 
Living Conditions in the Arctic and the Arctic Human Develop-
ment Report (2008, 18, 19). However, the Arctic Council could 
play a strong role in this area. The Strategy, too, remarks that 
the Arctic Council could play a stronger role. Indeed, “the Arctic 
Council must be reinforced as the only relevant political orga-
nization that has all Arctic states and peoples as members…The 
Kingdom will emphasize that the human dimension, i.e. people’s 
living conditions and wellbeing, is given increasingly more space 
in cooperation” (2011, 52).
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Equality is discussed in the 2011 Strategy in two ways. First, the 
document focuses on self-government for Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands. In particular, the document explains that “today, 
both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have extensive self-gov-
ernment” (2011, 10). Second, is gender equality in Greenland. 
Indeed, “Greenland is also sharing its experience on family 
matters and gender equality with, among others, the Nunavut 
region of Canada Furthermore, the Nordic Council of Ministers 
has been focusing on changes in the Arctic from a gender per-
spective” (2011, 40).
Finally, both documents speak to migration issues, albeit with 
different foci. Labour migration is a factor in the 2011 Strategy 
which comments that “it will also be a significant challenge for 
Greenland to develop policies which, apart from the goal of so-
cial and societal-related sustainability, deal with the prospect of 
significant foreign labour migration” (2011, 23), although there 
is no explanation as to why this would be the case. In contrast, 
the 2008 document comments on the challenges of identifying 
illegal migration (2008, 10) but does not explain if this is an 
issue that Greenland is facing.
The Governance indicator, which accounts for 18 % of the total 
coded quotes for the 2011 Strategy and 18 % of the 2008 docu-
ment (see Figure 9, p. 61), recognizes the importance of strength-
ening cooperation between Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland 
in different areas of research, decision-making and governance. 
The 2011 Strategy clearly states that “the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland have had home rule since 1948 and 1979, respec-
tively. Home rule arrangements have been continuously mod-
ernised, most recently by the Takeover Act on Power of Mat-
ters and Fields of Responsibility and the Act on Faroes Foreign 
Policy Powers of 2005 in the Faroe Islands and the Greenland 
Self-Government Act of 2009.” Apart from this, Greenland 
serves as an example and model for Indigenous peoples world-
wide with its “self-government model, natural resource man-
agement, climate policy, environmental policy and preserva-
tion of its cultural” (2011, 10). The document continues that 
“today, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have extensive 
self-government and the division of legislative and administra-
tive powers between the Kingdom’s three parts requires good 
cooperation and a joint strategy to meet the opportunities and 
challenges in the Arctic.” While Greenland is fully responsible 
for “decisions on development, exploration and exploitation of 
resources in Greenland… revenues from mineral activities will 
benefit both the Greenland and Danish people” (2011, 10; 2008, 
14, 29, 39).
Protection of the “rights of Indigenous peoples and their surviv-
al through respect for their culture, language and way of life” as 
well as the peoples’ right to self-determination under interna-
tional law is very important to the Kingdom of Denmark. Based 
on “the initiative of Denmark and Greenland,” a “Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues” under the UN framework was es-
tablished in 2002 (2011, 50, 51; 2008, 10, 17, 20, 40). The 2011 
Strategy also highlights the support of the Danish Realm “for 
cooperation among different institutions in the field of Arctic 
research concerning the development of best practices, public 
health and health-related consequences of pollution”, and gives 
high priority for Nordic, European and international coopera-
tion on research and education. In addition to this “the King-
dom will continue to develop cooperation in the health area, 
including emergency and specialist treatments within the King-
dom – and in the case of Greenland also with Iceland – and 
training and recruitment within the Kingdom and through 
Nordic and Arctic cooperation” (2011, 35, 40).
The 2011 document also refers to the mineral resources in 
Greenland, highlighting that the sector “has significantly ma-
tured over the last 10-15 years as a result of a long-term and 
deliberate strategy” based on the “adoption by Parliament 
Act No. 7 … on mineral resources and activities of relevance 
hereto the mineral resources sector was fully taken over by the 
Greenland Self-Government on 1 January 2010 and is a key 
element to building growth industries and a self-sustaining 
economy” (2011, 24). Furthermore, “in 2008, Greenland had 
already adopted the Parliament Act No. 6 of 5 December 2008 
on Greenland’s Mineral Resources Fund, which is inspired by 
the Norwegian model so that oil and gas revenues also benefit 
future generations… In 2000 the first licenses for exploration 
of the Faroese shelf were issued… In total, 17 licenses have 
been issued, of which 12 are currently active with a total of 11 
licensees.” (2011, 24, 25). 
Concerning the Faroe Islands, “one condition for acquiring a 
license is that a commitment must be entered into to finance ac-
tivities that build up local competencies.” Therefore, in regard to 
“radioactive minerals, the Self Government follows a zero-tol-
erance policy, which means that it does not permit the explora-
tion and exploitation of deposits that contain [any] radioactive 
elements… Terms and conditions for licenses to exploit must 
be reasonable for both larger and smaller companies, resilient 
to fluctuating market conditions as well as simple and easy to 
administrate for companies and authorities” (2011, 24, 25).
On the national level, the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland 
also pay attention to the protection of biodiversity in the Arctic. 
“Effective management and control regimes must be pursued to 
counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishery and hunt-
ing, and also work for international agreements on potentially 
attractive Arctic high seas not yet covered by the conservation 
and management systems” (2011, 32; 2008, 25). “The parts of 
the Danish Realm will work to ensure that in general fishery 
does not commence where a conservation and management 
system is not available.” The 2011 Strategy also lists key orga-
nizations in the fisheries and hunting sector, which include the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, the North 
Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization, the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Com-
mission, and the International Whaling Commission. Corre-
spondingly, on the international level, the 2011 Strategy states 
that “there is very limited understanding for the catch of ma-
rine mammals.” Additionally, this also applies to the “Greenland 
catch of large whales, which is regulated by the International 
Whaling Commission in accordance with the exemption that 
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applies to Indigenous peoples.” The Kingdom of Denmark “will 
also work towards the introduction of a special regional form 
of control for a prudent fishery in large ecosystems in sparsely 
populated areas where there is no historical data and where it is 
particularly challenging to collect data and carry out control.” 
The 2011 document emphasizes the importance of develop-
ment of methods “for sustainable management in situations 
of scientific uncertainty, whereby models are developed that 
support a learning management system based on the precau-
tionary principle” (2011, 32). 
Concerning the sensitive whaling issue, the Strategy clarifies 
that “each part of the Danish Realm is empowered to regulate 
the exploitation of whale resources in their own waters – though 
some whale species are subject to decisions to which the King-
dom is bound under the framework of the International Whal-
ing Commission (IWC).” The EU rules apply also to the waters 
of Kingdom of Denmark, “i.e. a total ban on whaling”. Neverthe-
less, “in Greenland, the hunting of small as well as large whales 
is operated in connection to the society’s food supply. Large 
whales are covered by the IWC’s regulatory powers. In case of 
the Faroe Islands, the commercial hunting of large whales was 
“previously operated, but [it] has for many years only operated 
non-commercial hunting of small whales, mostly pilot whales, 
which are not subject to the IWC” (2011, 33).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator, which accounts for 13 % of the total coded quotes for 
the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 document (see Figure 9, 
p. 61) emphasizes that “the Arctic has to be managed interna-
tionally on the basis of international principles of law to ensure 
a peaceful, secure and collaborative Arctic.” Furthermore, “in-
creased economic activity and renewed geopolitical interest in 
the Arctic results in a number of key challenges to ensuring a 
stable, peaceful and secure region characterized by dialogue, 
negotiation and cooperation” (2011, 7, 9, 10, 55; 2008, 7). In 
future international Arctic cooperation, the Kingdom of Den-
mark wants to play a key role as “international law and estab-
lished forums of cooperation provide a sound basis for conflict 
resolution and constructive cooperation in the development of 
the Arctic” (2011, 13; 2008, 5, 7). In addition to that, “within 
the entire spectrum of tasks, the Kingdom attaches great im-
portance to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic 
partner countries” (2011, 20; 2008, 6).
According to the 2011 Strategy “the Kingdom will prioritize 
global cooperation relevant to the Arctic, including, in partic-
ular, an ambitious focus on climate change, the protection of 
nature and the environment, strict global maritime rules, and 
continue giving high priority to Indigenous peoples’ rights.” 
Moreover, participation in relevant international fora, such as 
the European Union, is given high priority, as “cooperation with 
the EU is to be promoted and the Arctic to be given more weight 
in the Nordic context” (2011, 25, 49; 2008, 6, 12, 13, 15). The 
relations between the EU and Kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland should also be expanded and strength-
ened in order to contribute to the sustainable development. “It 
will be in the Kingdom’s interest to leave its mark on the shap-
ing and implementation of EU policies, for example, in energy, 
climate, fishing, hunting, exploitation of minerals and the rela-
tionship to the populations and Indigenous peoples in the Arc-
tic.” Furthermore, the 2011 Strategy highlights the importance 
of Arctic populations and their say in the “EU’s involvement 
in the Arctic.” The document also reminds, that the Kingdom 
“must seek to avoid further cases where the laws, traditions, cul-
tures and needs of Arctic societies are neglected, as for example 
in the EU’s ban on the import of seal products.” The Strategy 
highlights that “for the parts of the Kingdom that are not in the 
EU it will be of interest to participate in relevant EU programs 
where desirable and possible.” From the regional perspective, 
“it is of particular importance to promote good relations be-
tween Greenland and the EU and expand the cooperative re-
lations which exist between the parties involved.” Particularly, 
that “Greenland goods have duty-free access to the EU [and] 
the Faroe Islands has duty-free access to the EU for the majority 
of its goods.” In addition to this, “endeavours must be made to 
make the Faroe Islands more visible to the EU as part of the 
Arctic cooperation [and] the Kingdom will work to ensure that 
the EU has a place in the Arctic, including in relevant institu-
tions such as the Arctic Council where the Kingdom supports 
the EU’s wish for observer status” (2011, 33, 52, 53).
In order to “optimize the safeguarding of interests, the King-
dom will upgrade bilateral cooperation and dialogue regarding 
the Arctic, both with established and new partners” – global-
ly, regionally and bilaterally” (2011, 49). The Arctic Five “is an 
essential complementary regional forum for the coastal states 
of the Arctic Ocean” (2011, 49). Nevertheless, “Canada, USA, 
Norway and Iceland will remain key partners for close coop-
eration in areas such as the exploitation of resources, maritime 
safety, climate and environment, Indigenous peoples, research, 
education, health and defence.” Furthermore, “close contact 
with Finland and Sweden on Arctic issues” will remain (2011, 
54). According to the 2011 strategy, the Kingdom emphasizes 
willingness “to further expand and develop cooperation with 
Russia. For example, under the auspices of the Danish-Russian 
governing council, there is great mutual interest in closer co-
operation on strengthening the safety of navigation in Arctic 
waters.” Additionally, “enhanced cooperation with Russia could 
also incorporate scientific collaboration, for example, on the 
continental shelf.” Along with that, “it could also include the ex-
change of findings on economically, socially and environmen-
tally sustainable development, as well as confidence building 
and studies on potential co-operation between the Danish and 
Russian defence, particularly in the maritime area” (2011, 54). 
The 2011 Strategy explains that “It is a central goal of the King-
dom to strengthen cooperation in the Arctic Council [and con-
sider] the Arctic Council [as] the primary organ for concrete 
cooperation in the Arctic” (2011, 52). The Kingdom also wishes 
to ensure that the “Council has an increasingly direct impact 
on the Arctic peoples…must evolve from a ‘decision-shaping’ 
to a ‘decision-making’ organisation.” The documents highlight 
that “the Council’s function as an instrument exerting influ-
ence on nation states and international organizations should 
be reinforced, and where feasible, the possibility of real deci-
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sion-making ought to be developed.” Also, that the Council 
“must be reinforced as the only relevant political organization 
that has all Arctic states and peoples as members.” Importantly, 
“the Kingdom will emphasize that the human dimension, i.e. 
people’s living conditions and well-being, is given increasingly 
more space in cooperation” (2011, 52, 54; 2008, 13). Within the 
Arctic Council, the Kingdom further supports several stake-
holders, including the EU, and the Northeast Asian countries, 
China, Japan and South Korea in their efforts to obtain observer 
status in the Arctic Council (2011, 54). 
The Kingdom is part of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), “which contains detailed regulation of, for 
example, navigational rights and management of resources.” 
Denmark ratified the Convention “on behalf of the Kingdom 
on 16 November 2004”. UNCLOS “is the global internation-
al legal instrument in relation to the sea around the Arctic, in 
that the Convention defines states’ rights and responsibilities in 
relation to their use of the oceans”, and under the Convention 
“coastal states have the right to create an exclusive economic 
zone” (2011, 13, 14; 2008, 7, 11). The 2011 Strategy emphasizes 
that “the Kingdom will seek to resolve outstanding unresolved 
boundary issues and actively work to reduce the processing 
time of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
and thereby ensure greater assurance of coastal states’ continen-
tal shelf claims in the Arctic” (2011, 15). 
Both strategies highlight cooperation within the framework of 
the Nordic Council of Ministers, where Denmark and Green-
land develop different policy initiatives. The Nordic Council 
of Ministers also contributes financially to the Arctic Coun-
cil’s work. Additionally, “a number of collaborative projects of 
Arctic relevance are being carried out in the Nordic Council of 
Ministers’ various ministerial councils.” Moreover, “the King-
dom wants the Arctic aspect of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ 
work both directly and through ministerial councils to be given 
greater weight, both politically and financially” (2011, 53; 2008, 
6, 13, 16). Importantly, “cooperation in and about the Arctic is 
being undertaken in a wide range of organizations other than 
the above-mentioned, representing regional or sector-orga-
nized interests, for example through NORA [part of the Nordic 
Council of Ministers], the Nordic Atlantic Cooperation (Faroe 
Islands, Greenland, Iceland and coastal Norway), West Nordic 
Cooperation (Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland) and in 
sector organizations, such as NAMMCO (North Atlantic Ma-
rine Mammal Commission – consisting of Iceland, Norway, 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands).” In addition, the Kingdom 
also cooperates with “organizations that cover fishery, environ-
mental or scientific interests” (2011, 53; 2008, 36).
“Many international agreements and cooperation fora are rele-
vant to the Arctic and whose interests require active safeguard-
ing by the Kingdom.” For example, “this concerns world trade 
within the WTO (where both Greenland and the Faeroe Islands 
are part of it due to the Kingdom of Denmark’s membership), 
environmental and nature conservation within UNEP, in re-
search, health, and in security and defence matters in NATO 
among others” (2011, 49). Also, other cooperation platforms 
are mentioned in the 2011 Strategy. One of them is the “Joint 
Committee cooperation between Greenland, Denmark and the 
U.S. arose from the Igaliku Agreement, signed in 2004.” Th e 
Committee “is a tripartite forum…which aims to strengthen 
and promote economic and technical cooperation…with spe-
cial focus on research, health, technology, education, culture 
and tourism” (2011, 55). The 2011 Strategy further emphasiz-
es the importance of the May 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, which 
aims “to confirm the responsibility of the five coastal states for 
managing the development of the Arctic” (2011, 13). The 2008 
Strategy further refers to the cooperation within the Council of 
the Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (2008, 
13). The Northern Dimension cooperation from 1999 is also 
recognized in the 2008 Strategy, particularly in the context of 
the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document (2008, 
14). Last, but not least, cooperation within the United Nations 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is mentioned. The 
Kingdom is “working to promote cooperation on maritime 
safety in all key forums, particularly in the IMO, where binding 
rules for navigation in the Arctic are drawn up, but also through 
enhanced cooperation in the Arctic Council”. In addition, the 
2011 Strategy refers to the importance of “the Polar Code which 
will supplement the international maritime safety and environ-
mental conventions which already apply in the Arctic with ad-
ditional rules on rescue equipment, firefighting, ice navigation 
and navigation in uninhabited areas to allow for Arctic condi-
tions” (2011, 17, 18, 20, 25).
The Environmental Protection indicator, which accounts for 
7 % of the total coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of 
the 2008 document (see Figure 9, p. 61), shows that environ-
mental protection is a priority in the two strategies. Both doc-
uments recognize that regional economic activities, including 
the mining, energy, and living resources sectors, can negative-
ly affect the environment. An ecosystem-based management 
structure will therefore be applied to the use of natural re-
sources, and the 2011 Strategy explains that “decisions regard-
ing management and utilisation of resources and protection of 
the environment are taken in accordance with international 
obligations, and are based on the best scientific advice that 
supports healthy, productive and self-sustaining communi-
ties” (2011, 10; see also: 2008, 22).
 
Biodiversity and protected areas are a part of Kingdom of Den-
mark’s environmental protection plan. Indeed, both documents 
discuss the importance of the Ramsar and Biodiversity Conven-
tion, and the 2011 Strategy stresses that “the aim is to promote 
the protection and sustainable harnessing of the Earth’s biologi-
cal diversity and to ensure regeneration and preservation of the 
ecosystem services that underpins communities and well-be-
ing” (2011, 50; see also: 2008, 25). The Strategy further explains 
that the Arctic is part of migration routes for many animals and 
that it is also home to a diversity of species that are “largely as-
sociated with the sea” (2011, 9). Shipping has the potential to 
harm these areas and also introduce invasive species to the re-
gion (2011, 45).
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It is not surprising, therefore, that maritime pollution is an en-
vironmental concern. Home Rule has meant that “the Faroe Is-
lands and Greenland have entirely or in part been responsible 
for the monitoring of the marine environment and pollution 
control in territorial waters” (2011, 18), and there appears to be 
support from the Kingdoms of Denmark’s ministries of Climate 
and Energy, and the Environment (2008, 31). Bilaterally, the 
Kingdom of Denmark is a party to the CANDEN agreement 
“which ensures information exchange in case of oil spills and 
marine pollution, among other things” (2011, 55). Internation-
ally, the IMO has also contributed to environmental protection 
through shipping regulations that focus on oil spills and pollu-
tion (2011, 51).
 
The Pollution indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded quotes 
for the 2011 Strategy and 5 % of the 2008 document (see Fig-
ure 9, p. 61). The documents explain that while some pollution 
comes from within the region, many pollutants come from out-
side the Arctic and can have negative effects on the health and 
the food chains. Both strategies identify greenhouse gases, heavy 
metals, POPs, and oil; The 2011 Strategy also mentions mercury 
and chemicals, while carbon is referred to in the 2008 document 
(2011, 30, 40, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50; 2008, 26, 27, 28, 33). Both docu-
ments recognize that maritime traffic and mining activities con-
tribute to regional pollution, while the 2008 document mentions 
military activity, and the 2011 document states that “fishing and 
tourism pose a risk of pollution and accidents” (2011, 45; see also: 
2008, 25, 28, 33). The 2008 document also makes an interesting 
observation about the role climate change plays, in that additional 
greenhouse gases are produced from melting permafrost. Addi-
tionally, the document makes a point of stating that Greenland 
itself produces very little pollution (2008, 25). 
The 2011 document identifies a number of international pol-
lution treaties, formal structures, and other problem-solving 
methods to address regional pollution. Existing agreements 
include “the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pol-
lutants and the LTRAP protocol” which the Kingdom of Den-
mark would like to see improved (2011, 50). The Kingdom of 
Denmark is also in the process of “implementing and ratifying 
the HNS Protocol … and also the Ballast Water Convention” 
(2011, 46), and at the time working towards the creation of two 
new agreements: first “to support and promote the conclusion 
of a global agreement on limiting emissions of greenhouse gas-
ses” (2011, 44), which likely refers to the later Paris Agreement; 
second, “UNEP’s global mercury convention” (2011, 46), which 
is likely the Minimata Convention. The Kingdom of Denmark 
also contributes to pollution prevention through different struc-
tures. For example, the IMO regulates the shipping industry to 
help prevent pollution, and there is the CANDEN agreement 
between Greenland and Canada (2011, 25, 55), both previously 
mentioned in the Environmental Protection indicator.
 
The 2011 Strategy further recognizes problem-solving that is 
more domestic in nature. First, research has gone into creat-
ing a maritime atlas that “contains information about the local 
wildlife, local fishing and hunting interests and archaeological 
sites that are especially sensitive to potential oil spills” (2011, 
47). Second, the Kingdom of Denmark seeks to match the EU’s 
targets of “reducing total global greenhouse gas emissions by 
at least 50 % in 2050” while seeking to “become independent 
of fossil fuels by 2050 and that Denmark’s binding renewable 
energy target under the EU in 2020 is 30 percent” (2011, 50).
The 2008 document, in contrast to the 2011 Strategy, does not 
identify specific international treaties or agreements. While it 
does state that pollution should be addressed through formal 
organizations like the Arctic Council and the Nordic Council 
of Ministers (2008, 26), the focus appears to be more on what 
needs to be done. For example, more research is needed on how 
pollution affects Arctic residents, especially in relation to the 
effects of POPs and heavy metals on Greenlanders. Pollution 
research could additionally be used to inform international pol-
lution agreements (2008, 28, 29). The document also recognizes 
the need to better understand the consequences for Greenland 
if a maritime accident were to happen nearby and suggests the 
need for a stronger regulatory regime to prevent such incidents 
(2008, 28, 33).
 
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the 
total coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 
document (see Figure 9, p. 61), identifies a number of conse-
quences associated with climate change. The 2011 Strategy con-
textualizes how climate change has affected the region by stating 
that “warming in the Arctic is occurring faster than anywhere 
else on the planet, and the average temperature in the Arctic 
has surpassed all previous measurements in the first decade of 
the 21st century” (2011, 9). Both documents explain that this 
change can have negative effects on biodiversity, and according 
to the 2011 Strategy, on the ocean, too, “including rising sea lev-
els” and “potential changes in global ocean currents” (2011, 43; 
see also: 2008, 6). At the same time, opening waters from sea 
ice creates new economic potential within the region. These in-
clude, for instance, “the potential for mining and exploitation of 
hydrocarbon resources, and also navigational options for tour-
ism and transport” (2011, 35). 
To address these issues, both documents discuss the importance 
of mitigation and adaptation. According to the 2011 Strategy, 
“the effects of climate change are already being felt, and the 
Kingdom underlines the importance that adaptation measures 
are carried out in order to mitigate the already unavoidable cli-
mate impacts” (2011, 50). The two documents state that climate 
research is essential to developing mitigation and adaptation 
measures (2011, 31; 2008, 31, 39). At a practical level, Green-
land has “initiated a project concerning the consequences of cli-
mate change on the fishing and hunting industry with a view to 
identifying opportunities for adaptation that manage the chal-
lenges while exploiting new opportunities” (2011 31). 
Both documents recognize the Arctic Council as a focus for 
climate work (2011, 50; 2008, 26), and also value the scientif-
ic community’s work on climate change. For example, the 2008 
document acknowledges the contributions to climate knowl-
edge from the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and suggests 
that continued research and new facilities will especially help 
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inform policy development (2008, 26, 28, 32). The 2011 Strate-
gy provides information on how the state actively supports cli-
mate research. Notably, “in 2009, the Ministry of Science and 
the Government of Greenland set up an interdisciplinary cli-
mate research centre in Nuuk” which “focuses on basic research 
about the Arctic climate and the effects of climate change in-
cluding the need for mitigation and adaptation strategies, and 
currently has approx. 80 Greenland, Danish and international 
researchers affiliated on a permanent or flexible basis” (2011, 
35, 36). Additionally, “the Kingdom will work to promote the 
participation of Danish, Greenland and Faroese academic and 
scientific institutions in international research and monitoring 
activities” (2011, 36).
In terms of major climate agreements and frameworks, the 2011 
Strategy mentions two main climate structures. First, it refer-
ences “an ambitious global climate agreement” that suggests 
the future Paris Agreement (2011, 50). Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, it explains that “the Kingdom’s climate policy 
stems from the UN’s Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), 
whose goal is to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gases at a lev-
el that prevents climate change that is dangerous to humanity” 
(2011, 49). Certainly, addressing greenhouse gases appear to be 
Kingdom of Denmark’s primary climate focus in this Strategy. 
In contrast, the 2008 document mentions COP15 (2008, 7). 
 
The Security indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 3 % of the 2008 document 
(see Figure 9, p. 61), stresses the importance of collaboration and 
keeping the “Arctic as a region characterised by peace and coop-
eration” (2011, 13). The document states that “the Arctic has to 
be managed internationally on the basis of international princi-
ples of law to ensure a peaceful, secure and collaborative Arctic.” 
Particularly, as “increased economic activity and renewed geo-
political interest in the Arctic result in a number of key challeng-
es to ensuring a stable, peaceful and secure region characterized 
by dialogue, negotiation and cooperation” (2011, 7, 9). Apart 
from this, “the rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic 
region necessitates a continued prioritising of a well-functioning 
international legal framework for peaceful cooperation, a spe-
cial need for enhanced maritime safety, and persistent focus on 
maintaining the Arctic as a region characterised by peace and 
cooperation… [therefore] the Kingdom’s approach to security 
policy in the Arctic is based on an overall goal of preventing con-
flicts and avoiding the militarization of the Arctic” (2011, 10). 
The 2011 document states, that “even though the working rela-
tionship of the Arctic Ocean’s coastal states is close, there will 
be a continuing need to enforce the Kingdom’s sovereignty, es-
pecially in light of the anticipated increase in activity in the 
region” (2011, 20). For this purpose, “the Danish Armed Forces 
undertake important tasks in the Arctic including the enforce-
ment of sovereignty, and attach in this respect great importance 
to confidence building and cooperation with Arctic partner 
countries” (2011, 13). The defence of Greenland’s sovereignty 
is provided by the Kingdom’s armed forces. Greenland Com-
mand provides a wide range of sovereignty services, from pro-
tecting against foreign military to inspecting fisheries (2008, 
10). The Danish Defence supports the “citizens of Greenland 
[to] be increasingly involved in the tasks of the armed forces 
and participate in a wide range of training opportunities.” This 
would be of great “benefit from Greenland’s local knowledge” 
(2011, 20, 21; 2008, 11). 
Furthermore, the 2011 Strategy highlights that the armed forces 
“must be visibly present in and around Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands with regard to the enforcement of sovereignty and sur-
veillance… Units from the army, navy and air force carry out 
tasks in the Arctic.” The armed forces undertake “surveillance 
and enforcement of sovereignty of Greenland and Faroese ter-
ritorial waters and airspace, as well as the Greenland exclusive 
economic zone and the fishing zones to ensure that no system-
atic violations of territory can take place.” Furthermore, “the 
armed forces adapts its deployment of vessels, aircraft and other 
capacities in accordance with the distinct difference in season-
al activity. Because of the enormous dimensions of the Arctic, 
international cooperation is an important element in resolving 
the armed forces’ tasks in the Arctic” (2011, 21; 2008, 11). The 
2011 Strategy further talks about “the establishment of joint ser-
vice Arctic Command, which will be created by the amalgama-
tion of the Greenland Command and the Faroe Command.” The 
responsibilities of the Arctic Response Force vary depending on 
“defined periods and in defined areas anticipated to strengthen 
the armed forces’ enforcement of sovereignty and surveillance, 
for instance through military exercises” (2011, 20, 21). 
The Kingdom of Denmark cooperates on bilateral and multi-
lateral bases in the field of defence and security. “In May 2010 
Denmark and Canada signed a bilateral Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) on enhanced operational defence coopera-
tion in the Arctic, focusing on joint military exercises, staff ex-
changes and cooperation in rescue operations. The agreement 
serves as a catalyst for intensifying day-to-day collaboration 
between Greenland’s Command, Joint Task Force North in Yel-
lowknife and MARLANT Maritime Forces Atlantic in Halifax.” 
Moreover, “it is expected that close Danish – Canadian military 
cooperation will be further enhanced over the coming years 
partly via mutual exchange of findings in survival techniques in 
the Arctic, patrolling and surveillance and partly via continued 
participation in joint military exercises” (2011, 55). Geo-strate-
gically and militarily, more important is that the Danish armed 
forces closely cooperate with the United States, in particular the 
US military presence at the Thule Air Base (in North Green-
land), based on the bilateral US-Danish Defense Agreement of 
1951, where the US Army has operated from its own facilities. 
In 2002, the agreement was broadened to include Thule radar as 
the early warning radar, part of the US missile defence system 
(2008, 9). “Thule Air Base is, with its deep-water port, airport 
and well-developed infrastructure (including tank and storage 
capacity, workshop, hospital, quarters, support and office facili-
ties), a unique capability in the Arctic region north of the Arctic 
Circle” (2011, 54).
The 2011 Strategy underlines that “many international agree-
ments and cooperation fora are relevant to the Arctic and whose 
interests require active safeguarding by the Kingdom. For exam-
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ple, this concerns world trade within the WTO, environmental 
and nature conservation within UNEP, in research, health, and 
in security and defence matters in NATO among others” (2011, 
49). Both strategies refer to the NATO and its important role in 
the region. While “the Kingdom’s area in the Arctic is covered by 
the NATO treaty Article 5 regarding collective defence, the en-
forcement of sovereignty is fundamentally a responsibility of the 
Realm’s central authorities.” Importantly, “enforcement of sover-
eignty is exercised by the armed forces through a visible presence 
in the region where surveillance is central to the task. In addi-
tion, the armed forces play an important role in the provision of 
a range of more civilian-related duties” (2011, 20; 2008, 9). 
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the to-
tal coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 4 % of the 2008 docu-
ment (see Figure 9, p. 61), identifies a key safety concern in both 
documents—maritime safety, which encompasses a range of 
issues. The 2011 Strategy explains that “maritime safety is a fun-
damental priority. The extreme Arctic conditions require pre-
ventive measures including training and ship safety, as well as 
regional cooperation on search and rescue” (2011, 13; see also: 
2008, 33). Accidents and pollution should also be considered a 
part of maritime safety (2011, 46; 2008, 12). Safety concerns are 
also addressed in each of the two strategies. For instance, the 
2011 Strategy also prioritizes “public health preparedness con-
cerning disaster situations and other urgent challenges to public 
health” (2011, 40). While the 2008 document does not comment 
specifically on human health preparedness, it does note that 
plant and fish health are important. Additionally, the document 
does address the need to be prepared for disasters (2008, 12). 
To help make the Arctic safe, the 2011 Strategy identifies and 
discusses three key structures that contribute to regional safety. 
First, the Strategy explains the significance of UNCLOS in terms 
of regional regulation and cooperation. However, it also recog-
nizes that UNCLOS cannot remain static and that “there may 
be a continuous need for more detailed regulating of certain 
sectors. An example is the agreement on search and rescue ad-
opted at the Arctic Council Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 
2011 in Nuuk” (2011, 14). The second structure, therefore, is the 
Arctic Council and its SAR agreement which facilitates rescue 
cooperation in the Arctic as “a binding agreement between the 
8 members on search and rescue (SAR) with the Faroe Islands 
and Greenland as “co-signatories,” which is needed because of 
the increased access to areas that were previously covered by 
ice” (2011, 52). Third is the IMO, which also regulates safety at 
sea. The Kingdom of Denmark is keen on the creation of the 
Polar Code as it will further enhance maritime safety in the 
Arctic. The Strategy explains: “The Polar Code will supplement 
the international maritime safety and environmental conven-
tions which already apply in the Arctic with additional rules on 
rescue equipment, fire fighting, ice navigation and navigation 
in uninhabited areas to allow for Arctic conditions” (2011, 20). 
Indeed, “the rising strategic interest and activity in the Arctic 
region necessitates a continued prioritising of a well-function-
ing international legal framework for peaceful cooperation, a 
special need for enhanced maritime safety” (2011, 13). In con-
trast to the 2011 Strategy, the 2008 document does not provide 
information on safety structures, although it does suggest sup-
port for the development of the Arctic Council SAR agreement 
(2008, 12). While these three structures legally bind the Arctic 
states to the same safety practices, neither document makes the 
case for integrated safety efforts; they both support cooperation.
As much of the focus is on maritime safety, it is not surprising 
the strategies discuss the Kingdom’s capabilities in this domain. 
Satellite surveillance and monitoring systems, such as LRIT and 
AIS for large vessels, are used to improve safety in the waters 
around the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Additionally, “ships 
sailing to Greenland must report to the so-called GREENPOS 
reporting system, which requires ships in Greenland waters to 
continuously report their position to the Greenland Command” 
(2011, 17). While it seems that the Kingdom has addressed mar-
itime monitoring, one area marked for improvement is mari-
time mapping and charting. In this regard, the 2011 Strategy 
explains that “due to the vast sea areas, large areas of the Green-
land waters will be unsurveyed beyond 2018 while still greater 
areas become accessible to shipping as the ice melts. For reasons 
of safety at sea the Kingdom will furthermore continue to pri-
oritize the work of the International Hydrographic Organiza-
tion (IHO), such as in the regional commission on the Arctic 
which was established in 2010” (2011, 17). The 2008 document 
also addresses mapping and monitoring, but focuses more on 
efforts to map and monitor the Greenland’s shelf and landmass, 
which includes using the Greenlandic names for different loca-
tions (2008, 30). The 2011 Strategy also considers the role that 
Thule Airbase in Greenland could play in maritime safety. For 
instance, “collaboration on the logistical facilities in Thule could 
thus eventually include assignments and emergency prepared-
ness in relation to the maritime environment, a base for exercis-
es in connection to joint procedures such as search and rescue 
services, and also be a platform for joint research in the Arctic” 
(2011, 54).
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 12 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 18 % of the 2008 docu-
ment (see Figure 9, p. 61), identifies a broad range of economic 
activities. According to the 2011 Strategy, “today, tourism, sec-
ond only to fisheries, is the most important export industry in 
Greenland, and the tourist industry has potential for growth in 
the future” (2011, 23; 2008, 5, 36). The 2011 Strategy also rec-
ognizes that trade can help economies in other ways, as “the 
new trading opportunities can contribute to the diversification 
of Greenland’s economy and create the basis for economic sus-
tainability and prosperity. For the Faroe Islands in particular, 
the opening of the Northeast Passage will unfold new opportu-
nities as a result of increased navigation” (2011, 33). The 2008 
Strategy also identifies veterinary services, crafts and cultural 
products (2008, 35, 38). However, it is the natural resource sec-
tors that seem to hold greatest importance. Natural resources 
include living resources, such as fish, and non-living resourc-
es found in the mining and oil and gas industries. Certainly, 
the fish industry does represent a substantial amount of trade 
for the Kingdom. For the Faroe Islands, it “represents approx. 
90 % of total exports and for Greenland, approx. 85 % of total 
exports” (2011, 31). However, Greenland provides the most ac-
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cess to mining and oil and gas opportunities. A broad range of 
minerals are found in Greenland that can be used to support in-
novative technology and financial independence. For example, 
the 2011 Strategy explains that “Greenland is also rich in miner-
al deposits, including zinc, copper, nickel, gold, diamonds and 
platinum group metals, and has substantial deposits of so-called 
critical metals, including rare earth elements, several of which 
are important components of high-end technology, including 
green energy technologies” (2011, 24; see also: 2008, 23). As for 
oil and gas, these activities are not as developed as the mining 
industry. The two documents explain that while there has been 
some development, oil exploration is still taking place around 
Greenland. While exploration can be expensive, the payout will 
likely be worth it as “it is estimated that 31 billion barrels of oil 
and gas off the coast of Northeast Greenland and 17 billion bar-
rels of oil and gas in areas west of Greenland and east of Canada 
could be discovered, though the probability is greater for dis-
coveries in Northeast Greenland,” according to the 2011 Strate-
gy (2011, 24; see also: 2008, 22).
While oil and gas resources are being explored, renewable ener-
gies are also being exploited. For example, Greenland has been 
generating hydropower since at least 1993 (2008, 20–21). Re-
newable energy is important to the Kingdom in two ways, ac-
cording to the 2011 Strategy. First, the renewable energy gener-
ated in Greenland can be used to power facilities in the mining 
sector. For example, the 2011 Strategy states that “an example 
is the designing, in collaboration with the American company, 
Alcoa, of an aluminium smelting plant in Maniitsoq which will 
be operated solely by hydropower” (2011, 30). Additionally, re-
newable energy generated in both the Faroe Islands and Green-
land will help Denmark meet EU energy goals. The 2011 Strat-
egy explains that “Denmark’s commitment to renewable energy 
targets under the EU is 30 % by 2020. Greenland will increase its 
share of renewable energy to 60 % of total energy production by 
2020. The Faroe Islands will increase the use of renewable ener-
gy, including the target of 75 % of electricity production based 
on renewable energy by 2020” (2011, 30).
Sustainable development is important to many of the Kingdom’s 
economic activities. According to the 2011 Strategy, “it is a cen-
tral goal of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark that de-
cisions regarding management and utilisation of resources and 
protection of the environment are taken in accordance with in-
ternational obligations, and are based on the best scientific ad-
vice that supports healthy, productive and self-sustaining com-
munities” (2011, 10). Sustainable practices are applied to living 
resources through different mechanisms, such as fishing quotas, 
conservation, and ecosystem-based management, for example 
(2011, 32; 2008, 6, 24, 25). Interestingly, the 2008 document 
suggests that the USA has not fully supported the work of the 
Arctic Council, apparently in the area of sustainable develop-
ment (2008, 13).
The strategies sketch out different ways in which the Kingdom’s 
northern economy will be prioritized. Both documents explain 
that a great deal of focus will be on developing Greenland’s 
economy. In particular, the 2011 Strategy stresses that this “will 
be an overriding political priority for the Kingdom” (2011, 23), 
especially in relation to mineral resources. Because of this, ed-
ucation and training in this area will be prioritized (2011, 36). 
The 2008 document also discusses the importance of the miner-
al industry, but also includes oil and gas, and cultural products 
in its discussion (2011, 24; 2008, 23, 38). Another priority from 
the 2011 Strategy is to increase trade opportunities for the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, especially with the EU (2011, 35). 
Economic development does not happen without some form 
of regulatory practices. The 2008 document does not focus as 
much on this area, although the document does recognize that 
Greenland, under Home Rule, has the authority to regulate cer-
tain economic activities (2008, 25). In contrast, the 2011 Strat-
egy provides more information on some of the different ways 
that economic activities for living and non-living resources are 
regulated. For living resources, the strategy explains that fishing 
must be a sustainable practice to prevent overfishing. “Green-
land’s fishery is based on a quota system whose aim is to en-
sure a sustainable exploitation of certain stocks. Therefore, an 
annual ‘Total Allowable Catch’ (TAC) of the principal species is 
stipulated, based on biological advice and respecting socio-eco-
nomic concerns, commercial interests and international obliga-
tions” (2011, 31). As for the non-living resources in Greenland, 
the Mineral Resources Act dictates corporate responsibility, 
especially when environmental protection is at stake. More 
specifically, the Act explains that “responsibility for clean-up 
operations and compensation always lies with the party caus-
ing damage, whereby a number of stringent requirements are 
imposed following international standards regarding financial 
guarantees and insurance for oil and mineral activities” (2011, 
26). Oil and gas licenses are also controlled by the Bureau of 
Minerals and Petroleum (BMP) and are issued under the strict-
est of conditions (2011, 26). The document also explains that 
shipping safety is regulated through the IMO, and that trade 
activities follow regulations set out by the WTO (2011, 35, 51).
As for economic actors, the 2011 Strategy is very open about 
who is investing in the region. For instance, the document 
states that “there is great interest from a number of different 
companies and as of January 2011 the licensees are: NUNAOIL 
(Greenland), DONG (Denmark), Maersk Oil (Denmark), Exx-
onMobil (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), Husky (CAN), Cairn Energy 
(UK), PA Resources (SVE), ConocoPhillips (U.S.), Shell (NL), 
Statoil (NOR), GDF Suez (FRA) and Petronas (Malaysia)” 
(2011, 26), and for the Faroes “oil companies active in the Faroe 
Islands Atlantic Petroleum (FO), Cieco (Korea), Dana Petro-
leum (UK), DONG (DK), ENI (ITA), Exxon Mobil (US), Faroe 
Petroleum (FO), First Oil Expro (UK), OMV (Østrig), Sagex 
Petroleum (NOR), Statoil (NOR)” (2011, 27). There is also state 
involvement, especially with the Government of Greenland, in 
the resources sector, and cooperation with the broader “busi-
ness community” as well (see: 2011, 35, 33). The 2008 document 
also names private companies, such as Acloa Inc. and Maniit-
soq, both of which are in the aluminum industry. Other actors 
include governance bodies and other organizations such as the 
North Atlantic Hydrogen Association, the WTO (for Greenlan-
dic compliance), the Greenland Innovation Centre, Piorsaavik, 
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the Nordic Region Cooperation (NORA) (2008, 21, 37), and, of 
course, the state. 
The Tourism indicator is briefly discussed in both the 2011 and 
2008 strategies and accounts for 1 % of the total coded quotes in 
the 2011 Strategy and 2 % of the 2008 document (see Figure 9, 
p. 61). Tourism in Greenland has been on the rise (2008, 36). As 
stated in the 2011 Strategy “today, tourism, second only to fish-
eries, is the most important export industry in Greenland, and 
the tourist industry has potential for growth in the future. This 
applies both to land-based tourism and the cruise-liner business. 
Among the benefits of the latter is that even small towns and 
villages along the coast can be involved in tourism” (2011, 23, 
24). “The land-based tourism generates by far the greatest reve-
nue but is currently dependent on only a few markets, primarily 
the Danish. Therefore, Greenland’s Tourist Board is working on 
the development of a new national brand that more clearly de-
fines Greenland as an adventure destination focusing on sustain-
able tourism and which to a greater extent appeals to the global 
market” (2011, 23, 24). Tourism should be further promoted in 
Greenland as it brings in earnings from abroad. Furthermore, 
tourism creates economic and job growth (2008, 36). The 2008 
Strategy further explains that tourism has resulted in more 
flights to Greenland (2008, 36). 
The Kingdom of Denmark aims to “enhance economic develop-
ment and diversification of the economy, including the develop-
ment of the tourist industry and bolstering the overall develop-
ment with adequate infrastructure” (2011, 23). The government 
is taking an active role in helping Greenland develop its tourism 
industry (2008, 36).
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 6 % of the 2008 document 
(see Figure 9, p. 61), addresses different types of infrastructure. 
Transportation infrastructure is discussed in both documents 
and seems to be a priority, especially for Greenland. The 2011 
Strategy states that “infrastructure is a key element in the devel-
opment of the Greenland society and to ensure long term sustain-
able development, the Government of Greenland set up a trans-
portation commission in 2009 for the socio-economic analysis 
of the entire infrastructure in Greenland” (2011, 24). In partic-
ular, “ports and airports” are needed but they are expensive. The 
government will thus look for different sources of funding, in-
cluding the mining sector (2011, 24). The Strategy does not pro-
vide many particulars about what infrastructure would be devel-
oped and where, but it does seem as if ports are more important 
because infrastructure is needed to support growing maritime 
traffic and trade (2011, 17, 35). In contrast, the 2008 document is 
more focused on airports than it was ports because Greenland is 
unlikely to benefit from shipping through the Northwest Passage 
(2008, 33). Thus, the strategy focuses on air travel, commenting 
on the regular flights between Greenland and Iceland that have 
been taking place for 50 years. At the same time, the Strategy also 
acknowledges that there are very few flights between Greenland 
and Canada Regardless, for Greenland to increase international 
flights, Denmark must provide the license although there will be 
cooperation with Greenland (2008, 34).
Although there is not as much discussion about port develop-
ment in the 2008 document, both strategies address shipping as 
the melting sea ice and opening waterways provide new transit 
opportunities, although it will be expensive (MFA 2011, 16; 2008, 
33, 34). For example, the 2011 Strategy notes growing maritime 
traffic around the Faroe Islands and comments on the successful 
journey through the first Northwest Passage by a Danish ship-
ping company in 2010 (MFA 2011, 16, 19). In the light of these 
developments, it is not surprising that “the Kingdom will exam-
ine the need for the establishment of new shipping routes, and 
implement this to the extent it promotes maritime safety and 
marine protection.” Pollution is a concern and the 2011 Strategy 
comments that IMO will play an important role in with regard 
to safety and pollution prevention (2011, 51; 2008, 28). Despite 
the discussion around expanding shipping and safety concerns, 
there is very little about the role and function of icebreakers. 
Indeed, only the 2011 Strategy mentions them, but only in the 
context of mapping the continental shelf and that some Asian 
countries are developing them (2011, 15, 54).
Energy infrastructure is addressed in both documents, particu-
larly in the context of renewable energy sources. This is probably 
because “the energy policy objectives of Greenland, Denmark 
and the Faroe Islands respectively are to create security of sup-
ply, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollution 
while creating a basis for commercial development” (2011, 30). 
A goal, therefore, is for communities to use this type of energy 
(2011, 30). The 2008 document also notes the need to improve 
transmission line infrastructure because of functionality prob-
lems (2008, 21). 
ICT and telecommunications are briefly mentioned in both 
documents. The 2011 Strategy states that “the health reform is 
underpinned by the telemedicine network which was developed 
with the help of Alaskan and Norwegian inspiration” (2011, 
40), which obviously needs digital services. The 2008 docu-
ment more broadly notes that digital services help communities 
(2008, 41).
Other kinds of innovation and technology are also mentioned 
in the strategies, such as that used for mapping and charting. In 
particular, the NunaGIS system is mentioned as it is used for en-
suring that Greenlandic names are used appropriately on maps 
(2008, 29, 30). This is considered “geographical infrastructure” 
in more technical terms, “the objective of NunaGIS is to gather 
all essential information across Greenland in a digital atlas, and 
link this information to a data and organizational infrastruc-
ture, also called SDI (Spatial Data Infrastructure)” (2011, 37). 
Mapping processes are also taking place in the Faroe Islands 
(2011, 37). 
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 8 % of the 
total coded quotes in the 2011 Strategy and 14 % of the 2008 
Strategy (see Figure 9, p. 61). The two documents identify the 
different drivers for science. The main driver in both docu-
ments appears to be climate change (2011, 35, 36, 43, 44; 2008, 
5, 27, 31, 32, 39). For example, the 2011 Strategy explains that 
“in order to anticipate how global climate and environmental 
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conditions will evolve, it is crucial to understand how climate 
change affects the Arctic, and in turn how changes in the Arctic 
affect global climate trends” (2011, 43-44). Pollution is another 
research driver mentioned in both documents (2011, 45; 2008, 
28). Additionally, the 2011 Strategy notes that nature is also a 
driver, as “the Arctic nature and environment must be managed 
based on the best possible scientific knowledge and standards 
for protection” (2011, 43); the 2008 document notes the preser-
vation of living resources (2008, 19, 20).
However, research also serves other purposes. First, research 
will help the Kingdom with decision-making. For instance, 
the documents explain that research can be used for decisions 
regarding the management of living resources, like fish (2011, 
32; 2008, 34); the 2008 document states that research can help 
inform climate agreements (2008, 28). Research can also be of 
benefit to economic development. The 2008 document explains 
that research can be of assistance to the mining and shipping 
industries (2008, 23, 29, 32), while the 2011 Strategy explains 
that research can assist with workforce training. For instance, 
“the Kingdom’s Arctic research will be at the global forefront, 
and research and training efforts must support the development 
of industry and society in the Arctic” (2011, 23). Additionally, 
both documents state that research will help with the Kingdom’s 
continental shelf claim (2011, 14; 2008, 11, 12). Research should 
also be of benefit to northerners themselves. Indeed, the 2011 
Strategy remarks that “it is also essential that research findings 
are of practical use by Arctic peoples in supporting the rapid 
cultural, social, economic and industrial development that oth-
er peoples have had generations to adapt to,” including health 
concerns (2011, 35, 40; see also: 2008, 39, 41). Finally, research 
can help position the Kingdom as an Arctic research actor as 
“the Kingdom will work to promote the participation of Dan-
ish, Greenland and Faroese academic and scientific institutions 
in international research and monitoring activities” (2011, 36).
Both documents also recognize the importance of traditional 
knowledge, especially with respect to environmental and cli-
mate concerns (2011, 44; 2008, 18). The 2008 document, how-
ever, makes the interesting observation that the findings of tra-
ditional and scientific knowledge do not always match in the 
case of determining the size of animal stocks. The document 
suggests this can cause disagreement over decisions stemming 
from mismatched information (2008, 24). 
This research is facilitated through different types of research 
infrastructure. First, there are physical research stations which 
include, for example, “the Zackenberg research station and a 
similar station in Kobbefjord near Nuuk” as noted in the 2011 
Strategy (2011, 47). Second, there are different research insti-
tutes, organizations, and universities, which include, but are not 
limited to, the Arctic Technology Centre, the Greenland Insti-
tute of Natural Resources, the Climate Research Centre (Nuuk), 
Danish Meteorological Institute, Commission for Scientific 
Research in Greenland, Geological Survey of Denmark and 
Greenland, the Technical University of Denmark, the Universi-
ty of Greenland, University of Copenhagen, and Aarhus Univer-
sity (2011, 35, 36, 44, 47; 2008, 28, 32, 41). Third, several differ-
ent research networks and collaborations are mentioned in the 
documents. For instance, the 2008 document states that there 
is cooperation and collaboration with various researchers and 
research institutions across borders (notably with the USA), and 
different formalized networks like IASC, European Polar Board, 
and the European Polar Consortium (2008, 32). The 2011 Strat-
egy, in the context of oceanic and ice research, states that “all 
collections are conducted in cooperation with Danish, Green-
land, Swedish and American research institutions and have led 
to increased knowledge of the Arctic Ocean’s plate tectonics, pa-
laeoclimatology, physical oceanography and ecosystems” (2011, 
15), demonstrating the value of such collaborations. 
As for funding, state support for research seems to be associated 
with specific endeavors. For instance, the 2008 Strategy com-
ments on funding for the International Polar Year, whereas the 
2011 Strategy states that funding is provided for the continental 
shelf research (2011, 14; 2008, 32). The 2011 Strategy also ex-
plains that “within the Kingdom, cooperation between research 
institutions must constantly be consolidated and developed, 
and researchers have to be familiar with available options for 
funding of Arctic research” (2011, 36), and that research fund-
ing is also available “from among others the Nordic Council of 
Ministers and the EU” (2011, 35). 
In terms of education, both documents address the need to 
ensure Greenlanders attain education primarily for economic 
reasons. Emphasis is placed on improving skills and training 
for the mineral resources industry to ensure Greenlanders can 
access this job market (2011, 36; 2008, 23), and the state is facil-
itating this training. For example, the 2011 Strategy comments 
that “in January 2011, the Government of Greenland set up a 
new mineral resources school by reorganising the Mining and 
Construction School in Sisimut. The mineral resources school 
will function as a knowledge centre for the entire mining re-
source sector and develop training within the oil industry” 
(2011, 36). The 2008 Strategy also contextualizes their training 
efforts as a way for Greenland to gain further independence 
(2008, 37). 
Outside of training for the mining industry, other kinds of 
educational opportunities exist. First, the two strategies men-
tion that learning opportunities are provided through the Joint 
Committee. For instance, the 2011 Strategy explains that the 
Kangerlussuaq summer school “is targeting two of the three 
priority areas which the Joint Committee has agreed upon in 
2010-2011, namely to improve access for Greenland’s students 
to U.S. institutions of learning and to improve English skills 
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in secondary schools in Greenland” 3 (2011, 38; 2008, 37–38). 
Second, distance learning is discussed in both documents. The 
2011 Strategy addresses this by mentioning that “the Kingdom 
also supports the running of the University of the Arctic” (2011, 
36), whereas the 2008 Strategy acknowledges the importance of 
distance, or e-learning, to high school educational attainment 
levels, while also recognizing the challenges to this type of 
learning in Greenland (for example, the need for good and af-
fordable internet) (2008, 16, 41). Third, the 2008 Strategy notes 
that Greenlandic students can participate in EU education, in 
the areas of technology and innovation for example, through 
the Overseas Countries and Territories program (2008, 16). 
Implementation is addressed in both documents. For the 2011 
Strategy, a bullet-point list of action items is found at the end 
of each section. Although there is nothing written in the docu-
ment that makes clear that these are indeed items or plans that 
should be implemented, the language used suggests just this. 
However, as responsibility for the different tasks is not assigned 
to a government ministry or department, it is not clear who has 
ultimate responsibility for implementation. The Strategy ac-
knowledges that “the Kingdom consists of three societies, each 
with their own political priorities and social structures. There-
fore, the strategy’s implementation in each individual area will 
be adjusted to each part of the Realm’s unique legislation, po-
litical priorities and budget issues” (2011, 57). Yet, despite this 
mention of budget issues, there is very little information on 
how the strategy will be funded. However, the strategy does say 
that “the Foreign Ministry will allocate resources hereto” (2011, 
58) in regard to a few activities, including climate cooperation 
and trade. Yet, it is not clear if this funding will be newly allo-
cated or come out of existing budgets. 
The Strategy does, however, provide a great deal of informa-
tion about follow-up and evaluation. In terms of follow-up, “a 
cross-disciplinary Steering Committee is to be established for 
the Arctic Strategy, consisting of representatives of the gov-
ernment (ministries with Arctic activities), the Government 
of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes at high level” 
(2011, 57). As for evaluation, “the Foreign Ministry, on behalf 
of the Government and in cooperation with the Government 
of Greenland and the Government of the Faroes, will report 
annually on developments in the Arctic and the status of the 
Strategy’s implementation. The aim is to carry out a mid-term 
evaluation of the Strategy in 2014–2015 and consider the 
preparation of a new strategy in 2018-2019” (2011, 58). 
To sum up
It is harder to tell from the 2008 document what implementa-
tion is addressed. The document reads as if it is explaining exist-
ing regional practices and making some suggestions about what 
to do moving forward. There do appear to be some ‘aims’ at the 
3 The Joint Committee allows for international cooperation between Greenland, Denmark, and the United States. Part of the initiative is the Science Group that 
“advances and encourages cooperation across multiple policy areas, involving internationally-recognized experts contending with diverse, cutting-edge issues, 
from deepening Arctic science cooperation to advancing science education” (U.S. Embassy in Denmark, n.d). 
end of some discussions. If the word ‘aims’ is the correct trans-
lation, it does not suggest a strong commitment to implemen-
tation. Additionally, no new budget is identified. That said, the 
document does seem to suggest a working group will be created 
to generate a more comprehensive strategy that will also include 
the ministries responsible for the Strategy (2008, 42). 
Figure 9 at the beginning of the Denmark discussion shows 
that the top three coded indicators for the 2011 document are 
Governance, International Cooperation, and Economy. Simi-
larly, both the Governance and Economy indicators tie for the 
most-coded in the 2008 Strategy, followed by Science and Ed-
ucation and the Human Dimension. The least-coded indicators 
in 2011 are Tourism and Pollution, with Infrastructure and 
Safety and SAR tying for third least-coded indicators. 
As mentioned earlier, the 2011 Strategy identifies four areas 
of importance (2011, 10–11). First is “a peaceful, secure, and 
safe Arctic.” Generally, this is accounted for in the Security 
indicator which falls in the mid-to-lower range in terms of 
the percentages of coded quotes (see Appendix). However, 
the International Cooperation indicator, which is the second 
most-coded indicator, also addresses these issues through dis-
cussions around international law and cooperation. It thus 
seems that this priority is met. Second, “self-sustaining growth 
and development” is associated with the Economy indicator, 
which is the third most-quoted indicator and discusses Green-
land’s access to oil and gas. Third is “respect for the Arctic’s 
fragile climate, environment and nature.” While the Environ-
mental Protection, Pollution, and Climate Change indicators 
are each in the mid-to-lower range in terms of percentages 
coded, when combined they become the most discussed and 
coded topic(s). It seems therefore that this priority is met. Fi-
nally, there is “close cooperation with our international part-
ners” which is accounted for by the International Cooperation 
indicator, the second most-coded indicator (see Appendix).
There are also connections between the indicators. For exam-
ple, the Human Dimension in relation to Indigenous peoples 
is connected to the Governance indicator through discussions 
around Home Rule and the Self-Government Act. The Gover-
nance indicator is also connected to the Economy indicator in 
terms of how natural resources will be managed. The Infrastruc-
ture indicator is also connected to the Economy indicator, but 
in two ways. First, infrastructure is needed to support economic 
activities, and second, the economy indicator focuses on oil and 
gas development while the Infrastructure indictor notes the de-
sire for renewable energy for Greenlanders. 
Similar to the summary on the Icelandic strategies, a full com-
parison is difficult between the 2011 Strategy and the 2008 docu-
ment, which is an unofficial translation from which information 
may be missing. That being said, there are two relevant sim-
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ilarities between the documents of which two are discussed 
here. First, the 2011 Strategy appears to be a continuation of 
the 2008 Strategy in terms of economic development. Indeed, 
both documents state that tourism, fishing, trade, natural re-
sources, and energy are key economic activities, while the 2008 
document also mentions hunting, veterinary services, and 
crafts. Both documents discuss the importance of sustainable 
development. The 2011 Strategy also comments on the need 
for sustainable transportation and energy practices (develop-
ment of renewable energy), as well as the development of ICT. 
Interestingly, both documents appear to focus on economic 
development in Greenland and disregard the Faroe Islands. 
Second, both documents take a similar approach to addressing 
security. For instance, they both state that growing interest in 
the region must be managed. The documents also recognize 
the importance of international cooperation through efforts 
with Canada and the United States, as well as through organi-
zations like NATO. The high relevance of security cooperation 
with the USA is illustrated in both documents, where the ad-
vantage of having Thule early warning radar as part of the US 
missile defence system is described. 
Three relevant differences and three examples are also dis-
cussed here. First, there are some differences in how the two 
documents address migration. While both documents com-
ment on this issue, the 2008 document is concerned with il-
legal migration, whereas the 2011 Strategy focuses on (pre-
sumably) legal migration and the challenges associated with 
potential increases in labor migration. This is very relevant 
especially in case of Greenland, where more than half of the 
migrants come from Denmark, followed by the Faroe Islands 
and Iceland, where there are also small numbers of migrants 
from Thailand and the Philippines, mainly working in the fish-
ing industry. Second, both documents address environmen-
tal protection and mention the Ramsar and the Biodiversity 
conventions. Although the 2008 Strategy makes a little more 
reference to the work of the Arctic Council than the 2011 doc-
ument does, the latter document provides a more in-depth 
understanding of the Kingdom of Denmark’s environmental 
priorities as well as more information on specific pollutants. 
As environmental protection transcends borders and requires 
collaborative efforts, the 2008 document also notes that cir-
cumpolar environmental cooperation began in 1991 with the 
start of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). 
This could be suggestive of a broadening understanding of en-
vironmental protection by the Kingdom of Denmark. Third, 
while both documents appear to prioritize maritime safety 
and express the importance of international cooperation for 
safety, there are some differences between the two documents, 
with the 2011 Strategy providing more information on this 
topic. For instance, the Strategy recognizes that health is a 
safety issue, explains the role of international structures (ex. 
UNCLOS, IMO, and Polar Code) and how they contribute to 
maritime safety, and discusses Danish safety mechanisms like 
GREENPOS and satellites. In contrast, the 2008 Strategy notes 
that natural disasters and environmental safety must also be 
considered, but only does so in the context of Greenland. 
Overall, the 2011 Strategy aims to fulfil its purpose “to focus 
attention on the Kingdom’s strategic priorities for future devel-
opment in the Arctic towards 2020,” and its aim “to strengthen 
the Kingdom’s status as global player in the Arctic” (2011, 11). 
In addition, another important goal of the Strategy, drawn up 
two years after Greenland being accorded self-governing sta-
tus, was to support that new status and strengthen Greenland’s 
development towards increased autonomy. 
Norway
To date, Norway has produced five Arctic strategies. The most 
up-to-date is the 2017 document, Norway’s Arctic Strategy: Be-
tween Geopolitics and Social Development. As the English short 
version is analyzed here, it is difficult to determine what, if any-
thing, is missing from the original Norwegian text. Working 
backwards, the other documents are the 2014 Norway’s Arctic 
Policy: Creating Value, Managing Resources, Confronting Climate 
Change and Fostering Knowledge, the 2011 document The High 
North: Visions and Strategies, the 2009 New Building Blocks in 
the North: The Next Steps in the Government’s High North Strate-
gy, and 2006’s The Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy. 
For the purpose of this report, the 2017 and the 2014 strategies 
will be analyzed. 
The 2017 Strategy has 37 pages including pictures, maps, and 
infographics and clearly outlines the following Arctic priorities, 
or “Priority areas:
• International cooperation
• Business development
• Knowledge development
• Infrastructure
• Environmental protection and emergency preparedness” 
(Norway MFA 2017, 6). 
These items are also the same priorities as those identified in 
the 2014 Strategy (see: Norway MFA 2014, 3), which consists 
of 43 pages including pictures, maps, and infographics. Later in 
the 2017 Strategy, the government builds on their priority list 
and remarks that “the specific goals for each priority area are 
presented in the respective chapters. Common to all of them 
is that, in their different ways, they will help us realise our vi-
sion of peaceful, innovative and sustainable development in the 
north” (2017, 15). Additionally, the document states that “the 
Government’s Arctic policy builds on our long-term efforts. The 
overarching goals, as set out in the last white paper on Arctic 
policy, remain unchanged:
• Peace, stability and predictability
• Integrated, ecosystem-based management
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• International cooperation and the international legal order
• A stronger basis for employment, value creation and welfare” 
(2017, 15).4 
Having the same priorities in 2017 as in 2014, and also men-
tioning the goals from 2011 (Norway MFA 2011), suggests that 
the Norwegian government is consistent in its policy and in its 
long-term strategy for the Arctic region. 
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides insights in terms of how Norway defines and describes the 
region. Both strategies recognize the importance of the region. 
For instance, the 2017 Strategy opens by stating that “the Arctic 
is important for Norway and for the world as a whole,” especial-
ly as “people’s everyday lives are affected both by high politics 
and by day-to-day issues” (2017, 2), showing the importance 
of the region domestically. In contrast, the opening remarks by 
the Prime Minister in the 2014 Strategy state that “the Arctic 
is Norway’s most important foreign policy priority” (2014, 3), 
thus taking a more international perspective. Both strategies 
also describe the Arctic based on its physical characteristics, 
such as the Arctic’s “vulnerable environment” (2017, 3; 2014, 
43). The 2014 Strategy also comments on the region’s “inhos-
pitable wilderness” and explains that the “weather conditions 
are harsh” (2014, 11, 3). At the same time, the Strategy remarks 
that “the High North has some of the most beautiful scenery 
and wildlife that Norway has to offer” (2014, 36), thus painting 
two different pictures of the region. 
The 2017 Strategy calls the region the “Arctic” and use the term 
“circumpolar” once in relation to the Arctic Council (see: 2017, 
7). In contrast, the terms “Arctic,” “High North,” and “north” 
are used seemingly interchangeably, while “circumpolar” is 
used a few times when discussing the entire region in the 2014 
Strategy (see: 2014, 16). Interestingly, the 2017 Strategy does 
not define the Arctic, whereas the 2014 Strategy does, both de-
scriptively and geographically. Descriptively, the strategy states 
that “the Arctic as a region is defined by its natural environ-
ment, its resources and its inhabitants” (2014, 3). Geograph-
ically, the Strategy notes that “1/3 of Norway’s land area lies 
north of the Arctic Circle” and that “80 % of Norway’s sea areas 
lie north of the Arctic Circle” (2014, 42), suggesting the Arctic 
is located north of the Arctic Circle.5 
Both documents also identify different ministries involved in 
Arctic affairs, but to different degrees. For instance, the 2017 
Strategy only mentions the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but 
does take care to recognize different levels of government. For 
example, a photo caption from the Regional Forum For Dia-
logue on Arctic Policy in February 2017 identifies the “Minis-
ter of Local Government and Modernisation, Jan Tore Sanner, 
Senior Adviser from the Sami Parliament, Torvald Falch, Pres-
4  The white paper in reference is the document from 2011, The High North - Visions and Strategies (2017, 15). 
5 This understanding is different than in previous strategies. 
ident of Nordland County Government, Tomas Norvoll, Exec-
utive Counselor for Planning and Finance Gerd Hetland Kris-
tiansen, from Troms County Government, County Governor 
of Finnmark County Runar Sjåstad, and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Børge Brende” (2017, 13). This suggests that it is not just 
the federal government that has responsibilities for the region. 
 
In contrast, the 2014 Strategy identifies more federal-level min-
istries. These include the following ministries:
• Foreign Affairs, 
• Nordic Cooperation, 
• Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 
• Climate and the Environment, 
• Education and Research, and
• Petroleum and Energy (2014, 18, 19, 25, 26, 28). 
The 2014 Strategy also recognizes other bodies that have re-
gional responsibilities. These include the “police, Customs, the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, the Directorate of Fisheries, the Nor-
wegian Maritime Authority, the Norwegian Coastal Adminis-
tration and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centres” (2014, 32) 
in the context of BarentsWatch.
Figure 10 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total 
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber) in the document. 
Figure 10. Comparing Norway’s 2014 and 2017 Strategies 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 8 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2017 Strategy and 4 % in the 2014 Strategy 
(see Figure 10). One of the focuses in both documents is on In-
digenous peoples. This is not surprising as “the Sami population 
totals approximately 80 000–100 000 people, living in Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Russia” and “the largest Sami population 
is in Norway” (2014, 42) in the North (2017, 10). Both strate-
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gies discuss the importance of the Saami Parliament, known as 
the Sámediggi, which represents the interests of Norway’s Saa-
mi population. In relation to the 2017 Strategy, the Sámedig-
gi’s participation in the policy development process allows for 
Indigenous voices to be heard (2017, 13–4). The 2014 Strategy 
also recognizes the government’s collaboration with the Saami 
with regard to “ethical guidelines for resource extraction in In-
digenous areas” (2014, 24), although it is explicitly stated if this 
is in conjunction with the Sámediggi. The 2017 Strategy also ex-
plains that international Saami cooperation is important (2017, 
19–20), although the 2014 Strategy provides more details on co-
operation. The 2014 Strategy explains that cooperation among 
the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish Saami Parliaments takes 
place through the Sami Parliamentary Council which “[plays] 
a key role in efforts to promote cross-border cooperation and 
cultural exchange” (2014, 16). The preservation of the Saami 
language is important, and the 2014 Strategy further explains 
that “the Sami parliaments of Norway, Sweden and Finland have 
united in establishing a joint Nordic language centre – Sámi 
Giellagáldu. Developing and harmonising terminology in the 
Sami languages across the Nordic borders is the key to the use of 
the Sami languages in the broadest areas of society” (2014, 30). 
In addition to these venues of cooperation, the 2017 Strategy 
also states that the Norwegian government will “promote co-
operation between Indigenous peoples in the Arctic under the 
auspices of the Arctic Council, the Barents cooperation and the 
Nordic cooperation” (2017, 21).
 
Health and wellbeing are addressed only in the 2014 Strategy, 
and the priority is to address health-related concerns. Indeed, 
efforts are under way to “strengthen health services in the north, 
in order to meet the needs that arise as a result of increased ac-
tivity” (2014, 32), and three key areas emerge in the Strategy. 
First, “there is a need for a new hospital in the north and a new 
hospital is under construction in Kirkenes” (2014, 35). Second, 
there is a focus on increasing access to Northerners in remote 
areas. One approach to addressing this challenge is that “the 
National Centre for Integrated Care and Telemedicine (NST) 
at the University Hospital in North Norway (UNN) collects, 
produces, and disseminates knowledge about telemedicine ser-
vices, nationally and internationally, and works to ensure that 
telemedicine and e-health are implemented” (2014, 35). Final-
ly, the Strategy recognizes the need to address regional health 
concerns that cross borders. For example, with the Cooperation 
Programme on Health and Related Social Issues in the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region “priority is given to cooperation on com-
bating communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and tubercu-
losis, preventing lifestyle-related health problems and develop-
ing more comprehensive healthcare services for children and 
young people at risk” (2014, 19). 
Different equality issues are raised in the two documents. For 
instance, the 2017 document mentions the Svalbard Global 
Seed Vault as a way of “safeguarding genetic diversity and con-
tributing to global food security” (2017, 37). While this is not 
specifically about food security in the Arctic, the intent is to 
ensure everyone has equal access to food. The document also 
recognizes the “distances between people and markets in North 
Norway are huge” (2017, 30) and that infrastructure solutions 
are needed, especially for business. The 2014 Strategy also ad-
dresses equality in the context of business and infrastructure. 
In particular, the need for improved infrastructure in the North 
is mentioned, and the Strategy states that “where agreements 
have been signed concerning the public procurement of trans-
port services, the additional costs to transport companies may 
be transferred to the central government and county adminis-
tration...The three northernmost counties have the highest ex-
penses, and have thus been reimbursed the most” (2014, 35). 
Population and migration are also important in Northern Nor-
way, especially as “nearly 10 % of Norway’s population lives north 
of the Arctic Circle, a greater proportion than in any other coun-
try in the world” (2014, 7). However, the 2017 Strategy explains 
that Norway’s northern population is ageing and will likely not 
see the same growth rate as in southern Norway (2017, 11, 27). 
At the same time, the Strategy determines that “in contrast to 
our neighbouring countries, the population trend in the Nor-
wegian part of the Arctic is positive. This is due to immigration” 
(2017, 10). This, in part, seems to be connected to the Freedom 
of Movement Council, which is mentioned in both documents. 
The aim of the Council is to facilitate cross-border flows of peo-
ple “between the Nordic countries” (2017, 18; 2014, 19). 
The Governance indicator, which accounts for 19 % of the total 
coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 15 % for the 2014 Strat-
egy (see Figure 10, p. 73), highlights the relevance of existing 
policy and the effective international cooperation mechanisms, 
as well as the existing governance structures, including the Arc-
tic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. Norway also 
recognizes “the importance of cooperation and reaching the 
same goals at the national level, which enables to set the agen-
da for the international debate on developments in the Arctic” 
(2017, 2, 3; 2014, 3, 12). “Both the Norwegian Government and 
regional Norwegian stakeholders agree with the other Nordic 
countries, Russia and the EU on the need to view regional poli-
cy programmes and cooperation arenas in the Arctic as parts of 
a coherent whole” (2014, 18, 19, 22, 43). The 2014 Strategy high-
lights that “the people who live in the north are the main drivers 
of cross-border cooperation in the region.” Also, “the Barents 
cooperation forum has formed the basis of much of the exten-
sive cross-border contact in the north. Contact and cooperation 
across national borders strengthens business activity, enhances 
knowledge and provides a basis for a forward-looking and sus-
tainable society” (2014, 16). 
The work of County Councils, which have plenty of “tasks re-
lating to planning, coordination and regional development,” is 
“of great significance of the society in the North… Due to their 
tasks and role as planning authorities, they have a responsibility 
to take a coherent approach to land use management and social 
and business development, and to give strategic direction to the 
efforts of the municipalities, regional government bodies, and 
other key actors in the north” (2017, 12). Furthermore, the 2017 
Strategy notes that “the municipalities also have a key role to 
play in the development of their local societies…The Govern-
ment has presented a proposal to the Storting (Norwegian par-
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liament) on regional reform aimed at creating larger and more 
efficient regions. Among the objectives of the reform are closer 
coordination between sectors and a stronger role for the County 
Councils in the development of the region” (2017, 13). 
In the 2017 Strategy, “the Government has sought to give great-
er consideration to the domestic aspects of Norway’s Arctic pol-
icy… In the development of North Norway, it is the region’s own 
citizens, companies and politicians that have the most import-
ant role to play” (2017, 3). Due to the fact that most of the ob-
jectives of Norways’ Arctic policy are connected to the national 
regional policy, “the Government recently presented a white 
paper on regional policy, which outlines the direction of urban 
and regional development across the country. Sustainability is a 
key principle for all development. This is in line with the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals” (2017, 15). 
Both strategies emphasize the importance of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, and that “the Convention forms the 
legal basis for the management of the Arctic sea areas” (2017, 
19–21; 2014, 11, 12, 16). The 2017 Strategy also refers to “the 
cooperation in the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
and in the Arctic Council on maritime safety and the sustain-
able development of shipping in the Arctic [as] vital for ensur-
ing a high level of maritime safety in Arctic sea areas.” Norway 
is also “actively promoting the Polar Code, which entered into 
force on 1 January 2017, and is playing a role in facilitating a 
harmonised and effective global implementation of the code” 
(2017, 36, 37; 2014, 36, 38, 39). 
Following from this, Norway’s Arctic policy “is also ocean pol-
icy”. The 2017 document highlights that Norway “have built up 
knowledge over generations that puts [them] in a good posi-
tion to take on a leading role in promoting sustainable use of 
the oceans.” Furthermore, “in 2015, the coastal states signed the 
Oslo Declaration on research cooperation and on preventing” 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing “in the internation-
al part of the central Arctic Ocean” (2017, 9, 20, 21; 2014, 19). 
Additionally, “the blue economy holds great promise for new 
investments, growth and employment. Sustainable ocean man-
agement is essential to ensure economic growth and limit neg-
ative environmental impacts in the Arctic” (2017, 22). Recently, 
“the Government presented an updated management plan for 
the Norwegian Sea, and work has begun on a complete revision 
of the management plan for the Barents Sea–Lofoten, which is 
due to be completed in 2020” (2017, 35).
  
In fact, “the Government attaches importance to safeguarding 
Sami interests. As an Indigenous people, the Sami have a right 
to be consulted in matters that could affect them directly. These 
consultations are to take place in good faith with the aim of 
reaching agreement on any proposed measures” (2017, 23). 
Behind is that “Norway is a maritime nation, and not least a 
nation of marine resources. Through work on the integrated 
ocean management plans for Norwegian sea areas, Norway is 
also a pioneering country when it comes to comprehensive, eco-
system-based management.” In addition, “climate change and 
increased activity in the sea and coastal areas in the north create 
new challenges for the management.” Therefore, “this makes it 
necessary to further develop maritime administration to safe-
guard good environmental standards and promote business 
activities and food safety within sustainable limits” (2014, 38). 
Norway “will therefore continue to have strict environmental 
requirements as a basis for new activities, and protect particu-
larly valuable and vulnerable areas” (2014, 36). 
To strengthen cooperation on developments in the Arctic, “the 
Government has established a regional forum for systematic 
dialogue at political level between the national government, 
the three regional governments counties of North Norway and 
the Sámediggi.” Additionally, “other key players in the Arctic, 
such as the business sector, academia, etc. will also be invited 
to take part in the forum, when relevant.” The purpose of the 
forum is “to discuss issues of importance for developments in 
the north that require cooperation across different sectors and 
administrative levels. These discussions will form the basis for 
implementing policy in the three counties and nationally.” As 
the strategy points out, “it is already clear that education, infra-
structure and business development will be high on the agenda” 
(2017, 13; 2014, 16). 
In order “to improve the quality of education and increase com-
pletion rates,” the government works to “establish cooperation 
between representatives of the counties, municipalities, the Sá-
mediggi (Sami parliament) and the national authorities” (2017, 
29). In fact, “the Sámediggi has a number of cooperation agree-
ments with both regional and governmental actors in the region, 
and with city municipalities such as Tromsø and Bodø.” The 
Government recognizes the important input of the Sámediggi 
“in connection with the development of the Arctic policy based 
on its insight into what the various Sami communities see as 
the greatest challenges” (2017, 13, 14). In the 2017 Strategy, the 
Government also promised to “work towards signing the Nordic 
Sami Convention” (2017, 21). 
On the bilateral level, it is important to continue cooperation 
with Russia in different areas of interest. One of them is “regular 
Norwegian-Russian search and rescue exercises that are carried 
out under the Barents cooperation”. As well, the two states will 
cooperate “on oil spill preparedness and response in the Barents 
Sea.” In fact, “targeted cooperation with Russia has also led to im-
proved maritime safety, higher cod quotas and action to reduce 
the risk of radioactive pollution.” Together with other states in 
the region, Norway “aims to maintain international cooperation 
on the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, with a view to safeguarding 
genetic diversity and contributing to global food security.” Last, 
but not least, Norway emphasizes the importance of “further im-
plementation of the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical 
and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, through the work 
of the Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response Working Group (EPPR)” (2017, 37; 2014, 11, 16, 37). 
The 2014 Strategy also refers to the “new Kirkenes Declaration, 
adopted at the Barents summit in 2013,” which “emphasizes the 
importance of business cooperation” (2014, 19).
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The International Treaties and International Cooperation 
indicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded quotes for the 
2017 Strategy and 10 % for the 2014 Strategy (see Figure 10, 
p. 73) and has significant relevance for the Norwegian Arctic 
policy. “Norway recognizes the necessity of close cooperation 
with other countries and organisations on how best to devel-
op the region. These include also national, regional and local 
authorities, as well as various institutions and NGOs, that par-
ticipate actively in cooperation in the Arctic, which promotes 
understanding in the region and opens up more channels for 
dialogue” (2017, 17). International cooperation is “vital for 
maintaining the overarching framework, including peace and 
security, but it also enhances national efforts in areas such as 
infrastructure, knowledge development and business devel-
opment.” Indeed, “the stable and predictable region where 
international cooperation and respect for the principles of in-
ternational law are the norm” (2017, 10, 17). The 2014 Strate-
gy highlights that “impacts of climate change are particularly 
marked in the Arctic.” Moreover, the current major challenges 
“can only be tackled by means of knowledge, responsible man-
agement and international cooperation” (2014, 3). 
The purpose of international cooperation in the north is “to 
promote predictable, peaceful and sustainable development 
through intergovernmental, regional and people-to-people 
cooperation.” The 2017 Strategy further highlights the impor-
tance of “a good balance between conservation and sustainable 
use” (2017, 19). “Close international cooperation has played a 
significant part in safeguarding Norwegian interests relating 
to safety, environmental protection and resources in the Arc-
tic. Safety, the environment, resource management, health and 
maritime safety are cross-border issues, and can only be ad-
dressed in cooperation with other countries and actors in the 
north” (2017, 2, 9, 17). Developments in the Arctic are also im-
portant beyond the region itself, and therefore Norway states 
it is important to cooperate with the observer countries of the 
Arctic Council – “both for the sake of the valuable contribu-
tions they can make to the Council’s work, and to promote 
understanding of Norwegian policy… It is therefore important 
to maintain all existing cooperation fora in Arctic” (2017, 17; 
2014, 16). 
Following from this, Norway’s Arctic Strategy states that “al-
though various actors may have legitimate but conflicting in-
terests in the north, there is no race for the Arctic or for the 
resources in the region… [and] Norway is intensifying its dip-
lomatic efforts in the Arctic vis-à-vis the other Arctic states, 
the EU, key European countries and the new Asian observ-
ers” (2014, 12, 18). Furthermore, Norway “wants to exploit 
the opportunities Nordic cooperation offers for growth and 
development in the Arctic. Key areas for cooperation include 
knowledge development, business development, infrastruc-
ture, climate change, the environment, security policy, and co-
operation with the EU” (2014, 18). The “government attaches 
importance to maintaining its dialogue with the EU on the 
Arctic.” Norwegian government “also supports the EU’s appli-
cation for observer status in the Arctic Council, which is still 
being processed” (2017, 19). 
“Respect for international law and international cooperation 
are crucial” values are at the core of Norway’s efforts (2014, 11). 
This is also “crucial for promoting stability and predictability 
in the north” (2014, 11). Both Norwegian strategies reflect the 
importance of cooperation with Russia, despite Russia’s viola-
tions of international law in Ukraine and Norway’s response to 
these: “It is vital that Norway and Russia work together to ad-
dress key challenges in the north.” Hence, “broad cooperation 
with Russia over the course of many decades has been important 
for building trust and promoting stability in the Arctic.” In fact, 
“the bilateral cooperation has also produced concrete results in 
areas of common interest.” Indeed, “the government will pro-
mote Norwegian–Russian political dialogue and cooperation in 
areas of common interest, including fisheries management, the 
environment, search and rescue, nuclear safety, border control, 
and notification and response to incidents at sea, and maintain 
the direct line of contact between the head of the Norwegian 
Joint Headquarters and the head of the Northern Fleet.” All in 
all, Norway wants “to have good neighbourly relations with Rus-
sia, and the Government gives high priority to dialogue with the 
Russian authorities. Relations with Russia will remain a constant 
and important element of Norway’s Arctic policy” (2017, 18, 21). 
Together with the rest of Europe and other allies, “Norway is 
standing firm in defence of international law and internation-
al rules in the face of Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. Respect for 
the Law of the Sea, and international cooperation are crucial for 
promoting stability and predictability in the north.” At the same 
time, Norway intends “to continue cooperation with Russia in 
areas where we have common interests.” As the 2014 Strategy 
emphasizes, “it is in everyone’s interests that the Arctic remains a 
peaceful and stable region” (2014, 11, 16). 
In the international cooperation indicator, both strategies also 
highlight Norway’s approach towards the Exclusive Econom-
ic Zone (EEZ) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
which “provides vital guidelines for continued peaceful coex-
istence in the north.” Indeed, “there are very few unresolved 
issues relating to jurisdiction in the Arctic, states comply with 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the Arctic coastal 
states have committed themselves to the orderly settlement of 
any overlapping claims.” As both strategies emphasize “the Law 
of the Sea must be respected in the Arctic as elsewhere” (2017, 
19–21; 2014, 11, 12). Generally, “all coastal states have a conti-
nental shelf extending 200 nautical miles from their baselines… 
Norway has already submitted documentation on the extent of 
its continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit… The maritime 
delimitation line agreed between Norway and Russia in 2010 
stretches for 1750 kilometres. All the coastal states bordering the 
Arctic Ocean have undertaken to resolve maritime delimitation 
issues in accordance with the law of the sea.” The 2014 Strategy 
summarizes that “it is essential for Norway to take a clear and 
firm approach to upholding its rights and fulfilling its duties in 
maritime areas under its jurisdiction in the north” (2014, 11, 12). 
As the 2014 document states “the Arctic is Norway’s most im-
portant foreign policy priority” (2014, 3). As well, “The Govern-
ment’s Arctic policy builds on our long-term efforts” and here 
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“the overarching goals” are: “peace, stability and predictability” 
and “International cooperation and the international legal or-
der” (2017, 2, 15). Norway aims to “play a leading role in inter-
national diplomacy in the Arctic.” (2014, 3). The Government 
will therefore “strengthen Norway’s position as a responsible 
actor and partner in the north by focusing on knowledge de-
velopment, business development and international coopera-
tion” (2014, 16). In common with other Arctic states, Norway 
recognizes “the Arctic Council [as] the only circumpolar forum 
for political discussions at government level.” “Climate change 
and environmental issues are key areas of the Council’s work, 
and, in line with Norway’s wishes, greater attention is now being 
paid to business development.” As both documents point out, 
“the Arctic Council should remain the most important inter-
governmental body for cooperation on Arctic issues” (2017, 17, 
21; 2014, 3, 7, 12, 16). 
Besides the Arctic Council, both strategies refer to the “Barents 
cooperation between the five Nordic countries, Russia and the 
EU which has been promoting peaceful and sustainable de-
velopment in the Barents region” since 1993 (2014, 11). “The 
Barents cooperation was initiated in response to changes in the 
political landscape, which made closer cooperation between the 
eight Arctic states possible.” Its “aim is to secure peace and stabil-
ity in the Arctic.” Norway will “continue to play an active role in 
the Barents cooperation, and to further develop people-to-peo-
ple cooperation in the Barents region” (2017, 17, 18, 21; 2014, 
11, 12, 16, 19). The Northern Dimension also contributes to 
regional cooperation. For example, “a number of partnerships 
have been set up in the framework of the Northern Dimension, 
including partnerships on the environment, health, culture, and 
transport and logistics” (2017, 17; 2014, 19). Both strategies also 
highlight the cooperation with the Baltic Sea Council and the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council. The 2014 Strategy also refers to 
the Kirkenes Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Eu-
ro-Arctic Region from 1993 which aims “to secure peace and 
stability in the Arctic” (2017, 2, 17, 18, 21; 2014, 12, 19). 
The Arctic Economic Council (AEC) is also recognized in the 
2014 Strategy. “The AEC will be an important platform for dia-
logue between the Arctic Council and the business sector. Nor-
way considers it important that the Arctic Council gives greater 
priority to business development cooperation” (2014, 18). The 
2014 Strategy also highlights the importance of more extensive 
Finnish–Norwegian cooperation as “Norway and Finland have 
established a partnership to strengthen economic and scientific 
cooperation in the Arctic. Key areas include promoting student 
exchanges, research cooperation, dialogue on transport and 
logistics, closer regional cooperation and flows of labour and 
services” (2014,19).
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 6 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 7 % for the 2014 
Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73). As mentioned earlier, both docu-
ments consider the Arctic’s environment to be vulnerable, mak-
ing environmental protection a priority. According to the 2017 
Strategy, “as one of the eight Arctic states, Norway has a great 
responsibility for ensuring sound management of all activities 
in the Arctic, so as to protect the region’s vulnerable environ-
ment” (2017, 3). According to both documents, the main way 
Norway will accomplish this appears to be through balancing 
environmental protection and economic activities, as this will 
be important to both the functioning and future of the region. 
For example, the 2017 Strategy states that “the natural environ-
ment and natural resources are the basis of all livelihoods in the 
north, and healthy ecosystems provide goods and services the 
region depends on” (2017, 10; see also: 2014, 28). Both docu-
ments accordingly note that oil spills can be environmentally 
damaging and that response measures are needed (2017, 37; 
2014, 39, 40). To find this balance, both documents identify dif-
ferent environmental practices. For example, the 2014 Strategy 
explains that environmental research is important for decision 
making, and that “the goal is to acquire new knowledge about 
oil and gas resources in the Arctic and develop knowledge and 
methods for more environmentally friendly exploration activ-
ities” (2014, 28). Research will also be used to make decisions 
with regard to climate change and environmental protection 
(2014, 36). Additionally, Norway will use an ecosystem-based 
management structure for managing the ocean and its resources 
(2014, 38). The 2017 Strategy also mentions the use of an eco-
system-based management structure; however, this exact term 
is only used in the context of the strategy’s objectives (2017, 15). 
Other practices include sustainable business practices (2017, 21, 
24) and finding ways to “reduce greenhouse gas emissions from 
road transport” (2017, 33).
 
Protected areas and biodiversity are also important to envi-
ronmental protection and mentioned in both documents, al-
though more detail is provided in the 2014 Strategy. The 2017 
Strategy makes a general statement that “the Government will 
seek to safeguard threatened species and habitats, achieve good 
ecological status in ecosystems, and maintain a representative 
selection of Norwegian nature” (2017, 35). The 2014 Strategy 
suggests that Svalbard is an important location for animal pro-
tection. Indeed, the document notes that “65 per cent of Sval-
bard is protected” (2014, 38), and that “3000 polar bears live 
around Svalbard and in the northern Barents Sea. The breed-
ing population of seabirds in this area totals 15 million, and the 
walrus population in the Svalbard area is about 4000” (2014, 7). 
Moreover, climate change can increase the presence of invasive 
species, and ocean acidification can harm the region’s flora and 
fauna (2014, 36, 40). To address some of these issues, “Norway, 
together with Canada, will develop a plan for the follow-up of 
the Arctic Council’s report on the threats to natural diversity in 
the Arctic” (2014, 40).
The Pollution indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 5 % for the 2014 Strategy (see 
Figure 10, p. 73). Both documents identify similar pollutants, 
including oil, greenhouse gases, radioactive material, and local 
and other waste material (2017, 6, 10, 31, 36; 2014, 6, 11, 14, 25). 
Additionally, the 2014 Strategy mentions short-lived climate 
forces, soot, and sulphur dioxide (2014, 29, 40), while the 2017 
Strategy also mentions “emissions of persistent, bioaccumula-
tive and toxic substances” and “marine litter and microplastics” 
(2017, 35). As for the sources of pollution, both documents 
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States
78
mention the shipping industry, and the “transport sector” more 
broadly in the 2017 document (2017, 6, 32; 2014, 40). The 2017 
Strategy also mentions that pollution comes from “infrastruc-
ture development” and the 2014 Strategy also names “the nickel 
production facilities on the Kola Peninsula” (2017, 31; 2014, 29). 
 
The strategies also discuss different approaches to pollution 
prevention. In particular, there is consistency, as they both ac-
knowledge the Paris Agreement and the Arctic Council’s Agree-
ment on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic, as well as other mechanisms to ad-
dress oil pollution in the Barents, Lofoton, and Vesterålen (2017, 
32, 36, 37; 2014, 11, 36, 39). Some of the other problem-solving 
tactics in the 2014 Strategy include documenting pollution, or 
the possibility of pollution. For example, the MAREANO pro-
gram maps pollution among other things (2014, 30), and in the 
Kola Peninsula, “documenting the impact on the environment 
and health is important for the dialogue with Russia on how 
to reducing the discharges” (2014, 30). Risk analysis is also im-
portant for preparing for potential pollution incidents. As an 
example, the Strategy states that “in the course of 2014, the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration completed an environmen-
tal risk and preparedness analysis for Svalbard and Jan Mayen. 
The analysis will provide a better basis to measure national pre-
paredness against acute pollution in these areas” (2014, 39). The 
2017 Strategy also speaks to plastics pollution and explains that 
“the Government will strengthen efforts at both national and 
international level to prevent and combat marine litter and mi-
croplastics” (2017, 35), but does not go into detail on what these 
measures will include.
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2017 strategy and 3 % for the 2014 
Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73) identifies some of the conse-
quences of climate change. The 2017 Strategy explains that cli-
mate change is a global issue, and that “the impacts of climate 
change in the Arctic are affecting countries both in and outside 
the region” (2017, 3). It also recognizes that “the impacts of cli-
mate change are particularly pronounced in the north, and this 
may affect current business activities and communities in the 
region” (2017, 3). Indeed, both documents recognize that sea 
ice is melting and that this may lead to new economic activity in 
the region (2017, 3; 2014, 3, 7), which is one of the positive con-
sequences of climate change. That being said, there are negative 
consequences for the flora and fauna, as “climate change is a ma-
jor and growing threat to species and ecosystems in the north 
and also makes them more vulnerable to other environmental 
pressures” (2017, 35). Somewhat similarly, the 2014 Strategy 
notes that “higher temperatures in the sea and changes in ocean 
currents may lead to fish stocks moving elsewhere” (2014, 26).
Despite the consequences of climate change, the 2017 Strategy 
does not use the words mitigation and adaptation. Instead, it 
makes statements that are suggestive of this. For example, the 
Strategy explains that “more knowledge and new approaches are 
needed to minimise the impacts of human activity and climate 
change on the Arctic environment” (2017, 35). Certainly, this 
sounds like mitigating the effects of climate change. In contrast, 
the 2014 Strategy directly address adaptation with regard to re-
gional and national efforts. Regionally, “the parties in the Barents 
Cooperation forum have prepared an action plan with measures 
that can contribute to reduced emissions and better adaptation 
to climate change” (2014, 40), while nationally “the Government 
will strengthen work on climate adaptation in the north through 
the measures that are announced in the white paper on climate 
adaptation in Norway… to the Storting)” (2014, 40).
As for climate agreements and frameworks, both documents 
mention the significance of the Paris Agreement for addressing 
climate change, and the 2014 Strategy also recognizes collabo-
rative climate and emission reduction efforts through the work 
of the Barents Cooperation (2017, 12, 32; 2014, 11, 40). While 
these agreements are important, both documents also address 
the need for more climate research. For example, the 2017 Strat-
egy suggests that research underpins climate cooperation (2017, 
35), while the 2014 Strategy explains that “good climate models 
are necessary in order to be able to say something about future 
climate change, and better knowledge of sea ice is important to 
improving these models” (2014, 28).
The Security indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 5 % for the 2014 Strategy (see 
Figure 10, p. 73) illustrates the importance of international co-
operation and the international legal order in security matters. 
The government’s Arctic policy builds on long-term efforts and 
foundations of the Norwegian foreign policy. As both strategies 
emphasize, “international cooperation is vital for maintaining 
the overarching framework, including peace, security and sta-
bility, but it also enhances national efforts in areas such as infra-
structure, knowledge development and business development” 
(2017, 9, 10, 15; 2014, 16). According to the Norwegian Arctic, 
as well as foreign, policy “it is in everyone’s interests that the 
Arctic remains a peaceful and stable region… [due to] the im-
portance of this approach to management in an area with such 
abundant natural resources but at the same time a highly vul-
nerable natural environment”, as there are changes in Europe’s 
security environment. Therefore, Norway will “continue to take 
a consistent and predictable approach to the exercise of its sov-
ereignty” and “will play a leading role in promoting coopera-
tion with other countries based on trust and openness” (2014, 
11, 16). This entails “strategic projects with various cooperative 
partners that can contribute to increased interaction across bor-
ders in the north, ambitious business initiatives, broad knowl-
edge initiatives, further development of infrastructure, and re-
inforced environmental protection, security and preparedness” 
(2014, 31). 
As the 2017 and 2014 strategies are the most recent Arctic strat-
egies of any of the Arctic states, Norway reflects Russian for-
eign policy and condemns its aggressive activities in Ukraine, 
as mentioned in the International Cooperation indicator. “To-
gether with the rest of Europe and our other allies, Norway is 
standing firm in defence of international law and international 
rules in the face of Russia’s conduct in Ukraine.” This approach 
is also important in the context of the Arctic. “On the subject 
of security policy and good neighbourly relations: there is no 
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hiding the fact that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are affecting re-
lations between Russia and the rest of Europe” (2014, 3, 11, 16). 
Both strategies also refer to the increase of “Russian military ac-
tivities in the North… over the last ten years”. Although, “this 
increase in activity is not considered to be targeted at Norway, 
but it is nevertheless an important factor in Norway’s security 
and defence policy” (2017, 18; 2014, 3). The Norwegian Armed 
Forces “will continue to exercise sovereignty and authority and 
[provide] situational awareness in the northern sea areas in a 
predictable, consistent and unambiguous way. This is an im-
portant element of the Government’s overall Arctic policy.” The 
Norwegian Coastguard plays also an important role (2017, 18, 
21; 2014, 11, 16). 
The 2014 Strategy highlights the importance of continued coop-
eration with Russia in areas where there are common interests, 
based on the “respect for the Law of the Sea and international 
cooperation are crucial for promoting stability and predictabil-
ity in the north”. Behind is that being among the Arctic littoral 
states “Norway and Russia share many common interests, not 
least the need to ensure sound management of the environment, 
the natural resources and the joint fish stocks of the Barents 
Sea.” In addition to that, “the building of new military border 
stations will strengthen Norway’s ability to monitor and con-
trol the Norwegian–Russian border.” At the same time, “Norway 
cooperates with the other Arctic coastal states on measures to 
combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the Arctic 
Ocean” (2014, 16, 19). Hence, “targeted cooperation with Rus-
sia has led to improved maritime safety, higher cod quotas and 
action to reduce the risk of radioactive pollution” (2014, 11). 
The 2017 Strategy also confirms that “membership of NATO 
and the transatlantic security community is the cornerstone of 
Norway’s security policy.” Moreover, “the presence of our allies, 
such as for training and exercising in Norway, is an important 
and natural result of our membership of NATO” (2017, 18). And 
the document continues with that “Norway is further develop-
ing its military cooperation and ability to cooperate with key 
allies and Nordic partner countries in the north, for example by 
participating in joint exercises.” In fact, “the Cold Response ex-
ercise is carried out in North Norway every other year, most re-
cently in March.” Importantly, “closer cooperation between the 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters in Bodø and NATO’s command 
structure strengthens the Alliance’s ability to manage potential 
military crisis situations in the north” (2014, 16, 19).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 8 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 9 % for the 2014 Strategy 
(see Figure 10, p. 73). The 2017 Strategy clearly states that “en-
vironmental protection, safety, emergency preparedness and 
response” (2017, 35) must be addressed. In part, this includes 
maritime safety (2017, 3, 36). The 2014 Strategy provides more 
information on Norway’s safety priorities, including maritime 
safety. For example, environmental protection is linked to oil 
spills, as well as other forms of pollution, especially in the Sval-
bard and Jan Mayen areas (2014, 36, 39). Safety and emergency 
preparedness at sea is also discussed. For example, the Strategy 
explains that maritime safety requires that “ships and other in-
stallations are suitable for polar waters, and that crew members 
have received the necessary training.” Norway, moreover, will 
also be active in search and rescue (2014, 36). Rescue operations 
will also take place on land, especially if there is an accident or 
other form of health emergency in Svalbard (2014, 39). Land 
safety is also addressed with regard to transportation safety on 
roads and highways. Indeed, the document stresses that “con-
gestion points, as well as landslide-prone and other vulnerable 
roads will be improved” (2014, 32).
In light of these concerns, different approaches to safety are dis-
cussed in the strategies. With regard to formalized agreements, 
both documents identify the Arctic Council’s SAR and oil spill 
agreements, which are collaborative efforts with the other Arc-
tic states (2017, 17; 2014, 36, 38). Additionally, the strategies ac-
knowledge the important role of the IMO and the Polar Code 
to maritime safety. After participating in the development of the 
Polar Code, the 2017 Strategy states, “Norway is actively pro-
moting the Polar Code, which entered into force on 1 January 
2017, and is playing a role in facilitating a harmonised and ef-
fective global implementation of the code” (2017, 36; 14, 38). 
This suggests that binding safety rules are important for Nor-
way. There are also other collaborative safety initiatives in the 
Barents region. For instance, Norway and Russia bilaterally co-
operate on search and rescue (2017, 37), while the “the Norwe-
gian-Russian ship reporting system, Barents SRS, and the mari-
time surveillance and information system BarentsWatch help to 
provide an overview of high-risk traffic in these sea areas and a 
more effective response in the event of accidents” (2017, 36; see 
also: 2014, 32, 34). There is also multilateral safety cooperation, 
with the 2014 Strategy explaining that “in 2008, Norway signed 
an agreement with Sweden, Finland and Russia on prevention, 
preparedness, and crisis management in the Barents region” 
(2014, 36–38). Safety collaboration also takes place within Nor-
way, such as through the SARiNOR project that ran from 2013 
to 2016. The 2014 Strategy explains the project “is led by the 
Maritime Forum Northern Norway” and that “the purpose of 
the project is to create an arena for cooperation in search and 
rescue among relevant private and public actors” (2014, 40). 
Although the two strategies demonstrate close cooperation be-
tween states, there does not seem to be a desire to integrate any 
of these safety systems. This sentiment is clearly expressed in the 
2014 Strategy as “the challenges in the Arctic transcend all bor-
ders, and must be managed through international cooperation 
in agencies such as the UN Maritime Organisation IMO, and 
regionally in the Arctic Council” (2014, 36). 
In terms of capabilities, both strategies discuss the same four key 
topics. First is the role of satellites for safety and surveillance. 
The 2017 Strategy explains that “satellite navigation, communi-
cations and surveillance systems are also important in the north 
for search and rescue efforts, climate and environmental mon-
itoring, resource management and the exercise of sovereignty” 
(2017, 32). The 2014 Strategy identifies Norway’s satellite capa-
bilities as the AISSat-2 as part of the BarentsWatch program, 
and explains that capabilities are also acquired from the EU’s 
Galileo and EGNOS programs (2014, 32, 35). However, both 
strategies recognize that a key challenge to satellite operation is 
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that “existing satellite communication systems have little or no 
coverage north of 75 degrees north” 6 (2014, 35; see also: 2017, 
36) and that this flaw needs to be addressed. The 2017 Strategy 
also explains Norway’s intention to “establish new land-based 
AIS (Automatic Identification System) base stations along the 
west coast of Svalbard, and will consider further developing the 
AIS network in Svalbard” (2017, 36).
The second topic is improved SAR capabilities, particularly near 
Svalbard. The strategies generally attribute this improvement to 
the purchase of two helicopters. The 2014 Strategy explains that 
these “have a greater range, reduced response time and greater 
carrying capacity, as well as new and modern search, communi-
cation and safety equipment” (2014, 38; see also: 2017, 37). The 
2017 Strategy further explains that, in addition to the helicopters, 
safety around Svalbard has also been improved through new leg-
islation “relating to ports and navigable waters” (2017, 37). The 
third topic is oil and pollution prevention, especially near Lofo-
ten and Vesterålen. Both strategies show progression in address-
ing this concern, with the 2014 Strategy explaining that Norway 
wants to create a base for pollution response, and 2017 Strategy 
stating that Norway will “establish a centre with leading compe-
tence on oil spill preparedness and response and marine plastic 
litter, located in the Lofoten and Vesterålen archipelago” (2017, 
37; see also: 2014, 39). The final topic is mapping and charting 
around Svalbard. Again, the two documents show progress with 
this regard. The 2014 Strategy explains that little mapping has tak-
en place in this area, while the 2017 Strategy explains that “nauti-
cal charts and ice data are an important part of the infrastructure 
needed to save lives, and protect health, the environment and 
valuable assets and resources. The work that is already under way 
to chart key areas around Svalbard will therefore be continued” 
(2017, 37). In addition, with responsibility for Arctic safety in 
mind, the Coast Guard performs a range of safety related duties, 
“including fisheries inspections, customs inspections, environ-
mental protection and search and rescue operations” (2014, 15).
The Economy indicator accounts for 18 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 17 % for the 2014 Strategy (see 
Figure 10, p. 73). The two documents identify similar econom-
ic activities including tourism, reindeer husbandry, aquaculture, 
fisheries, seafood, and the blue economy (2017, 10, 22; 2014, 6, 
20) According to the 2017 Strategy, the blue economy likely in-
cludes “ocean-based industries such as marine biotechnology, 
energy, seabed mining, and maritime transport” (2017, 23–24; 
see also: 2014, 14, 25). The blue economy, and fish in particular, 
are important to Norway as “24,5 billion NOK was the value of 
fish exports from North Norway in 2016. This amounts to around 
60 % of the region’s total exports of goods” (2017, 6). The 2017 
Strategy additionally recognizes that “traditional Sami industries” 
also contribute to Norway’s economy, and also that there is “con-
siderable potential for green growth in North Norway” (2017, 
23, 12). The 2014 Strategy also recognizes that space is another 
regional economic activity. Indeed, the report states that “space 
6 When making the same point, the 2017 Strategy explains that coverage issues begin at 72°N (2017, 36). It was not clear why there was a 3° difference between 
the two strategies. 
technology and research is one area in which the region is already 
a world leader” (2014, 14).
Minerals and energy, of course, are important aspects of Norway’s 
economy. Both documents support developing the mining indus-
try (2017, 31; 2014, 22), especially as “33 % of turnover from the 
Norwegian mining and mineral industry is generated in North 
Norway and Svalbard” (2014, 6). Both documents also highlight 
the potential for increased oil and gas activity through similar 
statements about untapped resources. The 2014 Strategy remarks 
that “43 % of undiscovered oil and gas resources on the Nor-
wegian continental shelf are expected to lie in the Barents Sea” 
(2014, 7; 2017, 2). In light of this potential, the 2014 Strategy fur-
ther explains that the Government will promote exploration and 
issue new licences (2014, 20). Oil and gas, however, are not the 
only energy sources mentioned in the two strategies; renewable 
energy is also addressed, and there seems to be a slight shift in 
tone between the two documents. For instance, the then Foreign 
Minister Brende expressed that “‘renewable energy use should, 
and will, increase considerably, but a large share of the global 
energy supply will still have to come from sources such as gas. 
Gas will be an important bridge between a fossil fuel based and 
a low-carbon economy…’” (2014, 14), suggesting that Norway is 
still focusing on oil and gas. The 2017 Strategy, however, appears 
to put more emphasis on the use of renewable energy. Indeed, the 
Strategy states that “North Norway has abundant renewable ener-
gy resources, and the region as a whole has a power surplus. The 
Government will promote the effective use of renewable energy 
resources as a basis for business development and value creation” 
(2017, 32).
Sustainability is also important for Norway’s economic activities. 
For instance, the 2014 Strategy states that “Foreign Minister Bren-
de considers it important that the Government promotes sustain-
able business development in the north” (2014, 13–14). The 2017 
Strategy further supports sustainable development, as one of its 
main aims is to “ensure economically, socially and environmen-
tally sustainable business development in the Arctic” (2017, 23). 
The Strategy does not, however, just stop at sustainable business-
es, but also seeks to create regional sustainability. It explains that 
“a sustainable region is one that has a balanced population struc-
ture, and is one where human and natural resources are managed 
in a way that promotes development and growth, both now and 
in the future” (2017, 9).
Considering the breadth of economic activities, both documents 
comment on the importance of the regional economy to Nor-
way. For example, the 2017 Strategy expresses that “the business 
sector in North Norway is thriving, and the rate of growth in 
the north of the country is currently higher than in the south” 
(2017, 3). The 2014 Strategy makes similar statements, explain-
ing that “GDP growth forecasts for North Norway for 2014 and 
2015 are better than for the rest of the country, and growth of 
3 % is forecast for both years. Expected growth for the rest of 
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the country in 2014 and 2015 is 2 %” (2014, 43). Moreover, “the 
business sector in North Norway is more export-oriented than 
the rest of the Norwegian economy and is responsible for some 
8 % of the country’s exports other than oil and gas” (2014, 43). 
The two strategies recognize that the success of Northway’s 
northern economy is dependent upon people living in the re-
gion. The two documents thus propose different approaches to 
ensuring a viable workforce. The approach in the 2017 Strategy 
is to build a sustainable region in order to attract or retain peo-
ple. Indeed, the Strategy explains that “creating attractive local 
communities that can offer secure and interesting jobs in both 
the private and public sectors is therefore an essential compo-
nent of the Government’s Arctic strategy” (2017, 10, 23). The 
2014 Strategy’s plan to increase the labour force was through 
the Freedom of Movement Council’s plan to ease cross-border 
employment (2014, 19) that was first mentioned here in the Hu-
man Dimension indicator. Another shared strategy is the legis-
lation or policy changes to facilitate economic growth. The 2017 
Strategy addresses “simplifying the Planning and Building Act” 
as a way to stimulate growth (2017, 31). In contrast, Mr. Brende 
in the 2014 Strategy “emphasises the fact that the Government 
will target its efforts towards industries with growth potential. 
Priority areas will include the oil and gas industry and the re-
lated supply industry, the maritime sector, the seafood industry, 
the mineral industry, tourism and space technology” (2014, 14). 
To help facilitate some of these priorities, there will be both a 
“white paper and draft legislation” put forward for the seafood 
industry, and also a maritime strategy for maritime industries 
(2014, 25). Regulations will also apply to the bioprospecting 
field; the oil and gas industry is also accountable to internation-
al standards (2014, 25, 39). That said, the 2017 Strategy speaks 
to the issue of regulation and explains that “most sectors with 
growth potential in the north are subject to considerable gov-
ernment regulation” (2017, 24) which will affect how economic 
activities are performed.
Other actions will be taken outside of population building and 
economic regulation. According to the 2017 Strategy, the Gov-
ernment will “provide risk capital through Innovation Norway’s 
Environmental Technology Scheme to companies seeking to 
develop environmentally friendly products and technology” 
and also “strengthen the supplier industry in North Norway by 
establishing a supply chain development programme for the re-
gion” (2017, 23, 24). The 2014 Strategy also looks towards inter-
national cooperation as “the prime ministers of Norway, Swe-
den and Finland have set up an expert group to identify ways 
of strengthening business cooperation in the north” (2014, 18). 
Combined, the two strategies identify a wide range of econom-
ic actors. The state, the EU, the private sector, and Indigenous 
peoples or the Saami are mentioned in both documents (2017, 
18, 24; 2014, 16, 19, 20, 22). The 2017 Strategy further mentions 
skilled labor, Innovation Norway, and The Expert Committee for 
Green Competitiveness (2017, 9, 12, 23), while the 2014 Strategy 
names the Geological Survey of Norway, the Svalbard Director-
ate of Mining and the Commissioner of Mines, the Petroleum 
Safety Authority, and Visit Svalbard AS (2014, 22, 25, 39). 
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 1 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 2 % of the 2014 Strategy (see 
Figure 10, p. 73) recognizes the relevance of the tourist industry 
for the future. Tourism in the North is increasing, “with visitors 
coming to the region from all over the world” (2017, 3). Indeed, 
“the High North has some of the most beautiful scenery and 
wildlife that Norway has to offer” which are “major competitive 
advantages for the travel and tourism industry” (2014, 20). Fur-
thermore, “there is rich natural diversity, both on land and in 
the sea. This has been the basis of settlement, value creation and 
welfare for as long as people have lived here. Fisheries, aquacul-
ture, agriculture, new marine industries and tourism make use 
of the natural environment and are dependent on sustainable 
management.” The 2014 Strategy further explains that “Tourism 
is also important for local employment”, and “the Hurtigruten 
ships are a symbol of authentic northern Norway to many peo-
ple.” As well “The Government will contribute to good, predict-
able framework conditions for the travel and tourism industry” 
(2014, 20, 23, 36). 
“The Norwegian economy is undergoing a process of restruc-
turing, and needs North Norway’s contribution more than ever” 
(2017, 3). At the same time, the 2014 Strategy warns that “since 
the region is becoming more accessible as the sea ice melts and 
with the growing demand for energy and raw materials, the 
region faces several other challenges, such as the expansion of 
tourism, besides others like growing traffic along new sailing 
routes or greater oil and gas activity” (2014, 12).
The 2014 Strategy also addresses the “growth in the travel and 
tourism industry in Svalbard”. In fact, “visit Svalbard AS is today 
the only travel and tourism company that receives annual sup-
port directly from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. 
This is because Svalbard has special safety and environmental 
challenges and the travel and tourism industry has a central po-
sition in society in Svalbard and is important for settlement” 
(2014, 25). The Government will further “develop the tourist 
industry with a focus on profitability and sustainable manage-
ment of the natural environment and cultural heritage.” At the 
same time, it will “develop the transport system in the north 
so that it can handle the flow of goods, everyday transport and 
travel and tourism” (2014, 23, 24, 32). 
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 9 % of the 2014 
Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73) discusses different infrastructure 
issues. Improving transportation infrastructure is addressed in 
both strategies. Both documents comment that the National 
Transport Plan guides their infrastructure developments (2017, 
31–32; 2014, 32), and that transportation needs to facilitate the 
movement of goods (2017, 11; 2014, 32). Additionally, the need 
to develop sustainable, environmentally friendly, and safe trans-
portation is also discussed in both strategies, while the 2014 
Strategy also acknowledges the need for accessibility (2017, 31; 
2014, 32). Both strategies, though recognizing the need to de-
velop different types of transportation infrastructure, provide 
different amounts of detail. While the 2017 Strategy explains 
that “it is vital to ensure that infrastructure is well-maintained, 
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ferry capacity is sufficient, roads across the mountains are kept 
open year-round, and that there are reliable flight connections 
in the region” (2017, 32), the 2014 Strategy goes into detail and 
provides concrete actions and proposals on highway, air, rail-
way, and port infrastructure. For example, “National Trans-
port Plan 2014–2023 funds have been allocated to upgrading 
and constructing new harbour infrastructure in the port of 
Longyearbyen” (2014, 35). 
Shipping is also connected to infrastructure and addressed in 
both documents, although to varying degrees. The 2017 Strat-
egy does not address shipping as much as the 2014 Strategy 
does, but it does mention Norway’s plans to make local mar-
itime traffic more environmentally friendly. It also expresses 
the desire for increased safety by “[Norway participating] in 
efforts under the IMO and the Arctic Council to harmonise 
implementation of the Polar Code worldwide” (2017, 37). The 
2014 Strategy provides more detail, especially on safety, the 
IMO, and the Polar Code. It explains that “80 % of maritime 
traffic in the Arctic passes through Norwegian waters” (2014, 
6), which contextualizes the focus on safety. It also explains 
that “Norway is an active driving force in establishing glob-
al safety and environmental rules for ships operating in polar 
waters. Norway has led the working group in the UN maritime 
organisation (IMO) which is working to establish the so-called 
Polar Code” (2014, 38). 
Ensuring energy security is raised in both strategies, as is the 
need for transmission lines (2017, 31; 2014, 35). In particu-
lar, the 2014 Strategy explains that “Statnett, the Norwegian 
state owned enterprise responsible for owning, operating and 
constructing the central power grid in Norway, is making sig-
nificant investments in the main grid, which will result in in-
creased security of supply in Northern Norway” (2014, 32). 
Energy security, seemingly, may also come from renewable 
energy (2017, 32; 2014, 32). 
Telecommunications and ICT infrastructure are briefly men-
tioned in both documents in a safety context. In particular, 
the two strategies recognize the challenges of operating satel-
lites in the far north (2017, 32; 2014, 35), which is discussed 
in detail in the Safety and SAR indicator. The 2017 Strategy 
also recognizes that as “long distances between communities 
and businesses” is problematic, the Government will “facilitate 
improvements in broadband coverage nationwide, including 
in North Norway” (2017, 32, 33).
To achieve these transportation and communications goals, 
innovation and technology are needed. Innovation and tech-
nology in the 2017 Strategy cover transportation infrastruc-
ture with the aim of ensuring that “North Norway has effec-
tive, well-connected infrastructure that facilitates sustainable 
development, the transition to a green economy and the devel-
opment of an innovative and adaptable business sector in the 
region” (2017, 31). As for communications, the 2014 Strategy 
states that “the Government will facilitate the development of 
space-based solutions for navigation, communication and earth 
observation” (2014, 32).
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 9 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2017 Strategy and 14 % for the 2014 
Strategy (see Figure 10, p. 73). Climate change is identified as a 
driver behind Norway’s scientific activities in both documents, 
while the 2017 Strategy also explains that “the oceans, climate 
change and the environment are key topics in current Arctic 
research” (2017, 27; see also: 2014, 3). Research can also be 
used for other purposes. For example, both strategies suggest 
that research and knowledge can help improve Norway’s econ-
omy (2017, 27; 2014, 28), and the 2017 Strategy directly links 
climate and environmental research to business development. 
The Strategy states that “more knowledge about interactions be-
tween oceans, ice, biodiversity, and ecosystems is necessary for 
overall management of the northern sea areas and business de-
velopment and value creation” (2017, 28). Additionally, research 
is used to help inform economic decisions, including on sus-
tainable development (2017, 9). The 2014 Strategy also explains 
that “it is important to have a research-based approach when 
evaluating environmental consequences before making deci-
sions about new activity” (2014, 36). Both strategies also discuss 
the need for knowledge. The 2014 Strategy recognizes Saami 
knowledge, whereas the 2017 Strategy states that “we must draw 
on the knowledge of the people, companies, institutions and lo-
cal politicians in the north” (2017, 10; see also: 2014, 30).
To facilitate this research, the two documents identify differ-
ent research infrastructure. First, in terms of physical infra-
structure, the 2017 Strategy explains the Government wants to 
“establish a centre of expertise on ocean and Arctic issues in 
Tromsø” and that “Norway is preparing for the future with a 
new ice-breaker research vessel, Kronprins Haakon” (2017, 29). 
The 2014 Strategy also mentions that “the Institute of Marine 
Research has signed a contract for the construction of a new 
ice-going research vessel” (2014, 28), as well as “the Alomar Ob-
servatory on Andøya” (2014, 8), and a “space research cluster 
made up of research centres in Svalbard, Tromsø, Narvik and 
on Andøya” (2014, 14). There are also plans to build “better in-
frastructure for research in Svalbard” (2014, 29). The 2014 Strat-
egy also mentions different research institutes and universities, 
for example, the Fram Centre, the Institute of Marine Research, 
the Research Council of Norway, the Norwegian Polar Institute 
(2014, 26, 28, 29, 30), Nofima which “is Europe’s largest busi-
ness-oriented research institute…and the head office is located 
in Tromsø” (2014, 25), as well as the “University of Tromsø, the 
University Hospital of North Norway and the Northern Re-
search Institute (Norut)” (2014, 25). Finally, the two strategies 
recognize that the research infrastructure also includes cooper-
ation through formal and informal networks and projects. For 
example, the 2017 Strategy mentions “the Arctic Council and 
EU research programmes” (2017, 27), while the 2014 Strategy 
mentions the “Maritime Preparedness and International Part-
nerships in the High North (2014-2016)” project, and collabo-
ration with the USA (2014, 30, 39). 
The funding of research is addressed minimally in the docu-
ments. The 2017 Strategy explains that “750 million NOK was 
spent on research relating to the Arctic through the Research 
Council of Norway in 2016” (2017, 6), and that local County 
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Councils also provide “regional research funds” (2017, 12). In 
contrast, the 2014 Strategy suggests that research with commer-
cial value receives funding. Specifically, the Strategy states that 
“through financing research and commercialisation, the public 
authorities are contributing to the development of businesses 
based on marine biotechnology and bioprospecting” (2014, 25). 
Research, innovation and technology are also connected in both 
strategies. In particular, the 2014 Strategy stresses that “our aim 
must be for North Norway to become one of the most inno-
vative and knowledge-driven regions of growth in the world” 
(2014, 14), while both strategies assert that knowledge and in-
novative technological developments help with the economy 
(2017, 27; 2014, 36). Technological innovations in space will 
also be of importance for Norway (2014, 32). The 2017 Strategy 
appears to build on this aim as the Government is stating that 
it will present “a national space strategy during the course of 
2017” (2017, 33).
In terms of education, the two strategies comment on levels 
of educational attainment. The 2017 strategy states that in the 
north there are “school results that are lower than the nation-
al average, low completion rates in upper secondary schools, 
and a shortage of qualified teachers are among the challenges 
facing the education system in North Norway” (2017, 28). To 
address these gaps, “the Government is seeking to raise the lev-
el of education, improve the quality of education and training 
programmes, and reduce the dropout rate in upper secondary 
schools” (2017, 28). Indeed, the Strategy identifies the aim to 
“improve the quality of education from primary school to uni-
versity, and increase completion rates” (2017, 27). Yet, the pro-
posed course of action appears to be to gear education towards 
“regional labour market needs” (2017, 27), suggesting that ed-
ucation has, not only a knowledge-based purpose, but also an 
economic one. The 2014 Strategy also recognizes the lower at-
tainment levels, but is more direct in connecting education to 
the economy. The Strategy explains that “the level of education 
in Northern Norway is lower than in the rest of the country. 
The development of strong, regional knowledge-based business 
environments and skilled manpower for business and society 
is critical to unleashing the value creation potential of the re-
gion” (2014, 26). The Strategy further solidifies the connection 
between education and the economy, stating that “the Govern-
ment is determined to cooperate with business to make it at-
tractive for young people to choose – and complete – courses 
of education that are important to the development of society 
in the north” (2014, 26). The focus here seems to be in the field 
of engineering: “the Ministry of Education and Research has 
therefore allocated 60 new places for technology students at the 
University of Tromsø for the academic year 2013/2014” (2014, 
28-29). Additionally, “142 doctorates were awarded at the Uni-
versities of Tromsø and Nordland in 2013, twice the number 
awarded in 2006” (2014, 43).
The Implementation indicator identifies the different approach-
es to implementation in the two documents. In the 2017 Strat-
egy, there are text boxes at the end of each section containing 
the wording “THE GOVERNMENT WILL” and listing a series 
of action items. While this shows intent, the document does 
not provide details as to which ministries will be responsible 
for the action items, nor are there time frames associated with 
them. Strategy funding or budgets are not properly explained 
in the document either, although one action item says to “allo-
cate approximately NOK 40 billion (under the National Trans-
port Plan 2018–2029) for investment projects in Norway’s three 
northernmost counties” (2017, 33). Finally, there is no mention 
of follow-up or evaluation, and the document ends without a 
conclusion. However, as this is a short version, more details may 
be provided in the original Norwegian language document. 
At the end of the priority sections in the 2014 Strategy, there 
are subsections called “Government measures for...” that main-
ly provide details on what the Government is already doing 
or some areas that they want to address. This does not read so 
much like action items found in the 2017 document, perhaps 
because of the inclusion of existing actions. The action items, at 
times, do not necessarily align with what is written in the text. 
For example, there is an item in the international cooperation 
section about increasing cross border health efforts, but this is 
not discussed as an issue in the section. While it is a good action 
item, it is not substantiated by the discussion. What is more, 
the business section has less than one page of information but 
two pages of action items, and there seems to be a disconnect 
between them. Some aspects of the Strategy did have funding 
allocated to them. For example, an action item in the business 
section notes that “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has allocat-
ed NOK 150 million to business projects in the High North for 
the period 2014-2019” (2014, 22). The document also states 
that “through the establishment of a new grant scheme, Arc-
tic 2030, we are expanding the perspective, both geographically 
and in time. The new scheme will have a framework of NOK 
150 million for 2015” (2014, 31). There is also an infographic on 
budgets which states that “the Norwegian Government’s budget 
allocations for activities relating to the Arctic have risen since 
2010. The figures are not exhaustive, but give an indication of 
the trend over time” (2014, 43). The document does not men-
tion follow-up or evaluation. 
To sum up
Figure 10 at the beginning of this chapter shows that the same 
four indicators—Governance, Economy, International Coop-
eration, and Science and Education (2017 Strategy)—have the 
highest percentage of quotes assigned to them in both strategies. 
In the 2014 Strategy, the order is slightly different: Economy, 
Governance, Science and Education, and International Coop-
eration. In both cases, Tourism is the least-coded, followed by 
Climate Change. 
In terms of meeting Norway’s stated priorities identified at the 
start of the Norway discussion (2017, 6), “international cooper-
ation,” “business development,” and “knowledge development,” 
these are supported by the corresponding indicators, which are 
in the top four coded indicators in the 2017 Strategy: Interna-
tional Cooperation, Economy, and Science and Education (see 
Appendix). Infrastructure is the fifth most-quoted indicator, 
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suggesting that it is neither a priority nor an afterthought. As 
for “environmental protection and emergency preparedness,” at 
first glance it may not seem as if this priority is supported. How-
ever, when the Environmental Protection, Pollution, Climate 
Change, and Safety and SAR indicators are added together, they 
become the most coded issues (see Appendix) suggesting that 
the priority is met. 
The use of infographics for certain data stands out in these doc-
uments and also draws the reader’s attention to important in-
formation. There are some challenges when comparing the two 
documents, as the 2017 Strategy is an English short version, so 
it is difficult to tell what, if any, pertinent information was not 
included that was in the original Norwegian version. That said, 
there are some connections between the different indicators and 
themes. For instance, the international cooperation and gover-
nance indicators are connected, as cooperation takes place in 
different governance structures (i.e., Arctic Council, Barents) 
and with different governance issues, such as safety (i.e., through 
the Polar Code and the IMO). International cooperation is also 
connected to security, as cooperation is the foundation of re-
gional stability. 
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant sim-
ilarities and the three most relevant differences are discussed. 
There are some similarities between the two documents and 
two are discussed here. First, safety and SAR are addressed 
similarly in the two strategies. For instance, both mention the 
Arctic Council oil and SAR agreements, BarentsWatch, the 
IMO and Polar Code, and both support safety cooperation with 
Russia. As for capabilities, they also recognize the importance 
of satellites for maritime surveillance and communication ca-
pabilities but acknowledge the challenges of operating above 
72°N (75°N in the 2014 Strategy). The strategies also comment 
on the improved SAR capabilities in Svalbard with the addition 
of two helicopters, and the need to improve maritime mapping 
and charting. Indeed, both documents recognize the gains that 
have been made for regional safety while also acknowledging 
that more needs to be done. Second, there are similarities in the 
way the economy is discussed. Indeed, both documents men-
tion economic activities, such as mining, oil and gas, and the 
green economy. The discussion around green growth and re-
newables shows the progress made between the two documents, 
from something to be developed in 2014 to something to be 
promoted in 2017; the importance of sustainable development 
is also reiterated in both documents. Other industries like tour-
ism, reindeer husbandry, and fishing are also mentioned in both 
documents. Another key similarity in this indicator is the way 
both documents stress that a successful northern economy is 
dependent upon people living in the region. In this regard, the 
2017 Strategy suggests creating sustainable communities to at-
tract people to the North, while the 2014 Strategy seeks to ease 
labor migration. In both documents, the Government also dis-
7 Sweden mentions the need for “greater awareness of traffic at sea, in the air and on land helps to reduce the risks of accidents” (Sweden. GOS 2011a, 35), but 
then goes on to discuss maritime traffic. This is not an adequate discussion of road safety in contrast to Norway’s. 
cusses actions they can take to help stimulate the economy, such 
as making legislation and/or regulation more business-friendly.
There are some differences between the two documents, three 
of which are discussed here. First, there is an interesting differ-
ence in terms of safety, with the 2014 Strategy commenting on 
road safety and the possibility of landslides. This appears to be 
the only document that actually addresses this issue.7 Second, 
there are some differences in how transportation infrastructure 
is addressed. While both documents comment that improve-
ments are needed for economic reasons, the 2014 Strategy also 
states that infrastructure improvements are also for residents 
and that they must be safe. 
Additionally, more detailed information is also provided on 
specific road, air, and rail projects. Both documents also men-
tion the need to improve ICT infrastructure, but the 2017 Strat-
egy speaks more about broadband for business while the 2014 
Strategy focuses on satellites for safety. Third, there is one key 
difference when it comes to security. While both strategies state 
that attention needs to be paid to Russian expansion in the Arc-
tic, the 2014 Strategy clearly calls out the situation in Ukraine as 
something to be condemned, while at the same time also sug-
gesting cooperation can carry on in other, shared areas in a sec-
tion of the report titled ‘Peace and Law of the Sea.’ In contrast, 
the 2017 Strategy mentions Ukraine and the need for continued 
cooperation in a subsection on international cooperation that 
precedes a short security discussion that covers Russia’s actions 
in the North, although not Ukraine. The 2014 Strategy also ad-
dresses border management in the context of new border posts 
that were opened.
Overall, the two documents show progression in the way the 
Norwegian government approaches Arctic governance in that 
the 2017 Strategy keeps pace with environmental changes and 
changing international relations. 
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Russian Federation
The Russian Federation has two main strategy documents on 
the Arctic that we analyze: the 2013 Strategy for the Devel-
opment of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Na-
tional Security Efforts for the Period up to 2020 [Стратегия 
развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и 
обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до 
2020 года] (Russia TRG 2013). It is a follow-up to the 2008 
Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in 
the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond [Основы государственной 
политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 
2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу] (Russia TRG 2008). 
In 2001 Russia presented for the first time Foundations of the 
State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic [Основы 
государственной политики Российской Федерации в 
Арктике], a draft of the Arctic policy for the 2008 document. 
For this analysis, the unofficial English translations are used 
and compared to the original Russian language documents; it 
is thus important to understand that the quotes used here may 
not be the same in the original Russian version. 
There are also other policy documents/resolutions released 
by the Russian government. However, because they are not 
strategies, they are not considered in this analysis. Resolution 
of the Government of the Russian Federation On approval of 
the state program of the Russian Federation Socio-economic 
development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for 
the period up to 2020 [Правительствo Российской Федера-
ции Постановление Об утверждении государствен-
ной программы Российской Федерации Социально-
экономическое развитие Арктической зоны Российской 
Федерации на период до 2020 года] issued in April 
2014 (Russia TRG 2014); Resolution of the Government of the 
Russian Federation On approval of the Provisions of the State 
Commission for the Development of the Arctic [Правительствo 
Российской Федерации Постановление Об утверждении 
Положения о Государственной комиссии по вопросам 
развития Арктики] from March 2015  (Russia TRG 2015); 
and Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation On 
Amendments to the Resolution of the Government of the Rus-
sian Federation of April 21, 2014 [Правительствo Российской 
Федерации Постановление О внесении изменений в 
постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 
21 апреля 2014] from August 2017 (Russia TRG 2017). Addi-
tionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive 
order on 26 February 2019 N78 On the improvement of state 
governance in the sphere of development of the Arctic zone of the 
Russian Federation  [О совершенствовании госуправления 
в сфере развития Арктической зоны Российской 
Федерации] (Russia TRG 2019), according to which the Min-
istry for the Development of the Russian Far East is renamed 
to the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East 
and the Arctic. This Ministry has the authority, inter alia, to 
develop and enforce government policy and legal regulations 
concerning the Arctic’s socio-economic development. Final-
ly, the Russian Fedration is currently working on a new draft 
policy, Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation up to 2035 (Korchunov 2019, 4-11).
The 2013 Strategy identifies the following five main priorities:
“a) integrated socio-economic development of the Arctic zone 
 of the Russian Federation; 
 b) the development of science and technology;
 c) the establishment of a modern information and telecommu- 
 nications infrastructure;
 d) environmental security;
 e) international cooperation in the Arctic;
 f) provision of military security, protection, and protection of 
  the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” 
 (2013, 3). 
The priorities of the 2008 Strategy can be summarized as mar-
itime delimitation, regional safety (SAR) standards, regional 
cooperation, improved infrastructure, socio-economic devel-
opment, and improving regional wellbeing (2008, 3, 4). While 
there may be some overlap in priorities, the new 2013 document 
provides a more comprehensive description of Russia’s objec-
tives, priorities, and means of implementation.
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides insights into how the Russian Federation (Russia) under-
stands the Arctic. Both documents recognize that the regional 
climate is extreme and that there is poor ecological stability. Ad-
ditionally, Russia considers the region to be industrial despite 
its remoteness (2013, 2; 2008, 2,10). The strategies also refer to 
the region as the “Arctic” and do not use terms like circumpolar 
or North. 
Figure 11 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total 
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber) in the document. 
Figure 11. Comparing the Russian Federation’s 2008 and 2013 Strategies 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
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The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 12 % of the total 
coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 3 % of the 2008 Strategy 
(see Figure 11, p. 85). The 2008 Strategy addresses little to do 
with this indicator; there is one sentence stating that increased 
access to social and economic activities would improve the 
wellbeing of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the 
Russian Arctic. The strategy seeks the “improvement of quali-
ty of life of the Indigenous population and social conditions of 
economic activities in the Arctic” (2008, 4).
In contrast, the 2013 Strategy addresses a wider range of top-
ics. First, Indigenous peoples are discussed in relation to overall 
health and wellbeing corresponding to education, culture, and 
economic success. For instance, the Strategy links education to 
future success. This means the improvement of “educational 
programs for Indigenous Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, 
especially as it relates to preparing children for life in a modern 
society with a full mastery of skills policies for extreme envi-
ronments, including equipping of educational institutions and 
remote areas means of distance learning” (2013, 4). The Strategy 
also explains that there is a connection between Indigenous cul-
ture(s), way of life, and environmental protection (2013, 4). As 
for Indigenous economic success, this is understood as new op-
portunities rooted in “the traditional economy that strengthen 
employment and self-employment” (2013, 5) rather than larger 
companies hiring Indigenous peoples as employees. To achieve 
this, the Strategy explains that many actors will be involved 
through the “mobilization of domestic resources of households 
and communities, and their active support from the govern-
ment, business and non-profit organizations” (2013, 5). 
The Strategy also addresses culture outside the Indigenous con-
text. In particular, it provides a broad understanding of things 
and places that provide culture. Indeed, the strategy seeks “ac-
tive formation in cities, small villages and towns new affordable 
for all segments of the population, and mobile multi cultural 
institutions (socio-cultural centers, cultural and sports facilities, 
information intelligence centers, mobile library)” (2013, 4). 
Health and wellbeing are also addressed outside the Indigenous 
context. For example, there is much emphasis on the need for 
improved access to health care for those living in the Russian 
Arctic. For example, the Strategy calls for “ensuring the avail-
ability and quality of medical care to the population, including 
through improved primary care and primary health care in plac-
es of traditional residence and traditional economic activities of 
the population of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the 
use of country vehicles and aircraft for sanitary -Air evacuation 
of patients, the development of technologies for remote panel of 
doctors” (2013, 4). The Strategy also links better telecommuni-
cations, water, housing, and energy infrastructure to improved 
wellbeing (2013, 4). Improved health and wellbeing, in turn, are 
connected to increased “self-employment and entrepreneur-
ship” opportunities, “particularly in single-industry towns and 
villages” (2013, 4), as well as improved education, and access to 
sports and cultural activities (2013, 4). 
As for demographics and migration, the 2013 Strategy also ac-
knowledges that skilled workers are problematically leaving the 
Russian Arctic. For example, the Strategy identifies the “negative 
demographic trends in most of the Arctic regions of the Russian 
Federation, the outflow of labor (especially skilled) in the south-
ern regions of Russia and abroad” (2013, 2). More skilled people 
will thus be needed to migrate back into the region (2013, 4). 
The Governance indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85) is briefly 
captured only in the newest 2013 Strategy, while the 2008 Strate-
gy does not reflect on governance at all. The 2013 Strategy states 
that for the “effective use and development of the resource base” 
it is necessary to “ensure the preparation of materials submitted 
to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for 
the validation of the outer limits of the continental shelf of the 
Russian Federation in the Arctic” (2013, 5). 
To “modernize the fishing industry” the Russian government 
promises “the effective use of key species of marine biological 
resources and the involvement of non-traditional fishing sites.” 
At the same time, there is also a need for “preventing and com-
bating illicit production and trafficking of water biological re-
sources.” Furthermore, the Strategy aims at “the preservation 
and development of the resource potential of fisheries and 
implementation of technical upgrading and commissioning of 
new capacities for deep processing of aquatic biological resourc-
es and the development of marine biotechnology” (2013, 6). 
In terms of science and technology, the Russian government 
aims to use “use of the opportunities for international scientif-
ic and technological cooperation, ensuring the participation of 
Russian scientific and educational organizations in the global 
and regional technology and research projects in the Arctic” 
(2013, 6). 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total coded quotes in the 
2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 
85), highlights the importance of joint cooperative efforts by all 
Arctic states. The 2013 Strategy states that “in order to promote 
international cooperation and preservation of the Arctic as a 
zone of peace” it is necessary “providing a mutually beneficial 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Russian Fed-
eration and the Arctic states on the basis of international trea-
ties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is increas-
ing the efficiency of foreign economic activity” (2013, 7; 2008, 
3). Russia should also “ensure a mutually beneficial Russian 
presence, economic, and scientific activities on the Norwegian 
archipelago of Svalbard keep” (2013, 8).
One of the strategic priorities of Russia is to “strengthening, 
on a bilateral basis and within the framework of regional or-
ganizations, including the Arctic Council and the Barents-Eu-
ro Arctic region Council, good-neighborhood of Russia with 
the sub-Arctic states, atomization of economic, scientific and 
technical, cultural interaction, and also frontier cooperation, 
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including in the field of effective natural resources management 
and environment preservation in the Arctic” (2013, 8; 2008, 4).
The 2013 Strategy also refers to the importance of “combining 
the efforts of the Arctic states to create a single regional sys-
tem for search and rescue, and to prevent man-made disasters 
and elimination of their consequences” (2013, 7). There is also a 
need for “the implementation of the regular exchange of infor-
mation on the environment, as well as data on the Arctic climate 
and its dynamics, the development of international cooperation 
in improving systems for meteorological observations in the 
Arctic climate, including from space” (2013, 8).
The 2008 document also emphasizes the need for “carrying out 
of an active interaction of the Russian Federation with the Arc-
tic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the 
basis of norms of international law, mutual arrangements taking 
into account national interests of the Russian Federation, [and 
also] for tackling issues of an international legal substantiation 
of the external border of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa-
tion” (2008, 3). The 2013 Strategy further highlights the organi-
zation and “efficient use of transit and cross-polar air routes in 
the Arctic, the use of the Northern Sea Route for international 
shipping under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and 
in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Feder-
ation” (2013, 8).
The 2008 Strategy also emphasizes enhancing “the participation 
of Russian official agencies and public organizations in the work 
of international forums devoted to the Arctic problematic, in-
cluding the inter-parliamentary interaction within the frame-
work of the Russia - European Union partnership” (2008, 3, 4). 
Furthermore, the 2013 Strategy refers to the necessity of “devel-
oping a dialogue between the regions and municipalities of the 
Nordic countries to exchange experience in the development of 
climate and energy policies” (2013, 8). 
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 5 % of the 
total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). The two 
documents take different approaches to discussing environmen-
tal concerns. For instance, the 2013 Strategy acknowledges that 
the environment in the Russian Arctic has been damaged (2013, 
3), and expresses adesire to find a way to use technologies, es-
pecially those in the resource industry, to limit further harm. 
The Strategy calls for the “development and implementation of 
new techniques and technologies in the field of environmental 
management, the development of offshore mineral resources 
and water resources, as well as the prevention and elimination 
of oil spills in ice conditions” (2013, 6). In contrast, the 2008 
Strategy does not recognize that environmental damage has oc-
curred, but expresses the wish to ensure that economic activities 
do not harm the environment. The Strategy thus states a “basic 
objective…in the sphere of environmental security – preserva-
tion and maintenance of environment protection of the Arctic, 
liquidation of ecological consequences of economic activities 
in the conditions of increasing economic activity and global 
changes of climate” (2008, 3). Despite the small difference be-
tween the two documents with regard to recognition of existing 
environmental damage, both strategies do recognize the need to 
protect the environment. 
Expanding protected areas and protection of the region’s bio-
diversity are addressed in both documents in a similar man-
ner. For example, the 2013 Strategy makes clear that it is im-
portant “to ensure the conservation of biological diversity of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna in the expansion of economic activities 
and global climate change, including:” i) “development and ex-
pansion of the Arctic protected areas and federal waters”; ii) 
“development and expansion of the Arctic protected areas of 
regional significance;” iii) “monitoring of ecosystems and flora” 
(2013, 7; see also: 2008, 7). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy ex-
plains that there will be “the development and expansion of the 
network of protected areas and water areas of the federal and 
regional level” (2013, 7), suggesting that this is a priority for the 
Russian government.
The Pollution indicator accounts for 3 % of the total coded 
quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 3 % in the 2008 Strategy (see 
Figure 11, p. 85). Neither strategy clearly defines regional pol-
lutants, other than one statement about oil spills in the 2013 
Strategy (2013, 6). There is one quote from the 2013 Strategy 
that identifies different sources of pollution, explaining “envi-
ronmental damage caused by past economic, military and other 
activities in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2013, 7) 
is problematic. One can thus can glean that military waste is a 
pollutant, while the economic pollution mentioned is likely oil. 
The document does not state whether the mining industry has 
also caused pollution. Similarly, the 2008 Strategy is also vague, 
naming “anthropogenous pollution” (2008, 7), but not saying 
exactly what this is or where it comes from. 
Despite the limited discussion around the types and sources 
of pollution, both strategies identify different pollution prob-
lem-solving measures. For instance, both documents suggest 
that technology can be of benefit for pollution management. 
The 2008 Strategy provides a little more information than the 
2013 Strategy, explaining that Russia will “introduce new tech-
nologies, including for clearing of the territories of islands, 
coastal zones and water areas of the Arctic seas of anthropog-
enous pollution” (2008, 7). The 2013 Strategy identifies other 
problem-solving methods that range from environmental as-
sessments, “environmental monitoring,” corporate responsibili-
ty, and improved state oversight (2013, 7). 
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 3 % of the total cod-
ed quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 5 % of the total coded quotes 
for 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). Both documents state 
that climate change requires further study. Indeed, in both doc-
uments there are similar statements explain the need for bet-
ter understand of climate change. This means working towards 
“the prediction and assessment of the impact of global climate 
changes in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation under the 
influence of natural and anthropogenic factors in the medium 
Part I: Strategies and Policies of the Arctic States
88
and long term” (2013, 6; see also: 2008, 8). Additionally, similar 
statements were used with regards to using technology to pre-
dict change. For instance, Russia will “promote comprehensive 
research on the study of natural hazards, the development and 
introduction of new technologies and methods to predict in a 
changing climate” (2013, 6; see also: 2008, 8). Russia also recog-
nizes that climate change research requires international coop-
eration. To this end, the 2013 Strategy states that there will be 
“organization of complex international research expeditions to 
study the environment (ice, pollution of marine waters, marine) 
and the influence of observed and projected climate change” 
(2013, 8). 
The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 15 % of the 2008 Strategy 
(see Figure 11, p. 85), describes the need to protect the national 
interests and national borders in the Arctic. According to the 
2008 Strategy, the basic objective “in the sphere of military se-
curity, defense and protection of the state border of the Russian 
Federation [is] lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa-
tion, [and] maintenance of a favorable operative regime in the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintenance 
of a necessary fighting potential of groupings of general purpose 
armies (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, 
other armies, military formations and organs in this region” 
(2008, 3). The 2013 document highlights that the Russian gov-
ernment aims at the “development of integrated security system 
for the protection of territory, population and critical facilities 
[in] Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from the threats of 
natural and man-made disasters” (2013, 4).
Further the 2013 Strategy states that “in order to ensure military 
security” it is necessary “to ensure comprehensive combat and 
mobilization readiness level required and sufficient for solving 
non-military pressure and aggression against the Russian Fed-
eration and its allies, to ensure the sovereign rights of Russia’s 
Arctic and features the smooth implementation of all of its ac-
tivities, including the exclusive economic zone and the conti-
nental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic [and also] 
to neutralize internal and external military dangers and mili-
tary threats in peacetime, providing strategic deterrence, and in 
the event of armed conflict – repel aggression and cessation of 
hostilities on terms that meet the interests of the Russian Fed-
eration” (2013, 8). Further, “there is a need for improvement of 
airspace and surface control and use of dual-use technologies 
for the benefit of a comprehensive approach to defense, security 
and sustainable socio-economic development of the Arctic zone 
of the Russian Federation” (2013, 8).
The 2008 Strategy states that one of Russia’s strategic priorities 
in the Arctic is the “delimitation of maritime spaces in the Arctic 
Ocean and maintenance of a mutually advantageous presence of 
Russia on the Spitsbergen archipelago” (2008, 4). Furthermore, 
according to the 2008 Strategy, it is necessary “to optimize the 
system of a complex control over the situation in the Arctic, in-
cluding the boundary control at the check points across the state 
border of the Russian Federation, [and] introduction of a bor-
der zones regime in the administrative-territorial formations of 
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the organization 
of a device technical control over the strait zones, rivers estu-
aries, firths on the itinerary of the Northern Sea Route” (2008, 
6). The 2008 Strategy also highlights that it is necessary to cre-
ate “groupings of general purpose armies (forces) of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military forma-
tions and organs in this region” (2013, 8; 2008, 6). 
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % in the 2008 Strategy 
(see Figure 11, p. 85), identifies similar safety concerns in the 
two documents. For instance, safe transit through the Northern 
Sea Route is important, as are search and rescue capabilities and 
the ability to address “natural and man-made disasters” (2013, 
4, 7; see also: 2008, 4, 5). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy also in-
cludes environmental safety (2013, 4). Neither document names 
any formalized search and rescue or safety agreements, but they 
do address cooperation and collaboration on the issue of search 
and rescue. For example, the 2013 Strategy mentions coopera-
tion through “the coordination of rescue forces” in the context 
of search and rescue and “man-made disasters” (2013, 7), and 
the 2008 Strategy also mentions the “building-up of efforts of 
the [Arctic] states for the creation of a uniform regional system 
of search and rescue” (2008, 4). The latter possibly suggests an 
integration of national safety solutions, or perhaps it was allud-
ing to what would later become the Arctic Council’s SAR agree-
ment, but neither is explicitly stated in the Strategy. In terms of 
facilitating safe maritime transit, the 2008 Strategy also prioritizes 
“assistance in the organization and effective utilization of transit 
and cross Polar air routes in the Arctic, and also in the use of the 
Northern Sea Route for international navigation under the juris-
diction of the Russian Federation and according to international 
treaties of the Russian Federation” (2008, 4). 
The 2013 Strategy identifies a few areas for improvements on the 
safety front, especially in relation to maritime transit. This in-
cludes the need to develop adequate mapping of sea ice, reliable 
weather information, communications and satellite capabilities, 
icebreaking services, and rescue services (2013, 5, 7). A challenge 
identified in the Strategy is the “lack of permanent complex space 
monitoring of the Arctic territories and waters dependence on 
foreign sources of funds and information management of all ac-
tivities in the Arctic (including interaction with aircraft and ves-
sels)” (2013, 2). The 2008 Strategy makes similar observations, 
recognizing the need “to create a reliable system of rendering of 
navigating, hydro meteorological and information services pro-
viding an effective control of economic, military, environmen-
tal activity in the Arctic, and also forecasting and prevention of 
emergency situations, minimization of damage in case of their 
occurrence, including through the use of global navigating satel-
lite system GLONASS and multi-purpose space system” (2008, 7).
The Economy indicator accounts for 19 % of the total coded 
quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 21 % of the 2008 Strategy (see 
Figure 11, p. 85). The 2013 Strategy recognizes that traditional 
economies and the tech sector are among Russia’s economic ac-
tivities. Indeed, there is a desire to “build a competitive scientific 
and technological sector in the development and implementa-
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tion of advanced technologies, including the development of 
new or adapting existing in Arctic conditions on the basis of 
relevant technology platforms” (2013, 6). However, much of the 
focus is on the natural resources and energy sectors in both the 
2013 and 2008 strategies (note: the 2008 document does not 
mention other forms of economic activity). Both documents 
discuss hydrocarbons and energy, mining, and living resourc-
es. With regard to hydrocarbons and energy, both documents 
explain that developing the hydrocarbon sector is important, 
particularly “on the continental shelf of the Russian Federa-
tion” (2013, 5; see also: 2008, 3). Moreover, the 2013 Strategy 
explains the importance of energy security and the need for 
“sustainable development of the energy sector in the long term” 
as sustainable energies become substituted in traditional areas 
of development where production will be declining after 2020 
(2013, 5). Minerals will also be extracted from the continental 
shelf, alongside oil and gas (2008, 4). There are other miner-
al extraction locations in Russia, including the Kola Peninsula 
and the Ural Mountains. Russia expects to extract “non-ferrous, 
precious metals and precious and scarce types of mineral raw 
materials, effective mining of chrome, manganese, tin, bauxite, 
uranium, titanium, zinc” (2013, 5). The biological resources ap-
pear to be ocean-based and include items such as fish, “water bi-
ological resources,” and “marine biotechnology” (2013, 6; 2008, 
3). At the same time, the government recognizes the need for 
“preventing and combating illicit production and trafficking of 
water biological resources” (2013, 6).
The government suggests different ways in which economic 
activities will be prioritized. For example, the 2013 Strategy 
explains that the government will help with “development and 
implementation of a system of state support and stimulation of 
economic entities operating in the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation, particularly in the development of hydrocarbon 
resources, other minerals and water resources, through the 
introduction of innovative technologies, the development of 
transport and energy infrastructure, modern information and 
telecommunication infrastructure, improvement of customs 
tariff and tax regulations” (2013, 3; see also: 2008, 5). The gov-
ernment will also help Indigenous peoples with their econom-
ic development (2013, 5). The goal appears to be “a balanced 
labor market, updating social guarantees and compensation 
for people working and living in the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation” (2013, 4). Supporting economic development also 
means ensuring new regulatory frameworks are in place, and 
to address this the government seeks “improving the regula-
tory framework that promotes the rationalization of property 
relations in the sphere of culture and promotion of business 
through the development of a system of grants, sponsoring 
institutions, copyright, sponsorship, insurance, tax, and oth-
er specific sources of funding of social and cultural projects” 
(2013, 4). 
Different economic actors are involved in Russia’s northern 
economy. These include “state, business, science and educa-
tion” institutions (2013, 6). The state, however, appears to be 
the most involved, according to the strategies. Notably, the 2013 
Strategy explains that the state shall facilitate the “promotion 
of new projects of economic development of the Arctic territo-
ries through their co-financing from the budgets of the various 
levels of the budget system of the Russian Federation and extra-
budgetary sources” (2013, 3; see also: 2008, 5). 
The Tourism indicator is reflected only in the most recent strat-
egy (2013) and accounts for 3 % of the total coded quotes in it 
(see Figure 11, p. 85), with the document stating that the Rus-
sian Federation shall provide for “development of Arctic tourism 
and expansion of environmentally friendly tourism activities in 
the Arctic” (2013, 3). Furthermore, the 2013 Strategy empha-
sizes that Russia aims at “improving the regulatory framework 
of tourism, establishment of its financial support on the basis 
of public-private partnerships, promotion of regional tourism 
clusters [and] Arctic tourism promotion at the national and in-
ternational markets” (2013, 3). Last but not least, “in order to 
promote international cooperation,” Russia will focus on “the 
development of international tourism, including recreational, 
scientific, cultural, educational, environmental” (2013, 7, 8).
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 24 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 15 % of the 2008 Strategy 
(see Figure 11, p. 85), and different types of infrastructure are 
discussed. Both documents recognize that transportation infra-
structure needs to be improved due to the “underdevelopment 
of basic transport infrastructure, its marine and continental 
components, aging icebreaker fleet, lack of small aircraft” (2013, 
2). There is also need for “modernization and development of 
the infrastructure of the Arctic transport system” and “re-struc-
turing of volumes of cargo transportation through the Northern 
Sea Route” (2008, 4, 5). The 2013 Strategy provides a great deal 
of information on Russia’s plans for transportation infrastruc-
ture development. Russia intends to develop regional rail and 
road networks. For the latter to be successful, the government 
recognizes that “the development and introduction of new ve-
hicles adapted for use in arctic conditions” will also be required 
(2013, 6). Air transport will be addressed through “the devel-
opment of small aircraft to meet the needs of air traffic and to 
ensure their availability in the Arctic zone of the Russian Feder-
ation” (2013, 6). Maritime traffic will be improved through the 
creation of new ports and ensuring an easy transition between 
maritime, rail, and air transport options (2013, 5). This indicates 
that transport infrastructure should facilitate the movement of 
commercial goods. 
As mentioned, icebreakers also contribute to the transportation 
infrastructure and Russia needs to update its fleet. The 2008 
Strategy recognizes that “state support” will be needed for new 
icebreakers, while the 2013 Strategy states that new icebreakers 
will need “modern technologies … including nuclear power 
plants” (2013, 5; see also: 2008, 5). In addition to state support, 
funds for development could be raised through “tariff regulation 
services for icebreaking and other types of support” (2013, 5). In 
addition to icebreakers, other infrastructure is needed to support 
shipping in the Russian Arctic. While the 2008 Strategy does not 
address shipping, the 2013 Strategy notes that shipping safety is a 
concern. As previously mentioned in the Safety & SAR indicator, 
improved navigational aids are needed (2013, 2, 5). 
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Both strategies recognize the importance of telecommunica-
tions and ICT infrastructure to the region. Both documents ex-
plain that this would contribute to economic development. The 
2013 Strategy recognizes the benefits of digital infrastructure to 
the wellbeing of northerners, while the 2008 Strategy also rec-
ognizes that it will help with “military, environmental activity 
in the Arctic, and also forecasting and prevention of emergency 
situations” (2008, 7; see also: 2013, 2, 5). Digital infrastructure, 
according to the 2013 Strategy, should include “the establish-
ment of a modern information and telecommunication infra-
structure that enables the provision of services to the popula-
tion and economic entities across the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation, including by laying underwater fiber-optic commu-
nication lines along the Northern Sea Route, and integration 
with networks of other countries” (2013, 7; see also: 2008, 7). 
Housing infrastructure is only briefly mentioned in the 2013 
Strategy as being connected to regional wellbeing and quality 
of life. The document notes the government recognition of the 
need for “updating and upgrading of the housing stock,” and for 
“fixed assets housing on the basis of energy saving technologies” 
(2013, 4). 
The need to improve energy infrastructure is also identified in 
both strategies, especially as the existing delivery system in in-
efficient (2013, 2; 2008, 5). The documents make similar state-
ments suggesting different approaches to improving this situ-
ation. For example, the 2013 Strategy expresses the benefits of 
“power differentiation schemes, including the construction of 
nuclear power plants, including floating” (2013, 3), and the “op-
timization of economic mechanisms of the “northern delivery” 
through the use of renewable and alternative, including local 
energy sources, reconstruction and modernization of exhausted 
power plants, [and] the introduction of energy-saving materials 
and technologies” (2013, 3; see also: 2008, 5).
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 9 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2008 Strategy 
(see Figure 11, p. 85). The 2013 Strategy identifies that scientific 
research is driven by natural “hazards”, climate change, and the 
environment (2013, 6). Research can also contribute to better un-
derstanding of social and economic conditions. The 2013 Strat-
egy explains that other research areas in which science can con-
tribute include “the history, culture and economy of the region, 
as well as the legal regulation of economic and other activities in 
the Arctic” (2013, 6) It can also help improve health and wellbe-
ing, and contribute to greater international cooperation (2013, 6). 
The 2008 Strategy also recognizes the importance of research for 
social and economic issues, and states that research helps inform 
the “management of the Arctic territories” (2008, 3). 
To carry out scientific activities, a proper research infrastructure 
is needed. However, the 2013 Strategy states that “in the field of 
science and technology are scarce technical resources and tech-
nological capabilities to the study, development and use of the 
Arctic areas and resources, lack of readiness for the transition to 
innovative development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Fed-
eration” (2013, 3). The strategy, thus, calls for the “development 
of materials adapted to the climatic conditions of the Arctic, as 
well as introduction of means and equipment base, adapted for 
the polar research” (2013, 6). Both strategies state that maritime 
research vessels are important, and according to the 2013 Strat-
egy, this could include “the use of deep-robotic systems” (2013, 
6; see also: 2008, 7).
Education is addressed only in the 2013 Strategy and links 
education to the economy. In particular, it covers “the devel-
opment of education, provision of training, retraining and ad-
vanced training in higher and secondary education to work in 
the Arctic with the existing and projected need for specialists 
in the field of marine geology, hydrocarbon production and 
processing, marine biotechnology, information and communi-
cation technology and other specialties” (2013, 4). Education, 
including distance education, is also important for the health 
and wellbeing of northerners, and in particular for Indigenous 
peoples (2013, 4). This was also discussed under the Human 
Dimension indicator. 
Both documents address Implementation in great detail. The 
2013 Strategy has a section on “Mechanisms for the implemen-
tation of the Strategy” (2013, 8) that lists nine action items. The 
2008 Strategy lists five key action items and details on how to 
achieve them (2008, 5–8). Both documents also provide infor-
mation on how implementation follow-up will occur. For ex-
ample, the 2013 Strategy divides the tasks into two stages; the 
first running until 2015 and the second until 2020 (2013, 9, 10). 
In contrast, the 2008 Strategy uses three phases: 2008–2010, 
2011–2015, and 2016–2020 (2008, 9–10). This makes sense, 
however, as both strategies run until 2020 and the first docu-
ment was written five years prior to the second, leaving more 
time for implementation when it was written. The 2013 Strategy 
also addresses evaluation in the section, “Monitoring the Imple-
mentation of the Strategy” (2013, 11). This section stresses that 
the “Government of the Russian Federation, federal executive 
authorities and executive authorities of the Russian Federation 
shall provide system monitoring and analysis of the imple-
mentation of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic” (2013, 12). There will also be “an annual report to the 
President of the Russian Federation on the progress and results 
of the Strategy” (2013, 12), which will support accountability. 
The budget is addressed only in the 2013 Strategy. In particular, 
the document states that “the scope of work and the volume of 
their funding from the federal budget is determined by the de-
velopment of state… federal and departmental target programs” 
(2013, 9). Moreover, “extra-budgetary financial support of the 
Strategy is a public-private partnership, with the resources of 
development institutions, international financial institutions 
and foreign investments into the future of infrastructure, social, 
innovation, environmental and other projects” (2013, 9).
To sum up 
Figure 11 at the beginning of this chapter shows that the 
most-coded indicators in 2013 are Infrastructure, followed by 
Economy and the Human Dimension. In 2008, the most coded 
indicator is Economy, with Infrastructure and Security tying for 
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second place, and Safety and SAR, International Cooperation, 
and Science and Education tying for third. The three least-coded 
indicators in 2013 are Tourism, Pollution, and Climate change, 
tying for top place, followed by Environmental Protection and 
Security tying for second, and Governance, International Coop-
eration, and Safety and SAR tying for third. Tying for least-cod-
ed indicators in 2008 are Tourism and Governance, followed by 
Human Dimension and Pollution tying for second, and Climate 
Change coming third. 
As mentioned above, there are six priorities in the 2013 Strategy 
(2013, 3). First, “integrated socio-economic development of the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” would be associated with 
the Economy and Human Dimension indicators, which are the 
second and third most-coded indicators in the document (see 
Appendix), suggesting that this priority is met. Second, “the 
development of science and technology” is associated with the 
Science and Education indicator, which is the fourth most-cod-
ed indicator. Third, “the establishment of a modern information 
and telecommunications infrastructure” is associated with the 
Infrastructure indicator, which is the most-coded indicator, sug-
gesting this priority is met. Fourth, “environmental security” is 
associated with the Environmental Protection indicator, which 
is the second least-coded indicator. When combined with the 
Pollution and Climate Change indicator, environment becomes 
the fourth most-discussed topic (see Appendix). It seems that 
these priorities are met. Fifth, “international cooperation in the 
Arctic” is associated with the International Cooperation indica-
tor, which is in the middle in terms of coded quotes (see Ap-
pendix). Sixth, “provision of military security, protection, and 
protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic” is associated with the Security indicator, which is the sec-
ond least-coded indicator. While international and cross-border 
cooperation and security are not the most coded, there is discus-
sion dedicated to these indicators. 
Comparison of the two documents is interesting, especially in 
terms of the discussion on the Human Dimension and Infra-
structure, as the percentage of quotes for these indicators sub-
stantially increases from 2008 to 2013. For the Human Dimen-
sion, the newer strategy spends a considerable amount of time 
recognizing what needs to be done to improve the living con-
ditions of Indigenous peoples, as well as on regional health and 
wellbeing. In infrastructure terms, there is an increased focus 
on improving transportation to improve connectivity and tele-
communications/ICT infrastructure for economic and safety 
reasons in 2013. 
There are also some connections between the indicators. For 
example, the Human Dimension is connected to the Economy 
indicator in the context of access to, and skills for, economic 
opportunities. The Human Dimension is also connected to the 
Infrastructure indicator, as wellbeing can be improved with in-
creased access to different types of infrastructure. The Science 
and Education indicator is connected to both the Human Di-
mension and the Economy indicators through the need for re-
search in these areas. The Science and Education indicator is also 
connected to the Economy indicator through skills training. 
To further compare the documents, the two most relevant simi-
larities and the three most relevant differences are discussed. 
There are also some similarities between the two Russian doc-
uments of which two are discussed here. First, both documents 
stress the importance of international cooperation with other 
states. This includes at different levels of government, within and 
between organizations, and the need to abide by international 
law and treaties, especially on maritime activities and rescue op-
erations. Regional safety issues are then are discussed similarly, 
as both documents mention maritime safety, man-made disas-
ters, and SAR. However, the 2013 Strategy does a better job at 
identifying where Russia could improve its safety capabilities, 
despite discussing safety substantially less (as a percentage of 
total quotes) than the 2008 document. Second, both documents 
recognize the importance of environmental protection, especial-
ly in relation to ongoing economic activities in the region. Both 
documents call for protected areas to help maintain biodiversity, 
although the 2013 Strategy appears to take environmental pro-
tection more seriously than the 2008 document does. Moreover, 
in terms of pollution, the two documents identify different types 
of pollution (military and economic vs. anthropogenic), but nei-
ther provides much detail on what the actual pollutants are. De-
spite this vagueness, they do both suggest that technology can 
help address reduce environmental damage. 
There are also some interesting differences between the two 
strategies, and three are discussed here. First, the human dimen-
sion is discussed substantially more in the 2013 document than 
it is in the 2008 document. The 2008 Strategy makes one com-
ment about improving Indigenous wellbeing through econom-
ic activity, while the 2013 Strategy discusses Indigenous health 
and wellbeing, and economic growth. The 2013 Strategy also 
speaks about maintaining a northern culture to ensure overall 
health and wellbeing in the Russian north, and identifies an out-
flow of labor migration from the region. Second, both strategies 
state that security practices must protect the land, people, and 
infrastructure; however, the two documents lay out different 
priorities for these topics and they are discussed more in the 
2008 Strategy. The 2013 document shows more concern with 
preparing for military and non-military threats to the Russian 
Arctic (security and defense in general), which also includes 
internal threats. In contrast, the 2008 Strategy is more focused 
on border management, including in the Arctic Ocean. Third, 
both documents explain that Russia’s economic priorities are 
resources and energy. Additionally, the 2013 Strategy paints a 
broader picture of Russia’s other Northern economic activities 
(e.g., fisheries and biotechnology) and provides more informa-
tion on how the state will foster this growth, to include Indige-
nous small businesses and self-employment. 
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Sweden
To date, the Swedish government has produced one Arctic 
strategy, Sweden’s Strategy for the Arctic Region, in May 2011. 
However, in a recent speech the Swedish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs remarked that “during the year, Sweden will renew its 
Arctic Strategy” (Wallström 2019), indicating that a new strate-
gy is not far off. Additionally, in 2016, Sweden released a mem-
orandum entitled the New Swedish Environmental Policy for the 
Arctic (Sweden MEA 2016), further demonstrating the state’s 
continued interest in the region. That said, as the Environmental 
Policy is about the environment, it is not a national strategy for 
the region and thus only the 2011 Arctic Strategy is considered 
in the following analysis. 
The Swedish government provides a clear statement about the 
purpose of the Strategy: “the purpose of the Government’s Strat-
egy for the Arctic Region is to present Sweden’s relationship 
with the Arctic, together with the current priorities and future 
outlook for Sweden’s Arctic policy, proceeding from an inter-
national perspective” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 4). Moreover, the 
release of Sweden’s strategy aligns with its first Chairmanship of 
the Arctic Council from 2011 to 2013, and this has influenced 
the strategic priorities. The document emphasizes: “Ever since 
the Arctic Council was founded in 1996, there has been strong 
consensus on the view that economic, environmental and social 
development must be seen as a single concept to create long-
term sustainable development in the region. Continued Swed-
ish research and education initiatives are essential if progress is 
to be made. The priorities below are to be seen in this context: 
• Climate and the environment • Economic development • The 
human dimension” (2011a, 23). 
The following discussion about the indicators will show 
whether the priorities stated by the government are reflected 
in the document, or not. 
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator ad-
dresses how the Arctic is defined within the context of the strat-
egy. In particular, it states that “there is no uniform definition of 
what “the Arctic” actually is. The region is made up of an ocean 
(the Arctic Ocean) surrounded by sovereign states” (2011a, 11). 
Not only is there no one definition of the Arctic, but there are 
also multiple ways to describe the region within the Strategy as, 
for example, “the region concerned is sometimes referred to as 
the Arctic region, sometimes as the Arctic and sometimes as the 
Arctic area” (2011a, 4). Additionally, there are regional varia-
tions in the circumpolar Arctic as, for example, “in describing 
the Nordic countries’ part of the Arctic (including in the context 
of regional cooperation with Russia), the term High North is 
sometimes used as well” (2011a, 4). The Strategy also refers to 
the region as the “North” in a few instances (2011a, 40). Ref-
erence is made, too, to the “unique Arctic environment” and 
one of the “world’s most vulnerable areas” (2011a, 25, 27). Addi-
tionally, it is mentioned that “widely scattered, small population 
centres” (2011a, 43) characterize the region. 
Sweden’s Strategy does not provide much detail on which gov-
ernment ministries have responsibilities in areas covered by the 
strategy. The Strategy mentions that the “Barents region’s trade 
and industry ministers” (2011a, 32) are involved in business de-
velopment, while other government agencies such as the Swed-
ish Polar Research Secretariat and the Swedish Marine Admin-
istration also have regional involvement (2011a, 29, 36). Both 
the environmental ministers and the foreign affairs ministers 
from the Arctic countries are also mentioned in the appendices, 
which provides further information on various regional gover-
nance structures. 
Figure 12 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total 
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber) in the document. 
Figure 12. Sweden’s 2011 Strategy
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The following analysis on the written content of these codes will 
give a better understanding of how the Strategy addresses these 
themes and issues. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 13 % of the total 
coded quotes (see Figure 12) and comments on the remoteness 
of the region: “most of the Arctic is characterised by widely scat-
tered, small population centres” (2011a, 43). The document also 
that the Arctic is the homeland to Indigenous peoples, and that 
“the geographical area inhabited by the Sámi from time imme-
morial is usually referred to as Sápmi or Sameland and stretches 
over the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Russia” (2011a, 17). 
Based on the troubled history between the Sami and the state, 
the Strategy recognizes that “from the seventeenth century on-
wards, more and more land was colonised as part of an active 
colonist policy, which gradually led to growing conflicts be-
tween colonists, forest farmers and the Sámi industries” (2011a, 
12). This acknowledgement, perhaps, is suggestive of the gov-
ernment taking a more inclusive approach to addressing Indig-
enous, and particularly Sami issues. 
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One of the issues the Strategy recognizes in relation to Indig-
enous peoples are the negative effects of climate change and 
pollution on Indigenous communities. The Strategy states that 
“climate change means that many traditional customs and liveli-
hoods will be more difficult to maintain” (2011a, 41). Therefore, 
as part of the Strategy, “Sweden will work for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity in the Arctic, taking Indige-
nous Arctic peoples into consideration” (2011a, 24). 
The relationship between Indigenous peoples and the econo-
my is also addressed. In particular, there is mention that “the 
tourism sector should be developed, albeit with consideration 
for the environment and the traditional lifestyles of Indigenous 
peoples” (2011a, 6). At the same time, the document recogniz-
es the various economic activities of Indigenous peoples. For 
example, the document states that “for many reindeer-herding 
Sámi, reindeer husbandry constitutes an important part of a 
“mixed economy” based on reindeer husbandry, hunting and 
fishing and a number of other secondary industries” (2011a, 38).
Preserving and protecting Indigenous language and culture is 
also important. The document recognizes the challenges of pre-
serving Saami culture and language, especially with the “migra-
tion of younger people away from traditional settlement areas 
in order to acquire an education or work elsewhere” (2011a, 
46). To counter this, “Sweden will promote the preservation of 
the Sámi language and other Arctic Indigenous languages and 
present Swedish experiences of revitalisation work,” as well as 
recognizing the importance of “ratifying the UNESCO15 Con-
vention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage” 
(2011a, 41, 45). 
The Strategy also addresses different issues of rights and equal-
ity. For instance, gender is discussed, as “Sweden will work to 
bring the human dimension and the gender perspective to the 
fore in Arctic-related cooperation bodies” (2011a, 6) and also 
within domestic politics. “Between 2008 and 2010, the Swed-
ish Government has targeted special measures at increasing 
the participation of Sámi women in political processes and 
the Sámi Parliament has been working actively on the issue” 
(2011a, 45). The Strategy also acknowledges formal agreements 
and treaties that affect rights. For instance, it identifies UN-
DRIP and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as well 
as work on the Nordic Sámi Convention (2011a, 20, 22). 
Sweden also identifies key elements of health and wellbeing. 
In particular, the Strategy states that “the basic prerequisites 
for the people living in the Arctic are: a long-term optimism; 
opportunities for them to earn a livelihood; good communi-
cations and social care” (2011a, 30). As this, however, fails to 
account for the some of the causes of illness, the Strategy ex-
plains that “measures will be needed to counteract the negative 
health and social impacts of climate change, pollutants and the 
expected increase in the exploitation of Arctic natural resourc-
es” (2011a, 6).
The Governance indicator accounts for 13 % of the total coded 
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and captures the importance of re-
gional cooperation. Sweden emphasizes in the document that 
“the distances from traditional centres of power also provide 
greater scope for self-determination in everyday life, a form of 
practical Arctic empowerment” (2011a, 43). The Strategy also 
mentions the importance of the Sámi Parliamentary Council 
(SPC). The SPC was created from the “three Sámi Parliaments 
and the Russian Sámi as observers” and “The overarching aim 
is to strengthen borderless cooperation between Sámi and 
speak for them as one voice internationally” (2011a, 22). The 
Strategy further explains that “a special form of cooperation 
between Sweden, Norway and Finland, in which the Sámi Par-
liament has a natural place. The ongoing negotiations on a Nor-
dic Sámi Convention are one of the most important current is-
sues with regard to this cooperation.” Additionally, “Within the 
framework of the gender equality measures, the Sámi Parlia-
ment has also begun an exchange of experience with Finland, 
Norway and Russia on gender equality, men’s violence against 
women, sexual harassment and abuse.” Sweden is also “taking 
a clear stance in favour of socially and culturally sustainable 
development for Arctic Indigenous peoples with technological 
development to ensure ethically and biologically sustainable 
resource use” (2011a, 6, 22, 45). 
According to the Swedish strategy the rapidly changing climate 
“requires greater political cooperation across territorial borders 
to develop methods for managing species affected by hunting 
and fishing”. Furthermore that “Ecosystem-based management 
of marine resources based on the principle of conservation 
and sustainable use and with special protection for threatened 
areas, species and stocks would be a way forward”. Therefore, 
“Sweden will work for international management plans to be 
drawn up for species affected by hunting and fishing and by a 
changed climate… [and] contribute to ecosystem–based ma-
rine management/spatial planning” (2011a, 24, 28).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded quotes (see Figure 
12, p. 92) and focuses on Sweden’s commitment that “activities 
and cooperation projects in the Arctic will be in accordance 
with international law, including UN conventions and other in-
ternational treaties” (2011a, 5, 18). Sweden promises to “bring 
the human dimension and the gender perspective to the fore in 
Arctic-related cooperation bodies” (2011a, 6). It also emphasizes 
that “despite significant challenges, Arctic cooperation is charac-
terised by a low level of conflict and broad consensus,” and at the 
same time, declares that it will “ensure that the Arctic remains an 
area of low political tension” (2011a, 18, 19). The Strategy further 
clearly emphasizes that “efficient, multilateral cooperation on the 
Arctic is a main priority for Sweden” (2011a, 19).
Sweden also declares that it “will highlight the importance of re-
specting international law when extracting the energy resources 
of the Arctic.” Moreover, Sweden aims “to be a driving-force in 
international cooperation in order to protect the unique Arctic 
environment and minimise the negative effects and risks of an 
anticipated increase in extraction.” In this context, “the scope 
for developing green and climate-neutral energy supply needs to 
be taken into consideration” (2011a, 30, 37). The Strategy high-
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lights the importance of “international research cooperation in 
areas of relevance for the Arctic, such as mineral research, envi-
ronmental technology and sustainable natural resource use,” as 
well as identifying that “cooperation among small and slightly 
larger institutions across national borders in the North is an ef-
fective way of ensuring good resource use and increasing the 
quality of education and research” (2011a, 40). 
Sweden recognizes that “the main multilateral arena for Arc-
tic-specific issues is the Arctic Council” and aims to “strengthen 
the Arctic Council in its role as the central multilateral forum 
for Arctic-related issues.” As stated in the Strategy, “the Coun-
cil should be more active in developing common policies and 
practical projects for the benefit of the region.” This would be 
particularly so if its “mandate were broadened to include other 
important strategic issues such as joint security, infrastructure 
and social and economic development.” Sweden believes there-
fore the Arctic Council could be further energized “to strength-
en [it] both institutionally and politically” (2011a, 4, 18, 19). 
Sweden further commits to “highlight the human dimension in 
the Arctic Council as a result of, among other things, its work 
on the Nordic Sámi Convention” and will consult with Sámi 
Parliament representatives prior to important Arctic Council 
meetings (2011a, 41).
Sweden supports the EU’s ambition to become an observer to 
the Arctic Council, while promising to “actively contribute to 
the ongoing development of an EU policy on Arctic issues.” 
Moreover, “Sweden wishes to promote the EU as a relevant co-
operation partner in the High North within relevant policy ar-
eas” (2011a, 5, 18, 19, 20). Sweden further emphasizes strength-
ening “cooperation with the Barents Euro-Arctic Council on 
measures to combat what are known as hotspots” (2011a, 27). 
“In the Nordic Council of Ministers, Sweden will work to sharp-
en the focus of Arctic–related project activities that have a clear 
supplementary value for the Arctic Council” and the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (2011a, 5, 18, 20). 
In the Council of Ministers Sweden is working “to promote 
the free movement of people, goods, services and capital”. For 
instance, “Cooperation in the Northern Dimension’s new part-
nership for culture provides scope for helping to strengthen 
creative and cultural industries in the region” (2011a, 32, 39). 
Additionally, “‘The Nordic Council for Reindeer Husbandry 
Research,’ which is under the auspices of the Nordic Council 
of Ministers, is a good starting-point for continuing to develop 
cooperation even in an Arctic perspective” (2011a, 47). 
Furthermore, reference is made to the Ilulissat Declaration of 28 
May 2008, when “the five coastal states also agreed to solve out-
standing issues in accordance with current international law” 
(2011a, 14). Sweden also underlines the importance of coopera-
tion with “Russian regions within the framework of the EU Ko-
larctic ENPI CBC financing instrument”. Additionally, “Regions 
in northern Scandinavia can also cooperate with Iceland and 
Greenland within the framework of the Northern Periphery 
Programme” (2011a, 31).
On the global scale, Sweden respects the UNCLOS Convention, 
stating that “the Arctic coastal states, like coastal states in gen-
eral, have rights to certain sea areas as defined in the UNCLOS 
Convention – both as regards the ocean and the seabed” and 
“the International Seabed Authority is responsible for the ad-
ministration of extraction from the seabed outside the jurisdic-
tion of the coastal states.” Sweden takes an active part in “the 
UN and its various bodies [which] provide important arenas 
for promoting the Arctic region” (2011a, 11, 20). Additionally, 
Sweden recognizes the importance of the IMO and its efforts 
at “limiting emissions of greenhouse gases from ships,” as well 
as the importance of having the IMO’s Polar Code into force 
(2011a, 20, 30). 
In the Strategy, several international agreements, which directly 
affect the Arctic, are mentioned, such as the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Convention 
on Biodiversity (CBD) and the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Among UN bodies involved 
in the Arctic, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and United Nations Environmental Programme 
(UNEP) are also among UN bodies involved in the Arctic, as are 
the World Health Organization’s European Region (WHO Eu-
rope) and Region of the Americas (WHO PAHO) (2011a, 20). 
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 8 % of 
the total coded quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92). It notes that the 
Arctic environment is “unique,” and “sensitive,” and also calls 
the Arctic “one of the world’s most vulnerable areas” (2011a, 25, 
27, 28, 38). Not surprisingly, therefore, “it is in Sweden’s inter-
est that new emerging activities are governed by common and 
robust regulatory frameworks and above all that they focus on 
environmental sustainability” (2011a, 4). Thus, attention needs 
to be paid to “short-lived climate forcers” and pollution (2011a, 
5, 26, 27). To this end, the government recognizes that econom-
ic activities contribute to environmental problems and seeks to 
find a balance between the economy and the environment. For 
example, the Strategy states that “increased resource extraction 
in the Arctic involves considerable risks, however and especial-
ly sensitive areas must be protected from exploitation” (2011a, 
31). What is more, “Sweden will work to prevent and limit the 
negative environmental impact potentially caused by the open-
ing–up of new shipping routes and sea areas in the Arctic” 
(2011a, 24). The use of marine resources will also follow an eco-
system-based management structure, and it is in the interest of 
the government to monitor the Arctic environment (see: 2011a, 
6, 28, 36). 
Protecting flora and fauna, and maintaining biodiversity is 
mentioned, even highlighted. The document states that “to 
strengthen the capacity for adaptation and resilience, networks 
of protected areas that are important for flora and fauna should 
be created in the Barents region and elsewhere” (2011a, 28). 
There is also concern about non-native species entering the re-
gion and that “species composition is changing as a result of 
southern species starting to outcompete high-arctic species” 
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and that “there is also a risk of negative environmental impact 
from shipping as a result … the spread of non-native organ-
isms” (2011a, 28, 35). To address this these concerns, “Sweden 
will contribute to the preservation and sustainable use of biodi-
versity in the Arctic” (2011a, 5). As well as, “the Arctic Council 
should also contribute to continued global biodiversity-related 
efforts” as well as the United Nations Convention on Biodiver-
sity (2011a, 22, 28). 
The Pollution indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded 
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and identifies a broad range of pol-
lutants affecting the Arctic, including:
• “emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases,  
including carbon dioxide” 
• “short-lived climate forcers such as soot, tropospheric  
ozone and methane” 
• “persistent bioaccumulative organic pollutants” 
• “non-accident-related discharges of oil and chemicals,  
air pollution, waste and the spread of non-native  
organisms” from ships
• “organic pollutants, such as polychlorinated biphenyls  
(PCB) and other dioxins and certain heavy metals  
(mainly mercury)” and 
• POPs (2011a, 5, 24, 26, 35, 44).
The Strategy recognizes that “despite there being few local sourc-
es of emissions in the Arctic, the spread of pollutants in and via 
the Arctic is a major problem ... Most pollutants are transport-
ed there via air or water currents” (2011a, 27). These sources 
of pollution include “carbon emissions from steelmaking,” the 
shipping industry which “is responsible for 870 million tonnes 
of greenhouse gas emissions, or 2.7 percent of global emissions” 
and “significant emissions of pollutants, both into the air and 
water, occur in a large number of industrial areas in the Russian 
Arctic” (2011a, 29, 34–35, 44). 
According to the Strategy, to combat pollution, “Sweden needs 
to actively pursue issues relating to reduced emissions and the 
spread of oil, chemicals, waste, non-native organisms and oth-
er air pollutants” (2011a, 27). At a policy and political level, 
this includes “making active efforts within the framework of 
the Stockholm Convention and the UN Convention on Long–
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)” and “[contrib-
uting] to the international efforts in the IMO aimed at limiting 
emissions of greenhouse gases from ships.” This includes ad-
vancing the Polar Code (2011a, 30), and working with Arctic 
neighbors to reduce “the risk of emissions of compounds that 
could pose hazard to man and environment” (2011a, 44). Addi-
tionally, “nuclear safety issues may also come to the fore from an 
environmental and security perspective” (2011a, 37). There is 
room for the private sector and researchers to contribute to pol-
lution reduction. For example, “Sweden and Norway, together 
with 48 businesses and organisations in the mining, steel, ener-
gy and engineering industries as well as research institutes and 
universities, take part in the priority research programme UL-
COS (Ultra-Low Carbon Dioxide Steelmaking) with the aim of 
halving carbon emissions from steelmaking” (2011a, 29).
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92). Both positive and negative con-
sequences are identified. Positive developments tend to be eco-
nomic as “new conditions are emerging for shipping, hunting, 
fishing, trade and energy extraction.” This is especially so for 
shipping in the Northwest and Northeast Passages (2011a, 4, 7). 
Most of the consequences, however, are problematic. In environ-
mental terms, climate change is “causing the world’s glaciers and 
sea-ice to melt at an accelerated pace” and it has “changed ocean 
currents and [caused] more frequent extreme weather events” 
(2011a, 16, 43). Indeed, “this rapid rise in temperature increases 
the likelihood of dramatic effects on Arctic ecosystems and can 
reduce their resilience” (2011a, 25). There are social impacts, for 
example, “security may well become more of a question of pub-
lic crisis management in extreme weather situations.” There is 
also “a greater risk of contaminated drinking water caused by 
changes in the permafrost that affect water sources” (2011a, 14, 
44). Additionally, the Strategy explains that climate change neg-
atively affects traditional and Indigenous ways of life (2011a, 7).
To address climate change, the government identifies some mit-
igation and adaptation strategies. For example, “in cooperation 
with other Arctic countries, Sweden will contribute to propos-
als for knowledge–building and action to strengthen the capac-
ity for adaptation to and recovery from the effects of climate 
change” (2011a, 24). Indeed, “adaptation to a changed climate 
requires good knowledge about the effects not only on biolog-
ical and technical systems but also on communities and hu-
mans” (2011a, 28), emphasizing the importance of the scientific 
community. The Strategy states that “Sweden will continue to be 
a leading nation as regards climate and environmental research, 
focusing also on the impact of climate change on humans.” As 
climate action requires broader frameworks, “Sweden will work 
to ensure that climate change in the Arctic and its global impact 
is highlighted in international climate negotiations” (2011a, 24). 
The Strategy acknowledges the UNFCCC and the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2011a, 24, 26).
The Security indicator accounts for 4 % of the total coded quotes 
(see Figure 12, p. 92); it emphasizes that “Sweden’s security pol-
icy position based on “security in cooperation” means that the 
security policies of the EU Member States and Nordic countries 
will strongly influence Swedish security policy” (2011a, 14). The 
Strategy further indicates that “the overall security policy climate 
in the Arctic is very much dependent on the relationship between 
Russia and the United States” (2011a, 14). As well, “Dialogue, 
transparency, confidence-building measures and cooperation in 
line with international law form the starting-point for Sweden’s 
approach to security concerning the Arctic” (2011a, 19). 
In bilateral and multilateral contexts, Sweden wishes “the Arctic 
remains a region where security policy tensions are low” (2011a, 
4) emphasizing “an approach based on security in its broadest 
sense and that the use of civil instruments is preferable to mil-
itary means” (2011a, 19). The Nordic Declaration of Solidarity, 
adopted in 2009, has led to “Sweden’s security policy becoming 
even more closely interwoven with the political priorities of the 
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other Nordic countries” (2011a, 15). In this context, the Strate-
gy recognizes the influence of Arctic developments on Swedish 
security, while at the same time the Strategy points out that “the 
current security policy challenges in the Arctic are not of a mil-
itary nature” and that “The Arctic is an area of low political ten-
sion in which the changed climate presents new opportunities 
and challenges” (2011a, 19, 23). The Swedish Strategy, however, 
mentions that as a “result of climate change, security may well 
become more of a question of public crisis management in ex-
treme weather situations; adaptation to changed climatic condi-
tions in order to protect human life, health and the economy” 
(2011a, 14) are needed.
Sweden proposes that “the Council could however be further 
energised if its mandate were broadened to include other im-
portant strategic issues such as joint security” (2011a, 19). The 
Strategy also briefly mentions energy security, when pointing 
out the “large volumes of fuel produced in the Arctic may there-
fore affect European security of supply and prices on several 
markets” (2011a, 37).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 4 % of the total coded 
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92); it primarily identifies maritime safe-
ty issues associated with increased traffic. The Strategy states that 
“increased shipping also brings issues related to safety require-
ments for sea transport to the fore. Poor safety routines or vessel 
construction can have devastating consequences for seafarers, 
marine flora and fauna and those who depend on the sea for their 
livelihoods” (2011a, 35). Issues around “sea and air rescue,” the 
need for “more stringent safety requirements,” and surveillance 
(2011a, 6, 34, 35) are thus addressed. Indeed, prevention is a key 
aspect of Sweden’s maritime safety agenda (2011a, 35). 
The Strategy discusses two approaches to addressing these 
concerns. First, through the IMO and the Polar Code, “an as-
sessment will be made of whether the existing international 
environmental regulatory frameworks offer a sufficient level 
of protection or whether further measures are needed” (2011a, 
35). Second, the Arctic Council also plays a safety role: “the Co-
operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic agreement negotiated between the members of the 
Arctic Council will enable more flexible use of existing resourc-
es and make it possible to find cost-effective solutions” (2011a, 
36). Importantly, Sweden does not call for the integration of the 
different national safety systems, but rather seeks “to continue 
development of regional cross–border cooperation in the field 
of sea and air rescue and to tighten the safety requirements for 
sea transport in several sectors” (2011a, 30). The Strategy also 
states that “better surveillance of shipping traffic, preventive 
measures and improved regional cross-border cooperation on 
air and sea rescue are all important components” of Sweden’s 
Strategy (Sweden. GOS 2011, 36). That said, capabilities could 
be improved as “the Arctic is sparsely populated and there are 
currently no widespread mechanisms in place for rescuing peo-
ple in distress at sea” (2011a, 35).
The Economy indicator accounts for 13 % of the total coded 
quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and reveals a wide range of eco-
nomic activities that would be expected in the region. These in-
clude natural resource extraction (addressed in more detail be-
low) such as “hunting, fishing and reindeer herding… in Arctic 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia” as well as tourism (2011a, 
15). There were also some unique industries such as “marine 
bioprospecting after unique genes” and “ice-breaking, sea trans-
port and consultancy based on knowledge of business activities 
in the Arctic climate.” Additionally, “the Swedish space industry 
has its base in the extreme north of Sweden” and that “Sweden is 
currently a world-leading supplier of vehicle-tests in the Arctic 
environment” (2011a, 15, 33, 37, 40). 
Sweden participates in the “ore and mineral extraction” indus-
try. This is important because “extraction is currently high on 
the global economic agenda, which has led to significant lev-
els of investment in the Swedish mining industry” (2011a, 15). 
Sweden has interests in other natural resources like wood. “To-
gether with fish, the forest is the Arctic’s most important renew-
able source of raw materials” and “Sweden has a world-leading 
pulp, paper and wood engineering industry, which also utilises 
forest materials from the Arctic region” (2011a, 15). 
Trade is another important economic activity. “Sweden’s growth 
and competitiveness stand to benefit from increased free trade 
and active efforts to counter technical barriers to trade in the 
Arctic region” (2011a, 6). To facilitate the movement of goods, 
“the Nordic countries cooperate closely on trade issues within 
the EU/EEA and in the Nordic Council of Ministers, and Sweden 
is working in the Council of Ministers to promote the free move-
ment of people, goods, services and capital” (2011a, 31–32).
Sweden is not greatly involved in the Energy sector. The Strategy 
states that “in contrast to the five coastal states, Sweden has no 
direct national energy interest in the Arctic and does not take 
part in energy policy cooperation initiatives in the area” (2011a, 
37). Sweden does, however, have access to energy products—“in-
creased trade and cooperation in energy – and rawmaterial-re-
lated sectors have been given high priority in Sweden and would 
help to achieve economic, energy and environmentally related 
objectives” (2011a, 32). 
Sustainable development is important to regional economic ac-
tivities. The Strategy recognizes that “in order not to undermine 
the social or natural environment for people living in the region, 
its economic developments must be sustainable in the long term” 
(2011a, 30). For example, “Sweden is … striving for environmen-
tally sustainable use of the forest in the Arctic… the Sámi villages 
affected [by forestry activities] will be consulted prior to forest 
being harvested in year-round reindeer-grazing grounds inside 
the Arctic area” (2011a, 32–33). The Strategy also states that “it 
is in Sweden’s interest that new emerging activities are governed 
by common and robust regulatory frameworks and above all that 
they focus on environmental sustainability” (2011a, 4).
The government prioritizes economic activity in a few different 
ways. It first recognizes that “green growth can lay the founda-
tion for new jobs where the business sector can play a central role 
in the development of innovative solutions” (2011a, 31). Second, 
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“Sweden needs the right skills in order to utilise the potential 
released by a developed Arctic region” and that “the recruitment 
requirement for the mining and mineral industries will be con-
siderable in the forthcoming five-year period” (2011a, 40). To 
this end, Luleå University of Technology offers Master’s level ed-
ucation in natural resources (2011a, 40). 
There are a variety of actors at different scales that help with Swe-
den’s Arctic economic activities. Internationally, Swedish Trade 
Council offices “should be instructed to build up skills to pro-
mote Swedish commercial interests in the Arctic” (2011a, 6). At 
a regional level “Sweden is cooperating on this with the countries 
in the Barents region in for example the Baltic Sea Region Ener-
gy Cooperation (BASREC) and the Nordic Council of Ministers” 
(2011a, 32). Locally, “the involvement of Swedish businesses in 
local communities and their willingness to adhere to the prin-
ciples of human rights, labour law, social responsibility, sound 
environmental and sustainability efforts and anti-corruption will 
give them a competitive edge in future business deals and invest-
ments in the Arctic” (2011a, 31).
The Tourism indicator accounts for 3 % of the total coded quotes 
(see Figure 12, p. 92) and briefly summarizes the Swedish ap-
proach towards this specific industry, which has growth poten-
tial in the Arctic. Sweden recognizes that “many visitors choose 
the Arctic because of its clean air, water, mountains, forest and si-
lence – things that are in short supply in many other parts of the 
world.” Furthermore, “the tourism sector, including hunting and 
fishing, has considerable potential for creating jobs and boosting 
economic growth” (2011a, 15, 38). At the same time, the Strategy 
emphasizes that “the tourism sector should be developed in a 
sustainable manner and communications between tourist des-
tinations should be improved”, although this means with “con-
sideration for the environment and the traditional lifestyles of 
Indigenous peoples” (2011a, 6, 30, 38). Sweden also “welcomes 
the development of Arctic cooperation aimed at strengthening 
the conditions for tourism in the Arctic area” since “accessibility 
is a key success factor in the development of the Arctic as a tour-
ist destination” (2011a, 6, 38).
Besides highlighting the opportunities for development of the 
sector, the Strategy also notes the potential problematic areas - 
the “increased seaborne tourism in Arctic waters heightens the 
risk of accidents affecting both the environment and humans” 
and “poor infrastructure makes it very difficult to deal with 
emergency situations.” As well, “Better surveillance of shipping 
traffic, preventive measures and improved regional cross-border 
cooperation on air and sea rescue are all important components” 
of the Strategy (2011a, 35, 36). Finally, the Strategy also recog-
nizes the possible side effects of tourism, stating that “if we then 
add socioeconomic development, in terms of intensified forest-
ry activities, expanded infrastructure and more tourism to the 
equation, the risk of conflicts of interest between reindeer herd-
ing and other land use becomes even greater” (2011a, 45).
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92). Transportation infrastructure 
is discussed primarily in the context of economic and resource 
development. For example, the Strategy states that “raw material 
extraction in the Arctic also generates the need for long-term 
sustainable land transport” (2011a, 33). Additionally, “the in-
creasing demand can also be expected to intensify calls for in-
vestment in infrastructure, such as new or upgraded harbours, 
railways, roads and airports” (2011a, 33-34). Shipping is empha-
sized, especially as “the most energy – and cost-effective way 
of transporting goods” (2011a, 34). Shipping could increase, as 
melting ice could open transit routes through the Northeast and 
Northwest Passage (Sweden. GOS 2011a, 7). There is recognition 
that “increased shipping also brings issues related to safety re-
quirements for sea transport to the fore” (2011a, 35). In addition 
to supporting commercial activities, “Swedish ice-breakers may 
be able to support increasing commercial shipping in the Arctic 
as well as help with both the monitoring of the vulnerable ma-
rine environment and Arctic research” (2011a, 36). 
Telecommunications and ICT are also an important component 
of icebreaking. To this end, “the development of technology 
and communications that facilitate ice-breaking operations are 
important from a Swedish perspective” (2011a, 36). Improved 
digital infrastructure can also help in other areas like, for exam-
ple, better “access to cost-effective and leading IT and telecom 
technology ... can present opportunities for Swedish businesses 
in this field” (2011a, 38–39). 
Improved energy infrastructure is also mentioned, with the 
Strategy explaining that “energy efficiency is one area where 
there is considerable need in some of the Arctic states and 
within which Sweden has substantial expertise and a strong 
industry” (2011a, 32). Potential options include “hydro- and 
wind-power, solar and bioenergy and technology for improving 
energy efficiency and reducing carbon emissions” (2011a, 37). 
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 13 % of the 
total coded quotes (see Figure 12, p. 92) and identifies climate 
change and the environment as key drivers of science and re-
search. Notably, the Strategy states that “Sweden will continue 
to be a leading nation as regards climate and environmental 
research, focusing also on the impact of climate change on 
humans” and that “Sweden should work to support Arctic re-
search and to monitor the vulnerable marine environment” 
(2011a, 24, 30). In addition to the climate and environment, re-
search serves other purposes. For example, Sweden’s long his-
tory of Arctic research can be used to ensure Sweden’s place as 
an Arctic stakeholder (2011a, 12). Research also contributes to 
the functioning of the Arctic Council and “continued Swedish 
research and education initiatives are essential if progress is to 
be made” (2011a, 23). Research “cooperation across national 
borders in the North also helps to maintain good relations in 
the High North” (2011a, 40). Sweden is also interested in op-
portunities in space; the Strategy states that “Sweden is striving 
for cooperation in the Nordic region and the EU in order to 
develop space technology to promote monitoring, exploration 
and communication in the Arctic” (2011a, 39).
To facilitate its research program(s), Sweden makes use of four 
different types of research infrastructure. First, icebreakers and 
other vessels play a key role, with the Strategy boasting that 
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“few research vessels around the world can match the Swedish 
ice-breaker Oden’s capacity in terms of combining the class of an 
Arctic ice-breaker with advanced research equipment for seabed 
mapping and logistic platforms for climate studies” (2011a, 17). 
Indeed, Oden and other “research vessels are an important part 
of the infrastructure and give researchers the same opportuni-
ties as onshore research stations” (2011a, 39). Second, with re-
gard to onshore research, “Northern Sweden is home to research 
stations in Abisko and Tarfala,” each of which serves different 
purposes. “The Abisko Scientific Research Station administrates, 
coordinates and performs experiments and tests for researchers 
from all over the world,” while “the Tarfala Research Station, 
located in the Kebnekaise mountains, conducts basic research, 
glacier monitoring, meteorological and hydrological analyses, 
snow chemistry and permafrost studies” (2011a, 29). Third, are 
universities (2011a, 40), and fourth, Sweden draws on differ-
ent research networks and opportunities for collaboration. The 
Strategy recognizes the importance of informal cooperation and 
“Sweden should encourage international research cooperation 
in areas of relevance for the Arctic, such as mineral research, 
environmental technology and sustainable natural resource 
use” (2011a, 40). More formal networks are also important be-
cause “important knowledge is fostered within the framework 
of forums such as the International Arctic Science Committee 
(IASC) and the Arctic Council’s Sustaining Arctic Observing 
Networks (SAON),” and through the University of the Arctic 
(2011a, 26–27, 40). 
There is much discussion about the importance of knowledge 
throughout the Strategy. For example, according to the Strate-
gy, more knowledge is needed regarding the effects of industry, 
ecosystems and biodiversity, and climate change; dissemination 
is also important (2011a, 8, 26, 27). The way knowledge is gener-
ated is important, too, with the Strategy recognizing the need for 
interdisciplinary research. To illustrate this, the document pro-
claims that in the context of climate change, “current research 
cooperation and network-building need to move towards more 
integrated research in which natural scientists, social scientists 
and humanists cooperate to improve understanding of the many 
multi-dimensional problems” (2011a, 28). The role of traditional 
knowledge is also addressed, with the Strategy stating, for exam-
ple, that “Sweden will strive to ensure that Indigenous peoples 
have greater scope for preserving and developing their identity, 
culture and traditional industries and [will] facilitate their tra-
ditional knowledge gathering and transfer” (2011a, 41). Much 
of the focus is on transferring knowledge to Indigenous peoples 
(2011a, 46–47) rather than including traditional knowledge into 
scientific knowledge production. Perhaps the focus on this one-
way transfer is in part related to the statement that “much of the 
traditional knowledge has been either entirely or partly forgot-
ten” (2011a, 46). 
Very little is mentioned in the Strategy about education, although 
it does call for improved access to higher education through ex-
change programs. For example, “Sweden should urge the EU to 
invest in Arctic research and higher education. This may include 
an improved Arctic window in Erasmus Mundus, the Bologna 
Process, an Arctic research and student exchange programme as 
well as EU involvement in a strengthened infrastructure” (2011a, 
40). The Strategy recognizes the work of the University of the 
Arctic which “focuses on postgraduate education, academic dis-
tance learning, Master’s programmes and the training of experts 
in a network comprising several institutes of higher education in 
the High North” (2011a, 40). 
As for Implementation, at the end of the sections on Internation-
al Cooperation and Swedish Priorities, there are blue text boxes 
with what appears to be a list of items the Swedish government 
will undertake in support of the Strategy. However, the text box-
es do not have headings that make clear these are actually items 
to be implemented. The document itself ends following the sec-
tion on the Human Dimension, without a conclusion. There is 
no discussion about time frames for following through on goals, 
nor are there any budget or plans for follow-up or evaluation. 
To sum up
Figure 12 at the beginning of this chapter shows the percentage 
of quotes within the document towards the different indicators. 
It shows that the most-coded indicators are the Human Dimen-
sion, Governance, Economy, and Science and Education, all with 
the same amount of quotes, followed by International Coopera-
tion. The least-coded indicators were Tourism, Safety and SAR, 
and Security tied in second place, while Pollution was the third 
least-coded indicator.
Unlike the other Arctic states, Sweden has produced only one 
Strategy to date. As previously mentioned, based on the percent-
age of quotes assigned to the different indicators (see Appendix), 
the Strategy reflects the state’s focus on climate/environment, 
economic, and the human dimension, as the priorities of the 
Arctic policy (2011a, 23). The Human Dimension indicator ad-
dresses the different relationships between Indigenous peoples 
and the state, the economy, and changing climate. It also includes 
discussion on language and culture protection, and how Sweden 
is working to protect Indigenous rights. Considering the size of 
Sápmi territory in the European Arctic, as well as in Sweden, it is 
not surprising that Indigenous peoples are prioritized. 
The Environmental Protection, Pollution, and Climate Change 
indicators, when read together, show that a variety of pollutants 
are entering the Arctic environment, some of which contribute 
to climate change, which then has consequences for the envi-
ronment and local biodiversity. The Strategy discusses different 
problem-solving strategies to both address pollution and miti-
gate climate change. As for the economy, there is a decent over-
view of Sweden’s different economic activities, which include re-
source development, but also activities like reindeer herding and 
innovation development, to name a few. The Strategy states that 
economic activities, including tourism, are to be performed in 
a sustainable manner. The Tourism indicator complements the 
Economy indicator by providing more information on Sweden’s 
approach to tourism, including issues of sustainability, Indige-
nous rights, and safety. 
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There also interesting findings from the indicators that fall out-
side of Sweden’s strategic priorities. When read together, the 
Governance and International Cooperation indicators provide 
a comprehensive overview of how Sweden operates in the Arc-
tic, both domestically and internationally. Indeed, as coopera-
tion helps keep the region stable, it is not surprising that Sweden 
cooperates in a broad range of areas. For example, there is co-
operation between the state and the Saami people within Swe-
den. Internationally, there is cooperation in the areas of safety, 
resource management (energy and animals), and in the area of 
research. Cooperation also takes place in different governance 
organizations like the Arctic Council, BEAC, the NCM, differ-
ent UN programs, the WHO, and through structures like the 
Ilulissat Declaration and the UNCLOS.
The Security and Safety & SAR indicators are also connected 
and should be read together. Both are underpinned by the need 
for international cooperation to address regional concerns. 
Sweden’s position is that security should not necessarily focus 
solely on military threats, but rather look at other, softer secu-
rity issues like safety. The Arctic Council could play a greater 
role, and has already begun to do so through the Cooperation 
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic 
agreement. The IMO has already taken on regional maritime 
safety through the creation of the Polar Code, which was in de-
velopment at the time the report was written. Safety, however, 
will be improved when the regional infrastructure is improved, 
according to the Strategy. 
 
The Infrastructure indicator shows a connection between in-
frastructure development, and economic development. Trans-
portation infrastructure, shipping, icebreakers, and even ICT 
developments can help fuel economic growth. Advances in ICT 
can help icebreakers function more efficiently, which also serves 
environmental and research purposes. New energy infrastruc-
ture development can help create green and renewable energy, 
thus helping the environment.
 
The Science and Education indicator connects back to many of 
the other indicators. For instance, science is driven by climate 
change and the environment; research can help inform gover-
nance structures like the Arctic Council; icebreakers are used to 
facilitate research; and research cooperation is important to ad-
dress shared issues. The Strategy also stresses that there is more 
than one type of knowledge and that interdisciplinary and tradi-
tional knowledge are also important. However, the focus seems 
to be on transferring knowledge to Indigenous communities 
rather than incorporating Indigenous knowledge into scientific 
settings. As for education, there is mention of exchange pro-
grams, which is a form of cooperation with other institutions. 
United States of America
The first Arctic strategy for the United States (USA) was re-
leased in 2009 with the National Security Presidential Direc-
tive/NSPD—66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD—25, with 14 pages and no pictures or maps. It was fol-
lowed up with a more formal strategy, the National Strategy 
for the Arctic Region, in 2013, with 11 pages and no pictures or 
maps. In addition to these two documents, the government re-
leased the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region (USA TWH 2014) in 2014, and in 2015 the Exec-
utive Order 13689— Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts 
in the Arctic (USA TWH 2015) was released. More recently, the 
United States Coast Guard released their own Arctic Strategic 
Outlook (USA United States Coast Guard 2019), and the De-
partment of Defense released the Department of Defense Arctic 
Strategy (USA Department of Defense 2019). In this study the 
presidential and homeland security directives (2009) and the 
2013 Strategy will be analyzed. 
In the introduction to the 2013 Strategy, the government clearly 
states its priorities, seeking “an Arctic region that is stable and 
free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust 
and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are 
developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile 
environment and the interests and cultures of Indigenous peo-
ples” (USA TWH 2013, 4). The Strategy outlines “three lines of 
effort” that will help the USA achieve its goals. These are to “1. 
Advance United States Security Interests”; “2. Pursue Responsi-
ble Arctic Region Stewardship”; and “3. Strengthen Internation-
al Cooperation” (2013, 2). The Strategy explains that, as things 
change in the region, “we will be guided by our central interests 
in the Arctic region, which include providing for the security 
of the United States; protecting the free flow of resources and 
commerce; protecting the environment; addressing the needs 
of Indigenous communities; and enabling scientific research” 
(2013, 4). In contrast, the 2009 directives do not make clear pri-
ority statements. Instead, the documents’ section headings can 
be used to indicate the policy priorities. They are “B. National 
Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic”; “C. In-
ternational Governance”; “D. Extended Continental Shelf and 
Boundary Issues”; “E. Promoting International Scientific Co-
operation”; “F. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic Region”; 
“G. Economic Issues, Including Energy”; and “H. Environmen-
tal Protection and Conservation of Natural Resources” (USA 
TWH 2009, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12). 
Comparison by Indicator 
The quotes in the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic in-
dicator provides further insights into how the region is under-
stood by the USA. While the 2009 directives do not define the 
region, the opening remarks of the 2013 Strategy seem to define 
the American Arctic as the state of Alaska; it specifies that an 
“Arctic state is defined as one of the eight nations making up 
the permanent membership of the Arctic Council and includes 
the following nations: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Swe-
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den, and the United States” (2013, 4). Describing the region, 
the 2013 Strategy considers the Arctic to be “one of our planet’s 
last great frontiers” (2013, 1); both documents use phrases like 
“unique” and “changing,” while also recognizing the value of the 
region’s resources (2013, 1; 2009, 2, 12). Both documents also 
call the region the “Arctic,” although the directives use the term 
“circumpolar” when discussing “the establishment of an Arctic 
circumpolar observing network” (2009, 8), presumably because 
it includes all Arctic states. 
Only the government ministries or departments responsible for 
the Arctic are addressed in the directives as the directives were 
sent to 24 different officials, including, but not limited to, the 
Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, the Interior, Com-
merce, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Energy, 
and Homeland Security (2009, 1). 
The departments with responsibilities for the 2013 Strategy 
are actually identified in the 2014 implementation report, and 
can take on the role of either lead or supporting agency for the 
different tasks. Throughout the document these include the 
Departments of Agriculture (supporting), Defense (lead and 
supporting), Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (lead and supporting), Energy (lead and sup-
porting), Health and Human Services (lead), Homeland Secu-
rity (lead and supporting), Homeland Security, United States 
Coast Guard (lead and supporting), Interior (lead and support-
ing), Interior, United States Geological Survey (supporting), 
State (lead and supporting), Transportation (lead and support-
ing), Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration (lead 
and supporting), Transportation, Maritime Administration 
(supporting). Other agencies and departments are also men-
tioned, including the Environmental Protection Agency (lead 
and supporting), Member Departments and Agencies of the 
Aquatic Nuisance Species Task Force and the National Inva-
sive Species Council (supporting), Member Departments and 
Agencies of the Committee on the Marine Transportation Sys-
tem (supporting), Member Departments and Agencies of the 
United States National Response Team (supporting), National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (supporting), National 
Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (supporting), National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (lead), National Sci-
ence Foundation (lead and supporting), Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (lead), Smithsonian Institute (lead and sup-
porting), and the U.S. Arctic Research Commission (support-
ing). Although there are 24 different government entities listed; 
some only play supporting roles, and more importantly, some 
are more involved than others. 
Figure 13 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as-
signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total 
number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber) in the document. 
 
Figure 13. Comparing the United States of America’s 2009 Directives and 
2013 Strategy
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 5 % of the total 
coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 4 % of the directives (see 
Figure 13) and addresses improving the state’s relationship with 
Indigenous peoples through consultations. For example, the 
2013 Strategy gives importance to “[engaging] in a consultation 
process with Alaska Natives, recognizing tribal governments’ 
unique legal relationship with the United States and providing 
for meaningful and timely opportunity to inform Federal policy 
affecting Alaskan Native communities” (2013, 3; see also: 2009, 
3). The two documents also recognize that changes to the en-
vironment can be harmful for Indigenous peoples. In this re-
gard, the 2013 Strategy explains the USA “will endeavor to do 
no harm to the sensitive environment or to Alaska native com-
munities and other Indigenous populations that rely on Arctic 
resources” while the 2009 directives identify climate change as a 
problem and recognize that energy development can also harm 
the environment (2013, 4; 2009, 10, 11). The 2009 directives also 
recognize that the Arctic Council “provides a beneficial venue 
for interaction with Indigenous groups” (2009, 5). 
Culture is addressed only in the 2013 Strategy. The document 
identifies the incorporation of “cultural values” into the deci-
sion-making process, accounting for “cultural sensitivities” 
(2013, 8) in the context of resource and development. Addition-
ally, culture must also be considered in the context of national 
security (2013, 6). The Strategy does not provide a definition of 
what constitutes cultural values, except in relation to the energy 
sector and the “cultures of Indigenous peoples” (2013, 4). 
The 2009 directives briefly mention health and wellbeing, and 
connect wellbeing to climate change in two different ways. 
First, climate change is argued to negatively affect Indigenous 
peoples, with the directives commenting that “climate change 
and other factors are significantly affecting the lives of Arctic 
inhabitants, particularly Indigenous communities” (2009, 10). 
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Second, climate change and the economy are also connected to 
wellbeing (2009, 11). 
In the Governance indicator, which accounts for 18 % of the 
total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 27 % of the direc-
tives (see Figure 13, p. 100), the emphasis is placed on, among 
other things, the “effects of climate change and increasing hu-
man activity in the Arctic region” (2009, 2). “New or enhanced 
international arrangements for the Arctic to address issues [are] 
likely to arise from expected increases in human activity in that 
region, including shipping, local development and subsistence, 
exploitation of living marine resources, development of energy 
and other resources, and tourism” (2009, 6).
The 2009 directives highlight that “the United States promotes 
the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries 
in support of collaborative research that advances fundamen-
tal understanding of the Arctic region in general and potential 
Arctic change in particular. This could include collaboration 
with bodies such as the Nordic Council and the European Po-
lar Consortium, as well as with individual nations” (2009, 7). 
The directives further state that “given the need for decisions to 
be based on sound scientific and socioeconomic information, 
Arctic environmental research, monitoring, and vulnerability 
assessments are top priorities” (2009, 12). 
Furthermore, the 2009 directives state that the USA will “con-
sult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to explo-
ration, production, environmental and socioeconomic impacts, 
including drilling conduct, facility sharing, the sharing of en-
vironmental data, impact assessments, compatible monitoring 
programs, and reservoir management in areas with potentially 
shared resources” (2009, 11). In addition, the USA will “con-
tinue to emphasize cooperative mechanisms with nations op-
erating in the region to address shared concerns, recognizing 
that most known Arctic oil and gas resources are located outside 
of United States jurisdiction.” Also, “in cooperation with other 
nations, respond effectively to increased pollutants and other 
environmental challenges” (2009, 12, 13).
The 2009 directives recognize that “sustainable development in 
the Arctic region poses particular challenges.” Therefore, “stake-
holder input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks 
to promote economic and energy security.” At the same time, 
the USA will “pursue marine ecosystem-based management in 
the Arctic” (2009, 10, 14). The 2013 Strategy also underlines that 
“the law recognizes these rights, freedoms, and uses for com-
mercial and military vessels and aircraft. Within this frame-
work, we shall further develop Arctic waterways management 
regimes, including traffic separation schemes, vessel tracking, 
and ship routing, in collaboration with partners” (2009, 7).
The 2013 Strategy highlights that the USA “will emphasize sci-
ence-informed decisionmaking and integration of economic, 
environmental, and cultural values” and that “across all lines of 
effort, decisions need to be based on the most current science 
and traditional knowledge” (2013, 3, 8). At the same time, deci-
sions should be made by “using the best available information 
by promptly sharing – nationally and internationally – the most 
current understanding and forecasts based on up-to-date sci-
ence and traditional knowledge” (2013, 10). Thereofore, “Just as 
a common spirit and shared vision of peaceful partnership led 
to the development of an international space station, we believe 
much can be achieved in the Arctic region through collabora-
tive international efforts, coordinated investments, and pub-
lic-private partnerships” (2013, 6).
Last but not least, the role of Indigenous peoples is reflected in 
both documents. The 2009 directives state that “it is the policy 
of the United States to… involve the Arctic’s Indigenous com-
munities in decisions that affect them” (2009, 2, 3). The 2013 
Strategy further confirms that the “Arctic nations have varied 
commercial, cultural, environmental, safety, and security con-
cerns in the Arctic region. Nevertheless, [the] common interests 
make these nations ideal partners in the region” (2013, 9). The 
Strategy explains that “we seek new opportunities to advance 
our interests by proactive engagement with other Arctic na-
tions through bilateral and multilateral efforts using of a wide 
array of existing multilateral mechanisms that have responsi-
bilities relating to the Arctic region” (2013, 9). As the US Policy 
“emphasizes trust, respect, and shared responsibility... [and] ar-
ticulates that tribal governments have a unique legal relation-
ship with the United States and requires Federal departments 
and agencies to provide for meaningful and timely input by 
tribal officials in development of regulatory policies that have 
tribal implications” (2013, 11). The USA needs to “engage in 
a consultation and coordination process with Alaska Natives, 
recognizing tribal governments’ unique legal relationship with 
the United States and providing for meaningful and timely op-
portunity to inform Federal policy affecting Alaskan Native 
communities” (2013, 3).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator accounts for 15 % of the total coded quotes in the 2013 
Strategy and 7 % of the directives (see Figure 13, p. 100); this 
highlights the importance of international cooperation, which 
is emphasized in both documents. The 2009 directives state that 
“it is the policy of the United States to… strengthen institutions 
for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations” (2009, 2). The 
2013 Strategy further confirms that the USA aims to strengthen 
the international cooperation in the Arctic, stating that “what 
happens in one part of the Arctic region can have significant 
implications for the interests of other Arctic states and the in-
ternational community as a whole” (2013, 8). The 2013 Strategy 
further recognizes that “the United States will rely on existing 
international law, which provides a comprehensive set of rules 
governing the rights, freedoms, and uses of the world’s oceans 
and airspace, including the Arctic” (2013, 10).
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The 2013 Strategy states that “the Arctic region is peaceful, sta-
ble, and free of conflict. The United States and its Arctic allies 
and partners seek to sustain this spirit of trust, cooperation and 
collaboration, both internationally and domestically” (2013, 1). 
The 2013 Strategy also highlights that “the United States is an 
Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arc-
tic Region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, 
protect the environment, responsibly manage resources, account 
for Indigenous communities, support scientific research, and 
strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues” 
(2013, 2).
The United States recognizes the value and effectiveness of ex-
isting fora, international organizations, and bilateral contacts 
which promote the United States’ interests in the Arctic. The 
USA participates in a variety of them: for instance, the Arctic 
Council, the International Regulators Forum, the International 
Standards Organization, the International Maritime Organi-
zation (IMO), the “United Nations (U.N.) and its specialized 
agencies, as well as through treaties such as the U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pol-
lution and its protocols” (2009, 5–6), the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, wildlife conservation 
and management agreements, and many other mechanisms. 
“As many nations across the world aspire to expand their role in 
the Arctic, we encourage Arctic and non-Arctic states to work 
collaboratively through appropriate fora to address the emerg-
ing challenges and opportunities in the Arctic region, while we 
remain vigilant to protect the security interests of the United 
States and our allies” (2013, 6; see also: 2009, 3, 5, 6). The USA 
“will seek to strengthen partnerships through existing multi-
lateral fora and legal frameworks dedicated to common Arctic 
issues.” Furthermore, the Strategy states that the USA “will also 
pursue new arrangements for cooperating on issues of mutual 
interest or concern and addressing unique and unprecedented 
challenges, as appropriate” (2013, 8, 9).
The 2013 Strategy further explains in detail how “U.S. efforts 
to strengthen international cooperation and partnerships will 
be pursued through four objectives”: i) “pursue arrangements 
that promote shared Arctic State prosperity, protect the Arctic 
Environment, and Enhance Security”; ii) “work through the 
Arctic Council to advance U.S. interests in the Arctic Region”; 
iii) “accede to the Law of the Sea Convention”; iv) “cooperate 
with other interested parties” (including “non-Arctic states and 
numerous non-state actors [that] have expressed increased in-
terest in the Arctic region) (2013, 9).
Behind is that the outcomes of the Arctic Council have “pro-
duced positive results for the United States by working within 
its limited mandate of environmental protection and sustain-
able development” and “it is the position of the United States 
that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum de-
voted to issues within its current mandate and not be trans-
formed into a formal international organization, particularly 
one with assessed contributions.” However, “the United States 
is nevertheless open to updating the structure of the Council, 
including consolidation of, or making operational changes to, 
its subsidiary bodies, to the extent such changes can clearly im-
prove the Council’s work and are consistent with the general 
mandate of the Council” (2009, 5). 
The 2009 directives ask the US Senate to act favorably and 
promptly on the US accession to UNCLOS “to protect and 
advance U.S. interests, including with respect to the Arctic. 
Joining will serve the national security interests of the United 
States, including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces 
worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive 
marine areas, including the valuable natural resources they 
contain” (2009, 5). “The most effective way to achieve interna-
tional recognition and legal certainty for our extended conti-
nental shelf is through the procedure available to States Parties 
to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea” (2009, 6). The 
need to join UNCLOS is emphasized again in the 2013 Strategy, 
since the USA being the only non-UNCLOS party of the Arctic 
states: “Only by joining the Convention can we maximize legal 
certainty and best secure international recognition of our sov-
ereign rights with respect to the U.S. extended continental shelf 
in the Arctic and elsewhere, which may hold vast oil, gas, and 
other resources. Our extended continental shelf claim in the 
Arctic region could extend more than 600 nautical miles from 
the north coast of Alaska” (2013, 9). As well, “instances where 
the maritime zones of coastal nations overlap, Arctic states 
have already begun the process of negotiating and concluding 
maritime boundary agreements, consistent with the Law of the 
Sea Convention and other relevant international law” (2013, 
9–10). The Strategy continues to explain that “the United States 
supports peaceful management and resolution of disputes, in a 
manner free from coercion. While the United States is not cur-
rently a party to the Convention, we will continue to support 
and observe principles of established customary international 
law reflected in the Convention” (2013, 10).
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 9 % of 
the total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % in the di-
rectives (see Figure 13, p. 100); it notes that these documents 
comment on the “fragile” and “unique” nature of the Arctic, 
as mentioned in the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arc-
tic indicator. The 2013 Strategy also comments that there is a 
“harshness of the Arctic climate” (2013, 10), while also stating 
that the environment is “sensitive” (2013, 4). This suggests a 
need to protect the environment, and both documents make 
clear statements that environmental protection is a priority for 
the USA. Indeed, the 2013 Strategy states that “protecting the 
unique and changing environment of the Arctic is a central 
goal of U.S. policy” (2013, 7), while the 2009 directives state 
that “it is the policy of the United States to … Protect the Arctic 
environment and conserve its biological resources” (2009, 2). 
Additionally, the 2013 Strategy identifies different areas of en-
vironmental concern, such as “land ice and its role in changing 
sea level; sea-ice and its role in global climate, fostering biodi-
versity, and supporting Arctic peoples; and, the warming per-
mafrost and its effects on infrastructure and climate” (2013, 8). 
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According to the U.S. documents, environmental protection 
must be balanced with regional economic activities, while also 
ensuring that Indigenous peoples are not negatively affect-
ed (2013, 2, 4; 2009, 11). The Arctic environment needs to be 
properly managed; the 2009 directives explain that the USA 
will “pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arc-
tic,” while the 2013 Strategy more generally states that it will 
“establish and institutionalize an integrated Arctic management 
framework” (2013, 2; 2009, 14). 
Environmental protection can make use of protected areas, al-
though none of the documents is explicit in terms of the in-
tent of the USA to use or create such areas. The 2013 Strategy, 
for example, focuses on ‘preservation’ and not protection. The 
document states that “the remote and complex operating con-
ditions in the Arctic environment make the region well-suited 
for collaborative efforts by nations seeking to explore emerg-
ing opportunities while emphasizing ecological awareness and 
preservation” (2013, 9). The 2009 directives also skirt around 
the topic, speaking more generally to the “effective conserva-
tion and management” of “living marine resources” (2009, 13) 
and recognizing American participation in the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (2009, 5).
Biodiversity is also an important aspect of environmental pro-
tection, even if the term “biodiversity” is not used8 in all doc-
uments. For example, the 2013 Strategy states that “the United 
States in the Arctic will assess and monitor the status of eco-
systems and the risks of climate change and other stressors to 
prepare for and respond effectively to environmental challeng-
es” (2013, 8). Similarly, the 2009 directives seek to “continue to 
identify ways to conserve, protect, and sustainably manage Arc-
tic species and ensure adequate enforcement presence to safe-
guard living marine resources, taking account of the changing 
ranges or distribution of some species in the Arctic” (2009, 13). 
Both quotes are suggestive of biodiversity protection. 
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 4 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the directives (see Fig-
ure 13, p. 100), identifies sources of pollution found in the Arc-
tic. For example, the 2013 Strategy identifies methane, mercury, 
oil spills, and “emissions of black carbon or other substances 
from fossil fuel combustion” (2013, 5, 7). The 2009 directives 
mention “persistent pollutants (e.g., persistent organic pollut-
ants and mercury) and airborne pollutants (e.g., soot)” (2009, 
13). The directives also recognize that “pollutants from within 
and outside the Arctic are contaminating the region” (2009, 12). 
While there is some overlap in terms of the types of pollution 
identified, the two documents identify different sources of the 
pollution. The 2013 Strategy suggests that poorly planned eco-
nomic activities, or “uncoordinated development” is to blame. 
In contrast, the 2009 directives remark that pollution is a result 
of climate change as “with temperature increases in the Arctic 
8 The 2013 Strategy only uses the term ‘biodiversity’ once in a list of issues that the government wants to learn more about, rather than in relation to the protection 
of biodiversity. 
region, contaminants currently locked in the ice and soils will 
be released into the air, water, and land” (2009, 13). Moreover, 
the document comments that “increased human activity within 
and below the Arctic, will result in increased introduction of 
contaminants into the Arctic” (2009, 13). 
Each document discusses different strategies for addressing pol-
lution. For example, according to the 2013 Strategy, “it is imper-
ative that the United States proactively establish national pri-
orities and objectives for the Arctic region” in relation to black 
carbon (2013, 5). The document also explains that the Arctic 
Council’s Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
sponse Agreement will help with regional cooperation and that 
“together, Arctic nations can responsibly meet new demands – 
including ... developing capabilities to prevent, contain, and re-
spond to oil spills and accidents – by increasing knowledge and 
integrating Arctic management” (2013, 7). In contrast, the 2009 
directives pay more attention to international treaties, such as 
the “Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution 
and its protocols” (2009, 5-6) and the role of the IMO in relation 
to “oil and other hazardous material pollution response agree-
ments” (2009, 9). 
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 5 % of the 2009 directives 
(see Figure 13, p. 100) with the consequences of climate change 
being discussed in those documents. The 2013 Strategy explains 
that “while the Arctic region has experienced warming and 
cooling cycles over millennia, the current warming trend is un-
like anything previously recorded” (2013, 5). Both documents 
draw attention to melting ice and thawing permafrost. “Sea ice 
and glaciers are in retreat. Permafrost is thawing and coasts are 
eroding,” with consequences for Indigenous peoples (2009, 12; 
see also: 2013, 5). At the same time, the documents also recog-
nize that climate change can be of economic benefit—“the melt-
ing of Arctic ice has the potential to transform global climate 
and ecosystems as well as global shipping, energy markets, and 
other commercial interests” (2013, 11). Climate change can also 
improve energy security (see: 2013, 7). 
To a limited extent, the documents mention mitigation and 
adaptation with respect to climate change, although the 2013 
Strategy does not explicitly use these words. The 2009 direc-
tives, in contrast, mention adaptation once, explaining that 
“the United States affirms the importance to Arctic commu-
nities of adapting to climate change, given their particular 
vulnerabilities” (2009, 10). A possible reason for so little dis-
cussion in the documents about mitigation and adaptation 
may be due to no connection being made in the documents 
between climate change and scientific research, and the failure 
to recognize climate change agreements and frameworks. The 
2009 directives do, however, refer to the UNFCCC (2009, 5), 
but they do not discuss what climate cooperation within this 
framework might entail. 
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In the Security indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 7 % of the directives (see Fig-
ure 13, p. 100), the documents highlight the importance of na-
tional security in the Arctic. The 2009 directives confirm that “it 
is the policy of the United States to… meet national security and 
homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region” (2009, 2). 
The 2013 Strategy states that the United States “will be guided 
by our central interests in the Arctic region, which include pro-
viding for the security of the United States” (2013, 4). As such, 
“the United States has broad and fundamental national security 
interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either 
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard 
these interests. These interests include such matters as missile 
defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems 
for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and 
maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of naviga-
tion and overflight” (2009, 3). The United States is “establishing 
an overarching national approach to advance national security 
interests, pursue responsible stewardship of this precious and 
unique region, and serve as a basis for cooperation with other 
Arctic states and the international community as a whole to ad-
vance common interests” (2013, 4). The Strategy further empha-
sizes that “we acknowledge that the protection of our national 
security interests in the Arctic region must be undertaken with 
attention to environmental, cultural, and international consider-
ations outlined throughout this strategy” (2013, 6). 
According to the 2013 Strategy, “U.S. security in the Arctic en-
compasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those 
supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national 
defense” and the USA seeks “an Arctic region that is stable and 
free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust 
and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are 
developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile 
environment and the interests and cultures of Indigenous peo-
ples” (2013, 2, 4). “The United States will identify, develop, and 
maintain the capacity and capabilities necessary to promote safe-
ty, security, and stability in the region through a combination of 
independent action, bilateral initiatives, and multilateral coop-
eration” (2013, 6).
The 2009 directives explain that “the Arctic region is primarily 
a maritime domain; as such, existing policies and authorities 
relating to maritime areas continue to apply, including those 
relating to law enforcement” (2009, 2). Furthermore, the 2013 
Strategy states that “in protecting these interests, we draw from 
our long-standing policy and approach to the global maritime 
spaces in the 20th century, including freedom of navigation 
and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
and airspace related to these freedoms; security on the oceans; 
maintaining strong relationships with allies and partners; and 
peaceful resolution of disputes without coercion” (2013, 4). Ad-
ditionally, “freedom of the seas is a top national priority for the 
USA” (2009, 3) and “preserving the rights and duties relating 
to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our 
ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including 
through strategic straits” (2009, 4).
The USA strives to “encourage the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes in the Arctic region” (2009, 3). Furthermore, the 2013 
Strategy confirms that the USA will “safeguard peace and sta-
bility by working to maintain and preserve the Arctic region as 
an area free of conflict, acting in concert with allies, partners, 
and other interested parties” (2013, 10). This will require ac-
tion by the United States and “the actions of other interested 
countries, in supporting and preserving international legal 
principles of freedom of navigation and overflight and other 
uses of the sea related to these freedoms, unimpeded lawful 
commerce, and the peaceful resolution of disputes” (2013, 10). 
“Working through the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), the United States promotes strengthening existing 
measures and, as necessary, developing new measures to im-
prove the safety and security of maritime transportation, as 
well as to protect the marine environment in the Arctic region” 
(2009, 9). Furthermore, the United States “exercises authority 
in accordance with lawful claims of United States sovereign-
ty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic region, in-
cluding sovereignty within the territorial sea, sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction within the United States exclusive econom-
ic zone and on the continental shelf, and appropriate control 
in the United States contiguous zone” (2009, 3). In addition, 
“the United States will support the enhancement of national 
defense, law enforcement, navigation safety, marine environ-
ment response, and search-and-rescue capabilities” (2013, 6).  
The 2009 directives also address prevention of terrorism: 
“the United States also has fundamental homeland security 
interests in preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those 
criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States 
vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region” (2009, 2). The 
2013 Strategy further addresses energy security: “the Arctic 
region’s energy resources factor into a core component of our 
national security strategy: energy security. The region holds 
sizable proved and potential oil and natural gas resources that 
will likely continue to provide valuable supplies to meet U.S. 
energy needs” (2013, 7).
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 4 % of the 2009 directives 
(see Figure 13, p. 100). The documents address different safe-
ty concerns. The 2013 Strategy recognizes a number of safety 
issues, including “search and rescue, and pollution prevention 
and response,” which can be connected to “safe, secure, and reli-
able Arctic shipping” (2013, 1, 10). The Strategy also recognizes 
the possibility of “natural or man-made disasters” (2013, 6) and 
there is a need for general situational awareness (see: 2013, 6, 
7). The 2009 directives primarily focus on shipping safety and 
also includes SAR, environmental protection, and situational 
awareness through, for example, “short- and long-range aids to 
navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, iceberg 
warnings and other sea ice information, [and] effective shipping 
standards” (2009, 9). Situational awareness could also include, 
but is not limited to, “ship routing and reporting systems, such as 
traffic separation and vessel traffic management schemes in Arc-
tic chokepoints; updating and strengthening of the Guidelines 
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for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice Covered Waters; underwater 
noise standards for commercial shipping; a review of shipping 
insurance issues; oil and other hazardous material pollution 
response agreements; and environmental standards” (2009, 9). 
Although the directives focus on shipping, they demonstrate 
that shipping safety is a complex issue. 
As for safety agreements, the 2013 Strategy recognizes the role 
of the Arctic Council in regional safety. For example, it notes 
that “recent successes of the Council include its advancement 
of public safety and environmental protection issues, as evi-
denced by the 2011 Arctic Search-and-Rescue Agreement and 
by the 2013 Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Re-
sponse Agreement” (2013, 9). While the 2009 directives were 
written before these agreements were put in place, the docu-
ments address similar issues at a national level. In particular, 
they mention that the USA will, “commensurate with the level 
of human activity in the region, establish a risk-based capa-
bility to address hazards in the Arctic environment. Such ef-
forts shall advance work on pollution prevention and response 
standards; determine basing and logistics support require-
ments, including necessary airlift and icebreaking capabilities; 
and improve plans and cooperative agreements for search and 
rescue” (2009, 10). 
With regard to safety capabilities, the documents identify ar-
eas for improvement. For the 2009 directives, the only men-
tion is of improvements in the area of SAR being required 
(2009, 10). In contrast, the 2013 Strategy recognizes two key 
areas where improvements can be made. First, the strategy ex-
plains that “the United States will endeavor to appropriately 
enhance sea, air, and space capabilities as Arctic conditions 
change, and to promote maritime-related information shar-
ing with international, public, and private sector partners, to 
support implementation of activities such as the search-and-
rescue agreement signed by Arctic states” (2013, 6). Second, 
improvements also need to be made with respect to mapping. 
“Given the vast expanse of territory and water to be charted 
and mapped, we will need to prioritize and synchronize chart-
ing efforts to make more effective use of resources and attain 
faster progress. In so doing, we will make navigation safer and 
contribute to the identification of ecologically sensitive areas 
and reserves of natural resources” (2013, 8). The 2013 Strategy 
would thus appear to be more reflective of America’s capabili-
ties than the documents. 
Despite their shortcomings, the documents demonstrate that 
safety and SAR is truly a multilevel governance issue. For ex-
ample, the 2009 directives recognize that “effective search and 
rescue in the Arctic will require local, State, Federal, tribal, 
commercial, volunteer, scientific, and multinational cooper-
ation” (2009, 9). Similarly, the 2013 Strategy states that the 
USA, “working cooperatively with the State of Alaska, local, 
and tribal authorities, as well as public and private sector part-
ners, we will develop, maintain, and exercise the capacity to 
execute Federal responsibilities in our Arctic waters, airspace, 
and coastal regions, including the capacity to respond to natu-
ral or man-made disasters” (2013, 6). 
The Economy indicator accounts for 8 % of the total coded 
quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 12 % in the 2009 directives 
(see Figure 13, p. 100) which provides only a narrow under-
standing of regional economic activities. The 2013 Strategy 
mentions oil and gas, shipping, and briefly mentions trade 
(2013, 7). The 2009 directives mention natural resources and 
“maritime commerce” (2009, 9, 2). Much of the focus in both 
documents is on oil and gas and natural resources. 
The documents recognize the importance of the continental 
shelf for access to natural resources, although the 2009 direc-
tives also note that the USA must “consider the conservation 
and management of natural resources during the process of 
delimiting the extended continental shelf ” (2009, 7; 2013, 9). 
The 2013 Strategy, more generally, also acknowledges that re-
source conservation and environmental protection must take 
place (2013, 7). The documents explain that “within the con-
text of this broader energy security strategy, including our 
economic, environmental and climate policy objectives, we 
are committed to working with stakeholders, industry, and 
other Arctic states to explore the energy resource base, de-
velop and implement best practices, and share experiences to 
enable environmentally responsible production of oil and nat-
ural gas as well as renewable energy” (2013, 7). Similarly, the 
2009 directives explain that “the United States seeks to ensure 
that energy development throughout the Arctic occurs in an 
environmentally sound manner, taking into account the inter-
ests of Indigenous and local communities, as well as open and 
transparent market principles” (2009, 11). Energy security is 
also a priority of the two documents. The 2013 Strategy re-
marks that the USA will increase “efficiency and conservation 
efforts to reduce our reliance on imported oil and strengthen 
our nation’s energy security” (2013, 7) while the 2009 direc-
tives explain that the USA will “work with other Arctic na-
tions to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in 
the Arctic region is carried out in accordance with accepted 
best practices and internationally recognized standards and 
the 2006 Group of Eight (G-8) Global Energy Security Prin-
ciples” (2009, 11). The 2009 directives also discuss other types 
of natural resources, such as fishing. The directives state that 
the government will “seek to develop ways to address changing 
and expanding commercial fisheries in the Arctic, including 
through consideration of international agreements or organi-
zations to govern future Arctic fisheries” (2009, 13). 
Sustainable development is raised in both documents, al-
though often in passing. For instance, the 2013 Strategy ex-
plains that “we will seek opportunities to pursue efficient and 
effective joint ventures, based on shared values that leverage 
each Arctic state’s strengths. This collaboration will assist in 
guiding investments and regional activities, addressing dy-
namic trends, and promoting sustainable development in the 
Arctic region” (2013, 9). This is clearer than the 2009 direc-
tives which make statements about actions that are “environ-
mentally sustainable” or about carrying out such actions “in 
an environmentally sound manner” (2009, 2, 11). At the same 
time, the directives also state that “sustainable development 
in the Arctic region poses particular challenges. Stakeholder 
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input will inform key decisions as the United States seeks to 
promote economic and energy security” (2009, 10), without 
going into detail about what those difficulties are. None of the 
documents depict what sustainable development looks like in 
an American context. 
None of the documents address tourism industry; thus, the 
Tourism indicator is not discussed.
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 7 % of the total coded 
quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 6 % of the 2009 directives (see 
Figure 13, p. 100) and addresses different types of infrastructure. 
With regard to transportation infrastructure, the 2013 Strategy 
mentions this slightly more the 2009 directives do. For instance, 
the Strategy links infrastructure development and the resource 
industry because the potential of untapped resources has “in-
spired fresh ideas for commercial initiatives and infrastructure 
development in the region” (2013, 5). A general increase in re-
gional activity also calls for new infrastructure as “we will care-
fully tailor this regional infrastructure, as well as our response 
capacity, to the evolving human and commercial activity in the 
Arctic region” (2013, 6). An increase in regional activity also 
has implications for the shipping industry, and the Strategy ex-
plains that “Arctic nations can responsibly meet new demands – 
including maintaining open sea lanes for global commerce” and 
that the IMO can help facilitate shipping and maritime safety 
(2013, 7, 10). 
In contrast, the 2009 directives do not pay as much attention to 
transportation infrastructure as they do to shipping. The direc-
tives state that “the United States priorities for maritime trans-
portation in the Arctic region are: a. To facilitate safe, secure, 
and reliable navigation; b. To protect maritime commerce; and 
c. To protect the environment” (2009, 9). Shipping safety, and 
the importance of the IMO, are also discussed in the directives 
(2009, 9), as, too, is the need to “develop additional measures, in 
cooperation with other nations, to address issues that are likely 
to arise from expected increases in shipping into, out of, and 
through the Arctic region” (2009, 10). The directives, unlike the 
Strategy, also mention icebreaking, but again in the context of 
maritime safety (2009, 10). 
Regarding other forms of infrastructure, the role of innova-
tion and technology is mentioned only in the 2013 Strategy. 
The document states that “the unique Arctic environment will 
require a commitment by the United States to make judicious, 
coordinated infrastructure investment decisions, informed by 
science” (2013, 10). None of the documents address telecom-
munication and ICT, housing, or energy infrastructure. The lack 
of discussion on the energy infrastructure is surprising, consid-
ering the focus on energy security. That said, energy security is 
more about accessing and producing energy rather than build-
ing the infrastructure needed to get it to the people. 
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 11 % of the 
total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 13 % in the 2009 
directives (see Figure 13, p. 100) and identifies the environment 
as a driver behind American Arctic science. For example, the 
2013 Strategy states that “proper stewardship of the Arctic re-
quires understanding of how the environment is changing, and 
[that] such understanding will be based on a holistic earth sys-
tem approach” (2013, 8; see also: 2009, 2–3). The 2009 directives 
also identify climate change and pollution as scientific driv-
ers. For example, the document states that “an understanding 
of the probable consequences of global climate variability and 
change on Arctic ecosystems is essential to guide the effective 
long-term management of Arctic natural resources and to ad-
dress socioeconomic impacts of changing patterns in the use 
of natural resources” (2009, 12). The USA will “intensify efforts 
to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pol-
lutants on human health and the environment and work with 
other nations to reduce the introduction of key pollutants into 
the Arctic” (2009, 14). 
The mention of using climate science to help with the regional 
economy shows that science is directed at purposes other than 
climate change. The 2013 Strategy notes that research helps in-
form decision-making at all levels of governance (2013, 7, 10). 
It also explains that traditional knowledge is important to deci-
sion-making because “across all lines of effort, decisions need 
to be based on the most current science and traditional knowl-
edge” (2013, 3). The 2009 directives also recognize the value of 
science to decision-making. For example, they state that “given 
the need for decisions to be based on sound scientific and so-
cioeconomic information, Arctic environmental research, mon-
itoring, and vulnerability assessments are top priorities” (2009, 
12) and that “scientific research is vital for the promotion of 
United States interests in the Arctic region” (2009, 7). There is 
an economic aspect to research; the USA will “seek to increase 
efforts, including those in the Arctic Council, to study chang-
ing climate conditions, with a view to preserving and enhancing 
economic opportunity in the Arctic region” (2009, 11). 
The ability to support these efforts is important; however, only 
the 2009 directives note the USA’s research infrastructure. For 
example, the documents mention that “the United States has 
made significant investments in the infrastructure needed to 
collect environmental data in the Arctic region, including the 
establishment of portions of an Arctic circumpolar observing 
network through a partnership among United States agencies, 
academic collaborators, and Arctic residents” (2009, 7–8). This 
quote recognizes both physical infrastructure and infrastructure 
in the form of networks by noting that “[strengthening] part-
nerships with academic and research institutions and [building] 
upon the relationships these institutions have with their coun-
terparts in other nations” (2009, 9) will help facilitate research. 
Obtaining new knowledge, both scientific and traditional, is 
also important. For example, the opening statement of the 2013 
Strategy comments that “working together, we will continue 
to increase our understanding of the region through scientific 
research and traditional knowledge” (2013, 1). Moreover, “re-
sponsible stewardship requires active conservation of resources, 
balanced management, and the application of scientific and tra-
ditional knowledge of physical and living environments” (2013, 
7). While the 2009 directives also recognize the need for knowl-
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edge-based understanding of the region (2009, 12), there is no 
mention of the role of traditional knowledge in this process. 
Research on Arctic conditions also requires a certain level of 
innovation. To address this, the 2013 Strategy comments that 
the USA will “Pursue Innovative Arrangements to support the 
investments in scientific research, marine transportation infra-
structure requirements, and other support capability and ca-
pacity needs in this region” (2013, 10). Innovation and technol-
ogy are also important, including in the space domain (2013, 
6), mentioned in the discussion under Safety indicator. Inno-
vation and technology are not overtly addressed in the 2009 
directives. 
As for education, neither document addresses access to higher 
education, educational attainment, or the role of the Universi-
ty of the Arctic and distance learning. The focus, therefore, is 
clearly on science. 
The 2009 directives provided detailed Implementation plans. 
Indeed, the directives state that “this directive establishes the 
policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region 
and directs related implementation actions” (2009, 1). At the 
end of the policy priorities, there is also an implementation 
section that lists action items that will be done. These sections 
also include a list of departments that have responsibility for 
the items and that they ‘shall’ do them, suggesting there is 
some importance behind doing them. Moreover, the document 
states: “Implementing a number of the policy elements direct-
ed above will require appropriate resources and assets. These 
elements shall be implemented consistent with applicable law 
and authorities of agencies, or heads of agencies, vested by law, 
and subject to the availability of appropriations. The heads of 
executive departments and agencies with responsibilities relat-
ing to the Arctic region shall work to identify future budget, 
administrative, personnel, or legislative proposal requirements 
to implement the elements of this directive” (2009, 14).
Certainly, the document provides an implementation strategy 
for the various aspects of the directives. 
The 2013 Strategy also provides insights into how it will be im-
plemented. For example, it states that “when implementing this 
strategy, the United States will proceed in a thoughtful, respon-
sible manner that leverages expertise, resources, and coopera-
tion from the State of Alaska, Alaska Natives, and stakeholders 
across the entire nation and throughout the international com-
munity” (2013, 4). Additionally, at the end of each of the three 
lines of effort, there are bullet point lists of different objectives. 
However, unlike in the directives, there are no details as to how 
they will be implemented and who will be responsible. Instead, 
the 2014 implementation plan does this in great detail as each 
issue clearly lays out an objective, next steps, how progress will 
be measured, and who are the lead and supporting agencies. 
At the end of the document, it is explained that: “The Imple-
mentation Plan will be reviewed on an annual basis to ensure 
that progress continues to be made in positioning the United 
States to best prepare and respond to changes, challenges, and 
opportunities in the Arctic region” and that it “will be revisited 
after 5 years to ensure that it still meets the intent and priori-
ties of the Nation” (USA TWH 2014, 32), providing follow-up 
and evaluation. 
To sum up
Figure 13 at the beginning of this section discussion shows that 
Governance, International Cooperation, and Science and Ed-
ucation are the three most-coded indicators in the 2013 Strat-
egy and that Governance, Science and Education, and Econo-
my are the three most-coded in the 2009 directives. The three 
least-coded in 2013 are Tourism, Pollution, and the Human 
Dimension, while the three least-coded in 2009 are Tourism, 
Human Dimension and Safety and SAR (tying second) and Cli-
mate Change being the third least-coded indicator. 
As identified at the beginning of the discussion on the Ameri-
can strategies, the three lines of effort for the 2013 Strategy are 
security, stewardship, and international cooperation. As the 
International Cooperation indicator is the second most-coded 
indicator (see Appendix), it is fair to say this line of effort is met. 
As for the security line of effort, the security indicator is tied 
as the fourth most-coded indicator. Despite security not being 
in the top three indicators, the Strategy does make clear and 
concise statements about the USA’s broadening understanding 
of regional security. As for stewardship, this is more difficult to 
assess because it cuts across different indicators and draws on 
quotes from the environment indicator, governance (natural 
resources, blue economy, licensing), safety (mapping), and sci-
ence and education.
Moreover, the 2013 Strategy, also states that the USA will “seek 
an Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where na-
tions act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and 
where economic and energy resources are developed in a sus-
tainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and 
the interests and cultures of Indigenous peoples” (2013, 4). This 
is a broad statement that is connected to the International Co-
operation (second most-coded), Security and Environmental 
Protection indicators (tied as fourth most-coded), the Economy 
indicator (fifth most-coded), and Human Dimension indicators 
(seventh most-coded). 
Governance is the most-coded indicator and Science and Ed-
ucation is the third most-coded (see Appendix) in the 2013 
Strategy. The Governance indicator addresses topics around 
science-informed decision-making, international cooperation, 
and respecting and consulting Indigenous governments. The 
Science and Education indicator identifies the environment 
as a driver behind research and values the use of traditional 
knowledge. While not all the indicators associated with the pri-
orities are highly coded, this priority does seem to be addressed 
through connected discussions. 
There are also some connections between the different indi-
cators and themes. For example, the Governance indicator is 
connected to the Human dimension indicator through state-
ments about ensuring consultations with Indigenous groups, 
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and it is also connected to the Science and education indicator, 
as research will be used to inform governance decisions. Gov-
ernance structures are also used for safety, such as the Arctic 
Council’s SAR and oil agreements. Another linkage occurs with 
the Economy indicator. Indeed, economic activities can cause 
pollution and harm the environment, while climate change may 
increase the regional economic activity. The Economy indica-
tor is also linked to the Security indicator through discussions 
around energy security, and to the Safety indicator, as shipping 
can increase environmental safety risks. 
To further compare the documents, the two most-relevant sim-
ilarities and the three most-relevant differences are discussed. 
It is possible to compare the documents, and there are some 
similarities between them. Two similarities stand out. First, the 
documents address environmental protection, with the 2013 
Strategy calling it “a central goal” (2013, 7), and the 2009 di-
rectives state that environmental protection is a policy. In the 
documents, there is thus a desire to balance environmental 
protection with economic development. While protected areas 
were discussed more in the 2013 Strategy, it and the directives 
address biodiversity protection, even if the term is not explic-
itly used. Second, climate change is addressed by the Strategy 
and the directives; however, the 2013 Strategy is more expres-
sive about the consequences, both positive and negative, than 
the 2009 directives which are more matter-of-fact. Regardless 
of how the consequences ware framed, neither the Strategy nor 
the directives places much emphasis on issues of mitigation/ ad-
aptation or ways of addressing climate change through interna-
tional frameworks or scientific research.
There are also some differences between the documents, three 
of which are discussed here. First, the Governance indicator 
is discussed more in the 2009 directives than it is in the 2013 
Strategy, and there is very little overlap in ideas. The directives 
mention cooperation and fisheries management, while the 2013 
Strategy mentions the use of law for maritime governance. 
There is some overlap as the documents discuss decision-mak-
ing, but the directives speak to stakeholder engagement while 
the Strategy speaks to science as a way to inform decision mak-
ing. That being said, they both reference the need to include In-
digenous peoples in the decision-making process. Second, the 
documents take slightly different approaches to the issue of pol-
lution. While they mention similar, but slightly different types 
of pollution, their responsibility for addressing pollution differs. 
Notably, the 2009 directives state that melting permafrost and 
undefined human activity are the causes of pollution and that 
international cooperation and adherence to international con-
ventions are the solution. In contrast, the 2013 Strategy suggests 
economic and resource development are the primary source of 
pollution, and the USA must take responsibility for this. As the 
directives were released 11 days before former President Bush 
stepped down and former President Obama was sworn in, this 
shift is telling of the change in government from Republican to 
Democrat. It could also be suggestive of greater self-reflection 
and national accountability within the Arctic region. Third, 
while there are similarities regarding how security is addressed 
between the documents, there is one key difference. Notably, 
the 2009 directives comment on the possibility of terrorism in 
the region, whereas the 2013 Strategy emphasizes the need for 
increased energy security. Again, this difference is indicative of 
the change in government.
The two documents address similar issues even though the 
Strategy and the presidential directives are different types of 
documents, but some issues are discussed with different foci. 
Nevertheless, the documents, overall, provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the USA’s regional priorities. 
Comparing the Current Strategies
The last section provided an overview the contents of the strate-
gies and policies on the Arctic of the eight Arctic states, and how 
they have developed. To gain a better understanding of how the 
Arctic region is currently being governed, as well as how the 
national strategies and policies complement each other, a com-
parison between the current strategies for each state is needed. 
This section will go through the current national strategies and 
policies of the eight Arctic states with an indicator-by-indicator 
comparison. It will identify both similarities and differences in 
general, and discuss on some of relevant (biggest) differences 
that could have implications for the state of Arctic governance 
and development of the entire region. It is important to note 
that, with the exception of Norway (2017), the current strategies 
were released between 2009 and 2013. While some countries 
are working on new strategies as noted earlier, the majority of 
documents that currently govern state action in the Arctic are 
between six and ten years old. 
To recognize where the similarities and differences are, to mea-
sure their value, and whether they are general or rare, we have 
used simple criteria. If there are seven or more similarities be-
tween the national strategies and policies, the finding is striking. 
If there are five or more, the finding is relevant, and if there are 
three or fewer similarities, the finding suggests fragmentation. 
Table 6 shows where the different countries place the official 
priorities of their Arctic strategies and policies. For example, all 
countries, except the USA, clearly state that economy/economic 
development is a priority (Canada and Russia use the term with 
socio-economic development), which is striking. Similarly, all 
countries, except Canada and Sweden, state that international 
cooperation is a priority, which is relevant. All countries, except 
the United States, either have climate change or environmental 
protection as a priority, which is striking. Security and stability 
are priorities for Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Rus-
sia, and the United States, which is relevant, but not striking. 
Overall, what this tells us as a conclusion is that the economy, 
international cooperation, and environmental protection are 
the overarching priorities of the national strategies and policies 
of the Arctic states. 
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CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Climate change X X X
Economic  
development X X X X X
Environmental  
protection incl. 
climate change 
X X X X X X
Expertise X X X
Human dimension
Incl. Indigenous 
rights
X X
Improving and 
devolving northern 
governance 
X
Infrastructure X X
International  
cooperation X X X X X X
Safety / Emergency 
preparedness X
Science and  
technology X
Security / Stability X X X X X
Socio-economic 
development X X
Sovereignty /  
position in the 
region 
X X X
Stewardship X
(Strengthen) Arctic 
Council X
Table 6. Comparing (Official) Priorities 
The table also shows some issues that are priorities for one or 
two states. Interestingly, Iceland is the only state to explicit-
ly identify Indigenous rights as a priority, although Sweden 
does prioritize the Human Dimension which includes Indig-
enous peoples and rights. Either way, this shows fragmenta-
tion. Some of the other priorities are country-specific, such 
as Canada and devolving governance, Iceland and the Arctic 
Council, and Russia and telecommunications (as part of in-
frastructure). These suggest a certain degree of fragmentation. 
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides a good understanding of how each Arctic state views the 
region. Table 7 shows the which words are used to describe 
the Arctic (region) and its features in the documents. Most of 
the strategies (Canada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark, Rus-
sia, and Sweden) comment on the region’s remote, scattered, 
or sparse populations. As for the environment, ecosystem(s), 
and climate, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden, and 
the USA comment on its uniqueness, while the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden consider it vulnerable, and 
Canada, Iceland, and the Kingdom of Denmark comment on 
its fragility. Only Finland considers it to be pure or exception-
al, which are more positive assessments than the others. Ad-
ditionally, the region is also described in geopolitical contexts 
as strategic or important for Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, and Norway. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Part of identify X
Pure X
Exceptional (env). X
Strategic or im-
portant X X X X
Fragile (env., cli-
mate, or ecosystem) X X X
Vulnerable (climate 
or env.) X X X
Unique (ecosystem 
or env.) X X X X
Valuable (env) X
Frontier X
Extreme (climate) X
Unstable  
ecologically X
Industrial X
Remote / scattered / 
sparsely populated X X X X X
Table 7. Describing the Region
Table 8 shows the different terms used to name the region. All 
states but Canada prioritize the use of the term “Arctic” whereas 
Canada uses “Arctic” and “North” fairly interchangeably. Fin-
land, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden also use 
“North” but very minimally. Circumpolar is also used by Fin-
land, the Kingdom of Denmark, and Norway to describe larger 
regional affairs. The term “High North,” which was originally 
launched by Norway in its 2006 High North Strategy, is men-
tioned in Iceland and Sweden’s strategies, but not as a term Nor-
way uses itself to describe the region in its 2017 policy . 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Arctic X X* X* X* X* X X* X
High North X X
North X X X X X
Circumpolar X X X
Table 8. Naming the Region 
*indicates most common term when multiple given 
Generally speaking, none of the strategies provide a set defini-
tion of the Arctic, although a few imply where a border might 
be. For instance, both Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark 
suggest that the southern border of the Arctic region might be 
around the 60th parallel. For Canada, this is suggested based on 
their focus on the three northern territories, although the Cana-
dian Strategy notes that the territory of some of Canada’s north-
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ern Indigenous peoples goes further south. For the Kingdom of 
Denmark, there is a map with what appears to be the 60th par-
allel on it. If so, this would mean that almost the whole territory 
of Finland would be included in this definition. Perhaps, then, 
it is not surprising that the official Arctic policy of Finland con-
siders the entire country to be within the Arctic. A little further 
north, Iceland suggests the Arctic Circle might be the boundary, 
as the Strategy comments on the country’s proximity to it. The 
U.S. Strategy recognizes the American Arctic as Alaska, and uses 
a political boundary for the Arctic by stating it consists of the 
eight Arctic states. Sweden comments on a sub-region within the 
Arctic—the High North which includes the Nordics and Russia. 
The documents also take different approaches in assigning re-
sponsibility to their strategies. For instance, Russia and the USA 
do not name any ministries, although the American implemen-
tation plan identifies 24 different departments and agencies. 
Iceland, Norway, Canada, and Sweden mention only between 
one and three ministries. In contrast, the Kingdom of Denmark 
names six ministries plus the Government of Greenland and 
their Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Government of the 
Faroe Islands and their Ministry of Trade and Industry, while 
Finland lists the most at 11. This suggests is that Finland and 
the Kingdom of Denmark (and the USA) have either a clearer 
vision or a greater sense of accountability in terms of how their 
respective strategies will be delivered, or the governments of 
these states want to involve as many ministries as possible in the 
process. For example, if the Finnish Government states that the 
whole country belongs to the Arctic, all ministries should be in-
volved in designing policy there and for the region. 
Concerning the comparison of the current national strategies 
and policies of the Arctic states, Figure 14 provides an overview 
and detailed comparison of how the most current strategies pri-
oritize the different indicators as a percentage of the total quotes 
for each document. Governance, Economy, and International 
Cooperation have the most quotes coded to them, although the 
next one, Human Dimension is very close. Tourism, Pollution, 
and Climate Change have the lowest percentage of coded quotes. 
(see Figure 14. Comparing the Current Strategies, p. 111)
The table also shows some interesting differences. Canada dis-
cusses the Human Dimension indicator the most and the USA 
the least. Iceland mentions the Governance indicator much 
more than the other countries, and Russia the least. Finland is 
the only country to provide a substantial discussion on Tour-
ism. Finland, Russia, and Norway have the most quotes on the 
Economy indicator; whereas the other states did not devote as 
much space to this topic. Russia mentions the Infrastructure 
more than all the other states, and the most within its strategy. 
The Human Dimension indicator reveals similarities and dif-
ferences in the approaches to Indigenous, human, and gender 
rights. For Indigenous peoples, all current strategies address 
Indigenous peoples, including Iceland, though there are no 
Indigenous peoples living in the country, a striking finding, 
though not surprising at all. The issues are discussed coun-
try-by-country in different ways. A fragmented finding is that 
the United Nations for the Declaration on Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) is mentioned only by the Kingdom of Denmark 
and Sweden, even though five of the Arctic states voting in 
favor of it on 13 September 2007 (Finland, Iceland, the King-
dom of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), while Canada and 
the USA voted against, and Russia abstained (United Nations 
2007). In 2010, Canada and the USA demonstrated for support 
for UNDRIP, with Canada adopting the Declaration in 2016 
(CBC News 2010; Fontaine 2016; Richardson 2010). Consid-
ering these events, it is not surprising that neither Canada nor 
Russia mentioned UNDRIP in their strategies. 
The recognition of Indigenous governments, however, was a 
more relevant finding. All but Iceland and Russia refer to it 
(see Table 9), although from different perspectives. Canada 
recognizes self-government in the context of land claim set-
tlements, the United States mentions tribal government, and 
Kingdom of Denmark champions the self-government system 
in Greenland. Finland, Norway, and Sweden all mention the 
Saami Parliament.
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
UNDRIP X X
Indigenous Gov  X X X X X X
UN Declaration on 
Human Rights X
Gender Equality X X X
Table 9. Rights and Equality
Table 9 also shows that the United Nations Declaration on Hu-
man Rights is mentioned only by Sweden. However, Canada, 
Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States 
all signed the Declaration in 1948, while the Soviet Union ab-
stained (United Nations 1948). Finland, joined the UN in 1955 
(United Nations 2006) and has since signed the Declaration. 
The table also shows that gender equality is mentioned only by 
Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden. Both the human 
rights and gender equality findings are therefore fragmented. 
In addition to discussions about Indigenous peoples, the 
documents speak more generally to topics that affect every-
one living in the region. For example, Canada seeks to ensure 
that “Northerners” have access to necessary services (2009, 5, 
22). Similarly, Finland addresses issues for the “local popu-
lation” and “local inhabitants” (2013, 11, 20), and Iceland is 
concerned about the effects of climate change on “Arctic resi-
dents” (2011, 2). The Kingdom of Denmark addresses hunting 
rights for the “Arctic community” (2011, 31), Norway com-
ments on ensuring diversity in “local communities” and good 
“settlement patterns” for a “balanced population” (2017, 3, 10).
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Figure 14. Comparing the Current Strategies
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the % of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
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Russia mentions issues affecting “people living and working in 
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2013, 4), and Swe-
den shows its concerns about the life expectancy of “those living 
in the Arctic area” (2011, 43). Finally, the USA broadly men-
tions the “Arctic region” and the desire for stability (2013, 4). Of 
course, Indigenous peoples would also be accounted for in these 
broader descriptions. 
The Governance indicator illustrates the importance of gover-
nance to all eight states. From the perspectives of a quantitative 
and qualitative content analysis, all eight countries of the Arctic 
devote a considerable part of their strategies to governance. The 
only exception here is Russia, which according to both analy-
ses, dedicates the least space to Governance compared to other 
areas of interest in their strategy. For Iceland, on the contrary, 
the Governance indicator, together with the international coop-
eration, is the most significant, covering more than 25 percent 
of its Strategy. The high relevance of Governance is shown by 
Arctic states listing several key regional and international or-
ganizations in their strategies and discussing their involvement 
in particular organizations or cooperative platforms. Although, 
governance is described differently by different states, there is 
a considerable overlap in their approaches. The high political 
stability of the region enables the states to focus on cooperative 
relationships and invest in support for these relationships. The 
majority of the states emphasize the work of the Arctic Coun-
cil, and mention successful cooperation with the United Na-
tions, European Union, Nordic Council of Ministers, Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council, Northern Dimension, Barents Regional 
Council, or Council of the Baltic Sea States. Interestingly, Swe-
den is the only country to highlight the potential stakeholder 
conflict of interest. With increased socioeconomic development 
and other land use, there is a risk of conflicts of interest with 
the more traditional way of life and culture of reindeer herders. 
Therefore, Sweden focuses on socially and culturally sustainable 
development of the Arctic.
In the International Treaties and International Cooperation 
indicator there is a clear difference between the quantitative 
and the content analyses. In the quantitative analysis Finland 
and Russia address international cooperation the least of all the 
Arctic States. In the figure below, however, the comprehensive 
approach of the Finnish government can be seen with respect 
to all aspects of international cooperation. Moreover, Finland 
is the only Arctic state to address the 1992 UN Rio+20 confer-
ence in its 2013 Strategy. The USA and Iceland lead the quanti-
tative analysis based on the frequency of quotes on this indica-
tor. Russia devotes the least space to international cooperation, 
as illustrated both by the quantitative and the content analysis. 
However, as very clearly stated by the recent declarations of the 
Arctic Council Ministerial meetings, all the Arctic states con-
sider international cooperation as a key instrument of the devel-
opment of the Arctic to maintain the high geopolitical stability 
of the region and continue the constructive cooperation, and 
thus keep the region free from potential conflicts.
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Role and 
importance 
of int.coop.
X X X X X X X X
Major 
agreements 
and forums
X X X X X X X
Global 
perspective 
and scales
X X X X
UN SDGs (or 
RIO 1992) X
Table 10. International Treaties and International Cooperation 
There are mainly similarities in how the Environmental Pro-
tection indicator is addressed by the different strategies. Table 
11 shows that all strategies recognize the need to balance en-
vironmental protection with economic activities. Canada re-
fers only to sustainable development, while the USA alludes to 
this kind of balance but does not state it as explicitly as other 
documents do. Four strategies explicitly state they will use an 
ecosystem-based management system with regard to maritime 
resources, although Norway uses this phrase only in the over-
all document’s strategic priorities and not in the discussion 
about the environment. The USA does not use the term eco-
system-based management, but refers to an “integrated Arctic 
management framework” (2013, 2) which seems similar (see 
also: 2013, 8). 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Balance  
environment  
and economy  
(ex. Sustainable dev)
X X X X X X X X
Ecosystem based 
management X X X X X
Protected areas vs 
Conservation P C P P C P P P
Invasive species X X X
Table 11. Environmental Protection 
P=protected area C=conservation 
Six of the eight countries address the concept of protected areas, 
with four referring to them as protected areas and two mention-
ing them as being linked to conservation. In the U.S. Strategy, 
the focus is on ‘preservation’ without specific geographical areas 
being stated. The Iceland document also generally speaks about 
protecting or conserving biota, but does not recognize any spe-
cific areas. 
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While there are many similarities, there is also fragmentation 
when it comes to recognizing invasive species, with only three 
documents raising this issue. 
The Pollution indicator shows that each strategy, to varying ex-
tents, discusses the sources of pollution and different approach-
es to problem-solving in this regard. Table 12 identifies which 
pollutants are mentioned in the different strategies. However, 
there is not one pollutant that is addressed by all strategies. Oil 
is mentioned in six strategies, while greenhouse gases and eco-
nomic activity are each identified in five (see Table 12). Thus, 
these are relevant findings for the pollutants of greatest concern. 
All other pollutants are mentioned in three or fewer strategies, 
suggesting there is a fragmented approach to pollution. Inter-
estingly, military waste is explicitly mentioned as a pollutant 
by the Russian strategy. Microplastics is mentioned only in the 
Norwegian strategy, probably because that document, released 
in 2017, is the latest one. While plastics have been in the oceans 
for decades, it was not until 2014 that a study identified the vast 
amounts of plastics in the Oceans (Eriksen et al. 2014, 7). 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Man-made 
pollutants X
Greenhouse 
Gases X X X X X
Carbon dioixde X X
Short lived 
climate poll. X X
Black carbon X X
Methane X X X
Radioactive 
material X X
Heavy Metals X
Mercury X X X
POPs X X
PBTs X X
PCBs X
Chemicals X X
Oil X X X X X X
Pathogens from 
ballast water X
Economic activity 
(mining, ship-
ping, etc)
X X X X X
Soot X
Military waste X
Microplastics X
Marine litter X
Local Pollution X X
Table 12. Pollutants 
Table 13 shows different pollution problem-solving approaches. 
The strategies that identify greenhouse gases (e.g. black carbon) 
as pollutants also address, to varying degrees, the need to reduce 
those emissions. This is also the case for POPs and the Stock-
holm Convention, and pollution from economic activity. Note 
that because a problem-solving approach is mentioned and cap-
tured on Table 13, does not necessarily mean the solution is giv-
en much attention in the corresponding strategy. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Greenhouse 
gas reduction 
(UNFCCC –XX, 
Paris Agreement - 
XXX)
X XX X XXX X
Stockholm  
Convention  
on POPs
X X
Long-Range 
Transboundary 
Air Pollution 
(LRTAP)
X X
Hazardous 
and Noxious 
Substances (HNS) 
Protocol
X
Agreement on 
Cooperation  
on Marine Oil 
Pollution  
Preparedness  
& Response in  
the Arctic
X X X
Ballast Water 
Convention X
UNCLOS X
IMO 
Requirements X X X
Polar Code X
Nuclear Safety X X
Research on 
pollution  
(consequences, 
best practices)
X X
Pollution  
monitoring X X X
International 
cooperation X X X X X X
Domestic legisla-
tion, policies,  
and practices 
X X X X
Changes to eco-
nomic activities X X X X X
Table 13. Pollution Problem-Solving 
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It surprising that more strategies do not mention POPs/Stock-
holm Convention and show more concern over the long-range 
transmission of these pollutants, considering they have been 
present in the Arctic since the 1970s at least (see: AMAP 1997, 
72). It is also surprising how few strategies opt to root their pol-
lution action in formalized institutions like UNCLOS and the 
IMO. Instead, there is more emphasis in working collaboratively 
with other Arctic states on certain issues. 
The Climate Change indicator captures information from all 
the strategies, although the issue is mentioned to different ex-
tents. Table 14 shows some of the ways each state approaches 
climate action. It is striking that all strategies, except that of 
the USA, recognize the role of the scientific community—ei-
ther existing scientific contributions, the need for continued 
research, or greater interaction between researchers and gov-
ernment. 
There are also three relevant findings: i) Canada, Finland, the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the USA all ad-
dress issues around mitigation vis-a-vis adaptation. However, 
although Norway does not explicitly use these terms, its Strat-
egy discusses activities that could be understood as such. ii) 
Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden all refer to climate change agreements. In particular, 
Canada, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden mention 
the UNFCCC. Sweden is also the only country to mention the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.9 Norway is the 
only country to mention the Paris Agreement, as this is the 
only strategy written after the signing of the Agreement. The 
Kingdom of Denmark, however, does allude to the Agreement, 
mentioning an “ambitious global climate agreement” (2011, 
13). Finland, in contrast, makes a general comment about 
reducing emissions in “global climate negotiations” (2013, 13). 
iii) Climate change causing environmental refugees, and Asia 
as a contributor to climate change, are not mentioned in any 
document. 
9  The Finnish strategy lists the IPCC in an appendix but does not address it in the body of the strategy (2013, 66). 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Mitigation/  
Adaptation X X X X X X
Frameworks: X X X X X X
UNFCC X X X X
IPCC X
Paris Agreement X X
Scientific  
Community 
Heard
X X X X X X X
Climate Change 
as Security Factor X X X X
Environmental 
Refugees
Asia  
Mentioned 
Access to  
Fresh Water X X
Table 14. Climate Action and Climate Concerns
Fragmentation also exists as only two strategies mention ac-
cess to fresh water. Sweden clearly states that there is “a greater 
risk of contaminated drinking water caused by changes in the 
permafrost that affect water sources” (2011a, 44) and Finland 
makes a vague reference to ensuring that changes are made to 
protect “water resources” (2013, 39). 
 
There is one more interesting finding that is neither relevant 
nor fragmented—climate change as a security issue. Finland, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, Sweden, and the USA mention this 
in different ways. Finland suggests that climate change could 
cause regional instability and that the security of Indigenous 
cultures could also be undermined. The Kingdom of Denmark 
notes that climate change could lead to softer security issues 
like illegal fishing. Sweden comments on the effects on health 
as a security issue, while the USA suggests climate change 
would improve energy security.
The Security indicator is relatively fragmented. While all the 
Arctic states to some extent define security, none of them cov-
ers all aspects of the indicator. Interestingly, Canada and Fin-
land discuss security most comprehensively, covering a broad 
range of sub-indicators. However, the perspective of frequency 
of codes in the quantitative analysis illustrates that Canada, 
the USA, and, surprisingly, Iceland, are the three countries 
that put the most emphasis on security in their strategies (in 
comparison to other indicators). The issues of sovereignty are 
covered by Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, and Fin-
land. For Finland, a general notion related to “International 
Cooperation” is that “while the sovereignty of the States must 
be respected, it should not discourage genuine recognition of 
mutual dependencies” (2013, 43). This matches well with the 
results of an international public opinion survey Rethinking 
the Top of the World on global perceptions of Arctic security 
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which explains that “while most of the Nordic countries heavily 
support negotiating a compromise to Arctic territorial disputes 
(64 % of Danes, 50 % of Finns, and 49 % of Norwegians), in Can-
ada and Russia, there is more support for pursuing a firm line 
in asserting their sovereignty in the Arctic (41 % of northern 
Canadians, 43 % of southern Canadians, and 34 % of Russians)” 
(Munk School/Gordon Foundation, 25 January 2011).
Interestingly, border issues are included only in the Russian 
strategy, which refers to the delimitation of territorial waters, 
the economic zone, and the continental shelf. NATO and its 
role is mentioned only by three out of five Arctic—NATO 
members Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, and Norway. The is-
sues connected to maritime security are included in the strat-
egies of four states: Canada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark, 
and Sweden.
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
How defined X X X X X X X X
Sovereignty X X* X X
Borders X
Stability and  
stability building X X X X X
Interpretation  
of security X X X X X
Armed forces X X X X X
Measures to  
increase security X X X X
NATO and its role X X X
Military spending X X
Military capabilities X X
Maritime Security 
(military and coast 
guard)
X X X X
Table 15. Security             
* the 2013 Finnish strategy includes a general notion on sovereignty related to 
“International Cooperation” (see text)
The Safety and SAR indicator reveals some similarities and 
differences in terms of how the different strategies understand 
safety, what formal structures are involved, and how the states 
respond to these issues. Table 16 shows two striking similari-
ties in that all the strategies identify environmental safety, and 
search and rescue (SAR) as being the most relevant safety top-
ics. Another relevant similarity is that maritime safety is identi-
fied in five of the strategies, and these are not necessarily the five 
littoral states of the Arctic. Transportation safety is mentioned 
in four strategies. There is also some fragmentation, as disas-
ter preparedness is mentioned in three strategies, occupational 
safety in two, and civil preparedness, emergency preparedness, 
and health preparedness are each only mentioned once. This 
tends to show that there is more focus perhaps on the commer-
cial aspect of the Arctic rather than the human side (although 
there are clearly human implications for issues such as environ-
mental safety). 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Environmental  
Safety (incl. pollu-
tion, oil spills, etc.)
X X X X X X X X
Search and Rescue X X X X X X X X
Surveillance X X X X
Maritime Safety  
(including shipping) X X X X X
Tourism X X X X
Civil preparedness X
Emergency  
preparedness X
Disaster  
preparedness X X X
Health preparedness X
Transport safety X X X X
Occupational safety X X
Nuclear Safety X
Table 16. How Safety is Understood
There are also similarities and differences with regard to which 
international safety bodies are mentioned. Table 17 shows that 
six strategies mention the Arctic Council’s SAR agreement, 
while five refer to either the IMO and/or the Polar Code. Only 
two strategies comment on Barents-specific cooperation, while 
only Finland mentions the Arctic Council’s EPPR working 
group, and Iceland mentions NATO. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Arctic Council  
SAR Agreement X X X X X X
IMO/Polar Code X X X X X
UNCLOS X
Barents  
cooperation (ex. 
SAR, surveillance) 
X X
Arctic Council 
EPPR X
NATO X
Table 17. Safety Institutions 
Finally, there are also some similarities, but mostly differences, 
when it comes to the safety capabilities or practices mentioned 
in the strategies. Table 18 shows the most striking similarity, 
namely, that six strategies state international cooperation to be 
important for different safety practices. Additionally, four strat-
egies note that safety involves multilevel cooperation within the 
country, and only Finland and the Kingdom of Denmark rec-
ognize cooperation domestically and internationally, while the 
Kingdom of Denmark states that the Faroe Islands look after 
their own SAR. Another similarity is that four strategies state 
the importance of surveillance and monitoring, including the 
use of satellites and communications, to safety practices. That 
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said, two of the strategies (Norway and Russia) comment on the 
need to improve some of these capabilities. Four strategies also 
refer to mapping and charting, and three of them also comment 
that there is a need for improvement in these areas. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Multilevel coopera-
tion (in country) X X X X
International  
Cooperation X X X X X X
Vessel reporting  
in national waters X X
Surveillance, 
monitoring, and/
or communication 
(including satellites)
X X X* X*
Information sharing X*
Maritime mapping 
and charting X* X* X X*
SAR equipment X
Pollution solutions X
Export of safety 
products X
Occupational safety 
knowledge X
Table 18. Capabilities and Practices 
*needs to be improved 
There is also some fragmentation in the results. For example, 
only the USA comments on information sharing and the need 
for it to be improved. Only Norway mentions SAR equipment 
like helicopters, as well as problem-solving for pollution. Fin-
land is the only state to mention having an ability to help others 
through its expertise in making safety products and its occupa-
tional knowledge. 
The Economy indicator reveals some similarities and differenc-
es between the approaches to economic activities, economic 
prioritization, and economic actors. Table 19 shows the range of 
activities discussed in the different strategies. There is a striking 
similarity between all the strategies, with the exception of the 
USA, in that they actively discuss the mining industry. Iceland 
does so in the context of Greenland. The USA strategy does 
make a generalized statement about new minerals being dis-
covered, and that “these estimates have inspired fresh ideas for 
commercial initiatives and infrastructure development in the 
region” (2013, 5), but this does not indicate what U.S. interests 
are in mining. Another striking finding is that all strategies, ex-
cept the U.S. strategy, mention tourism. 
Six strategies explicitly discuss fisheries.
Another striking similarity is that all strategies mention export 
trade (although to varying degrees), while striking similarities 
include the general mention of energy in five strategies (Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and the USA). As types of eco-
nomic energy production, Canada, Iceland, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the USA discuss oil and gas, 
while Russia discusses hydrocarbons. Sweden and Finland both 
recognize the oil potential in Norway and Russia. Renewable 
energies are also mentioned by Iceland, the Kingdom of Den-
mark, Norway, and the USA.
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Energy X X X X X
Oil and Gas X X X X X X
Renewables X X X X
Hydrocarbons X
Mining X X X X X X X
Forestry X X
Fisheries X X X X X X
Aquaculture X
Blue Economy X
Bioprospecting X X
Reindeer  
Husbandry X X X
Tourism X X X X X X X
Cultural Products/ 
Crafts X X X
Local food X
Shipping Services 
and Transport X X X X
Export Trade X X X X X X X X
Technology X X
Maritime tech  
(incl. icebreakers) X X
Biotechnology X X
Cold Climate X X
Space Industry X
Construction X
Table 19. Economic Activities 
Table 19 also shows some fragmentation as strategies become 
more specific in discussing their economic activities. For exam-
ple, cold climate expertise and forestry are discussed by Finland 
and Sweden, whereas Canada, Finland, and Norway mention 
cultural products or local crafts. Certainly, the fragmentation 
also illuminates industries that might be unique to certain 
countries or sub-regions. 
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In terms of how the different strategies prioritize their region-
al economic activities (see Table 20), there is nothing particu-
larly striking or relevant, but this is rather fragmented. Only 
four strategies mention government support programs, such as 
SINED in Canada, Tekes in Finland, and Innovation Norway, 
whereas the Russian strategy speaks more generally about the 
state supporting regional growth. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Gov’t legislation and 
policy changes X
Economic actions 
in line with regional 
priorities 
X
Gov’t Support 
Programs X X X X
Indigenous business 
and economic 
development 
X
Focus on national 
expertise X X
Focus on areas of 
growth X
Cooperation with 
other states X X
Encouraging people 
to move to the 
North
X
Compensating 
people that live in 
the North 
X
Table 20. How the Economy is Prioritized
There are also some differences as to how states approach simi-
lar priorities. For example, Canada discusses skills development 
for Indigenous peoples to facilitate increased employment op-
portunities in the resources sector, whereas the Russian strategy 
seeks to increase Indigenous capacity to gain employment and 
to become self-employed. 
Table 21 shows what economic actors are identified in the differ-
ent strategies. There is a striking finding that all strategies men-
tion the private sector, although this is to varying degrees. Six of 
the eight strategies also interpret the government as an econom-
ic actor, as it helps facilitate economic opportunities. Finland 
also names the public sector, which is an extension of the state. 
The USA mentions public–private partnerships, which involves 
the state/public sector. Sweden also mentions public–private co-
operation, notably with the Swedish Trade Council. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Other states X X
EU X
Government(s) / 
state X X X X X X
Public Sector X X
Private sector X X X X X X X X
Oil companies X
Indigenous 
businesses and 
communities
X X
Funding and  
financing agencies X X
Academia and 
research institutes X X X
Industry networks X X
Table 21. Economic Actors 
There is also fragmentation with the economic actors. For 
example, many of the strategies mention working with other 
Arctic states on economic issues. Only Finland and Iceland 
acknowledge the increasing presence of certain Asian coun-
tries, like China and Japan, in the region. Another example 
is with industry networks where Finland mentions NordMin 
mining network, and Sweden mentions the Baltic Sea Energy 
Cooperation.
In the Tourism indicator, the biggest similarity is that, for all the 
A8, it is the least important of any of the indicators analyzed. 
This may be partly due to the fact, as mentioned above, that the 
strategies were published between six and ten years ago, when 
the tourism was not dramatically increasing. Another possible 
explanation might be the approach to how this indicator is ana-
lyzed—it is done separately, but can be part of the economy in-
dicator. These two explanations are, however, not sufficient with 
respect to Norway, which has the most recent strategy (2017) 
yet makes limited reference to tourism.
The general impression is that this indicator is very fragmented 
and that it is referred to by individual states in different ways. 
For Canada the tourism perspective is mostly connected to the 
development of the Northwest Passage and navigation safety. At 
the same time Canada supports the traditional knowledge and 
Indigenous cultural programs. In the case of Finland, the aim is 
to increase tourism that is sustainable. Finland, of all eight Arc-
tic states, covers tourism the most, comprehensively explaining 
how it is defined, who are the actors, and what is the scale and 
level of state support… “the growth in adventure and nature 
tourism is reflected in Lapland” (2013, 11), which is a popular 
location for visitors to Finland. Iceland approaches tourism as 
one of the main economic activities of the country, besides fish-
eries and energy production. 
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For the Kingdom of Denmark, the tourism is mainly connected 
to Greenland and the Faroe Islands, while being “second only to 
fisheries, is the most important export industry in Greenland” 
(2011, 23). The Kingdom of Denmark’s strategy is the only one 
that mentions cruise activities. Norway focuses on state support 
of the tourist industry with an emphasis “on profitability and 
sustainable management of the natural environment and cul-
tural heritage” (2017, 24). Similarly, Russia highlights state sup-
port for environmentally friendly tourism. Interestingly, only 
Sweden addresses the impact of tourism (potential for “creating 
jobs and boosting economic growth”) and possible side-effects 
of the industry, such as “the risk of conflicts of interest between” 
individual industries, especially between “reindeer herding and 
other land use” (2011, 38, 45). The United States does not reflect 
on tourism industry at all. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Safety and security 
defined in this 
context
X X X -
Tourism defined X X X X X -
Actors (who does 
tourism) X X -
Scale of industry X X -
Cruise activities X -
Impact of tourism X -
Level of state 
support X X X -
Possible side effects X -
Table 22. Tourism 
The Infrastructure indicator shows that, overall, a broad range 
of infrastructure needs are discussed, although to varying de-
grees. For example, Table 23 shows that all strategies address 
transportation and shipping, while most mention icebreakers, 
telecommunications and ICT, innovation and technology, and 
energy. However, only three strategies touch on housing infra-
structure. Additionally, not all infrastructure types receive the 
same amount of attention. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Transportation X X X X X X X X
Icebreakers X X X X X
Shipping X X X X X X X X
Telecoms / ICT X X X X X X
Innovation and tech X X X X X X X
Energy X X X X X
Housing X X X
Table 23. Infrastructure 
As all strategies discuss transportation infrastructure and ship-
ping, it is important to see if there are similarities and differ-
ences in these discussions. Table 24 shows that, strikingly, all 
strategies except Iceland’s state or suggest that transportation 
infrastructure development is underpinned by economic rea-
sons, although Finland and the USA do also acknowledge 
the benefit residents will obtain. A relevant finding is that six 
strategies mention air travel (Finland, Iceland, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Sweden). None of the strategies 
provide much detail on air infrastructure, but Finland and Ice-
land position it within international travel, Norway says it is for 
regional travel, while Russia wants new planes to better service 
the Russian North. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Maritime X X
Port X X X X
Air X X X X X X
Rail X X X
Roads X X X X
Border 
infrastructure X
Economic X X X X X X X
For the people X X
Table 24. Transportation Infrastructure 
As shipping is also discussed in every strategy, it is worth tak-
ing a closer look at what the different strategies emphasize. For 
example, Table 25 shows that all countries are concerned with 
safety. As a relevant finding, five of the strategies comment on 
increased navigability or possible new routes opening. Finland, 
Kingdom of Denmark, and Sweden mention both the North-
ern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. Finland and Sweden 
comment on the possibilities of these new routes. The Kingdom 
of Denmark notes the possibilities of the Northwest Passage, 
and also provides information on the 2010 voyage of a Danish 
ship through the Northeast Passage. Russia only mentions the 
Northern Sea Route, and Canada the Northwest Passage. Inter-
estingly, only Finland makes reference to existing other routes 
“in Greenland and Spitsbergen” (2013, 30). 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Northern Sea Route X X X X
Northwest Passage X X X X
Increased navigabil-
ity/ new routes X X X X X
Other existing 
transit routes X
Safety X X X X X X X X
Table 25. Shipping 
In the Science and Education indicator there are some similar-
ities and differences in terms of both science and education. For 
science, Table 26 shows that seven out of eight strategies state 
climate change to be a major research driver, and six out of eight 
interpret the environment as a key driver. (Iceland is included 
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here as it mentions glacier research.) There is also some frag-
mentation, as some strategies identify other issues of concern, 
such as natural hazards, health and other social issues, as a driver 
for science and research. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Environment X X X X X X
Climate Change X X X X X X X
Pollution X
Natural Hazards X
Health X
Social issues X
Table 26: Drivers behind Science and Research 
Research can also be used to serve different purposes, although 
there is not much consensus on what those purposes are, other 
than five strategies noting that research can be used to increase 
cooperation or build and strengthen relationships. That said, 
Table 27 shows some similarities, as four states mention that re-
search and knowledge will be used to inform decision-making 
and four strategies state that research can also help with eco-
nomic activities. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Economy X X X X
Social Issues X X X
Policy / decision 
making X X X X
Governance X X
Cooperation and  
relationship building X X X X X
Regional influence 
or positioning X X X
Sovereignty X
Table 27. Other Purposes of Research
Table 27 also shows that three countries consider that research 
could help with social issues, and three consider that research 
could also help assert their position within the Arctic. Only two 
strategies consider research important to governance, while one 
mentions that it could help with sovereignty. 
There are also some similarities and differences in terms of re-
search infrastructure. For example, Table 27 shows that universi-
ties and/or research institutes are the most mentioned infrastruc-
ture, appearing in five strategies. Four strategies mention research 
stations (in the case of Canada, the station was still in the devel-
opment stage) and four strategies comment on the importance 
of formal research networks (i.e., organizations and structures) 
through the Arctic Council, the EU, or IASC. Informal networks, 
such as cooperation between universities and researchers, is men-
tioned in three strategies. Three strategies also state that icebreak-
ers are used to help facilitate research and scientific activities. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Research Stations X X X X
Icebreakers / vessels X X X
Universities /  
research institutes X X X X X
Informal networks X X X
Formal networks X X X X
Table 28. Arctic Research Infrastructure 
Knowledge is an important factor in the eight strategies, as it 
means more than just scientific knowledge. Six strategies (Can-
ada, Finland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and 
the USA) mention the importance of traditional knowledge, 
although the Norwegian strategy mentions “knowledge of the 
people” (2017, 10). It is not surprising that Iceland does not 
mention traditional knowledge, as there are no recognized In-
digenous groups in the country. 
As for education, there are no striking or relevant findings. There 
is some consistency, however, as Table 29 shows four strategies 
suggesting that education be used to help with economic devel-
opment through programs and training geared towards certain 
industries or other economic needs. In contrast to this, there is 
also fragmentation, as only Norway mentions that attainment 
levels need to be improved in the North. 
CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Attainment levels X
Attainment for 
economic reasons X X X X
UArctic X X X X
Distance learning X
Table 29. Education in the Arctic 
There is also some consistency, as four strategies mention the 
University of the Arctic. However, only Russia mentions dis-
tance learning in general. Interestingly, the U.S. strategy does 
not discuss education at all. 
The Implementation indicator shows that there are both strik-
ing similarities and some fragmentation in how each state ex-
presses its implementation plans. Table 30 shows that seven 
out of eight strategies provide action items indicating how the 
strategy is to be implemented. As previously mentioned, the 
U.S. strategy provides a list of items after each line of effort that 
is suggestive of action items, but the real implementation plan 
follows in a subsequent document. As for Canada, there are no 
clearly outlined action items, but that is because the government 
considers the document itself to be the implementation plan.
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CAN 
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK 
2011
NOR 
2017
RUS 
2013
SWE 
2011
USA 
2013
Action items X X X X X X X
Budget X X X X X
Follow-Up X X X
Evaluation X X
Table 30. Implementation Details
In terms of budgets or funding for the strategies, Finland, the 
Kingdom of Denmark, and Russia’s strategies comment that 
funding will come out of existing budgets, while Russia also 
comments that the private sector may also contribute to financ-
ing aspects of the strategy through partnerships. Canada and 
Norway both mention items that will receive funding, but it is 
not clear if this is new or existing and reallocated funding. 
As for follow-up, only the strategy of the Danish realm provides 
detailed information on its plans for follow-up (e.g., steering 
committee), while Finland and Iceland remark that certain 
ministries will be responsible. As for the USA, this kind of in-
formation is found in the subsequent implementation plan 
document. Only the Kingdom of Denmark and Russia address 
evaluation: the former comments on a “mid-term evaluation” 
(2011, 58), while the latter seemingly envisages ongoing moni-
toring processes. 
Conclusions 
All Arctic states use the term ‘Arctic,’ and all, except Canada, 
prioritize it. In the national strategies, this ‘Arctic’ is described 
to be remote, scattered, and with a spare population. Its eco-
system is vulnerable, fragile, or unique. While there is no strict 
definition of the (Arctic) region, there is rather broad agreement 
that if there is a southern border to the region, it runs along the 
60th Northern parallel. 
A comparison of the current national strategies and policies of 
the Arctic states finds, as an overall conclusion, that the econ-
omy, international cooperation, and environmental protec-
tion are the overarching priorities of the Arctic states. On the 
other hand, according our coding of different indicators, the 
most-coded quotes relate to the Governance, Economy, Inter-
national Cooperation, and Human Dimension indicators (see 
Appendix). Thus, two of these – Economy and International 
Cooperation - align with the priorities identified by the states 
themselves. 
If, however, the Environmental Protection, Pollution and Cli-
mate Change indicators are looked at as one indicator, all deal-
ing with environmental protection, then the percentage of 
quotes coded to these indicators falls between the Governance 
and Economy indicators. This means that there is a fifth ma-
jor priority according to the most-quoted issues or themes, and 
then the three priorities identified by the strategies align with 
the percentages of coded quotes. 
Why then is Governance, with the most quotes, not among the 
official priorities? Is there a mismatch? This is not necessarily 
the case. If Security and/or Stability, which are among the of-
ficial priorities, are interpreted as governance issues—as they 
de facto are—and then included as part of Governance, we 
have the fourth official priority. From the perspective of both 
the quantitative and qualitative content analysis, therefore, the 
Arctic states devote a considerable part of their strategies to 
governance and, moreover, explicitly mention their existing 
governance structures. This can be interpreted as meaning that 
there is major political support for the current high geopoliti-
cal stability and international cooperation in the Arctic region 
and also for the work of the Arctic Council, which is the main 
international forum in the region and dealing with it.
This is supported by the strong and unanimous interpretation 
by the Arctic states of international cooperation as a key in-
strument of the development of the Arctic, and the high value 
placed by those states on international agreements and organi-
zations, such as UNCLOS, and the legally binding agreements 
on the Arctic region under the auspices of the Arctic Council. 
Constructive cooperation in the Arctic, based on a common 
will, has materialized as human capital. This is the success 
story and a resilient narrative, as mentioned earlier, that has 
maintained the high geopolitical stability in the region.
It is a little surprising is that only half the strategies have a 
global perspective and scale. The reason could be that the cur-
rent national strategies and policies are already 6–10 years old, 
except for that of Norway which, however, does not present a 
global perspective. Are the states afraid of the growing inter-
ests and activities of non-Arctic states if rapid climate change 
melts the rest of the sea ice, in particular, the major economies 
which have the status of Arctic Council observers? Or, are they 
afraid of the global commons discourse, in particular, if sci-
ence becomes a more dominant actor playing a more import-
ant role in the Arctic, as it does in the Antarctic?
The Human Dimension indicator has a good number of quotes, 
but is not among the official priorities. Furthermore, all strat-
egies explicitly mention Indigenous peoples. Six documents, 
including that of Iceland, which has no Indigenous peoples, 
also recognize Indigenous governments, and another six states, 
except Russia and the USA, explicitly mention self-gover-
nance/self-determination. Why, then, does the Human dimen-
sion seem not to be valued by the governments of the Arctic 
states—not appearing among their official priorities? Perhaps 
the importance of issues affecting Indigenous peoples is taken 
for granted, given that the Indigenous peoples are represented 
on Arctic Council as Permanent Participants and that Indige-
nous rights and issues are considered by many Arctic states at 
the domestic level. 
The big issue of Arctic governance and geopolitics—either 
challenge or ambivalence—is the environment (environmental 
protection and climate change) vis-à-vis economic activities in 
the Arctic. In the national strategies and policies of all the Arc-
tic states, there is a balance between environment and economy, 
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including sustainable development. Most documents also dis-
cuss protected areas or conservation. However, the Economy 
indicator is quoted the most, and within this indicator, mining, 
tourism, oil and gas, and fisheries are the top four, which ques-
tions the states’ commitment to balancing the economy and the 
environment. In terms of economic actors, the private sector 
is explicitly mentioned in the strategies and is thus a popular 
actor. This is followed by the Government/State, although the 
public sector is depicted as the most important and most want-
ed economic actor and investor in Arctic regions. 
It is not surprising that there a great deal of fragmentation 
with pollutants, and that oil and greenhouse gases are the most 
frequently alluded to. While there is a general sense that inter-
national cooperation can help address pollution, the use of re-
search in this area has been limited. In contrast, there is almost 
a unanimous readiness to listen the scientific community on 
climate change, which is why climate change is mentioned as 
the most important driver behind science and research. There 
is also strong common support for international frameworks, 
in particular for UNFCCC. It is thus not surprising that envi-
ronmental safety, including pollution and oil spills, together 
with search and rescue, is the most identified safety concerns 
in the Safety & SAR indicator, with maritime safety coming 
second. A more fundamental question is why the Climate 
Change indicator is not among the most quoted indicators, 
with the ACIA being launched in 2004 and climate change 
having become the most referred-to trigger for the Arctic and 
global change. While the Paris Agreement was signed only in 
2016, and thus only the Norwegian current strategy was ad-
opted after it, climate change is not much quoted even in the 
latter. Is this an explanation, or at least an excuse? Or, could it 
be that a real shock is needed, such as the 2018 IPCC Report 
together with the 2018 and 2019 summers being among the 
hottest summers on record. It will be interesting to see how 
climate change is addressed in forthcoming strategies of the 
Arctic states. 
 
As infrastructure relates to economy and development, and 
includes transportation, it is not surprising that it is quoted 
so often. And that it is, in fact, the most quoted indicator in 
the Russian strategy—the Russian strategy focuses on the so-
cio-economic development of the Russian Arctic, which con-
sists of almost half of the entire Arctic region and the coast of 
the Arctic Ocean. The topic of Arctic shipping has been hyped, 
much like the speed of thinning and melting of the sea ice of 
the Arctic waters. Thus, the unanimous support of the Arc-
tic states for shipping and transportation in general is noth-
ing new. Likewise, the interest in telecommunication and ICT 
among these states is well known. What is not that well known 
is the high interest in aviation of six states, excluding Canada 
and the USA which both also have plenty flight connections 
between the northernmost regions and the southern parts of 
their respective states. It would be interesting to know more 
about this issue and whether the states that focus on aviation 
are more interested in increasing the volume of flights going 
north–south or rather east–west within the Arctic. Or will avi-
ation services be decreased in the near future due to people’s 
growing conscience about global warming, though pan-Arctic 
flight routes would save time and energy, as well as pollute less. 
The areas of expertise, stewardship, as well as science & tech-
nology is a priority of five Arctic states, not all. It is weaker 
than the Science and Education indicator in terms of being 
quoted in the policy documents. This indicator, however, is 
the most even and has the highest similarity among the Arctic 
states, just as environment and climate change are the most 
important drivers behind Arctic research
The sovereignty of the eight Arctic states over their territo-
ries in the Arctic (excluding international sea areas) is thus 
firmly supported by the official priorities of the Arctic states’ 
strategies, the figures on their quoted interests, and their de 
facto priorities —and also by those of the observer states of 
the Arctic Council, as will be discussed later. This allows us 
to build a more holistic picture of the state of Arctic gover-
nance and geopolitics. Briefly, the main issue is that, although 
there is no international treaty on the Arctic and its environ-
ment, the Arctic states have full legitimacy to protect the Arc-
tic ecosystem. Moreover, they have shown increasing concern 
over the state of the ecosystems, they prioritize economic or 
socio-economic development, including large-scale activities 
such as mining, oil and gas drilling and tourism, and they sup-
port the private sector as the main economic actor. There is an 
increasing need for more protection of the fragile ecosystem 
and for more strict regulation of their use, for the Arctic states 
to be legitimized, and for civil society and NGOs to ask them 
do more to implement their concerns and principles.
All in all, concluding this section by a short summary: The 
Arctic states, except the United States of America, clearly state 
that economy/(socio)economic development is a priority, as 
well as either have climate change or environmental protection 
as a priority, which is striking. All countries, except Canada 
and Sweden, state that international cooperation is a priority, 
which is relevant. Security and stability are priorities for Fin-
land, Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Russia, and the Unit-
ed States of America, which is also relevant, but not striking. 
As an overall conclusion, on the one hand, comparing the cur-
rent official national strategies and policies economy/econom-
ic development, international cooperation, and environmental 
protection are stated the overarching priorities by the Arctic 
states. On the other hand, according to our coding of different 
indicators, the most-coded quotes relate to the Governance, 
Economy, International Cooperation, and Human Dimension 
indicators, as well as the Environmental Protection one (when 
connected to Pollution and Climate Change), which falls be-
tween Governance and Economy. 
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Part II:
Arctic Council Chairmanship  
Programs and Declarations
The Arctic Council, as mentioned in the introduction, has a ro-
tating chairmanship, with each member state serving as chair 
for two years. At the start of each chair, a program is produced 
by the government of the chairmanship country that outlines 
its agenda for the next two years. Each chairmanship then con-
cludes with a ministerial meeting that provides guidance for the 
following chair (Arctic Council 2015d) based on a consensus of 
the eight member states. 
This section analyzes the declarations and the priorities of each 
state on taking the chair, in order to identify similarities and dif-
ferences in the collective decisions of the Arctic Council. Each 
set of documents will be compared indicator by indicator. Strik-
ing similarities will be deemed to occur when ten or more decla-
rations address an issue; relevant similarities with seven to nine 
declarations; and fragmentation with four or fewer declarations. 
It is important to note that four declarations—in 1991 in 
Rovaniemi, in 1993 in Nuuk, in 1996 in Inuvik, and in 1997 
in Alta—are not considered in this analysis, as they were is-
sued under the auspices of ministerial meetings of the Arctic 
Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS), not in those of the 
Arctic Council. 
Chairmanship Programs
A program for a two-year rotating chairmanship of the Arctic 
Council is launched at the start of each chairmanship to out-
line the Chair’s priorities and goals for the next two years. This 
section analyzes and compares the chairmanship programs that 
were found on the Arctic Council’s website (note that there 
was no official program in the first Canadian chairmanship in 
1996–1998), and the first one is a Memo on U.S. Chairmanship 
Priorities, 1998-2000. As there have been, in 1996–2019, eleven 
programs this means that in our coding 10 or more similarities 
are a striking finding, 7 or more similarities are relevant, and 4 
or fewer show fragmentation. 
Table 31 shows the different priorities as identified in the pro-
gram headings, with the exception of the second Iceland pro-
gram which makes a clear statement about their priorities (see, 
Iceland MFA 2019, 2). While there are no particularly striking 
similarities, there is a general focus on issues of the environ-
ment and the climate, and also on the human aspect of the Arc-
tic. As these priorities are, for the most part, main headings, this 
does not mean that other issues are not addressed within them. 
For example, Norway talks about “Strengthening the adaptive 
capacities of Arctic residents, including Indigenous peoples and 
local communities, and identifying the most vulnerable sectors of 
society” (Norway 2006, 5) within the context of climate change. 
The second Iceland program also focuses on pollution within its 
discussion on the “Arctic marine environment” (Iceland MFA 
2019, 3, 4). (see Table 31. Priorities in the Chairmanship Pro-
grams, p. 124)
In addition to the priorities identified by headings, some of the 
programs made clear statements about their intent during their 
chairmanships. For example, Iceland’s first program states that 
“The Council’s environmental work has evolved continually 
and currently a number of important projects are being un-
dertaken under the auspices of the Council’s environmental 
working groups. Iceland, during the term of its chairman-
ship, intends to emphasise successful continuation of the 
environmental cooperation of the Council. Co-operation 
on the social, economic and cultural aspects of sustainable 
development, on the other hand, has a shorter history with-
in the Council. Therefore, Iceland intends to emphasise this 
part, especially as concerns well-being and quality of life of 
the inhabitants of the region” (Iceland MFA 2002, 2).
Similarly, the Danish Program states that 
“The chairmanship will focus on enhancing monitoring 
and assessments to give a more complete picture of status 
and trends in the availability of both species that are essen-
tial to traditional lifestyles and new species that in the fu-
ture could constitute important resources for a sustainable 
Arctic” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 2). 
Most of the programs follow a similar structure when it comes 
to program titles, “Program of, Chairmanship Program for …”. 
However, when the Chairmanship rotation began its second cy-
cle, the programs were given more descriptive titles that are also 
indicative of programs’ priorities. These include: 
• Development for the People of the North: The Arctic Council 
Program During Canada’s Chairmanship (2013-15)
• One Arctic. Arctic Council U.S. Chairmanship 2015–2017
• Exploring Common Solutions. Finland’s Chairmanship  
Program for the Arctic Council 2017-2019
• Together Towards a Sustainable Arctic. Iceland’s Arctic  
Council Chairmanship 2019-2021
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator does 
not tell us much about how the region is understood or defined 
in the different programs. Indeed, none of the programs pro-
vide a definition of the Arctic, although that is probably because 
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Arctic Council functioning X X X X X
Sustainable Development X X X X X
Climate X X X X X
Science, research, and knowledge X X* X*
Environment X X X X X
Marine Environment X
Biodiversity X
Human dimension / development X X X X
Communities X X X
Indigenous peoples X X
Education X X
ICT X X
Economic Development X
Integrated resource management X X
EU X
Safety and emergencies X X
Operational cooperation X
Responsible resource development X
Green energy X
Arctic Ocean X
Seas X
Arctic awareness X
Meteorological awareness X
Table 31. Priorities in the Chairmanship Programs
*focus on IPY
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they use the definition of the eight Arctic states from the Arctic 
Council. The programs do use different words to describe the 
region, with “Arctic” being the primary descriptor, as shown in 
Table 32. For the USA, the term “Far North” is also used as more 
of a location that a description: “the United States will continue 
highlighting the need to ensure that humanitarian relief reaches 
those living in the far North” (USA USC 1998, 1). 
U
SA
 1
99
8-
00
Fi
nl
an
d 
20
00
-0
2
Ic
el
an
d 
20
02
-0
4
Ru
ss
ia
 2
00
4-
06
N
or
wa
y 2
00
6-
09
D
en
m
ar
k 
00
9-
11
Sw
ed
en
 2
01
1-
13
Ca
na
da
 2
01
3-
15
U
SA
 2
01
5-
17
Fi
nl
an
d 
20
17
-1
9
Ic
el
an
d 
20
19
-2
1
Arctic X* X* X* X* X* X* X X* X X* X*
Far North X
Circumpolar X X X X X X X X
Polar X
North X X X
Table 32. Naming the Region in the Chairmanship Programs
*Primary term if more than one is used
The Arctic is also described in different ways in the programs, 
and Table 33 shows the descriptors that are used in most of 
the programs. Interestingly, neither the first American or sec-
ond Icelandic programs use descriptors to define the region, 
although the U.S. Program comments on “the unique circum-
stances of living in the Arctic” (USA USC 1998, 1) and the Ice-
landic Program mentions “small and remote Arctic communi-
ties” (Iceland MFA 2019, 5). 
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Unique X X X X
Fragile X X
Remote X X
Sparse X X
Vulnerable X X X
Unpredictable X
Amplifier X
Spacious X
Pristine / clean X X
Table 33. Describing the Arctic in the Chairmanship Programs
There is not much information on the different government 
ministries that have Arctic responsibilities. That said, Table 34 
does show what ministries are mentioned, and in many cases, 
the programs discuss activities that will bring all ministers from 
certain departments together. 
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Foreign X X X*
Culture X*
Education X*
Science X*
Environment X* X*
Commerce (US) X
Interior (US) X
Minister for  
Arctic Council X
Table 34. Ministries in the Chairmanship Programs
*in context of all the ministers of these departments meeting at the Arctic 
Council.
The Danish Program does not identify any ministries, but it 
does, however, state: “The Government of Denmark will be 
coordinating the chairmanship in close cooperation with the 
Governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands” (Denmark 
DCAC 2009, 1).
Figure 15 provides a comparison of indicators across the chair-
manship programs as a percentage of the total quotes coded 
for each indicator. The table shows that International Coop-
eration, Governance, the Human Dimension, and Science and 
Education are the most coded indicators over time, while Se-
curity and Tourism are the least, as they are not mentioned in 
every program (see Figure 15. Priorities in the Chairmanship 
Programs, p. 126). 
The Figure also shows that with the exception of the current 
Finnish and Icelandic programs, at least one indicator is not 
present in the programs. Moreover, as more topics are ad-
dressed over time, this does not mean that they receive simi-
lar treatment in terms of attention being paid to them. Indeed, 
some issues, like Governance, are discussed more than others. 
The Figure also shows that Environmental Protection, Pollu-
tion, and Climate Change gain momentum until about 2013, 
after which they are not mentioned as much. 
The Human Dimension indicator shows that there is one strik-
ing finding across the different programs. Indeed, all the pro-
grams address Indigenous peoples, although in different ways. 
For example, the first American Program mentions “Saami fish-
eries” (USA USC 1998, 1), while the Danish and Swedish pro-
grams discuss the importance of “traditional food” (Denmark 
DCAC 2009, 2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 5). In terms of Indigenous 
relations with the Arctic Council, the Norwegian Program men-
tions the success between the Council and Indigenous peoples 
(Norway 2006, 1) and the second Finnish Program comments 
on their support for “the strong participation of Indigenous 
peoples in the work of the Arctic Council and the integration 
of traditional and local knowledge into the programs and proj-
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Figure 15. Priorities in the Chairmanship Programs
Note: The numbers represented in each indicator are a percent of the total 
number of quotes coded for each document. The scale also ranges from 
0 - 40% because none of the percentages went higher than this. 
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ects of the Council” (Finland FC 2017, 14). Some programs also 
identify areas of improvement: the first Icelandic, Danish, and 
Swedish, and the second Canadian programs mention the need 
to better facilitate Indigenous participation (Canada CC 2013, 
2; Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Iceland MFA 2002, 4; Sweden GOS 
2011b, 4). The first Finnish Program also mentions “improving 
the living conditions of Indigenous peoples” (Finland MFA 2001, 
7), the Russian Program states that Arctic activities “fully cor-
respond to the needs of the Arctic Indigenous peoples” (Russia 
MFA 2004, 6), and the second U.S. Program mentions that the 
Permanent Participants would contribute to maritime environ-
mental protection (USA CAC 2015, 4). Considering the breadth 
of discussion around Indigenous peoples, it is surprising that the 
second Icelandic Program mentions Indigenous peoples only in 
the context of cooperation within the Arctic Council as Perma-
nent Participants (see: Iceland MFA 2019, 2, 9). 
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Culture and lan-
guage recognition 
and / or protection
X X X X X X
Gender equality X X X X X
Food security X
Sustainable Devel-
opment for health 
and wellness 
X X X X
Human health X X X X X X
Mental wellness X X X
Wellbeing X
Table 35. The Human Dimension in the Chairmanship Programs
Culture is often associated with Indigenous peoples; however, 
that is not always the case. For example, the first Finnish Program 
mentions “Arctic cultures” (Finland MFA 2001, 6), Iceland men-
tions the “Languages of small nations” (Iceland MFA 2002, 4), 
and Norway discusses “cultural monuments” (Norway 2006, 4). 
The issue of health is raised in six of the programs (see Table 
35), while more recently the need to address “mental wellness” 
is mentioned (Canada CC 2013, 4; Finland FC 2017, 15; USA 
CAC 2015, 2). In contrast to this, the second Icelandic Program 
does not focus on particular health concerns and simply states: 
“Initiatives that aim to promote the wellbeing of the roughly 
four million people living in the region will remain central to 
the Arctic Council’s work” (Iceland MFA 2019, 8). 
Table 35 shows that gender equality is raised in five programs, 
and twice by Finland and Iceland The first Finnish Program 
states: “Issues of gender equality have not yet been addressed 
within the Arctic Council although equality has been promot-
ed, inter alia, in networks of women from Indigenous com-
munities” (Finland MFA 2001, 6), while the second states that 
“Gender equality can be supported by raising awareness of the 
contribution of women and men to sustainable development. 
Finland supports the ongoing work on gender equality in the 
Arctic Council” (Finland FC 2017, 15). The second Icelandic 
Program states that “Iceland will continue to lead a project that 
aims to promote dialogue on gender equality in the Arctic and 
strengthen a network of experts and stakeholders in the field” 
(Iceland MFA 2019, 8), suggesting a continuation from the sec-
ond Finnish Program. While there is still work to be done on 
gender, this does suggest that Council has taken up the issue, 
even if it is not mentioned in all programs. 
Food security is also mentioned in the Swedish Program as being 
connected to traditional food sources (Sweden GOS 2011b, 5). 
The Governance indicator addresses the existing structures 
within the Arctic region. Mainly, it refers to the Arctic Council’s 
“mandate concerning protection of the Arctic environment” and 
the work of its working groups (AMAP, CAFF, EPPR, PAME), 
which provide recommendations to the AC (USA USC 1998, 2; 
Finland MFA 2001, 2; Iceland MFA 2002, 1; Russia MFA 2004, 
1; Norway 2006, 1; Denmark DCAC 2009, 1, 2; Sweden GOS 
2011b, 1; Canada CC 2013, 2; USA CAC 2015, 5; Finland FC 
2017, 5; Iceland MFA 2019, 9). Finland, in its first chairmanship 
program, underlines the unique character and composition of 
the Arctic Council, where “representatives of Indigenous peo-
ples convene around the same table with representatives of the 
governments of the member states.” At the same time, “several 
observers, states, international organizations and non-govern-
mental organizations bring their contributions to the activities 
of the Council”, as Finland proposes more active involvement of 
the Observers to the work of the AC (Finland MFA 2001, 2,4). 
Sweden, in its program, states that “the Arctic Council and its 
working groups should link their scientifically based reports to 
practical decision-making and policies” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 2). 
Iceland, in its first chairmanship program, reminds that “there 
is also need for stronger co-operation between the governments 
and stakeholders at all levels” (Iceland MFA 2002, 2).  
The majority of the chairmanship programs (see Table 36. Gov-
ernance in the Chairmanship Programs, p. 130) underline the 
importance of strengthening cooperative relations and bet-
ter coordination with the European Union and other region-
al bodies such as the Euro-Arctic Council, Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Council of Baltic Sea States, and Parliamentarians 
of the Arctic Region” (USA USC 1998, 3; Finland MFA 2001, 
4,7; Iceland MFA 2002, 5; Russia MFA 2004, 4; Denmark DCAC 
2009, 2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 2). The most recent chairmanship 
programs also address the need to strengthen the “cooperation 
between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council” 
and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (Finland FC 2017, 5, 17; Ice-
land MFA 2019, 9,10). In its first chairmanship program, the 
USA also promises to “encourage region-to-region contact, of 
the sort which has developed between Alaska and the Russian 
Far East under the auspices of the Northern Forum” (USA USC 
1998, 3). Finland, in its first chairmanship program, highlights 
the need for partnership between the AC and the European 
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Commission, in order to “strengthen Arctic knowledge and 
co-operation” (Finland MFA 2001, 4). In its second chairman-
ship, Finland proposes to “participate in the continued work of 
the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, recognizing the 
need for implementing an ecosystem-based approach to man-
agement and taking into account the positive experiences of 
cooperation in other sea areas” (Finland FC 2017, 12). The En-
vironmental impact assessment (EIA) is also mentioned as “an 
important tool for sustainable and responsible development in 
the Arctic” and that Finland also “proposes to develop an Arc-
tic-specific EIA tool in which public participation is an integral 
part of the process” (Finland FC 2017, 11).
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Eixsting structures X X X X X X X X X X X
international and 
transboundary 
cooperation
X X X X X X X X X X X
natural resources, 
blue economy, and 
licensing
X X X X X X
public consultations 
and env. impact 
assessments
X X X X
Decision making X X X X
Table 36. Governance in the Chairmanship Programs 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation 
indicator is well-defined and elaborated by all Arctic states in 
their chairmanship programs, ranging from the first U.S. chair-
manship to the latest Icelandic chairmanship (see Table 37, 
p. 129). The programs mainly refer to cooperation on the level 
of the Arctic Council. The programs also mention the AC’s 
important role and activities with a focus on “environmental 
issues and sustainable development became key elements in 
the Council’s sphere of activities” (Finland MFA 2001, 3,5; 
Iceland MFA 2002, 2; Russia MFA 2004, 1; Norway 2006, 1,6; 
Denmark DCAC 2009, 1, 2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 1; Canada 
CC 2013, 2; USA CAC 2015, 1,5; Finland FC 2017, 5; Iceland 
MFA 2019, 4). The Icelandic Program highlights the necessi-
ty “to strengthen scientific and technological co-operation for 
sustainable development through increased networking be-
tween scientists and research institutions.” In this respect, the 
document is the only one of all the documents to refer to the 
important role of the International Arctic Science Committee 
(Iceland MFA 2002, 3). Not surprisingly, Denmark is the only 
one to mention in its program that “the Ilulissat Declaration 
of 28 May 2008 underlines that co-operation on the sharing of 
information is a prerequisite for addressing future challenges” 
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 6).
The programs highlight Council’s relations with other regional 
bodies, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the Nordic 
Council of Ministers, Northern Forum, and the UN agencies, 
including the International Maritime Organization. In addi-
tion, the USA promises to “expand Arctic international coop-
eration” in public health (USA USC 1998, 1–2). For the first 
time, Finland mentions in its chairmanship program the need 
to “promote co-operation between the Council and the EU” 
and “making the EU an Arctic cooperation partner” “so that 
the Commission becomes a permanent Observer in the Coun-
cil.” The cooperation between the Council and the Northern 
Forum should also be enhanced (Finland MFA 2001, 4, 7). 
Other AC Observer states (and organizations) are also briefly 
mentioned (Finland MFA 2001, 3; Iceland MFA 2002, 4 ,5, 6; 
Russia MFA 2004, 4,7; Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Canada CC 
2013, 3; USA CAC 2015, 5; Finland FC 2017, 17; Iceland MFA 
2019, 9,11). It is in the second Canadian chairmanship, that 
the first reference is made to “establishing a Circumpolar Busi-
ness Forum”, which “will foster circumpolar economic devel-
opment and provide opportunities for business to engage with 
the Arctic Council” (Canada CC 2013, 3). In addition, “Fin-
land proposes to deepen meteorological and oceanographic 
cooperation among the Arctic States in collaboration with the 
World Meteorological Organization” (Finland FC 2017, 5, 8). 
Finland also welcomes the establishment of the Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum. 
The Arctic state chairmanship programs also refer to the cat-
egory of Permanent Participants as a body for Indigenous 
peoples’ representation in the Council. “Representatives of 
Indigenous peoples sit at the same table with the member 
states’ representatives, participating in the proceedings but 
without power of decision-making” (Finland MFA 2001, 3; 
Iceland MFA 2002, 6; Russia MFA 2004, 1; Norway 2006, 1, 2; 
Denmark DCAC 2009, 1,2; Sweden GOS 2011b, 1; USA CAC 
2015, 5; Finland FC 2017, 5; Iceland MFA 2019, 11). Finland 
mentions in its first chairmanship program that “At the Rio + 
10 follow-up meeting of the UN in 2002, the Arctic Council 
should be able to present its activities to support sustainable 
development” (Finland MFA 2001, 5). The Russian Program 
briefly follows up on this, stating that the Arctic Council “is 
the main mechanism for implementing the principles of sus-
tainable development set forth in the Program of Action on 
the Implementation of the Agenda 21 adopted by the UN Con-
ference on Environment and Development in 1992…and the 
decisions taken by the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in 2002” (Russia MFA 2004, 1).
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Role and  
importance of  
int. cooperation
X X X X X X X X X
Major agreements 
and forums X X X X X X X X X X X
Global Perspective 
and Scales
UN SDGs  
(or Rio 1992) X X X
Table 37. International Treaties and International Cooperation in the Chair-
manship Programs
The Environmental Protection indicator reveals one relevant 
finding. Specifically, Table 38 shows that seven programs also 
address protection of the marine environment, either in gen-
eral or with specific reference to the Regional Programme of 
Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
from Land-based Activities. Seven programs also mention the 
need to find a way to balance environmental protection with 
economic activities; yet only three programs mention ecosys-
tem-based management. There are also some similarities, with 
six of the programs addressing the issue of biodiversity and five 
programs addressing protected areas. 
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Regional Pro-
gramme of Action 
for the Protection  
of the Arctic  
Marine Environ-
ment from Land-
based Activities
X X
Protect marine 
environment X X X X X X
Protected areas X X X X X
Biodiversity X X X X X X
Invasive species X X
Animal  
conservation X X
Balance  
environment and 
economy (ex. 
Sustainable dev)
X X X X X X X
Ecosystem-based 
management X X X
International  
cooperation X X
Share best practices X X
Table 38. Environmental Protection in the Chairmanship Programs 
There is also some fragmentation, as two programs mention an-
imal conservation and invasive species. Moreover, only two pro-
grams mention international cooperation and sharing best prac-
tices. This fragmentation is surprising, as environmental issues 
cross national boundaries. 
The Pollution indicator reveals a somewhat fragmented approach 
to addressing pollution. Table 39 shows that starting with the Swed-
ish Program, “short-lived climate forcers (SLCF), such as black 
carbon,… and methane” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 2), are consistently 
identified as problems for the Arctic, and the second Finland Pro-
gram recognizes that these pollutants can come from outside the 
region (Finland FC 2017, 11). Oil (pollution) is also mentioned in 
four of the last six programs, suggesting that this, along with the 
short-lived climate forcers, are the primary concern. 
Table 39. Pollutants in the Chairmanship Programs 
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Man-made  
pollutants X
Greenhouse Gases X X
Carbon dioxide X
Short lived climate 
poll. X X X X X
Black carbon X X X X X
Methane X X X X X
Radioactive 
material X
Heavy Metals X
Mercury X X X
POPs X
PCBs X
Chemicals X
Oil X X X X
Mining waste X
Shipping Waste X
Marine litter X
Plastics X
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It is surprising that the broad term of “greenhouse gases” is used 
in only two programs (Danish and Swedish), although black car-
bon and methane are explicitly named in every program since 
Sweden’s in 2011. The second most-identified pollutant is oil 
(spills), which was mentioned in the Danish, Swedish, second 
Canadian, and second Finnish programs (Canada CC 2013, 3; 
Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Finland FC 2017, 13; Sweden GOS 
2011b, 2). Plastics is named for the first time in the second Ice-
landic Program (Iceland MFA 2019, 4). Table 39 also shows fur-
ther fragmentation as POPs, PCBs, man-made pollutants, radio-
active materials, chemicals, mining waste, and shipping waste 
are each mentioned in only one strategy. 
There is also substantial fragmentation with regard to the dif-
ferent approaches to addressing pollution. Table 40 shows that 
none of the approaches to problem-solving are mentioned in 
more than three programs. For example, only the first U.S., Finn-
ish, and Russian programs recognize the Arctic Council’s Action 
Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic (ACAP) (Finland MFA 
2001, 4; Russia MFA 2004, 4; USA USC 1998, 2). Moreover, three 
programs express support for the work of AMAP. For instance, 
the Russian Program states that “the Russian Chairmanship in-
tends to pursue the policy aimed at intensifying efforts taken by 
the Arctic Council Member States within the framework of the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP)” (Russia 
MFA 2004, 4). Both the Swedish and second Finnish programs 
express support for specific projects under AMAP. For Sweden, 
that is “a report on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on 
the acidification of the Arctic Ocean, Arctic Ocean Acidification” 
(Sweden GOS 2011b, 4), and the Finnish Program notes that “the 
Arctic Council’s report “Chemicals of Emerging Arctic Concern” 
(2017) will guide the work on pollution” (Finland FC 2017, 11).
There are also some time-specific findings. For example, the 
Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arc-
tic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities and the 
Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities are not men-
tioned after 2006. Moreover, the SAR Agreement was signed in 
2013, and is thus mentioned in the second Canadian and sec-
ond Finnish programs (Canada CC 2013, 3; Finland FC 2017, 
13), while the Polar Code is mentioned in the second Finnish 
Program (Finland FC 2017, 13). Additionally, it appears that 
the Arctic Council’s work with the Framework for Action on 
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Greenhouse gas reduction X X
Short lived climate forcers reduction X X
Global rules on mercury X
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) X
Recognize and support work of AMAP X X X
Recognize and support work of CAFF X
Recognize and support work of EPPR X
Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic 
(ACAP) X X X
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness  
& Response in the Arctic X X
Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane 
Emissions Reduction X
Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane X
Polar Code X
Research on pollution X
Pollution assessments X
Cooperation X
Share best practices X
Regional Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment from Land-based Activities X X
Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the Arctic  
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities X
Changes to economic activities X
Oil spill prevention or preparedness X X
Regional Action Plan for marine litter X
Table 40. International Treaties on Pollution and Problem Solving Measures 
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Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions 
from the second Finnish Program (Finland FC 2017, 10) will be 
followed up during the second Icelandic chairmanship: “build-
ing on the work of the Expert Group on Black Carbon and 
Methane, efforts to identify opportunities to reduce emissions 
of short-lived climate pollutants will continue” (Iceland MFA 
2019, 5). The second Icelandic chairmanship will also start to 
address marine litter: “The Arctic Council will work on the de-
velopment of a Regional Action Plan to reduce marine litter, in-
cluding micro-plastics, along with other efforts to monitor and 
limit its impacts” (Iceland MFA 2019, 4).
Other approaches to problem-solving include less formal mech-
anisms. Iceland mentions pollution assessments in the larger 
context of environmental protection (Iceland MFA 2002, 4) 
and Norway mentions increasing knowledge and sharing best 
practices, as well as cooperation: “cooperation under the Arctic 
Council and integration of Indigenous peoples’ knowledge into 
these efforts has yielded results far greater than could have been 
achieved by national efforts alone. This is particularly true in 
the fields of long-range pollution and climate change” (Norway 
2006, 1; see also: 3). 
The Climate Change indicator shows growth in the way that 
climate change is addressed in the chairmanship programs (see 
Table 41). From the first U.S. Program, and with the exception 
of the Russian, and the second Canadian and U.S. programs, 
there is evidence that the scientific community has been, or is 
being, heard on this issue. Indeed, the ACIA Report was the first 
big climate project/study and is mentioned in the first Finnish, 
Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, and second Finnish programs 
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 1; Finland FC 2017, 10; Finland MFA 
2001, 5; Iceland MFA 2009, 4; Norway 2006, 5). The Norwegian 
Program recognizes the report’s significance, especially with 
regard to mitigation and adaptation efforts. It states that “ac-
cording to the ACIA report, the consequences of climate change 
in the Arctic will be dramatic for human life, ecosystems and 
many sectors of society. Further studies of impacts and means 
of adaptation are needed in order to address these issues” (Nor-
way 2006, 5), and since then all programs have mentioned mit-
igation and/ or adaptation. The significance of the ACIA is not 
lost in the second Finnish Program which states that “the con-
clusions of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004) have 
been largely confirmed by local environmental observations” 
(Finland FC 2017, 10). 
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Mitigation/  
Adaptation X X X X X X X
Frameworks: 
UNFCC X X X X
IPCC X X
Paris Agreement X
Kyoto Protocol X
Scientific  
Community Heard X X X X X X
ACIA X X X X X
Access to  
Fresh Water X X
Table 41. Climate Action in the Chairmanship Programs 
With respect to the climate framework, the Russian Program 
recognizes that Russia is working with its international partners 
on these issues—“a major evidence of this is the ratification by 
the Russian Federation of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, which cleared the way to 
the entry into force of that instrument” (Russia MFA 2004, 3–4). 
Although Kyoto is not mentioned again, the UNFCCC is men-
tioned by the Norwegian, Danish, and second Finnish programs 
and the IPCC is mentioned by the Swedish and second Finnish 
programs (Norway 2006, 5; Denmark DCAC 2009, 4; Sweden 
GOS 2011b, 2; Finland FC 2017, 11). The second Finnish Pro-
gram also mentions the Paris Agreement, stating that “putting 
into practice the commitments of the Paris Climate Agreement 
will be the most important contribution from the Member States 
in addressing climate change” (Finland FC 2017, 10). Interest-
ingly, the second Icelandic Program does not mention climate 
frameworks and instead states that “Member States take action 
to address climate change in accordance with their respective in-
ternational commitments and national policies” (Iceland MFA 
2019, 5). 
The issue of access to freshwater is brought up in the second 
U.S. and the Finnish programs. While neither overtly makes 
the connection, they both show concerns. For instance, the U.S. 
Program states “the Arctic Council’s work on energy and water 
security seeks to improve economic and living conditions in the 
region by pursuing innovative technologies to mitigate the sig-
nificant challenges faced by remote Arctic communities” (USA 
CAC 2015, 2) and the Finnish Program that “raising awareness 
of the state of Arctic freshwater and its ecological, economic, so-
cial and cultural value is also important” (Finland FC 2017, 11). 
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The Security indicator is not captured in any of the first AC 
chairmanship programs (Canada, US, Finland, Iceland, years 
1996–2004). It only appears for the first time in the chairman-
ship program of Russia in 2004 in connection with environmen-
tal security. The Program states that the “main priorities of the 
Russian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council include implemen-
tation of further coordinated measures to protect, preserve and 
restore the Arctic environment, enhance environmental security, 
including prevention of ecological emergencies, as well as to pro-
vide for the rational Arctic resource management in order to en-
sure environmental, social and economic welfare of the present 
and future generations in that region” (Russia MFA 2004, 4). In 
2006, Norway recognizes the importance of keeping the region 
out of conflict, stating that “while many of the other petroleum 
provinces of the world are characterised by conflicts and politi-
cal unrest, the Arctic stands out as a stable and peaceful region” 
(Norway 2006, 2). Denmark does not address any security issues 
in its 2009 Program. Two years later in 2011, Sweden recognizes 
that “the issue of food safety and access to good quality water 
in the Arctic is a matter of constant concern to the region’s in-
habitants and is closely linked to climate change and other envi-
ronmental disturbances” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 5). Canada in its 
2013–2015 chairmanship program does not address any securi-
ty matters. The USA, at the beginning of its AC chairmanship, 
states that “with the increase in human and maritime activity 
in the Arctic, Arctic Council members are working together to 
promote Arctic Ocean safety, security and stewardship, includ-
ing by exercising Arctic State agreements on search and rescue 
cooperation and oil pollution preparedness and response” (USA 
CAC 2015, 1). 
Finland in its second chairmanship program emphasizes that all 
AC “Member States have pledged to maintain the Arctic as a re-
gion of peace, stability and constructive cooperation” (Finland 
FC 2017, 5). Furthermore, Finland states that “the goal must be 
to ensure the positive future perspectives of the inhabitants and 
to improve the safety of communities in the Arctic” (Finland 
FC 2017, 14). In particular, “electronic communication services 
improve safety and quality of life for those who live in or visit 
the Arctic. Access to broadband facilitates e-learning, enables 
the development of digital health and social services, and allows 
connectivity to media” (Finland FC 2017, 7). Finland also “high-
lights the socioeconomic dimension of freshwater bodies in the 
Arctic. These are used as sources of water supply, nutrition and 
recreation by many Arctic communities and they form an im-
portant part of the food security of the communities” (Finland 
FC 2017, 14). Moreover, “health security requires the ability to 
prevent, detect and respond to health threats across borders” 
(Finland FC 2017, 5, 7, 14, 15). In the sphere of security, Finland 
further welcomes the “establishment of the Arctic Coast Guard 
Forum” and “Under the auspices of the Arctic Coast Guard Fo-
rum, the Finnish Border Guard will strengthen the cooperation 
with search and rescue stakeholders to promote safety at sea. The 
aim is to exchange best practices, align standard operating proce-
dures and promote interoperability” (Finland FC 2017, 13). Ice-
land in its second chairmanship program focuses on promoting 
“safe and sustainable shipping in the Arctic” (Iceland MFA 2019, 
4). It continues: “With increasing marine traffic and activities, it 
is essential to maintain close and effective cooperation among 
the Arctic States on search and rescue, as well as emergency pre-
vention, preparedness and response. Circumpolar meteorologi-
cal and oceanographic cooperation also serves to improve safety 
at sea and should be developed further, in collaboration with the 
World Meteorological Organization” (Iceland MFA 2019, 4).
The Safety and SAR indicator demonstrates that safety does not 
receive much attention until the Russian chairmanship and then 
becomes a regular topic starting with the Danish chairmanship. 
Table 42 shows that maritime safety is the general regional 
safety concern. Environmental security is also a concern and 
has been connected to pollution and the potential for oil spills 
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 7; Finland FC 2017, 13; Russia MFA 
2004, 4). Search and Rescue services are also mentioned in five 
programs, and Finland also recognizes that climate change can 
also affect safety (Finland FC 2017, 11). 
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Environmental 
Safety  
(incl. pollution,  
oil spills, etc.)
X X X
Climate change X
Maritime Safety X X X X X X
Tourism safety X
Search and Rescue X X X X X
Emergencies  
(in general) X X X
Table 42. Safety Concerns in the Chairmanship Programs
Interestingly, the Danish Program comments on the challeng-
es associated with SAR in the Arctic. The Program states that 
“due to low population and infrastructure density, emergency 
response resources are thinly spread over a large area, making 
for instance search and rescue operations difficult to stage and 
manage” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 6). The second U.S. Strate-
gy comments on the importance of telecommunications for 
rescue operations (USA CAC 2015, 2), suggesting that chal-
lenges remain. 
There are also varied responses to addressing safety issues. Table 
43 shows that the most-mentioned response was in support of 
the work of the IMO (Denmark DCAC 2009, 7), and also the 
development of the Polar Code (Canada CC 2013, 3; Finland FC 
2017, 13). Moreover, the second U.S. and Finnish programs rec-
ognize the Arctic Council’s SAR agreement (Finland FC 2017, 
13; USA CC 2015, 1), while the Russian and Danish programs 
mention safety cooperation, which seems to entail efforts lead-
ing up to the SAR agreement. For instance, the Russian Pro-
gram states that in the context of emergencies “in the longer 
term we could consider the signing of an intergovernmental 
agreement on cooperation between rescue services of the Arctic 
Council Member States in this area” (Russia MFA 2004, 6). The 
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Danish Program, also in the context of emergencies, states that 
“there is a growing understanding that the capacity to respond 
to emergency crises in the Arctic should be improved and that 
the means to doing so is through the exchange of information, 
training and experience, technical development and support, 
and the co-ordination of response” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 6). 
The second Icelandic Program also mentions cooperation, but 
does so in the context of shipping and not in relation to any 
particular agreement (see: Iceland MFA 2019, 4). 
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Arctic Council SAR 
Agreement X X
Arctic Marine 
Shipping  
Assessment 
X
Arctic Coast Guard 
Forum X
IMO / Polar Code X X X
Satellites X
International 
cooperation on 
rescue services 
and/ or supports 
X X X
International
 cooperation 
maritime safety 
guidelines 
X
International 
cooperation on 
weather and 
ocean research 
X X
Information 
sharing X
Oil spill  
prevention X
Table 43. Responses to Safety Concerns in the Chairmanship Programs
The Danish Program also supports international cooperation 
on creating safety guidelines and sharing information (Den-
mark DCAC 2009, 7). Sweden mentions the importance of the 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment and the need for better oil 
spill prevention (Sweden GOS 2011b, 2). The second Finnish 
Program mentions the value of satellites for safety purposes and 
the role the Arctic Coast Guard Forum can play in improving 
regional safety (Finland FC 2017, 13). Additionally, both the 
second Finnish and second Icelandic Program state the need for 
“Circumpolar meteorological and oceanographic cooperation” 
(Finland FC 2017, 8; Iceland MFA 2019, 4) as safety measures, 
mainly due to climate change and having WMO as an observer 
of the Arctic Council. 
The Economy indicator shows that a broad range of economic 
activities takes place in the Arctic. However, there is no striking 
consistency with respect to what these activities are and involve. 
Indeed, Table 44 shows that four or fewer programs identify a 
particular industry. Instead, what emerges is that different pro-
grams prioritize different types of activities. For example, the 
first Finnish Program focuses on living resources and associated 
activities (Finland MFA 2001, 7), while Norway tends to focus 
more on a broad range of natural resources (Norway 2006, 1–3), 
and the second Finnish Program emphasizes more technologi-
cal or innovative activities (Finland FC 2017, 5). 
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Natural resources X X X X
Energy X
Renewables X X
Green energy X
Fossil fuels X
Oil and gas X X X X
Mining /minerals / 
metals X X X
Forestry X
Hunting X
Fisheries and 
fishing X X
Reindeer  
husbandry X X
Agriculture X
Living marine 
resources X
Bioeconomy X X
Shipping X X X X
Tourism X X X X X
Technology X
Cold climate X
Communication X X
Construction X
Housing X
Table 44. Economic Activities in the Chairmanship Programs
Sustainable development or sustainable economic activities are 
mentioned in all the programs, except the second U.S. Program. 
However, the programs address the issue in different ways. For 
instance, the first Finnish Program states that “attention should 
be paid on not only the ecological dimension but also the social, 
cultural and economic dimensions of sustainable development” 
(Finland MFA 2001, 2). The first Icelandic Program, however, 
comments on the complexity of sustainable development as it 
“requires, among other things, adaptation of international edu-
cation and science to regional conditions through local research 
and development projects” (Iceland MFA 2002, 1). The Norwe-
gian Program diverges a little, however, by stating that “protec-
tion of the environment combined with sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources should be the core area of cooperation under 
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the auspices of the Arctic Council in the years ahead” (Norway 
2006, 3), and further at the very beginning of the document that
“Until now, the main emphasis has been on sustainable de-
velopment and environmental protection, and an extensive 
knowledge base has been established under the auspices of 
the Council. However, it will not be possible to maintain 
settlement patterns and ensure growth and welfare without 
economic activity. Therefore, the Council should also initiate 
broad political debate on all issues of importance to the Arc-
tic and the people living there” (Norway 2006, 1). 
The Finnish second chairmanship also addresses “the coop-
eration between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic 
Council to support the goal of facilitating business-to-busi-
ness activities and responsible economic development” (Fin-
land FC 2017, 5).
The first mention of the Tourism indicator is in the Finnish 
chairmanship program in 2000, when Finland recognizes the 
success of the Arctic Council’s “tourism project on eco-cul-
ture” (Finland MFA 2001, 7). In addition, “Finland aims at 
strengthening co-operation on tourism that supports sustain-
able development, by utilizing and co-ordinating the work 
done in this field by other bodies, such as the WWF and the 
Northern Forum” (Finland MFA 2001, 7). In 2002 Iceland fol-
lows up on this, stating in its chairmanship program that the 
Icelandic “aim is to build on existing international organiza-
tions and programmes working with issues such as sustainable 
agriculture, communications, tourism, construction, and use 
of natural resources” (Iceland MFA 2002, 3). Russia does not 
address tourism in its chairmanship of the AC in 2004–2006. 
Norway in 2006 states in its chairmanship program that “the 
establishment of guidelines for responsible development of 
petroleum and mineral resources in the Arctic should be giv-
en priority. The need for guidelines for other activities such 
as tourism, shipping, the establishment of infrastructure and 
waste management should also be considered” (Norway 2006, 
3). Denmark also briefly mentions tourism in its chairmanship 
program from 2009, stating how in “responding to the general 
increase in activities taking place in the Arctic,” it “would be 
useful to explore how co-operation could be enhanced to fur-
ther the development of guidelines in fields such as tourism, 
shipping and maritime safety, etc.” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 7). 
Sweden does not address tourism in its 2011 AC chairman-
ship program. Two years later, Canada mentions tourism in 
its 2013 Program, particularly recognizing that “opportunities 
for tourism are growing in the Arctic.” Canada believes that 
“by establishing guidelines for sustainable tourism and cruise-
ship operations, the Arctic Council will encourage the benefits 
that tourism will bring to communities while reducing the risks 
associated with increased activity” (Canada CC 2013, 3). The 
USA does not mention tourism in its chairmanship 2015-2017, 
while Finland in its second chairmanship 2017–2019 “strives to 
increase the cooperation between the Arctic Council and the 
Arctic Economic Council to support the goal of facilitating 
business-to-business activities and responsible economic de-
velopment. Common areas of interest include capacity build-
ing, risk management, connectivity, cold-climate technologies 
and services, maritime transport, energy, bioeconomy, tourism, 
housing and mining.” Finland further “proposes to continue 
the Arctic Council’s work on telecommunications and explore 
ways to enhance the connectivity and availability of broadband 
services in the Arctic. This work would take into account the 
needs of Indigenous peoples, local communities and business-
es, tourism, and researchers” (Finland FC 2017, 5,7). Iceland in 
its second chairmanship follows up on its first Program, stating 
that “new economic opportunities, including in shipping and 
tourism, can contribute to growth and prosperity of Arctic com-
munities, if they are carried out sustainably. Environmental pro-
tection and social inclusion must always go hand in hand with 
economic development” (Iceland MFA 2019, 8). 
The Infrastructure indicator shows some similarities and dif-
ferences in the types of infrastructure that are discussed. Table 
45 shows that seven programs broach the topic of telecommu-
nications and ICT, which will be discussed in more detail later, 
and six programs address shipping. The Russian Program com-
ments on the Northern Sea Route (Russia MFA 2004, 2), while 
the Danish Program mentions the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment (Denmark DCAC 2009, 6); the Swedish Program 
mentions that surveillance could help the shipping industry 
(Sweden GOS 2011b, 6), and the Canadian and second Finnish 
programs mention the Polar Code (Canada CC 2013, 3; Finland 
FC 2017, 13). The second Finnish Program also remarks that 
climate and ocean research will “benefit international shipping 
and air traffic” (Finland FC 2017, 8), and the second Icelandic 
Program states that “Iceland will continue to promote safe and 
sustainable shipping in the Arctic” (Iceland MFA 2019, 5). 
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Transport X X X
Icebreakers X
Shipping X X X X X X
Telecoms / ICT X X X X X X X
Innovation  
and tech X
Energy X X X X
Housing X
Table 45. Infrastructure in the Chairmanship Programs 
As mentioned, a relevant finding is that telecommunications 
and ICT are mentioned in seven programs that span a long time 
frame. Table 46 shows that the most common issue was im-
proving health services via telemedicine (Finland MFA 2001, 6; 
Russia MFA 2004, 3; USA USC 1998, 1) or other “digital health 
and social services” (Finland FC 2017, 7). Another ongoing dis-
cussion is around the use of ICT to improve educational oppor-
tunities. The first Finnish, first Icelandic, and second Finnish 
programs comment on distance or e-learning (Finland 2017, 7; 
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Finland MFA 2001, 6; Iceland MFA 2002, 2). The two Icelan-
dic and second Finnish programs also comment on the use of 
telecommunications for economic reasons (Finland FC 2017, 8; 
Iceland MFA 2019, 8; Iceland MFA 2002, 2).
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Communications 
tech and  
infrastructure 
- - - - X X
Internet X - - - - X
ICT and  
Arctic Council X X - - - - X
Telehealth /  
health services X X X - - - - X
Education X X - - - - X
Economic  
development X - - - - X X
Safety - - - - X
Need cost-effective 
telecoms X - - - -
Table 46. Telecommunications and ICT in the Chairmanship Programs
The connection between ICT and the Arctic Council is inter-
esting. For instance, the first Icelandic Program comments that 
“limited time and financial resources can restrain direct partici-
pation in the work of the Arctic Council, especially by the Indig-
enous peoples organizations. It is important to strengthen the 
use of information technology in the work of the Arctic Council 
in order to facilitate communications and consultations” (Ice-
land MFA 2002, 5). The Russian Program discusses work the 
Council is doing on ICT, stating: “We believe it important that 
the Arctic Council activities continue to be focused on enhanc-
ing cooperation in the field of information and communica-
tion technology including further practical steps to develop the 
Arctic Information and Communication Technology Network” 
(Russia MFA 2004, 3). The second Finnish Program also states 
that “Finland proposes to continue the Arctic Council’s work 
on telecommunications and explore ways to enhance the con-
nectivity and availability of broadband services in the Arctic” 
(Finland FC 2017, 7). 
In terms of the Science and Education indicator, Table 47 shows 
that the programs primarily identify informal and formal net-
works as part of their science infrastructure. For informal net-
works, the first Icelandic Program mentions networking and 
general cooperation (Iceland MFA 2002, 3), the Russian Pro-
gram states that “further strengthening of the Arctic Council 
interaction with other international and regional organizations” 
(Russia MFA 2004, 7) which means strengthening networks, 
while the Norwegian Program wants to “strengthen the interna-
tional monitoring networks” (Norway 2006, 4), and the Danish 
Program to maintain connections developed during the IPY 
(Denmark DCAC 2009, 3). 
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Research institutes X
Informal networks X X X X
Formal networks X X X X
Table 47. Science Infrastructure in the Chairmanship Programs 
Regarding the formal networks, the first Finnish and first Ice-
landic programs mentions the International Arctic Science 
Committee (IASC) (Finland MFA 2001, 5; Iceland MFA 2002, 
3). The Russian Program mentions the International Polar Year 
(IPY) (Russia MFA 2004, 7), and the second Finnish Program 
calls the Arctic Council a “recognized international forum” 
(Finland FC 2017, 5). The Finnish Program is also the only one 
to recognize research institutes, and in this case “occupational 
health research institutes” (Finland FC 2017, 15), as part of the 
science infrastructure. 
In terms of the reasons for research, Table 48 shows that cli-
mate change is the primary driver as it is mentioned in seven 
programs. Pollution is mentioned by three programs, and the 
environment in one. 
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Environment X
Climate Change X X X X X X X
Pollution X X X
Table 48. Drivers of Research in the Chairmanship Programs 
However, research does more than just generate new knowl-
edge on these topics. Table 49 shows some of the other purpos-
es that research can be used for. Seven of the programs note 
that research will be used to inform policy or to help with de-
cision-making. For example, the first Icelandic Program com-
ments on the need for clarity of research findings, remarking 
that “research results also need to be presented in a way that can 
be used by policy makers in formulating policies and solving 
practical matter” (Iceland MFA 2002, 3). The Swedish Program 
asserts that “strong support for research in this part of the world 
will give decision-makers data on which to base an effective re-
sponse to challenges arising in a rapidly changing region” (Swe-
den GOS 2011b, 5). 
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Social Issues X X
Policy /  
decision making X X X X X X X
Inform AC  
working groups X
Cooperation X X X X
Sustainable  
development X
Increase knowledge 
of Arctic X X X
Education X X
Table 49. Purpose of Research in the Chairmanship Programs
Although somewhat fragmented, both the first U.S. and Norwe-
gian programs comment on the assistance of the Arctic Coun-
cil in education. The first U.S. Program states that “we attach 
high priority to the Council’s mandate to encourage education 
and public awareness of Arctic-related matters, and are begin-
ning to consider a public affairs strategy” (USA USC 1998, 3); 
the Norwegian Program states its wish to “use of the work and 
publications of Arctic Council working groups for educational 
purposes” (Norway 2006, 4). This also contributes to increasing 
knowledge of the region (see also: Denmark DCAC 2009, 6). 
The use and incorporation of traditional knowledge is men-
tioned in both of the Finnish, the first Icelandic, and the Nor-
wegian, Swedish, and Canadian programs. However, the first 
Icelandic and Swedish programs mention local knowledge 
(Finland MFA 2001, 2; Iceland MFA 2002, 3; Norway 2006, 1, 
4; Sweden GOS 2011b, 5; Canada CC 2013, 4; Finland FC 2017, 
14) rather than specifically naming Indigenous peoples. Tradi-
tional knowledge is not mentioned in any of the U.S., Russian, 
and second Icelandic programs. 
As for education, the UArctic is mentioned in the first U.S. and 
discussed in the Finnish, Icelandic, Russian, and Norwegian 
programs in one capacity or another (USA USC 1998, 3; Fin-
land MFA 2001, 5, 6; Iceland MFA 2009, 3; Russia MFA 2004, 6; 
Norway 2006, 4). Distance learning outside the UArctic is men-
tioned in two programs. The first Icelandic Program specifically 
mentions that “the Internet is increasingly being used in ele-
mentary and secondary schools and by the same token the res-
idents in remote communities may now take university courses 
through distance learning” (Iceland MFA 2002, 2). While the 
second Finnish program also notes “access to broadband facil-
itates e-learning” (Finland FC 2017, 7), but does not comment 
on the level of education covered by the distance learning. For 
access to education, the first Icelandic Program comments on 
how the University of the Arctic has created an “international 
and interdisciplinary Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies, which 
were initiated in the spring of 2002” (Iceland MFA 2002, 3), 
which would create more access to education. For education-
al attainment levels, the second Finnish Program remarks that 
“fair educational opportunities in remote areas are key for cre-
ating sustainable development and building resilience in Arctic 
communities” (Finland FC 2017, 9). 
The Implementation indicator shows how the different pro-
grams address these matters. In terms of action items, the en-
tire program can be considered an action item list, as it out-
lines chairmanship priorities and what is expected to take place 
during a chairmanship. Some items are new, while others ex-
plain how previous work will be carried forward. For example, 
the first Finnish Strategy states that “during its chairmanship 
Finland will promote Arctic research and develop the Universi-
ty of the Arctic” (Finland MFA 2001, 6) and also that “Finland 
aims at ensuring the progress of the Environmental Protection 
Strategy by supporting various environmental programs” (Fin-
land MFA 2001, 5). The first U.S. document, which is a memo, 
states: “The purpose of this communication is to set out U.S. 
thinking on Arctic Council priorities during the period of our 
Chairmanship, and, for planning purposes, to provide an ini-
tial calendar regarding proposed Council activities during this 
period” (USA USC 1998, 1), which suggests that the items that 
follow in the document will be actioned. The second Canadian 
and U.S. programs are in brochure form and, while short on de-
tail, still provide information on what will be done during their 
chairmanships (see: Canada CC 2013; USA CAC 2015).
 
With regard to follow-up, the first U.S., Russian, Norwegian, 
Swedish, and second Finnish programs discuss follow-up ac-
tivities to previously agreed-upon decisions. For example, the 
Russian Program states: “Due attention will be given by the 
Russian Chairmanship to enhanced collaboration in the field of 
education and science and to the implementation of the Decla-
ration of the Meeting of Ministers of Education and Science of 
the Arctic Council Member States in Reykjavik on June 9, 2004” 
(Russia MFA 2004, 3). 
Evaluation is mentioned only in a couple of documents. In the 
context of the SDWG, the Russian Program states: “Our suc-
cess will be measured primarily by the extent to which the Arc-
tic Council Member States manage to translate the SDAP into 
practical activities, specific projects in each area of sustainable 
development, and to attract resources, first of all financial ones, 
needed for its realization” (Russia MFA 2004, 2). The Swed-
ish Program states: “Before the start of the Norwegian Chair-
manship of the Arctic Council in 2006, Norway, Denmark and 
Sweden informally adopted a joint ‘umbrella programme’ for 
their successive chairmanships. Sweden intends to highlight the 
jointly agreed objectives and the results achieved at the foreign 
ministers meeting in 2013” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 6). 
To sum up
As a whole, the chairmanship programs tend to focus on issues 
pertaining to the environment. In the past few years there has 
also been a focus on pollutants that contribute to climate change. 
As for the social aspect, there is an overall focus on health and 
wellbeing, as well as culture and/or language protection. Gen-
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der equality also shows up on the agenda every few years or so. 
Maritime safety has also emerged as a safety concern over the 
past few programs. 
Overall, it is surprising that the chairmanships do not have for-
mal or public evaluation processes, especially as the ministerial 
declarations produced at the end of the Chairmanship are root-
ed in consensus and provide a future vision for the Council and 
not a critical reflection of the previous two years. Instead, a SAO 
report to ministers is issued at the end of the chairmanship to 
provide a summary of achievements for the working groups and 
other initiatives during the chairmanship and their plans during 
the next chairmanship (for example, see, Arctic Council 2019c). 
While this is informal and useful for a better understanding of 
the breadth of work of the Council, how effective the chairman-
ship program has been is not mentioned. 
The Swedish Program remarks that “before the start of the Nor-
wegian Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2006, Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden informally adopted a joint ‘umbrella 
programme’ for their successive chairmanships” (Sweden, GOS 
2011b, 6). As this analysis shows, climate change and addressing 
how the Arctic Council functions are the only priorities the three 
have in common (see the beginning of this section). However, 
there is some commonality shown when different indicators are 
examined. For example, in the environmental protection indica-
tor, all three programs address protected areas and biodiversity 
protection. With climate change, the three programs discuss miti-
gation and adaptation, and indicate that the scientific community 
is important for climate action, which aligns with the science and 
education indicator where climate change is identified by all three 
as a driver of science. That said, there are also many instances 
where there is no commonality between the three programs. 
Programs vis-à-vis  
Arctic States’ Strategies
This section examines the Arctic Council chairmanship pro-
grams in relation to the current Arctic state strategies. Before 
delving into this discussion, it is important to have a better un-
derstanding of the timeline in which the strategies and chair-
manships began. The bottom of Figure 16 shows the dates of the 
chairmanships, and the top shows when the different strategies 
were written. (see Figure 16. Arctic Council Chairmanships and 
Arctic State Strategies Timeline)
Figure 16 shows that it took 10 years after the start of the Arctic 
Council for the Arctic states to create their own national strate-
gies and policies. Norway was the first to do so with its strategy 
of 2006, which was also the year it began its first chairmanship. 
Sweden also released its strategy in the same year, even on the 
same day, as its first chairmanship, and Denmark’s first strategy 
was released in the year prior to its first chairmanship. For the 
other states, there was a flurry of activity, even a sort of national 
competition by the Arctic states (see Heininen 2011), between 
2009 and 2013. In 2009 Canada, Iceland, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, and the USA released their own strategies. In 2010 
Canada and Finland each released a strategy. The year 2011 saw 
the release of four more strategies, including that of Sweden, 
which was the last to create such a document. Three strategies 
were then released in 2013, while Norway went on to release 
updated strategies in 2014 and 2017. This shows that the release 
of national strategies for the Arctic is not necessarily aligned 
with chairmanships. 
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As previously mentioned, there tends to be some fragmentation 
of priorities within both the strategies and the chairmanship 
programs. For the current strategies, the priorities that appeared 
in five or more documents are environmental protection (6), in-
ternational cooperation (6), economic development (5), and se-
curity/stability (5). There is less consistency in the chairmanship 
programs, as only issues concerning the main functions of the 
Arctic Council: the environment (5), climate (4) and sustain-
able development (4), as well as improving the Arctic Council’s 
functioning (4) appeared in four or more documents. The only 
overlap between the two document sets is the environment, and 
within the environment, only Finland, Russia, and Sweden ap-
peared on both lists. 
Comparison by Country 
Canada began its second Chairmanship in 2013, four years after 
the release of its 2009 Strategy. As the Program is a short bro-
chure, it does not have as much detail as Canada’s Strategy and 
policy documents, but some comparisons can be made. These 
two documents will be compared. 
For instance, with the Human Dimension, both the Program 
and the 2009 Strategy address issues around health and well-
being, the Program also addresses the issue of mental wellness, 
suggesting a deeper understanding of health concerns faced by 
northern communities. 
In both indicators—Governance and related International Co-
operation—Canada highlights the importance of cooperation 
in the region as well as recognizing the Arctic Council as the 
most relevant and key institution for “deepening global under-
standing of the Arctic” (Canada INAC 2009, 35). Canada also 
emphasizes the need to strengthen the Arctic Council, improve 
the “coordination and maximize efficiencies,” and “enhance the 
capacity of the Permanent Participant organizations” (Canada 
CC 2013, 2).
Regarding the Environmental Protection indicator, the two 
documents express the need to protect the marine environment, 
especially in the context of pollution, as well as the need to bal-
ance environmental protection with economic activity. 
For the Pollution indicator, there are differences between the 
Program and the 2009 Strategy. Notably, the Program recogniz-
es pollutants that affect climate change, such as black carbon 
and other short-lived climate pollutants, while the 2009 Strategy 
mentions waste from economic activity and ballast water patho-
gens. As for problem-solving, the Program mentions the Arctic 
Council’s oil pollution agreement, while the Strategy seeks to 
reduce pathogens from ballast water and suggests changes to 
economic activity may help.
With regard to the Climate Change indicator, the only com-
monality between the Program and the Strategy is that miti-
gation and adaptation are mentioned in both documents. The 
Program does not mention frameworks or the role of science in 
climate action, while the Strategy does. 
While in the 2009 Strategy, security is described extensively in 
the Security indicator, in the chairmanship program it is not re-
flected at all. 
For the Safety indicator, the two documents express a desire for 
maritime safety. As for ways to address safety issues, the Pro-
gram mentions the IMO and Polar Code, whereas the Strategy 
mentions domestic regulations, like NORDREG. 
For the Economy indicator, resource development is mentioned 
in both documents. Yet, while natural resources are an import-
ant aspect of the economic discussion in the 2009 Strategy, the 
Program identifies “responsible Arctic resource development” 
(Canada CC 2013, 2) as a priority, although it does not actually 
speak to what resources will be developed and how. Instead, it 
focuses on how the Arctic Council can help and mentions the 
need for sustainability. 
The Tourism indicator is reflected in the 2009 Strategy mainly in 
connection to the “increased number of ships undertaking des-
tination travel for tourism” (Canada INAC 2009, 5). The second 
chairmanship program follows up on that with reference to the 
establishment of “guidelines for sustainable tourism and cruise-
ship operations” (Canada CC 2013, 3).
The only similarity to the Infrastructure indicator is that both 
documents address shipping, particularly in relation to safety. 
 
The only similarity between the documents with regard to Sci-
ence and Education is that the importance of traditional knowl-
edge is recognized in both. 
The first Finnish Chairmanship began in 2000 (until 2002), 
eight years before the release of its first Arctic Strategy. The sec-
ond Strategy was released in 2013 and was in effect during Fin-
land’s second Chairmanship from 2017–2019. The current 2013 
Strategy and 2017–2019 Program will now be compared. 
In the Human Dimension, both the current Strategy and lat-
est Program mention improving mental wellness. However, the 
Program takes the discussion further and address suicide pre-
vention (Finland FC 2017, 15). A difference between the two 
documents is that the Program explicitly addresses improving 
“gender equality in the Arctic Council” (Finland FC 2017, 15), 
while the Strategy less so. 
The Governance and International Cooperation indicators un-
derline the relevance of multilateral cooperation to solve com-
mon challenges. Interestingly, while the Strategy quite exten-
sively supports the “EU’s policy towards the Arctic” and “the 
reinforcement of its role in the region” (Finland PMO 2013, 47), 
the chairmanship program does not talk about the EU at all. 
For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents 
state that an ecosystem-based management structure is im-
portant to regional environmental protection. However, the 
2013 Strategy speaks more about finding a balance between the 
environment and the economy, whereas the Program focuses 
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more on biodiversity. This suggests either that Finland’s envi-
ronmental focus changed over time, or that there were lessons 
learned from the feedback of the 2010 Arctic Strategy. 
In terms of the Pollution indicator, only four pollutants are 
mentioned in both documents, including short-lived climate 
forcers, black carbon, methane, and oil, while the 2013 Strategy 
additionally mentions greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide, ra-
dioactive material, economic waste, and local waste. As for pol-
lution problem-solving, the Program identifies six approaches 
and the Strategy four. Yet, the only overlap is with respect to 
acknowledging the Arctic Council’s oil spill agreement and 
changes to economic activity. 
For the Climate Change indicator, both documents recognize 
the importance of science and research for climate action and 
that both mitigation and adaptation strategies are needed. In 
terms of understanding the contexts in which this kind of work 
can be done, there are, however, differences between the two 
documents. Notably, the Strategy makes a general reference to 
“global climate negotiations” (Finland PMO 2013, 13) while 
the Program mentions the UNFCCC, IPCC, and the Paris 
Agreement. A key difference is that the Strategy names climate 
change as a security issue whereas the Program does not. 
In the case of the Security indicator, both documents illustrate 
the importance of maintaining “the Arctic as a region of peace, 
stability and constructive cooperation” (Finland FC 2017, 5). 
Security and stability in the Arctic region are considered as vital 
for any activities and efforts to develop the economy. While the 
Strategy refers to the rather traditional way of understanding of 
security in connection to “foreign and security policies” (Fin-
land PMO 2013, 14) (including crime prevention), the Program 
reflects health and food security, as well as maritime security.
The Safety indicator shows some similarities in safety issues, 
such as SAR and transport/shipping safety. As for environmen-
tal safety, the Strategy suggests that pollution is the priority, 
whereas the Program suggests that climate and weather are en-
vironmental concerns. To address safety issues, both documents 
recognize the importance of satellite monitoring and communi-
cations, as well as the role of the IMO and Polar Code and the 
Arctic Council’s SAR agreement as structural frameworks for 
maritime safety. 
For the Economy indicator, the Program mentions only two eco-
nomic activities: fishing and reindeer husbandry, both of which 
were identified among the twelve activities mentioned in the 
Strategy. The Strategy provides much more information about 
how the economy will be prioritized. One key issue is addressed 
in both documents: that business development requires com-
munications and information networks. As this is mentioned in 
documents that were written four years apart, this suggests that 
more work is needed in this area. 
The Tourism indicator is briefly addressed in the Program in re-
lation to the increase in cooperation between the Arctic Council 
and the Arctic Economic Council to support “business-to-busi-
ness activities and responsible economic development” (Finland 
FC 2017, 5). This approach is also supported in the 2013 Strategy 
by focusing on increasing the level of sustainable tourism.
For the Infrastructure indicator, both documents refer to trans-
portation infrastructure, including icebreakers and shipping, as 
well as telecommunications and ICT, housing, and energy in-
frastructure. There are some similarities and differences in how 
these issues are discussed. A similarity, for example, is that ac-
cess to energy and energy efficiency are mentioned in both docu-
ments. A difference is that, while the Strategy mentions that ice-
breakers serve a variety of functions (economic, research, etc.), 
the Program only mentions them in relation to research. 
For the Science and Education indicator, climate change is 
identified as the driver behind scientific activities in both doc-
uments. Both documents indicate that research would be for 
decision-making purposes, while the Strategy also notes that re-
search can be used for economic, social, governance purposes, 
and regional influence. Traditional knowledge is also acknowl-
edged in both documents, although the use of this knowledge 
is more explicit in the Program. In terms of education, only the 
UArctic is mentioned in both documents, but only in relation to 
the UArctic International Secretariat in the Strategy. In contrast, 
the Program links the UArctic to teacher training. 
Iceland’s two strategy documents (2009, 2011) were released be-
tween Iceland’s two chairmanships (2000–2002 and 2019–2021). 
As such, the most current Strategy (2011) (Iceland Althingi. 
2011) and Program (2019) will be compared. 
There are some similarities between the current Strategy and 
current Program in the Human Dimension indicator. For exam-
ple, they both express the importance of wellbeing and of gender 
equality. However, gender is only mentioned in passing in the 
Strategy, while the Program contextualizes gender equality in 
sustainable development. Both documents also mention Indig-
enous Peoples, although the Strategy speaks about Indigenous 
rights, whereas the Program only discusses Indigenous Peoples 
in relation to the Permanent Participants. 
In the International Cooperation and Governance indicators, 
the Icelandic Strategy expresses the need for inclusion of all 
eight Arctic states in discussions or important decisions. Iceland 
clearly states the disagreement with an approach in which “other 
members of the Arctic Council, i.e. Iceland, Finland, Sweden and 
representatives of Arctic Indigenous peoples, were excluded from 
the meetings” (Iceland Althingi 2011, 6) of the five littoral Arc-
tic states (e.g., Ilulissat Declaration 2008). In the Program, Ice-
land stresses the importance of “cooperation between the states 
and peoples,” as well as to “strengthen cooperation between the 
Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council” (Iceland MFA 
2019, 2, 10). In the Program there is no mention of the exclusion 
from discussions or decisions by the five Arctic states.
For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents 
indicate that environmental protection and economic activ-
ities must be developed through sustainable practices, while 
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the Program focuses more on the marine environment than 
the Strategy does. 
The Pollution indicator suggests more concern and awareness 
of regional pollution between the 2011 Strategy and the 2019 
Program. More specifically, the Strategy mentions only green-
house gases, whereas the Program identifies short-lived climate 
pollutants, black carbon, methane, marine litter, and plastics as 
pollution problems. The two documents also take different ap-
proaches to problem-solving. For instance, the Program focuses 
on the work of the Arctic Council through the Expert Group on 
Black Carbon and Methane, and the Regional Action Plan for 
marine litter, while the Strategy looks at other international fo-
rums, such as the UNCLOS, the UNFCCC, and the IMO, as well 
as through international cooperation, monitoring, and changes 
to economic activities.
 
For the Climate Change indicator, both documents acknowl-
edge that scientific research is important, although the Pro-
gram is more explicit about the role that science plays in cli-
mate action. Mitigation and adaptation are mentioned in the 
Program but not in the Strategy. As for frameworks, the Strategy 
mentions the UNFCCC, while the Program does not mention 
specific frameworks, but recognizes that frameworks are imple-
mented at the state level. 
Despite Iceland having no army, the Security indicator is dis-
cussed quite broadly in the Strategy, especially in connection 
to strengthening security and prevention of militarization. The 
Strategy also refers to NATO and its increasing role in the re-
gion. The Program specifically mentions only the promotion of 
safety in regard to shipping and marine traffic. 
There is some consistency in the Safety indicator with regard 
to understanding regional safety issues. For instance, both doc-
uments acknowledge maritime safety, SAR, and emergencies/
civil preparedness as concerns, while the Strategy also mentions 
environmental safety and surveillance. Both documents discuss 
how international cooperation can improve safety, although in 
different ways. For example, the Strategy recognizes more ‘tra-
ditional’ forms of state-to-state cooperation with activities like 
surveillance and SAR, whereas the Program recognizes that 
safety cooperation also takes place through SAR cooperation, as 
well as through weather and ocean research. The Strategy also 
mentions other governance organizations, such as the Arctic 
Council (SAR agreement), IMO, and NATO. 
The Economy indicator shows some overlap and divergence in 
the economic activities mentioned in the Strategy and the Pro-
gram. In terms of overlap, both documents mention tourism. 
The Program mentions green energy, while the Strategy men-
tions renewable energy; the Program mentions living marine 
resources while the Strategy mentions fisheries (and that fish are 
living marine resources). The divergence is interesting, as the 
Strategy mentions oil and gas, and mining, while the Program 
mentions bioeconomy and shipping. While the differences are 
not major, it does indicate a possible shift toward more green or 
sustainable economic activities. 
The Tourism indicator is briefly mentioned in both documents 
but in different contexts. While the Program talks about tour-
ism as one of the “new economic opportunities” (Iceland MFA 
2019, 9), the Strategy illustrates the connection of utilizing the 
Arctic resources for different industries, including tourism.
In terms of the Infrastructure indicator, the only similarity be-
tween the Strategy and the Program are discussions around safe 
shipping, although the Program also calls for shipping to be sus-
tainable. Moreover, the Program mentions telecoms and ICT, 
and energy infrastructure, while the Strategy mentions infra-
structure for air transportation. 
For the Science and Education indicator, both documents ex-
plain that climate change is a driver for research, while the Strat-
egy also mentions the environment and social issues. The two 
documents diverge on the purposes of research, with the Pro-
gram recognizing that it can help inform policy and the Strat-
egy arguing that research can help international cooperation. 
Interestingly, traditional knowledge is not addressed in either 
document. Education is mentioned only in the context of the 
UArctic. 
The Kingdom of Denmark released its first Strategy one year 
prior (2008) to the commencement of its Chairmanship (2009-
2011), and its second one in 2011, the year its Chairmanship 
concluded. The Chairmanship Program will thus be compared 
to the most recent policy (2011). 
In terms of the Human Dimension indicator, both documents 
address Indigenous peoples, although with some differences. 
For example, the Program addresses the role of the Permanent 
Participants in the Arctic Council and improving the wellbeing 
of Indigenous peoples, as well as ensuring traditional lifestyles 
are preserved, while the Strategy mentions hunting. The Strat-
egy differs in the sense that it provides considerable discussion 
on Indigenous rights in Greenland, through UNDRIP and other 
UN mechanisms. 
Concerning the Governance and International Cooperation 
indicators, the Program focuses on the importance of a strong 
Arctic Council to “safeguard the inherent cultural, economic 
and political rights of the Arctic states and of the Peoples of the 
Arctic” (Denmark DCAC 2009, 8). The Program also supports 
“international outreach, research and co-operation” (Den-
mark DCAC 2009, 1) with neighboring countries in different 
policy fields. The Strategy on the other hand, elaborates more 
on international law in order “to ensure a peaceful, secure and 
collaborative Arctic” (Denmark MFA 2011, 7). It also reflects 
on the self-government and the division of legislative and 
administrative powers between Denmark, the Faroe Islands, 
and Greenland.
There are similarities in the topics addressed in the Environ-
mental Protection indicator, as both documents discuss bio-
diversity and animal protection, as well as the need to balance 
environmental protection with economic activities. However, 
the Strategy also discusses protected areas, which the Program 
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does not. The Strategy discusses, too, the use of ecosystem- 
based management, while the Program does not. These two 
differences suggest that the Kingdom of Denmark’s under-
standing of environmental protection may have evolved 
during its Chairmanship. 
There are a number of similarities in the Pollution indicator 
with regard to the regional pollutants identified. Indeed, both 
documents mention greenhouse gases, heavy metals, mercury, 
oil, and economic waste. Additionally, the Strategy mentions 
man-made pollution, POPS, and chemicals. Correspondingly, 
the Program mentions only greenhouse gas reduction, where-
as the strategy mentions this, five other international treaties 
or governance regulations, and other practices like changes to 
economic activities. In both cases, the Strategy shows growth 
in Denmark’s understanding of the sources of pollution and 
mechanisms to address it. 
For the Climate Change indicator, both documents address 
mitigation and adaptation, although with different empha-
ses. For instance, half the quotes in the Program address 
mitigation, while the other half address adaptation. In con-
trast, the majority of quotes on this issue address adaptation 
in the Strategy. Nevertheless, both documents recognize that 
research is important for climate action. The two documents 
also acknowledge the UNFCCC, while the Strategy alludes to 
the creation of the Paris Agreement. One key difference is that 
the Strategy recognizes the impact climate change could have 
on illegal fishing. 
The Program does not address the Security indicator at all. The 
Kingdom’s approach to security policy is broadly described in 
the Strategy, emphasizing the prevention of conflicts, sover-
eignty, confidence-building, and international relationships. 
The Strategy also talks about the establishment of the Arctic 
Response Force and NATO as a reference to the protection of 
its territory under the Article 5 of collective defence. 
There are also some similarities and differences in the Safe-
ty indicator. For instance, both documents recognize that 
SAR and maritime safety are important, while the Strategy 
also mentions environmental, disaster, health, and occupa-
tional safety. There are some similarities in how safety is ad-
dressed. For instance, both documents identify the IMO as a 
safety actor: the Program calls for cooperation on SAR while 
the Strategy mentions the adoption of the Arctic Council’s 
SAR agreement. International cooperation is also addressed 
in both documents, especially in terms of creating maritime 
safety guidelines, while the Program also mentions informa-
tion sharing. As for differences, the Strategy also recognizes 
UNCLOS as a safety actor and the importance of surveillance. 
For the Economic indicator, both documents mention tour-
ism, oil and gas, and renewables. The Strategy also mentions 
mining, fisheries, and exports. The Strategy provides sugges-
tions on how to further prioritize economic development, 
while the Program does not. 
Tourism is mentioned in the Program in relation to the develop-
ment of guidelines for the responsible management of resourc-
es in the light of increased activities in the region. The Strategy 
talks about tourism as being the second “most important export 
industry” after fisheries in Greenland (Denmark MFA 2011, 23). 
At the same time, the Strategy addresses both “land-based tour-
ism and the cruise-liner business” (Denmark MFA 2011, 23).
There are two similarities in the Infrastructure indicator: First 
is that both documents discuss shipping, although the Program 
does so in the context of the Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
ment, while the Strategy looks the possibility of new routes 
opening and safety issues. The second similarity is in regard to 
energy, with the Program commenting that heating through the 
use of fossil fuels is expensive and the Strategy building on this 
idea and discussing options for the generation, supply, and de-
livery of renewables. 
For the Science and Education indicator, both documents iden-
tify climate change and pollution as research drivers, while the 
Strategy additionally mentions the environment. Regarding the 
purposes of research, there is only one common purpose men-
tioned in both documents, namely, that research can help with 
social issues, particularly in the area of health. Additionally, both 
documents make statements about using traditional knowledge 
alongside scientific knowledge. Education is discussed only in 
the Strategy with reference to the UArctic and increasing educa-
tional opportunities for economic reasons. 
Norway’s first Strategy was released the same year as it held its 
first Arctic Council Chairmanship (2006–2009). Since then, 
Norway has released four strategies in 2009, 2011, 2014, and 
2017. The chairmanship program will thus be compared to the 
most recent (2017) Strategy. 
For the Human Dimension indicator, both documents address 
culture and languages, in two somewhat similar ways. First, 
both documents speak about Indigenous culture. For instance, 
the Program recognizes that “environmental change in the Arc-
tic will affect … Indigenous cultures” (Norway 2006, 1), and 
the Strategy remarks that Indigenous language and culture 
need to be protected. Second, both documents discuss culture 
as experiential. The Program, for example, talks about cultural 
monuments and world heritage sites, while the Strategy posi-
tions “cultural heritage” in the context of tourism (Norway MFA 
2017, 24). 
Both documents address the Governance and International 
Cooperation indicators in connection with close international 
cooperation at different levels and particularly within the envi-
ronmental field. The Arctic Council is considered the most rel-
evant body for cooperation in the region. The Strategy further 
describes other platforms where Norway cooperates—“the Bar-
ents cooperation, the Baltic Sea cooperation, and the Northern 
Dimension” (Norway MFA 2017, 17). The Program also men-
tions the World Heritage Convention. 
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For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents 
remark that environmental protection and economic develop-
ment must be balanced. It is thus not surprising that the Pro-
gram and Strategy also mention the use of ecosystem-based 
management10 to ensure this takes place. Additionally, the two 
documents state that biodiversity needs to be protected. 
There are some differences for the Pollution indicator. In par-
ticular, the Program mentions only chemicals and radioactive 
material as regional pollutants. In contrast, the Strategy, written 
11 years later, also identifies greenhouse gases, PBTs, oil, mil-
itary waste, microplastics, marine litter, and local pollution in 
addition to radioactive materials. This suggests that Norway is 
keeping pace with pollution, especially as it refers microplastics 
in its Strategy. As for approaches to pollution problem-solv-
ing, the only similarity between the documents is their call for 
international cooperation. Otherwise, the Program also men-
tions pollution research and sharing best practices, while the 
Strategy identifies formal structures like the Paris Agreement, 
the Arctic Council’s oil spill agreement, and enforcement of do-
mestic legislation. 
One key difference in the Climate Change indicator is that while 
both documents discuss mitigation and adaptation, the Strategy 
does not use these terms explicitly. Both documents also stress 
that science is the basis for further knowledge about climate 
change, while the Strategy mentions putting this knowledge 
into action. As for frameworks, the Program mentions the UN-
FCCC and the Strategy mentions the Paris Agreement, suggest-
ing that Norway is part of a larger, international effort to address 
climate change. 
The Program reflects briefly on the Security indicator only once, 
mentioning that the Arctic is a “stable and peaceful region,” un-
like “many other petroleum provinces of the world which are 
characterized by conflicts and political unrest” (Norway 2006, 
2). The Strategy provides a broader understanding of the se-
curity in the region. The Strategy confirms that “foreign policy 
should lay the foundation for peace and stability in the region” 
(Norway MFA 2017, 9). At the same time, it describes the “role 
played by the Norwegian Armed Forces in exercising sovereign-
ty and authority” (Norway MFA 2017, 18). For the first time, 
a Norwegian strategy comments on the increase of “Russian 
military activity in the North” (Norway MFA 2017, 18) which 
should be considered an important factor for Norway’s security 
and defence policy. The Strategy also addresses the measures to 
strengthen defence capabilities in the North. 
The Program has nothing to say about the Safety indicator, 
whereas the Strategy identifies different safety issues, interna-
tional safety and SAR agreements, speaks about safety coopera-
tion, and discusses different capabilities. 
There is some overlap between economic activities in the Econ-
omy indicator. Both the Program and the Strategy mention oil 
10  The Strategy mentions only ecosystem-based management as a strategic objective and does not provide much detail on the topic (Norway MFA 2017, 15). 
and gas, mining, fishing, reindeer husbandry, and shipping. This 
overlap suggests that these are key economic activities. Addi-
tionally, the Program mentions fossil fuels, hunting, and tech-
nology, while the Strategy mentions renewables, aquaculture, 
blue economy, tourism, cultural products, and biotechnology. 
Sustainable development is also mentioned in both documents, 
although the Strategy provides a more nuanced discussion as to 
what this entails. 
The Tourism indicator is discussed in the Program, in accor-
dance to the Strategy, in relation to the establishment of guide-
lines and infrastructure for responsible and sustainable devel-
opment of the Arctic resources and activities. 
There is nothing in the Program under the Infrastructure indi-
cator, whereas the Strategy discusses transportation, icebreak-
ers, shipping, telecommunications and ICT, innovation and 
technology, and energy infrastructure. 
For the Science and Education indicator, both documents 
identify climate change as a driver of science, while the Pro-
gram also mentions pollution and the Strategy mentions the 
environment. Both documents mention decision-making sup-
port as a purpose of Science. Additionally, the Program notes 
that science can also be used to help the economy, while the 
Strategy notes that it can help improve knowledge of the Arc-
tic, and for education. There are no similarities between the 
documents with respect to education. Indeed, the Program 
acknowledges only the UArctic, while the Strategy addresses 
educational attainment levels and comments that education 
can be used for economic reasons. 
The first formal strategy of the Russian Federation was released 
in 2008, two years after the conclusion of its chairmanship 
(2004–2006). The second Strategy was released in 2013, and this 
will be compared to the chairmanship Program.
 
Regarding the Human Dimension indicator, both documents 
express a desire to protect traditional Indigenous ways of life 
and Indigenous culture. The Strategy explains that cultural in-
frastructure and activities (Indigenous and not) will also be de-
veloped. Both documents also address wellbeing, but in differ-
ent ways. The Program, for instance, speaks about health and at 
times connects this back to the environment. The Strategy also 
mentions health concerns, but also more broadly speaks about 
conditions that affect wellbeing, such as access to telecommuni-
cations, employment, and access to social services. 
For the Governance and International Cooperation indicators, 
both Russian documents emphasize the need for “enhancing 
international cooperation in the field of environmental protec-
tion” (Russia MFA 2004, 3). The Arctic Council is considered to 
be a “unique forum for interaction” (Russia MFA 2004, 1) of dif-
ferent stakeholders. In the Program, Russia also calls for a more 
substantial and balanced contribution of the Arctic Council to 
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resolve the challenges connected to “sustainable development of 
the Arctic” (Russia MFA 2004, 1). 
For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents 
discuss the need to balance environmental protection with eco-
nomic development and the protection of biodiversity. One dif-
ference is that the Strategy discusses the creation of protected 
areas while the Program does not. 
Regarding the Pollution indicator, the Program notes only that 
man-made pollution is a problem. The Strategy mentions oil, 
economic activities, and military waste as pollutants—all of 
which are man-made. While the Strategy does not name all the 
pollutants it could (compared to the other strategies), it is more 
specific than the Program. The documents also differ somewhat 
in how they address pollution problem-solving. The Program 
only makes reference to the work of the Arctic Council, in-
cluding the Russia-specific Russian Program of Action for the 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based 
Activities. In contrast, the Strategy does not reference Arctic 
Council activities, but also mentions pollution monitoring, 
changing domestic practices, and changing economic practices. 
Considering the nine years between the Program and Strategy 
there has been progress in cleaning up the environment. 
The Climate Change indicator is discussed differently in the two 
documents. For example, the Program refers to the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol, while the Strategy notes that climate 
change needs to be studied. Neither document mentions miti-
gation and/or adaptation. 
In the Program, the Security indicator is discussed in terms of 
the need for measures “to protect, preserve and restore the Arc-
tic environment, [and] enhance environmental security, includ-
ing prevention of ecological emergencies” (Russia MFA 2004, 
4). The Strategy describes “the establishment of integrated secu-
rity system for the protection of territory, population and crit-
ical facilities” of the Russian Arctic (Russia TRG 2013, 4). The 
Strategy also indicates the need for a “comprehensive combat 
and mobilization readiness level” of the armed forces required 
for “aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, to 
ensure the sovereign rights of Russia’s Arctic,” to provide “strate-
gic deterrence, and in the event of armed conflict - repel aggres-
sion and cessation of hostilities” (Russia TRG 2013, 8). 
For the Safety indicator, both documents recognize that en-
vironmental safety and SAR are important: the Program and 
Strategy mention the need to be prepared, for, respectively, gen-
eral emergencies and for disasters, and to improve transport 
safety. Both documents state that international cooperation for 
rescue operations is important, while the Strategy also discusses 
surveillance capabilities.
 
The Economy indicator shows different ways in which regional 
economic activities are understood. The Program mentions the 
use of natural resources, oil and gas, and renewable energy. The 
Strategy mentions hydrocarbons, but also identifies hunting, 
fishing, bioprospecting, biotechnology, and technology. 
The Tourism indicator is reflected only in the Strategy and is 
fully excluded from the Program. The Strategy addresses the 
intention of the Russian Federation to develop and expand 
“environmentally friendly tourism activities in the Arctic.” The 
Strategy also emphasizes the need for improvement of “the reg-
ulatory framework of tourism” (Russia TRG 2013, 3).
As for the Infrastructure indicator, both documents discuss 
transportation, shipping, and telecommunications and ICT. 
The discussion around telecoms and ICT is interesting as the 
Program seeks cooperation on developing these networks and 
also using them for health services. The Strategy also recognizes 
the need to improve this infrastructure, especially as it can help 
with social and economic conditions, research, and safety. The 
fact that this is still being discussed nine years later suggests the 
complexity of this type of infrastructure in the Arctic. 
For the Science and Education indicator, both documents iden-
tify climate change as a driver of research, and both explain that 
research is also used to help with international cooperation. 
However, the Strategy provides more information and indi-
cates that science is also driven by the environment and natural 
hazards, while research can also help with economic and so-
cial issues. Neither document mentions the role of traditional 
knowledge. As for education, the Strategy explains the need for 
distance-learning opportunities, while the Program suggests 
that the UArctic can possibly help with education on a number 
of issues. Educational attainment levels are addressed only in 
the Strategy, and within the context of improving people’s em-
ployment opportunities. 
Sweden’s Strategy was released in 2011, the year its Arctic 
Council chairmanship began. As Sweden only has one Strategy, 
this will be compared to the chairmanship Program. 
In the Human Dimension indicator, both documents brief-
ly identify gender as an issue. The Program calls generally for 
gender equality, while the Strategy more clearly indicates that 
increased gender issues are needed in international organiza-
tions. A difference between the two documents is that the Strat-
egy addresses human rights by mentioning both UNDRIP and 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the Program 
does not. 
Concerning the International Cooperation and Governance 
indicators, both documents emphasize that despite substantial 
challenges, “cooperation in the Arctic is characterised by a low 
level of conflict and broad consensus” (Sweden GOS 2011b, 1). 
The Arctic Council is considered as “the main multilateral arena 
for Arctic-specific issues” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 19). The Strate-
gy further mentions their desire to strengthen the Arctic Coun-
cil “both institutionally and politically” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 
19) (see also, Kiruna Vision (Arctic Council Secretariat 2013)). 
It also describes the cooperation with other organizations in the 
region as well as the need to respect international law in devel-
oping the Arctic.
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For the Environmental Protection indicator, both documents 
support the creation of protected areas and the protection of 
biodiversity. Both also mention the need to balance environ-
mental protection with economic activity and suggest that 
an ecosystem-based management may be the way to achieve 
this balance. 
For the Pollution indicator, there are similarities in the pollut-
ants identified. For instance, both documents mention short-
lived climate forcers, greenhouse gases, methane, mercury, and 
oil. The Program also mentions black carbon, and the Strategy 
identifies POPs, PTBs, PCBs, chemicals in general, soot, and 
waste from economic activity. Yet, despite these similarities, 
the only comment on pollution problem-solving, mentioned in 
both documents, is the need to reduce greenhouse gases.
 
For the Climate Change indicator, both documents address 
mitigation and adaptation, support the use of science to better 
understand climate change, and make reference to the IPCC. In 
addition, the Strategy also mentions the UNFCCC. What really 
stands out, however, is that the Strategy names climate change 
as a security factor, and the Program does not. Although securi-
ty, and military security in particular, is not normally addressed 
in the Arctic Council, the Strategy frames this threat as an issue 
of “public crisis management” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 14), an is-
sue that could have been addressed in the Program but is not.
The Security indicator is mentioned in the Program only in re-
lation to food safety and access to good quality water as being 
a matter of constant concern to the region’s inhabitants. The 
Strategy elaborates a little more on security, underlining that 
the Arctic remains a region where security policy tensions are 
low. Moreover, the Strategy emphasizes the “importance of an 
approach based on security in its broadest sense and that the 
use of civil instruments is preferable to military means” (Swe-
den GOS 2011a, 23). 
For the Safety indicator, both documents mention environmen-
tal and maritime safety, while the Strategy also mentions SAR, 
surveillance, and transport safety. To address these safety issues, 
the Program mentions working toward oil spill prevention ca-
pabilities and the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping As-
sessment, while the Strategy mentions the Arctic Council SAR 
agreement and the efforts toward creating the IMO’s Polar Code. 
Regarding the Economy indicator, economic activities referred 
to in both documents are mining, oil and gas, and shipping. The 
Strategy identifies a broad range of activities, including but not 
limited to cold climate expertise, bioprospecting, and forestry. 
The Tourism indicator is described only in the Strategy. A fur-
ther development of the tourism is mentioned, “albeit with con-
sideration for the environment and the traditional lifestyles of 
Indigenous peoples.” Furthermore, “communications between 
tourist destinations should be improved in a sustainable man-
ner” (Sweden GOS 2011a, 6). 
The only similarity between the two documents regarding In-
frastructure is that both mention shipping and address safety is-
sues, while the Strategy also comments on the possibility of new 
routes opening. 
For the Science and education indicator, both documents identi-
fy the environment and climate change as drivers of science. De-
spite these similarities, the two documents note that research can 
be used for different purposes. For instance, the Program notes 
that it can be used to help with social issues and decision-mak-
ing, while the Strategy notes that research can help with gover-
nance, cooperation, and regional influence. Both documents also 
comment on preserving traditional knowledge, and the Strategy 
comments on the need to improve the sharing of traditional and 
scientific knowledge. Education is not addressed in the program; 
however, the UArctic is mentioned in the Strategy. 
The USA’s first chairmanship was from 1998–2000, but the USA 
did not publish its first strategy until 2009 with the release of 
the presidential and homeland security directives. This was then 
followed by the 2013 Strategy, two years before the USA’s sec-
ond chairmanship (2015–2017). Thus, the 2013 Strategy and the 
2015–2017 chairmanship Program will be compared. It should 
be noted that as the Program is short and in brochure form, com-
parison may be limited. 
Regarding the Human Dimension indicator, the two documents 
discuss Indigenous peoples in different ways. The Program, for 
example, mentions only that the Permanent Participants will 
work with the Arctic Council on environmental issues, while the 
Strategy recognizes the role of Indigenous governments, Indig-
enous-state relations, and respecting Indigenous cultures. An-
other difference is that the Program addresses mental wellness, 
while the Strategy does not address health and wellbeing at all. 
The International Cooperation and Governance indicators are 
mentioned in both documents in connection to the important 
role of the Arctic Council as the “preeminent international fo-
rum for promoting cooperation” (USA CAC 2015, 5). The AC 
promotes “cooperation, coordination and interaction among 
the Arctic States, Indigenous communities and other interested 
parties on common Arctic issues, with particular emphasis on 
sustainable development and environmental protection” (USA 
CAC 2015, 5). The Strategy further reflects on the accession of 
the USA to UNCLOS.
Regarding the Environmental Protection indicator, both docu-
ments recognize the need to balance environmental protection 
with economic activities. The Program also discusses marine 
protected areas, while the Strategy speaks more generally about 
preservation. 
There are some similarities in the Pollution indicator, with both 
documents identifying black carbon and methane as pollutants 
found in the region. The Program also more generally mentions 
short-lived climate pollution, while the Strategy mentions mer-
cury and oil. Regarding pollution problem-solving strategies, 
the two documents provide different options. The Program calls 
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for the reduction of short-lived climate forcers, while the Strat-
egy mentions the Arctic Council’s oil pollution agreement, the 
need for pollution research, international cooperation, and de-
velopment of national pollution strategies. 
The only similarity in the Climate Change indicator is that both 
documents mention adaptation. Interestingly, the Strategy links 
climate change to increased energy security. 
The Program briefly addresses the Security indicator in relation 
to the increased human and maritime activity in the Arctic. The 
Strategy illustrates that the US “security in the Arctic encom-
passes a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those sup-
porting safe commercial and scientific operations to national 
defense” (USA TWH 2013, 2). For the first time, the Strategy 
also mentions energy security as a core component of the na-
tional security. Furthermore, the USA supports “the enhance-
ment of national defense, law enforcement, navigation safety, 
marine environment response, and search-and-rescue capabili-
ties” (USA TWH 2013, 6).
Following from this, for the Safety indicator, both documents 
comment on environmental safety and SAR as safety issues. 
Regarding safety agreements and capabilities, each document 
mentions the Arctic Council’s SAR agreement. 
For the Economy indicator, the Program does not mention any 
economic activities (or anything about the economy for that 
matter), whereas the Strategy mentions energy, oil and gas, re-
newables, shipping, and export trade. 
None of the documents reflect on the Tourism indicator.
For the Infrastructure indicator, the only similarity is that both 
documents address innovation and technology. For the Pro-
gram, this includes finding solutions for “energy and water se-
curity” (USA CAC 2015, 2), whereas the Strategy suggests that, 
in general, technology can support regional infrastructure. 
The two documents identify different research drivers in the 
Science and Education indicator: the Program mentions pollu-
tion, while the Strategy mentions the environment. As for other 
research purposes, the Strategy states that research can inform 
decision-making, while the Program does not mention any 
other purposes. Another difference between the documents is 
the stated importance of traditional knowledge in the Program 
while the Program does not mention it at all. Education is not 
mentioned in either document. 
Finally, concluding this section by a short summary: The Arctic 
Council chairmanship programs tend to focus on issues pertain-
ing to the environment. In the past few years, there has also been 
a focus on pollutants that contribute to climate change. As for the 
social aspect, there is an overall focus on health and wellbeing, 
as well as culture and/or language protection. Gender equality 
shows up on the agenda every few years or so. Maritime safety 
has also emerged as a safety concern over the past few programs. 
Declarations
This section analyzes the Ottawa Declaration, which provides 
the foundation for the work of the Arctic Council, as well as 
the ten ministerial declarations that followed, from Iqaluit in 
1998 to Fairbanks in 2017 (see, List of declarations in appen-
dix). The Kiruna ministerial meeting also adopted a special 
Vision for the Arctic paper produced by the Arctic Council 
Secretariat (Kiruna Vision 2013). The 2019 Rovaniemi Minis-
terial meeting failed to produce a signed declaration because 
consensus could not be reached on the issue of climate change. 
Instead, the Rovaniemi Joint Ministerial Statement 2019 was 
signed by representatives of the eight Arctic states, while the 
Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Timo Soini, also made 
a Statement by the Chair (Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair 
2019). The Statement by the Chair resembles what would have 
been the declaration had all parties agreed to it, and provides 
guidance; that is why it is considered in this analysis. 
Unlike the Arctic state strategies, it is harder to determine 
the priorities of the Arctic Council ministerial declarations, 
as they do not generally include priority statements. Priorities 
can, however, be determined based on the different section 
headings of the document. Table 50 provides this overview 
and it groups similar issues together. Note that the first Iqa-
luit and Barrow declarations do not have headings, making it 
difficult to determine their priorities. The 1996 Ottawa Decla-
ration on the establishment of the Arctic Council also has no 
headings; it was decided to follow Arctic Council procedure 
and to define “common Arctic issues, in particular issues of 
sustainable development and environmental protection in the 
Arctic” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 1) as the two main func-
tions or pillars of the Council. In this study, these were deemed 
to be the priorities of the document. 
In Table 50 below, Ministerial Declaration Priorities, there are 
no striking or relevant similarities per se and a great deal of 
fragmentation. However, when similar issues are looked at 
together, four relevant similarities emerge. First, eight decla-
rations address human and social issues when combining the 
human/social development, health, communities, and capaci-
ty-building priorities. Similarly, eight declarations also priori-
tize the environment, when environmental protection, marine 
environment, biodiversity, flora and fauna, pollution, and con-
taminants are taken together. Seven declarations prioritize cli-
mate change. Seven declarations also address the functioning 
of the Arctic Council, and every declaration since Kiruna in 
2013 has taken on this task. As the permanent Arctic Council 
Secretariat was established in 2013, this suggests that it may 
have identified areas of improvement. 
Taken together, the main priorities would thus seem to be: the 
human dimension, environmental concerns, and ensuring a 
functioning Arctic Council. 
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AC  
Procedure X X X X X X X
International 
cooperation X X*
Human /
social 
development 
X X X X* X* X
Health X
Communities X
Capacity 
building X
Economy X* X*
Energy X
Sustainable 
development X X* X
Env.  
protection X X* X X X*
Marine Env. X X X X X
Climate 
change X X X X X* X X*
Biodiversity X X X
Flora & 
Fauna X
Pollution X X
Contami-
nants X X
Monitoring & 
Assessment X
Science & 
Monitoring X
Int’l Polar 
Year X X
Ocean Safety, 
security, 
stewardship 
X X
Emergencies X X
Table 50. Ministerial Declaration Priorities
*two or more issues were linked in one declaration
The table also shows fragmentation. For example, energy is 
identified only once, and surprisingly emergency preparedness 
only twice, like international cooperation. That said, the discus-
sion in each section reflects a broader range of issues, which is 
why an indicator-by-indicator comparison is necessary. 
11  For example, the Circumpolar Resilience, Engagement and Action Through Story report and the Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program’s State of the 
Arctic Freshwater Biodiversity report are mentioned (Rovanimei Statement by the Chair 2019, 4, 8).
Comparison by Indicator 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator identi-
fies how the Arctic is defined in the context of the Arctic Coun-
cil. Specifically, the Ottawa Declaration’s opening statement 
defines the Arctic in a geopolitical context, stating: “THE REP-
RESENTATIVES of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and 
the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Arc-
tic States) meeting in Ottawa” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 1). 
This definition is not disputed or expanded upon in subsequent 
declarations. 
There is consistency in the terms used to describe the region (see 
Table 51). All declarations primarily use the term “Arctic” while 
also using, to a lesser extent, “circumpolar” with the exception 
of the Rovaniemi Chair Statement which only uses the term as 
part of a proper name.11 Additionally, the Tromsø Declaration 
(2009, 3–4) uses the term “polar” in the context of the IPY. 
Describing the Arctic was not really done until Salekhard in 2006 
and it stopped with Fairbanks in 2017. There is also no consisten-
cy in the terms that are used, although “vulnerable” and “unique” 
are used most often, and in the context of the environment.
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Unique X X X
Remote X
Vulnerable X X X X
Harsh X
Table 51. Describing the Arctic in the Arctic Council Ministerial Declarations 
Each declaration is signed by a representative of the eight Arctic 
states. Table 52 (Arctic State Representation at the Arctic Coun-
cil Ministerial Meetings, p. 147) shows which ministry, depart-
ment, or agency had a representative (either the minister or a 
senior official) attending the ministerial meeting and signing 
the declaration. In the case of the Ottawa Declaration, state rep-
resentatives signed on behalf of their government and not as a 
representative of a particular ministry. 
For each subsequent declaration, signatories were identified 
based on their ministry, department, or agency. Either the 
Premier or the Deputy Premier for Greenland signed for the 
Barrow, Reykjavík, and Nuuk declarations, while the Prime 
Minister of the Faroe Islands was also signatory in Nuuk (Nuuk 
Declaration 2011, 10; Reykjavik 2004, 8; Barrow 2000, 8). Table 
52 also shows consistency from certain states in terms of who 
signed the declarations. For example, Sergey Lavrov represent-
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Canada Finland Iceland Denmark Norway Rusia Sweden USA
Ottawa 
1996
Iqaluit 
1998
Lloyd Axworthy,
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Pekka Haavisto, 
Minister of  
Environment 
Gudmundur 
Bjamasson,
Minister of the
Environment
Niels Helveg 
Petersen,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Knut Vollebaek,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Vladimir Goman, 
Chairman of  
the State  
Committee for 
the Development 
of the North
Anders Bjurner, 
Deputy State 
Secretary
Wendy Sherman,
Ambassador
Barrow 
2000
Mary Simon,
Ambassador
Johannes  
Koskinen,
Minister of  
Justice
Siv Fridleifsdottir,
Minister for the 
Environment
Jonathan 
Motzfeldt,
Premier,  
Greenland  
Home Rule
Johan L. Løvald, 
Assistant  
Secretary  
General
Yuri Tsaturov,
First Deputy 
Head Federal 
Service for
Hydrometerology 
and Environmen-
tal Monitoring
Eva Kettis,
Ambassador
Frank E. Loy,
Under Secretary 
of State for
Global Affairs
Inari
2002
William Graham,
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Erkki Tuomioja,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Halldór Ásgríms-
son, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Ole Samsing,
Senior Arctic 
Official
Kim Traavik,
State Secretary
Roald F. Piskoppel, 
Deputy Minister 
of Economic
Development  
and Trade
Anna Lindh,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Paula Dobriansky,
Under Secretary 
of State
for Global  
Affairs
Reykjavík 
2004
Stéphane Dion,
Minister of the 
Environment
Erkki Tuomioja,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Davíð Oddsson,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Josef Motzfeldt, 
Greenland’s 
Deputy Premier
Jan Petersen,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Laila Freivalds,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Paula Dobriansky,
Under Secretary 
of State
for Global Affairs
Salekhard 
2006
Robert Mills.
Member of  
Parliament
Erkki Tuomioja,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Valgerður  
Sverrisdóttir,  
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Connie  
Hedegaard,  
Minister for the 
Environment
Jonas Gahr Støre,
Minister of For-
eign Affairs
Sergei Lavrov, 
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Carl Bildt,  
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Paula Dobriansky,
Under Secretary 
of State for  
Global Affairs
Tromsø 
2009
Lawrence Cannon, 
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Alexander Stubb, 
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Ásta Ragnheiður 
Jóhannesdóttir, 
Minister of 
Social Affairs
Per Stig Møller, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Jonas Gahr Støre,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Sergey Lavrov, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Carl Bildt, 
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
James Steinberg, 
Deputy Secretary 
of State
Nuuk 
2011
Leona Aglukkaq, 
Minister of Health
Jakko Laajava, 
Under-Secretary 
of State
Össur 
Skarphéðinsson, 
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Lene Espersen, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs; 
Kaj Leo Johannesen, 
Prime Minister 
Faroe Islands; 
Kuupik Kleist,  
Premier  
Greenland
Jonas Gahr Støre,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Sergey Lavrov, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Carl Bildt,  
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Hillary Clinton, 
Secretary of State
Kiruna 
2013
Leona Aglukkaq, 
Minister for the 
Arctic Council
Erkki Tuomioja,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Hermann Örn 
Ingólfsson, 
Director General
Villy Søvndal, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Espen Barth Eide, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Sergey Lavrov, 
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Carl Bildt, 
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
John F. Kerry, 
Secretary of State
Iqaluit 
2015
Rob Nicolson, 
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Erkki Tuomioja,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Gunnar Bragi 
Sveinsson,  
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Martin Lidegaard, 
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Børge Brende, 
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Sergei Donskol, 
Minister of 
Natural Resources 
and Environment
Kristina Persson, 
Minister  
for Nordic 
Cooperation
John Kerry, 
Secretary of State
Fairbanks 
2017
Christina  
Alexandra  
Freeland,
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Timo Saini,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Guðlaugur Þór 
Þórðarson, 
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Anders Samuelsen,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Børge Brende,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Sergey Lavrov,
Minister of 
Foreign Affairs
Margot  
Wallstrbm,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Rex Tillerson,
Secretary of State
Rovaniemi 
2019
Chrustia Freeland, 
Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
Timo Saini,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Guðlaugur Þór 
Þórðarson,  
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Anders  
Samuelsen,  
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Ine Eriksen 
Søreide, Minister 
of Foreign Affairs
Sergey Lavrov
Minister of For-
eign Affairs
Margot  
Wallstrbm,
Minister for 
Foreign Affairs
Michael R. 
Pompeo,
Secretary of  
State
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ed Russia at seven of the ministerial meetings, Erkki Tuomioja 
represented Finland at five, and Carl Bildt represented Sweden 
at four while others have attended only a couple of meetings. Of 
course, who attends depends on the governments of the day of 
the Arctic states; it is thus important to see what position was 
held by the signatories and from which ministry they came. In 
the early years, signatories represented a broad range of minis-
tries, but this began to change around 2002 when, for the most 
part, the signatories were from the Ministry of/for Foreign Af-
fairs (or the State Department in the USA). However, it was not 
until 2017 in Fairbanks that, for the first time, all signatories 
were Minister of/for Foreign Affairs/Secretary of State, and this 
was replicated in the most recent meeting in Rovaniemi. This 
shift, starting in the early 2000s, is suggestive of the growing 
importance of the Arctic and the Arctic Council. 
Regarding the content of the declarations, Figure 17 (Compar-
ison of Arctic Council Ministerial Declarations, p. 149) shows 
that International Cooperation, Governance, Human Dimen-
sion and Environmental Protection to be the most-quoted in-
dicators across time. In contrast, Tourism and Security are the 
least-quoted indicators across time, and in some cases, are not 
mentioned at all.
The Figure also shows that, over time, more topics are ad-
dressed and in greater detail. This is suggestive of both the 
expanding mandate of the Arctic Council and the growing im-
portance of new concerns, such as Climate Change (after the 
launch of the ACIA Report in 2004) and Infrastructure. 
The Human Dimension indicator reveals some similarities 
and differences in priorities regarding the Human dimension 
in the Arctic. Table 53 shows that Indigenous peoples, and 
especially the Permanent Participants, are addressed in ev-
ery declaration. Indeed, all declarations make statements that 
recognize and value the contributions of Indigenous peoples 
to the Arctic Council. For example, the first Iqaluit Declara-
tion comments that “the category of Permanent Participation 
is created to provide for active participation and full consul-
tation with the Arctic Indigenous representatives within the 
Arctic Council” (Iqaluit 1998, 1). There are also repeated re-
quests for financial support for the Permanent Participants. 
For example, the Nuuk Declaration reiterates “the need to 
finance circumpolar cooperation, as well as the importance 
of providing adequate funding to Permanent Participants to 
support their preparations for, and participation in, the Arctic 
Council, the working groups, task forces and Arctic Council 
projects” (Nuuk 2011, 9). Seven declarations also address In-
digenous culture and languages. For instance, in the second 
Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6) the Ministers of the eight Arctic 
states: “Recognize the importance of Arctic Indigenous lan-
guages in empowering Arctic communities, and look forward 
to continuous efforts to assess and promote Arctic Indigenous 
languages through the Arctic Council”, while the Rovaniemi 
Chair Statement notes that the Council “welcomed the con-
clusions of the Teacher Education for Diversity and Equality 
in the Arctic project, including the call to promote Indigenous 
languages in education, as well as national and regional mea-
sures taken in relation to the International Year of Indigenous 
Languages declared by the United Nations General Assembly 
in 2019” (2019, 9).
O
tta
wa
 1
99
6
Iq
al
ui
t 1
99
8
Ba
rr
ow
 2
00
0
In
ar
i 2
00
2
Re
yk
ja
ví
k 
20
04
Sa
le
kh
ar
d 
20
06
Tr
om
sø
 2
00
9
N
uu
k 
20
11
K
ir
un
a 2
01
3
Iq
al
ui
t 2
01
5
Fa
irb
an
ks
 2
01
7
Ro
va
ni
em
i 2
01
9
Permanent 
Participants X X X X X X X X X X X X
Culture and 
language rec-
ognition and / 
or protection
X X X X X X X
Gender 
equality X* X X
Food security X X X X X
Poverty X
Sustainable 
Development 
for health and 
wellness 
X X X X X X X X
Human 
health X X X X* X X X X X X X X
Mental health X X X X X
Recognize 
work of 
SDWG
X X X X
Table 53. The Human Dimension in the Ministerial Declarations
*strong connection. 
Another striking similarity is that all declarations address is-
sues of human health. Health discussions address telemedicine 
(Reykjavik 2004, 3; Inari 2002, 2; Iqaluit 1998, 2) in the earlier 
years, and mental health in more recent years (Rovaniemi 2019, 
8; Fairbanks 2017, 3; Iqaluit 2015, 13; Kiruna 2013, 2; Nuuk 
2011, 5), including for Indigenous peoples. Moreover, eight dec-
larations make the connection between sustainable development 
and health and wellness. 
However, there is also some fragmentation, especially around 
certain issues of equality. For example, only the Salekhard Decla-
ration (2006, 3) mentions Indigenous poverty. Food security, es-
pecially for Indigenous peoples, is mentioned in five declarations 
(Rovaniemi Statement 2019, 5; Fairbanks 2017, 3; Iqaluit 2015, 7; 
Nuuk 2011, 6; Barrow 2000, 4). Finally, gender inequality is men-
tioned in three declarations: in the Inari Declaration (2002, 2) 
the ministers of the eight Arctic Council states: “Recognize the 
crucial role of women in developing viable Arctic communities,” 
while also recognizing that gender equality can improve well-
being and violence against women can harm it (Inari 2002, 2). 
In the second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 7) the ministers: “Note 
the work done for the Arctic Council through the second Arctic 
Human Development Report, acknowledge that gender equality 
is very important for economic, social and cultural development 
and improves the prospects for future generations in the Arctic, 
and welcome[s] the report on current gender realities and future 
challenges.” Finally, the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 9) 
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Figure 17. Comparison of Arctic Council Ministerial Declarations
Note: The numbers represented in each indicator are a percent of the total 
number of quotes coded for each document. The scale also ranges from 
0 - 40% because none of the percentages went higher than this. 
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states that “it welcomed gender equality perspectives in the work 
of the Arctic Council and encouraged their mainstreaming”. 
In the Governance indicator, the AC declarations refers to the 
Arctic Council as a key high-level forum for cooperation in the 
Arctic. Beginning with the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998), the 
majority of the following declarations also “emphasize the need 
for the Arctic Council and its programmes to cooperate close-
ly with existing organizations such as the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and other appropriate 
fora, including scientific bodies” (Ottawa 1996, 1,2; Iqaluit 1998, 
6; Barrow 2000, 1,7; Inari 2002, 1,6; Reykjavik 2004, 7; Salekhard 
2006, 9; Tromsø 2009, 1,9; Kiruna 2013, 1; Fairbanks 2017, 1; 
Rovaniemi 2019, 1). The Inari Declaration (2002, 5) talks spe-
cifically about “closer cooperation between the Arctic Council 
and the European Commission.” The importance of the AC for 
Arctic states, expressed in the ministerial declarations of 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009, is further discussed in detail under 
the International Cooperation indicator. Additionally, the Inari 
declaration “take note of the recommendations issued by the 5th 
Conference of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and wel-
come their continuous cooperation and support” (Inari 2002, 6). 
The AC declarations stress the necessity of “full consultation with 
and the full involvement of Indigenous people and their commu-
nities and other inhabitants of the Arctic” (Ottawa Declaration 
1996, 1) on the “decision-making in relation to policy planning 
and implementation” (Salekhard 2006, 3). Therefore, “the cate-
gory of Permanent Participation is created to provide for active 
participation and full consultation with the Arctic Indigenous 
representatives within the Arctic Council” (Iqaluit 1998, 1). At 
the same time, the declarations of 1996, 2002, 2006, 2013, 2015, 
2017, and Statement of 2019 acknowledge the need to pay “atten-
tion to the impact of development and the use of natural resourc-
es on the traditional sources of livelihood of Indigenous peoples 
and their communities” (Inari 2002, 4).  
The Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 5) refers for the first time to “pro-
mote the application of the Arctic Council Offshore Oil and 
Gas Guidelines” and “an assessment of the adequacy of exist-
ing international agreements and arrangements related to the 
protection of the Arctic marine environment.” The Guidelines 
are mentioned once again in the Tromsø Declaration (2009, 5). 
The AC declarations of 1998, 2000 and 2002 further “acknowl-
edge the successful integration of the Arctic Environmental Pro-
tection Strategy (AEPS) and the four working groups” into the 
Arctic Council (Iqaluit 1998, 3). The Rovaniemi Chair Statement 
(2019, 5) refers for the first time to “the Agreement to Prevent 
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean” 
from 2018, “which provides for possible future fisheries regula-
tion and strengthens future marine science cooperation” as well 
as ensuring “conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks in 
Arctic waters.” 
The Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 4) talks about the “ratification and 
implementation of the Protocols on the elimination or reduction 
of discharges, emissions and losses of Persistent Organic Pollut-
ants (POPs) and of Heavy Metals under the framework of the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention 
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.” The declaration 
also “reaffirm our commitment from the Alta Declaration to take 
the findings and recommendations from the AMAP Report Arc-
tic Pollution Issues : A State of the Arctic Environment Report, 
into consideration in our policies and programmes, to increase 
our efforts to limit and reduce emissions of contaminants into the 
environment” (1998, 3).  
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Existing 
structures X X X X X X X X X X X
international 
and trans-
boundary 
cooperation
X X X X X X X X X X X X
natural re-
sources, blue 
economy, and 
licensing
X X X X X X X X X
public con-
sultations and 
env. impact 
assessments
X X X X X X
Decision 
making X X X X X X X
Table 54. Governance in the Ministerial Declarations
The International Treaties and International Cooperation indi-
cator illustrates how important collaboration is on the regional 
and international level for all Arctic states (see, Table 55). The 
first AC declarations already state that Arctic states are “Desiring 
further to provide a means for promoting cooperative activities 
to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation, and 
to ensure full consultation with and the full involvement of In-
digenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of 
the Arctic in such activities” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 1). 
The Arctic states emphasize “the importance of circumpolar 
and international cooperation as being fundamental to address-
ing circumpolar challenges” and confirm that “in international 
relations the rule of law is a prerequisite for peaceful regional 
development” (Barrow 2000, 1; Inari 2002, 6; Reykjavik 2004, 1, 
2; Salekhard 2006, 2; Tromsø 2009, 1). Furthermore, the Arctic 
states “welcome the increased contributions to Arctic coopera-
tion by non-arctic observer countries as well as scientific institu-
tions, international organizations and NGOs” (Inari Declaration 
2002, 5). 
The most discussed forum for cooperation in the AC declara-
tions is undoubtedly the Arctic Council. The high level forum 
“provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the 
Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on 
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable devel-
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opment and environmental protection in the Arctic” (Declara-
tions of 1996, 1; 1998, 1; 2000, 1; 2002, 1; 2004, 1; 2006, 1; 2009, 
1; 2011, 3; 2013, 1,2; 2015, 4,12; Statement of 2017, 6,7). Besides 
that, the Arctic states ministers also “recognized the contribu-
tion of international science to the knowledge and understand-
ing of the Arctic region and noted the role that scientific cooper-
ation, through the International Arctic Science Committee and 
other organizations, is playing in developing a truly circumpolar 
cooperation” (Ottawa Declaration 1996, 4). In the 2004 Reykja-
vik Declaration (2004, 2) the reference to the International Polar 
Year (IPY) 2007–2008 is made for the first time, and states that 
the IPY represents “a unique opportunity to stimulate coopera-
tion and coordination on Arctic research and increase awareness 
and visibility of the Arctic region and underline the role of the 
Arctic Council.” Following up on that, this statement is further 
confirmed in the declarations of 2006 (p. 3) and 2009 (p. 3).
Besides the Arctic Council, the Arctic states recognize the im-
portance of, and the need to, “cooperate closely with existing or-
ganizations” (Iqaluit 1998, 6) and with cooperative frameworks 
in the Arctic. The Iqaluit 1998 Declaration mentions for the first 
time the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Nordic Council of 
Ministers. The following declarations further reaffirm the need 
to strengthen the cooperation. The Barrow Declaration also 
introduces the cooperation with the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States, the Northern Forum, and the European Union’s Northern 
Dimension, and the later declarations (Iqaluit 1998, 6; Barrow 
2000, 7; Inari 2002, 6; Reykjavik 2004, 7; Salekhard 2006, 9; and 
Tromsø 2009, 9) confirm this. In the Nuuk Declaration (2011), 
for the first time none of the other cooperation frameworks be-
sides the Arctic Council is mentioned at all. The Kiruna Declara-
tion (2013, 6) follows up on the Nuuk, where only the European 
Union’s application for AC observer status is briefly mentioned. 
The Iqaluit 2015 Declaration (2015, 5) makes reference only to 
the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council. The Fair-
banks Declaration (2017, 2) recognizes cooperation through the 
Arctic Coast Guard Forum.
Interestingly, on the global level, the AC declarations refer only 
twice to the Rio/Rio+10 climate conference.12 The first time, 
the Barrow Declaration states that the Arctic states “welcome 
the opportunity presented by the Rio+10 process to review the 
work of the Arctic Council with a view to bringing Arctic issues 
to the attention of the global community through the prepara-
tory processes associated with the ten year review of Agenda 
21” (Barrow Declaration 2000, 3). The second time, the Tromsø 
Declaration (2009, 6) “urge Member States to apply the pre-
cautionary approach and polluter-pays principle as reflected in 
Principles 15 and 16 of the Rio Declaration, respectively, and 
conduct risk and environmental impact assessments for the ex-
ploration, development, transport and storage of oil, and enact 
and/or enforce appropriate laws and controls.” Six years later, 
in 2015, the second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 5) reaffirms the 
“Arctic States’ commitment to work together and with partners 
12  The original United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992; in 2002 the Rio+10 was held 
as a follow up in Johannesburg.
towards an effective, ambitious, durable international climate 
agreement in Paris in December 2015 that is applicable to all, 
and our determination to work within and beyond the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to limit the 
increase in global average temperature to below 2 degrees Cel-
sius above pre-industrial levels.” In 2017, the Fairbanks Decla-
ration (2017, 1) refers for first time to the UN SDGs, stating that 
the Arctic states are “reaffirming the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals and the need for their realization by 2030.”
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Role and 
importance  
of int.coop.
X X X X X X X X
Major agree-
ments and 
forums
X X X X X X X X X X X
UN SDGs  
(or RIO 1992) X X X
Mentions 
of other int. 
orgs.
X X X X X X X X
IMO/Polar 
code X X X X X X X X
Table 55. International Treaties and International Cooperation in the Minis-
terial Declarations
The Environmental Protection indicator shows that there is a 
considerable amount of consistency in how the declarations ad-
dress environmental protection. Indeed, Table 56 shows three 
striking similarities. First, all the declarations recognize the 
importance of environmental protection and the need to bal-
ance it with economic development, mostly through sustain-
able development. This is likely because these are the two main 
functions of the Arctic Council based on the Ottawa Declara-
tion (1996, 1), that is, “AFFIRMING concurrently our commit-
ment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the 
health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance or biodiversity in the 
Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural 
resources.” Second, all the declarations address the need to pro-
tect biodiversity in one way or another. For example, the first 
Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 4) mentions that Ministers of the 
eight states of the Arctic Council “Welcome and endorse the 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Strategic Plan 
for the Conservation of Arctic Biological Diversity as an overall 
framework for CAFF activities,” while in the Kiruna Declara-
tion (2013, 4), the Ministers, among other things: “Recognize 
the value of sustaining Arctic ecosystems and biodiversity and 
that the Arctic environment needs to be protected as a basis for 
sustainable development, prosperity, lifestyles and human well-
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being, and commit to pursue the conservation and sustainable 
use of Arctic biological resources.” Third, with the exception of 
the Ottawa Declaration, all subsequent declarations discuss and 
support the work of both CAFF and PAME. The work of AMAP 
in an environmental context is addressed in the Iqaluit (1998, 
4), Barrow (2000, 4), and Salekhard (2006, 6) declarations, and 
the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 5). 
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Recognize 
work of CAFF X X X X X X X X X X X
Circumpolar 
Protected Ar-
eas Network* 
(CAFF)
X X X - - - - -
Recognize 
work of 
AMAP
X X X X
Recognize 
work of 
PAME
X X X X X X X X X X X
Regional 
Programme 
of Action for 
the Protection 
of the Arctic 
Marine Envi-
ronment from 
Land-based 
Activities
X X X X X
Biodiversity X X X X X X X X X X X X
Balance 
environment 
and economy 
(eX. Sustain-
able dev)
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Ecosys-
tem-based 
management 
X X X X X X X
Table 56. Environmental Protection in the Ministerial Declarations
*Existed between 1996 and 2010 (CAFF n.d.). 
Other Arctic Council activities are more fragmented. For exam-
ple, the Circumpolar Protected Areas Network existed between 
1996 and 2010 (CAFF, n.d.), yet it was only mentioned in the 
first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 4), Barrow Declaration (2000, 4), 
and Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 6). 
Table 56 also shows that the role of ecosystem-based manage-
ment started to emerge with the Reykjavík Declaration and 
became consistent with the Tromsø Declaration. For example, 
in the Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 4–5) Ministers of the eight 
Arctic Council states “Note that an ecosystem-based manage-
ment approach underlies the AMSP and call upon Member 
States, Arctic Council working groups and relevant regional and 
international bodies to further the application of this approach 
to the Arctic marine environment,” while in the Nuuk Declara-
tion (2011, 6) Arctic Council ministers “Decide to establish an 
expert group on Arctic ecosystem-based management (EBM) 
for the Arctic environment to recommend further activities 
in this field for possible consideration by the SAOs before the 
end of the Swedish chairmanship.” In the Kiruna Declaration 
(2013, 5) the ministers, “Welcome the report on Ecosystem 
Based Management, approve the definition, principles and 
recommendations, encourage Arctic States to implement rec-
ommendations both within and across boundaries, and ensure 
coordination of approaches in the work of the Arctic Council’s 
Working Groups”; the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 6) 
notes that “the meeting welcomed the Guidelines for Imple-
menting an Ecosystem Approach to Management of Arctic Ma-
rine Ecosystems.” This shows progress and development of the 
management system over time. 
The Pollution indicator provides a great deal of information on 
what are considered to be the main Arctic pollutants and the 
different approaches to dealing with them. Table 57 shows some 
relevant similarities, with ten declarations mentioning POPs, 
nine mentioning mercury and oil, and seven mentioning heavy 
metals. Moreover, starting with Tromsø Declaration (2009), all 
subsequent declarations identify short-lived climate pollutants, 
including black carbon and methane, and greenhouse gases, 
with four declarations specifically mentioning carbon dioxide. 
This consistency suggests that POPs, mercury, oil, heavy metals, 
short-lived climate forcers (including black carbon and meth-
ane), and greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) are the 
primary pollutants in the Arctic, many of which come from 
outside the region (see: Rovaniemi Statement 2019 5; Fairbanks 
2017, 1; Iqaluit 2015d, 7; Nuuk 2011, 6; Tromsø 2009, 2, 5, 7; 
Salekhard 2006, 6; Reykjavik 2004, 4; Inari 2002, 1, 3; Barrow 
2000, 5, 6). Of all these, POPs, oil and heavy metals, as well as 
noise, radioactivity, and acidification were already mentioned 
in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (1991, 20–24). 
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Man-made 
pollutants X X
Greenhouse 
Gases X X X X X X
Carbon 
dioxide X X X X
Short-lived 
climate poll. X X X X X X
Black carbon X X X X X X
Methane X X X X X X
Acidifying 
substances X X
Radioactive 
material X X X
Heavy Metals X X X X X X X
Mercury X X X X X X X X X
POPs X X X X X X X X X X
PCBs X X X X X
PTS X
Chemicals X X X X X
Oil X X X X X X X X X
Shipping 
Waste X
Microplastics X X
Marine litter X X
Table 57. Pollutants in the Ministerial Declarations 
There is also fragmentation in the sense that few pollutants are 
identified in four or fewer declarations. For instance, Table 57 
shows that only two declarations mention man-made pollut-
ants. Interestingly, only the Barrow, Inari, and Tromsø declara-
tions comment on radioactive material (2009, 7; 2002, 3; 2000, 
6). The Barrow Declaration (2000, 4) is also the only document 
that mentions Persistent Toxic Substances (in Russia) and the 
Reykjavík Declaration mentions shipping waste (2004, 5). The 
Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 3), and the Rovaniemi Chair 
Statement (2019, 6) are also the only documents to mention mi-
croplastics and marine litter. 
The declarations also mention specific international treaties 
and a broad range of pollution solutions, including the work 
of the Arctic Council. Table 58 shows that the Stockholm Con-
vention on POPs is mentioned in eight documents, while the 
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and/or its 
protocols is mentioned in seven of the declarations. Moreover, 
the Minamata Convention on Mercury is mentioned by all four 
documents after its signing in 2013 (Kiruna 2013, 5; Iqaluit 
2015, 9; Faibanks 2017, 4; Rovaniemi 2019, 5; see also: United 
Nations n.d.b.). The Fairbanks Declaration and the Rovaniemi 
Chair Statement also mention the Paris Agreement which was 
signed after the second Iqaluit Declaration in 2015 (Fairbanks 
2017, 1; Rovaniemi 2019, 1). This consistency suggests that 
these four—the Stockholm Convention, LRTAP, Minamata 
Convention, and Paris Agreement—are the key international 
agreements. 
Table 58 also shows that with the exception of the Ottawa Decla-
ration, all the remaining declarations recognize the work of one 
or more of the Arctic Council’s working groups AMAP, EPPR, 
PAME, or SDWG (see Glossary) including various reports and 
projects. The work of the SDWG is only mentioned in the Ro-
vaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 8) with regard to the Best Waste 
Management Practices for Small and Remote Arctic Commu-
nities. Five declarations also comment on the Arctic Council’s 
Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic; three mention 
the Task Force and/ or Expert Group on Black Carbon and 
Methane; and two mention the Task Force on Short-Lived Cli-
mate Forcers and the Task Force on Oil Pollution. Additionally, 
once the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic was signed, all subse-
quent documents mention it. This shows that the Arctic Coun-
cil has an important role to play in addressing pollution. (see Ta-
ble 58. Pollution Treaties and Problem Solving in the Ministerial 
Declarations, p. 154)
There is also much fragmentation, as many problem-solving 
tactics are mentioned in four or fewer declarations. For exam-
ple, the Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment and Land-based Activities is men-
tioned only in the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 5) and the In-
ari Declaration (2002, 3). 
The Climate Change indicator reveals some similarities and dif-
ferences in how the declarations address climate change. Table 
59 shows a striking similarity in that all declarations, with the 
exception of the Ottawa Declaration, recognize the contribu-
tions of the scientific community in general or through specific 
reports such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA 
2004). For example, in the Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 6), the 
ministers “Reiterate the importance of climate science to our 
understanding of the changing Arctic region and our activities 
in the Arctic environment,” and in the Inari Declaration (2002, 
4) they “welcome with appreciation the good progress of the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the significant 
progress in evaluating and synthesizing knowledge on climate 
variability and change and increased ultraviolet radiation.” 
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Greenhouse gas reduction  
(Paris Agreement - XXX) X XXX XXX
Stockholm Convention on POPs X X X X X X X X
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)  
and/ or its Protocols X X X X X X X
Rio Declaration X
Minamata Convention on Mercury X X X X
Recognize and support work of AMAP X X X X X X X X X
Recognize and support work of EPPR X X X X X X X
Recognize and support work of PAME X X X X X X
Recognize and support work of SDWG X
Arctic Council Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution of the Arctic 
(ACAP) X X X X X
Task Force on Short Lived Climate Forcers X X
Task Force and Expert Group on Black Carbon and Methane X X X X
Task force on oil pollution X X
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil -Pollution - 
Preparedness & Response in the Arctic X X X X
IMO X X X
Polar Code X X
Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Technique X
UNEP X X X X X X
Nuclear Safety X X
Research on pollution X X
Pollution monitoring X X X X
International cooperation X X X X
Domestic action X X X X X
Sharing best practices X
Russian Programme of Action for the Protection of the  
Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities X X
Integrated Hazardous Waste Mgmt Strategy in the  
Northern Regions of the Russian Federation X
Changes to economic activities X X
Part II: Arctic Council Chairmanship Programs and Declarations
Table 58. Pollution Treaties and Problem Solving in the Ministerial Declarations
155
O
tta
wa
 1
99
6
Iq
al
ui
t 1
99
8
Ba
rr
ow
 2
00
0
In
ar
i 2
00
2
Re
yk
ja
ví
k 
20
04
Sa
le
kh
ar
d 
20
06
Tr
om
sø
 2
00
9
N
uu
k 
20
11
K
ir
un
a 2
01
3
Iq
al
ui
t 2
01
5
Fa
irb
an
ks
 2
01
7
Ro
va
ni
em
i 2
01
9
Mitigation/
Adaptation X X X X X X X X X
UNFCC X X X X X X X
IPCC X X X X X
Paris  
Agreement X X
Kyoto  
Protocol X
COP15 X
Montreal 
Protocol on 
Substances 
that Deplete 
the Ozone 
Layer
X
Arctic Resil-
ience Action 
Framework 
X X
Other  
frameworks X X
Scientific 
Community 
Heard
X X X X X X X X X
ACIA X X X X
Climate 
Change as 
Security 
Factor
X
Environmen-
tal Refugees
Asia  
Mentioned 
Access to 
Fresh Water X* X*
Table 59. Climate Action in the Ministerial Declarations 
*connection to climate change not clear
There are also some trends. Every declaration, starting with 
the Inari Declaration, addresses issues of mitigating climate 
change vis-à-vis adapting to it. The declarations also address 
key climate agreements at the time they are either decided or 
in force. For example, in the Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 7) 
on the Kyoto Protocol, ministers “Note the ratification by the 
Russian Federation of the Kyoto Protocol” the year before the 
Protocol came into force in 2005 (see: United Nations n.d.a.). 
The Tromsø Declaration (2009, 2) “confirm[s] the commitment 
of all Arctic States to actively contribute to reaching an adequate 
agreed outcome at the UNFCCC 15th Conference of the Parties 
(COP15) in Copenhagen in December 2009.” The second Iqa-
luit Declaration (2015b, 5) makes a similar statement regarding 
the Paris Agreement, with the Arctic Council ministers “Reaf-
firming Arctic States’ commitment to work together and with 
partners towards an effective, ambitious, durable international 
climate agreement in Paris in December 2015 that is applicable 
to all”; the Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 1) “Noting the entry 
into force of the Paris Agreement on climate change and its 
implementation”; while the Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair 
(2019, 1) “welcomed the outcomes of the UNFCCC COP24 in 
Katowice, including the Paris agreement work programme.”
There is also some fragmentation, with the Inari Declaration 
(2002, 5) being the only document to recognize that climate 
change can create emergencies, and can thus be considered a 
security concern. The second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6) and 
Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 6) also comment on access to 
freshwater, but they do not explicitly make the connection to 
climate change. 
The first mention of the Security indicator appears in the Otta-
wa Declaration (1996, 1) in a footnote stating that “the Arctic 
Council should not deal with matters related to military secu-
rity.” Two years later, the Iqaluit 1998 does not mention secu-
rity in any connection. In the 2000 Barrow Declaration (2000, 
4), the Arctic states “acknowledge approval for funding by the 
Global Environment Facility of the RAIPON/AMAP project 
‘Persistent Toxic Substances (PTS), Food Security and Indige-
nous Peoples of the Russian North’”. The three AC ministerial 
declarations that followed this (Inari, Reykjavik, and Salekhard) 
do not reflect on security at all.
The Security indicator appears again in the Tromsø Declaration 
(2009, 1), where the Arctic states confirm “that in international 
relations the rule of law is a prerequisite for peaceful regional 
development.” Security of the region is for the first time con-
nected to the stability and peace in the Arctic. Two years later, 
in Nuuk (2011, 3, 6) governments of the Arctic states are “Rec-
ognizing the importance of maintaining peace, stability and 
constructive cooperation in the Arctic.” Since the Nuuk Min-
isterial 2011, this sentence has been explicitly mentioned as the 
first preamble of the later ministerial declarations. At the same 
time, the governments “recognize that climate change and other 
negative factors have impacted the traditional livelihoods and 
food safety and security of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other 
Arctic residents and communities.” The following three minis-
terials—Kiruna 2013 (p. 1), Iqaluit 2015 (4, 7), and Fairbanks 
2017 (1, 2, 3,)—reaffirm “the commitment to maintain peace, 
stability, and constructive cooperation in the Arctic” (Fairbanks 
2017, 1). They also acknowledge “the cultural and nutritional 
importance of traditional and local foods, including from ma-
rine living resources in the Arctic”, and welcome reports, project 
proposals, and policy recommendations to “assess and promote 
food security” (Iqaluit 2015, 7), “access to safe water” (Fairbanks 
2017, 3), and mental wellness. The Rovaniemi Joint Ministeri-
al Statement (2019, 1) refers to the “commitment to maintain 
peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the Arctic.” The 
Rovaniemi Chair Statement also confirms this commitment but 
goes further (2019, 1). The meeting “approved the assessment 
on Biological Effects of Contaminants on Arctic Wildlife and 
Fish highlighting the risk of pollutants and chemicals of emerg-
ing concern to Arctic species, particularly those at the top of the 
food chain, and food security” (2019, 4). It also welcomed the 
“progress made to promote safe and sustainable Arctic marine 
shipping” (2019, 6).
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The Safety and SAR indicator reveals different regional safety 
concerns. For example, Table 60 shows a striking similarity in 
that there is a shared concern about environmental safety, es-
pecially in the context of oil spills, in all but the Ottawa Dec-
laration. Other similarities include maritime safety, which is 
addressed in seven declarations and search and rescue in five. 
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Environ-
mental 
Safety (incl. 
pollution,  
oil spills, etc.)
X X X X X X X X X X X
Climate 
change X
Maritime 
Safety X X X X X X X
Search and 
Rescue X X X X X
Natural 
disasters X
Radiation 
and other 
chemicals 
X X
Table 60. Safety Concerns in the Ministerial Declarations
The Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 5) mentions for the first time “the 
assessment of current and potential shipping activities to assist 
in determining what, if any, additional Arctic shipping measures 
are required, including work on an International Code of Safety 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) under the aus-
pices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).”
Some fragmentation also exists. Only the Reykjavík (2004, 5) 
and Salekhard Declarations (2006, 7) mention concerns around 
radiation. The Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 5) is also the one 
document to mention natural disasters. Climate change as a 
safety issue is also addressed only in the Inari Declaration (2002, 
5) in which the states “Recognize the increasing importance of 
prevention of and response to emergencies originating in cli-
mate variability and change.” 
In terms of addressing safety issues, the declarations do ac-
knowledge the work of the Arctic Council, and this is marked 
with an * in Table 61. Five declarations mention activities by 
the EPPR.13 While there are no particularly striking findings, 
there are some patterns. Table 61 shows that once the Arctic 
Council’s SAR agreement is ready, it is mentioned in every sub-
sequent declaration. 
13  Both the Inari and Tromsø declarations mention the EPPR, but not the work it is doing. 
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Arctic Coun-
cil EPPR X X X X X
Arctic 
Council SAR 
Agreement* 
X X X X X
Arctic 
Offshore 
Oil and Gas 
Guidelines* 
X X X
Circumpo-
lar Map of 
Resources at 
Risk from Oil 
Spills *
X X
Prevention of 
Arctic Marine 
Oil Pollution 
Project* 
X
Arctic Marine 
Shipping 
Assessment 
Recommen-
dations*
X
IMO /  
Polar Code X X X X X X X
Shoreline 
Cleanup 
Assessment 
Tool 
X
Community 
Radiation 
Information 
Project 
X
International 
Cooperation X X X
Table 61. Addressing Safety Concerns in the Ministerial Declaration 
*Arctic Council activities 
The IMO’s Polar Code is mentioned in every declaration start-
ing with the Nuuk Declaration (2011, 7) in which the ministers 
“Urge the completion as soon as possible of work at the Inter-
national Maritime Organization to develop a mandatory po-
lar code for ships.” Interestingly, discussions around the Polar 
Code began much earlier in the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 
4); the idea was to “work on an International Code of Safety 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).” 
In addition to the Polar Code, the Tromsø Declaration (2009, 
4) sought to “encourage active cooperation within the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) on development of rele-
vant measures to reduce the environmental impacts of shipping 
in Arctic waters” and to “urge that the ongoing work in the 
IMO to update the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic 
Ice-Covered Waters be completed.”
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The Economy indicator reveals a striking similarity in that all 
declarations address sustainable development. In seven decla-
rations, sustainable development is explicitly linked to resource 
utilization (see Ottawa, both Iqaluit, Barrow, Inari, Tromsø, 
Kiruna declarations, and Rovaniemi statement). This similarity 
is not surprising, as the Ottawa Declaration (1996, 1) is clear 
about the Council’s position on sustainable development, name-
ly, “AFFIRMING our commitment to sustainable development 
in the Arctic region, including economic and social develop-
ment, improved health conditions and cultural wellbeing.” Sim-
ilar messages are present in the other declarations. For example, 
the Inari Declaration (2002, 1) is “reaffirming the commitment 
of the Governments of the Arctic States and Indigenous peoples 
to work together to promote sustainable development and envi-
ronmental protection in the Arctic region with increased focus 
on climate change, sustainable use of resources and human de-
velopment in the Arctic.”
Specific economic activities are also mentioned in many of the 
Declarations, although sometimes in passing or within the con-
text of other economic discussions. This means that promoting 
or highlighting certain economic activities is not the main fo-
cus of economic discussions. Along these lines, Table 62 shows 
that there is general fragmentation in terms of what activities 
are mentioned. That said, energy, including renewables, is men-
tioned in six documents.
 
O
tta
wa
 1
99
6
Iq
al
ui
t 1
99
8
Ba
rr
ow
 2
00
0
In
ar
i 2
00
2
Re
yk
ja
ví
k 
20
04
Sa
le
kh
ar
d 
20
06
Tr
om
sø
 2
00
9
N
uu
k 
20
11
K
ir
un
a 2
01
3
Iq
al
ui
t 2
01
5
Fa
irb
an
ks
 2
01
7
Ro
va
ni
em
i 2
01
9
Energy X X X X
Renewables X X X X X
Oil and gas X X
Mining / 
minerals / 
metals 
X X
Fisheries X X
Reindeer 
husbandry X
Marine 
bioresources X
Blue 
economy X
Tourism X X X X X
Technology X
Diverse 
economies X X
Indigenous 
food X
Table 62. Economic Activities in the Ministerial Declarations
For example, the Salekhard Declaration (2006, 4) states that the 
Arctic Council will “welcome the increased co-operation in the 
field of energy, reflected in various AC projects, and endorse en-
ergy, including renewable energy and environmentally friendly 
technologies, as an important component of the AC coopera-
tion, addressing energy issues and their impact on human life 
and the environment, and request the SDWG to report on this 
activity to the AC Ministerial session in 2008, and to identify 
activities that the Arctic Council could consider for future im-
plementation.”
 
The Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair (2019, 6, 8) also sees the 
introduction of new economic activities, such as marine bio-re-
sources and Indigenous foods. Another point to note is the 
change in the way economic discussions are approached after 
the creation of the Arctic Economic Council in 2015. While pre-
vious discussions primarily focused on issues of sustainability, 
the Fairbanks Declaration (2017, 4) also begins to “recognize 
the importance of collaborating with the private sector.” Sim-
ilarly, the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019b, 10) comments: 
“The meeting welcomed the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Arctic Council and the Arctic Economic Council 
to further our shared goals, noted with appreciation the report 
on Business Finance in the Arctic.” 
The Tourism indicator is mentioned only five times in Arctic 
Council declarations—Iqaluit 1998, Barrow 2000, Inari 2002, 
Iqaluit 2015, and Rovaniemi 2019. The 1998 Iqaluit Declaration 
mentions the need to “establish the Sustainable Development 
Program” which would include eco-tourism as well as other ar-
eas (Arctic Council 1998, 2). The Barrow Declaration (2000, 3) 
follows that up by acknowledging the “results achieved by the 
Sustainable Development Working Group established at the last 
Ministerial Meeting, including the Arctic Children and Youth 
initiative, the Arctic Telemedicine and cultural and eco-tourism 
projects.” The Inari Declaration (2002, 2) notes with apprecia-
tion “the Council’s successful efforts to expand ecological and 
cultural tourism through circumpolar cooperation for the ben-
efit of local communities.” The 2015 Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 
6) recognizes “the growing importance of tourism to many Arc-
tic communities, and welcome[s] the report on Arctic marine 
tourism.” The Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 8) refers in one 
paragraph to tourism, addressing “the considerable growth in 
Arctic tourism and the economic opportunities for Arctic com-
munities, and encouraged enhanced cooperation in developing 
and sharing best practices to ensure sustainable Arctic tourism.”
For the Infrastructure indicator, Table 63 shows that there is 
one relevant similarity and one other similarity. The relevant 
similarity is that 10 of the 11 declarations address shipping; the 
other is that six declarations discuss telecommunications/ICT. 
These two topics will be addressed in more detail below. 
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Transport X X X
Icebreakers
Shipping X X X X X X X X X X
Telecoms / 
ICT X X X X X X
Innovation 
and tech X
Energy X
Housing X X
Table 63. Infrastructure in the Ministerial Declarations 
Aside from these two similarities, there is fragmentation in the 
way that infrastructure is discussed. For transportation infra-
structure in the Inari Declaration (2002, 2) Ministers “Empha-
size the significance of infrastructure, including aviation, marine 
and surface transport,” while the Kiruna Declaration (2013, 2) 
they “Welcome the Arctic Maritime and Aviation Transportation 
Infrastructure Initiative and its comparative analysis of seaport 
and airport infrastructure in the Arctic States, and encourage 
continued efforts to identify opportunities for complementary 
infrastructure development and use.” The Salekhard Declaration 
(2006, 4) mentions infrastructure in general, which would in-
clude transportation infrastructure. Housing could be includ-
ed in the “community infrastructure” mentioned in the second 
Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6), while in the Fairbanks Declaration 
(2017, 3) ministers “Recognize the vital importance of healthy 
Arctic communities, homes and peoples.” This Declaration is 
the only to recognize energy infrastructure, and in particular re-
newable energy infrastructure (2017, 4). Finally, the first Iqaluit 
Declaration (1998, 2) is the only one to recognize innovation and 
tech, especially in the context of “technology transfer to improve 
Arctic sanitation systems.”
Taking a closer look at shipping, the Iqaluit, Barrow, Reykjavík, 
Tromsø, Nuuk, Kiruna, Fairbanks, and Rovaniemi declarations 
focus on safety, quite often in the context of the IMO. For exam-
ple, in the Tromsø Declaration (2009, 4) ministers “urge that the 
ongoing work in the IMO to update the Guidelines for Ships Op-
erating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters be completed, application 
of its relevant parts be made mandatory, and global IMO ship 
safety and pollution prevention conventions be augmented with 
specific mandatory requirements or other provisions for ship 
construction, design, equipment, crewing, training, and opera-
tions, aimed at safety and protection of the Arctic environment.” 
The Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 7) also notes that “the 
joint submission by all Arctic states to the International Mari-
time Organization on a proposal for regional arrangement for 
Arctic port waste reception facilities was welcomed, the oper-
ationalization of the Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information 
Forum was noted with satisfaction, and further efforts for har-
monized implementation of the Polar Code were encouraged.”
Also connected to safety is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assess-
ment (AMSA) finalized in 2009 and mentioned in the Reyk-
javík, Salekhard, Tromsø, second Iqaluit, and Fairbanks dec-
larations. For example, in the Reykjavík Declaration (2004, 4) 
ministers “request PAME to conduct a comprehensive Arctic 
marine shipping assessment as outlined in the AMSP under 
the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead 
countries and in collaboration with the EPPR working group 
and other working groups of the Arctic Council and Permanent 
Participants as relevant,” while the Tromsø Declaration (2009, 
4) calls for approval of the Assessment, and the second Iqalu-
it (2015, 10) and Fairbanks declarations (2017, 3) comment on 
implementation. The Reykjavík (2004, 5), Tromsø (2009, 4), 
second Iqaluit (2015, 10), and Fairbanks (2017, 3) declarations, 
and also the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019, 7), recognize 
the connection of pollution to shipping. 
While six declarations discuss telecommunications and ICT, 
there is only one similarity that the Inari (2002, 2, 6), Salekhard 
(2006, 4), second Iqaluit (2015, 6), and Fairbanks (2017, 4) dec-
larations, and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019b, 8) com-
ment on: either the need for better communications technology 
or for infrastructure, which accounts for five of the six declara-
tions that discuss this issue. There is fragmentation, as only the 
Inari (2002, 2) and Reykjavík (2004, 3) declarations comment 
on the importance of telehealth, and only the Reykjavík Decla-
ration (2004, 3) wishes to identify best practices. 
Certainly, this fragmentation is not helpful in establishing better 
communications in the Arctic, especially as there is an existing 
need for improved broadband services. The Arctic Economic 
Council (2016, 5) states that “reliable broadband is necessary to 
promote and advance interconnectivity, which in turn facilitates 
improvements in national economies, education, health, and 
many other sectors of society. Despite these benefits, broadband 
deployment and adoption across the globe have not been uni-
form. One region in danger of being left behind is the Arctic.”
 
The Science and Education indicator reveals some similarities 
and differences in the way that science and education are ad-
dressed. In terms of science, Table 64 shows that with the ex-
ception of the Ottawa Declaration and the Rovaniemi Chair 
Statement, climate change is a key driver of scientific research. 
For example, the Salekhard Declaration (2006, 2) will “request 
the SAOs and the Arctic Council working groups to continue 
supporting, analyzing and synthesizing Arctic climate research.” 
Similarly, in the Nuuk Declaration (2011, 8) ministers “decide 
to task the Senior Arctic Officials to consider maximizing the 
legacy of the IPY by supporting a proposal to arrange an In-
ternational Polar Decade in light of the rapid climate change of 
the Arctic and the need for further coordinated research of the 
Arctic environment and its human dimension.” Another trend 
is the environment as driver, and this is noted in five of the dec-
larations, with biodiversity/ecosystems and/or flora and fauna 
being named as a concern in the Salekhard (2006, 7), Tromsø 
(2009, 4), Kiruna (2013, 4), and Iqaluit declarations (2015, 11). 
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Environment X X X X X
Climate 
Change X X X X X X X X X X*
Pollution X X X X X
Health X
Social Issues X
Economy X
Table 64. Drivers of Science in the Ministerial Declarations 
Pollution, health, and social issues are fragmented drivers here. 
It is interesting that as pollution dropped off after 2006 (except 
for its mention in the Rovaniemi Chair Statement), environ-
ment picked up. The Rovaniemi Statement by the Chair (2019, 
6) also addresses research for economic reasons, although there 
is a connection to the environment; it states that “the meeting 
noted the importance of conservation and sustainable use of 
marine bioresources for Arctic communities, and encouraged 
studies and sharing of best practices on the blue bioeconomy in 
the Arctic.”
Regarding the purpose of science, there is nothing particular-
ly striking or relevant in terms of similarities. However, Table 
65 does show some commonalities. For instance, the Barrow, 
Reykjavík, Salekhard, Nuuk, Kiruna, and second Iqaluit decla-
rations, and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement all note that science 
will help inform decision-making. For instance, in the Nuuk 
Declaration (2011, 8) Arctic Council ministers “recognize that 
the International Polar Year (IPY) was the largest circumpolar 
program on scientific research to date, and welcome in 2012 the 
‘Knowledge to Action Conference’ in Montreal as the conclud-
ing event of IPY and the opportunity it presents to transform 
knowledge and scientific results into policies that will guide our 
future actions related to the environment and well-being of Arc-
tic communities.” Similarly, the Ottawa, Reykjavík, Salekhard, 
Kiruna, second Iqaluit, and Fairbanks declarations note that 
science is about cooperation. For example, in the Kiruna Dec-
laration (2013, 5) ministers “agree that cooperation in scientific 
research across the circumpolar Arctic is of great importance 
to the work of the Arctic Council, and establish a Task Force to 
work towards an arrangement on improved scientific research 
cooperation among the eight Arctic States.” 
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Social Issues X X X X
Policy / deci-
sion making X X X X X X X
Inform AC 
working 
groups
X
Cooperation X X X X X X
Safety X
Increase 
interest in 
Arctic 
X X
Table 65. Purpose of Science in the Ministerial Declarations 
There is also fragmentation, as only four declarations link re-
search to social issues; two suggest it can promote an interest in 
the region, and one each that research will inform the working 
groups and be used for safety purposes.
In terms of science infrastructure, there is one relevant simi-
larity and two types of fragmentation. Table 66 shows that nine 
declarations make reference to formal networks. For example, 
the Barrow, Inari, and Reykjavík declarations mention only 
the University of the Arctic (UArctic), while the first Iqaluit, 
Salekhard, Tromsø, and Nuuk Declarations, and the Rovaniemi 
Chair Statement also mention other international academic net-
works. For example, the Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 3) comments 
on AMAP’s Human Health Thematic Data Centre; Salekhard 
(2006, 3) mentions the Global Earth Observing System of Sys-
tems, the International Polar Year, and the Northern Research 
Forum, and Tromsø (2009, 3,4) mentions the Sustaining Arc-
tic Observing Networks and IASC and the International Polar 
Year. Nuuk (2011, 7) mentions the Sustaining Arctic Observing 
Networks and the International Polar Year; and the Rovaniemi 
Chair Statement (2019, 3) mentions the Sustaining Arctic Ob-
servation Network.
O
tta
wa
 1
99
6
Iq
al
ui
t 1
99
8
Ba
rr
ow
 2
00
0
In
ar
i 2
00
2
Re
yk
ja
vi
k 
20
04
Sa
le
kh
ar
d 
20
06
Tr
om
sø
 2
00
9
N
uu
k2
01
1
K
ir
un
a 2
01
3
Iq
al
ui
t 2
01
5
Fa
irb
an
ks
 2
01
7
Ro
va
ni
em
i 2
01
9
Research 
Stations X
Informal 
networks X X
Formal 
networks X X X X X X X X X
Table 66. Science Infrastructure in the Ministerial Declaration
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There is also fragmentation as only the Salekhard Declaration 
(2006, 3) addresses monitoring stations, while the Tromsø Dec-
laration (2009, 4) and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement (2019b, 2) 
mention research cooperation which tends to be informal. That 
said, the Rovaniemi Chair Statement comments on the formal-
ization of cooperation as the Agreement on Enhancing Interna-
tional Arctic Scientific Cooperation is now in force (2019b, 2). 
Traditional knowledge is also addressed. There is a striking sim-
ilarity, as all except the Barrow Declaration mention the need to 
use traditional knowledge. For example, in the Reykjavík Decla-
ration (2004) ministers “Welcome the continuing contribution of 
Indigenous and traditional knowledge to research in the Arctic,” 
and in the second Iqaluit Declaration (2015, 6) they “Welcome 
the recommendations on traditional and local knowledge and 
recognize the importance of using this knowledge in the work of 
the Council, instruct the Arctic Council to take relevant actions 
to implement these recommendations, and note with appreci-
ation the work done by the Permanent Participants to develop 
their own principles for the use of traditional knowledge.”
In contrast to science, little attention is paid to education. As 
mentioned in the science infrastructure discussion above, the 
UArctic is a scientific network, but it is first of all an educational 
network and mentioned in all but the Ottawa, Kiruna, and sec-
ond Iqaluit declarations, making this a relevant finding. There 
is also substantial fragmentation, as only the Ottawa and Fair-
banks declarations and the Rovaniemi Chair Statement broach 
the topic of educational attainment. The Ottawa Declaration 
makes reference to education in passing, and it is also unclear 
if the education being discussed is about education for north-
erners or rather about educating the public on the Arctic. The 
Declaration states that “the Arctic Council is established as a 
high level forum to: [1](d) disseminate information, encourage 
education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues” (Otta-
wa Declaration 1996, 1–2). In contrast, the Fairbanks Declara-
tion (2017, 4) states that it will “encourage the advancement of 
equal access to good education at all levels” and that ministers 
“Welcome the initiative concerning preschool education prac-
tices aiming to raise the living standards of Arctic Indigenous 
peoples while maintaining their cultures and languages” (2017, 
4). In the context of Indigenous peoples, the Rovaniemi Chair 
Statement (2019b, 9) continues with education with “the call to 
promote Indigenous languages in education.”
For the Implementation indicator, each declaration addresses 
implementation in similar ways. Although the declarations do 
not have a specific “recommendation” list, the different points in 
declarations uses action-oriented language like, but not limited 
to, “encourage,” “commit,” or “request.” For example, the Reyk-
javík Declaration (2004, 1) states the Arctic Council ministerial 
meeting will “Recognize the need for raising the profile of the 
Arctic internationally.”
In terms of budgets, the Arctic Council itself does not pro-
vide an operating budget. Instead, “all projects or initiatives 
are sponsored by one or more Arctic States” (Arctic Council, 
2015c), as well as through funding from other sources. For ex-
ample, the Inari Declaration (2002, 3) states the Arctic Coun-
cil will “welcome multilateral and bilateral financial support of 
Russian NPA-Arctic and the projects derived from it as well as 
projects aimed to eliminate pollution in the Russian Federation.” 
Moreover, in kind funding is recognized through the hosting 
of working groups and secretariats. For example, the second 
Iqaluit 2015 Declaration (2015, 12) expresses “appreciation to 
the Kingdom of Denmark for hosting the Indigenous Peoples’ 
Secretariat for more than two decades, reaffirm[s] the decision 
taken by Permanent Participants to relocate it to Tromsø, Nor-
way, and note[s] the decision to host it with the Arctic Council 
Secretariat.” The Council also approves the budget for the Arctic 
Council Secretariat. For example, the Rovaniemi Chair State-
ment (2019,10) states that the Ministerial “meeting approved 
the Arctic Council Secretariat budget for 2020 and 2021.”
 
With the exception of the Ottawa Declaration, all declarations 
address follow-up measures to a certain degree. For example, 
declarations can follow up on the work done during the chair, 
such as in the first Iqaluit Declaration (1998, 2) in which minis-
ters “Welcome the SAOs’ Report to the First Ministerial Meet-
ing of the Arctic Council and adopt the recommendations 
contained within the Report.” Similarly, in the second Iqaluit 
Declaration (2015, 10) they “Welcome the Guide to Oil Spill Re-
sponse in Snow and Ice Conditions in the Arctic and the further 
efforts to implement the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, request 
continuous efforts to further cooperation on oil spill prepared-
ness and response.” Finally, the Rovaniemi Statement by the 
Chair (2019, 6) notes that “the meeting welcomed the Guide-
lines for Implementing an Ecosystem Approach to Management 
of Arctic Marine Ecosystems.” This shows progress and develop-
ment of the management system over time, even if it appears to 
have evolved slowly. 
In terms of evaluation, the Barrow Declaration comments on 
the achievements of the SDWG. In particular, in the Declara-
tion, Arctic states’ ministers “Note with satisfaction the results 
achieved by the Sustainable Development Working Group es-
tablished at the last Ministerial Meeting, including the Arctic 
Children and Youth initiative, the Arctic Telemedicine and cul-
tural and eco-tourism projects and the coastal fisheries project 
under the Council’s Sustainable Development Program” (Arctic 
Council 2000, 3). This reads as a successful evaluation of that 
work. However, there is not much by way of structures to eval-
uate the work of the Council or its working groups through the 
declarations themselves. Instead, evaluation appears to take 
place two years later with the SAO Report to Ministers follow-
ing the conclusion of the subsequent chair. That report outlines 
the achievements of the working groups for the previous two 
years and often the work of the groups is linked back to previous 
declarations. For example, the 2019 SAO Report to Ministers 
states that “In follow-up to the Fairbanks declaration 2017 (e.g., 
see paragraphs 11, 14-17, 20, 23–26 of the declaration), ACAP 
has, inter alia, undertaken the following work over the course of 
2017-–2019” (Arctic Council 2019c, 17). 
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As a conclusion, this section shows, not surprisingly, that re-
garding the content of the declarations they tend to prioritize 
issues around International Cooperation, Governance, Human 
Dimension and Environmental Protection, to be the most-quot-
ed indicators across time. They all mainly deal with – directly or 
indirectly - the two main functions of the Arctic Council: envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable development. Under the 
Human Dimension indicator there is also a focus on ensuring 
issues of the health and wellbeing of Northerners. The economy 
and infrastructure are also discussed, although not to the same 
extent as the other issues. 
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Part III:  
Permanent Participants’ Documents
When the Arctic Council (AC) was established in 1996, the 
eight Arctic State ‘Members’ unanimously agreed to recognize 
six Indigenous Peoples Organizations as ‘Permanent Partici-
pants’ (PPs) in the Council. According to The Ottawa Declara-
tion (1996), the position of PPs “equally is open to other Arctic 
organizations of Indigenous peoples14* with a majority Arctic 
Indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a single Indigenous 
people resident in more than one Arctic State; or (b) more than 
one Arctic Indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state”. 
The eight Arctic states first recognized the Indigenous peoples of 
the Arctic in 1991, with the signing of the Arctic Environment 
Protection Strategy (AEPS). According to the AEPS, the eight 
Arctic states agreed “to continue to promote cooperation with 
the Arctic Indigenous peoples and to invite their organizations 
to future meetings as observers” (Declaration on the Protection 
of the Arctic Environment, 1991, 2). Inuit and Saami represent-
atives had, in fact, participated in the preparatory meetings for 
the AEPS in 1989–1990 (e.g., Heininen 1992). In contrast, the 
Ilulissat Declaration (2008), based on the ministerial meeting 
of the five Arctic Ocean coastal states in May 2008, does not 
recognize the six Permanent Participants or other Arctic Indig-
enous peoples. 
The Arctic Council has aimed, since its establishment, to ena-
ble the Arctic Indigenous peoples—as permanent residents of 
the region—to contribute to the circumpolar debate in terms 
of their traditional knowledge, policy and political perspectives, 
and insights into environmental protection and sustainable de-
velopment—the latter being the Council’s two main focuses. 
This has been evidenced in ministerial and plenary meetings of 
the AC, where the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) representing 
the six Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs) sit down at the 
same table with the representatives of the member states. These 
Indigenous peoples’ representatives also have the right to take 
the floor and express their opinions and proposals, a right that is 
not afforded to the representatives of the AC observer countries 
and to other permanent observers, whose mandate is only to be 
present and to observe. 
The six Indigenous Peoples Organizations with the status of a 
Permanent Participant of the Arctic Council are: the Aleut In-
ternational Association (AIA), connecting Aleut from the USA 
and the Russian Federation; the Arctic Athabaskan Council 
14  Footnote (*2), one of two in the Declaration, states: “the use of the term ‘peoples’ in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard 
the rights which may attach to the term under international law” (1996, 3).
(AAC), connecting Athabaskan from Canada and the USA; the 
Gwich’in Council International (GCI), connecting Gwich’in 
from Canada and the USA; the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(ICC), connecting Inuit from Canada, Greenland/DNK, the 
Russian Federation and the USA; the Russian Association of 
Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), connecting all In-
digenous peoples in the Russian Arctic; and the Saami Council 
(SC), connecting Saami in Finland, Norway, the Russian Feder-
ation, and Sweden. 
Of these organizations, only the Arctic Athabaskan Council and 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council have written and adopted a spe-
cific Arctic policy into their portfolio of governance documents; 
the Gwich’in Council International has produced a report on 
environmental impact assessments; and the Saami Council has 
published declarations on the Arctic. Thus, a proper intercom-
parison of the documents cannot be performed in this section, 
as each document type serves different purposes, and, unlike 
the national policies, are not coded in the study. The documents 
of these four Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council 
(Athabaskan, Inuit, Gwich’in, and Saami) are, however, analyz-
ed below—they provide valuable insights into their different ap-
proaches to Arctic governance and geopolitics, with Indigenous 
rights and self-determination being frequently highlighted in 
them. They also provide politically diverse and academically in-
teresting approaches to Arctic security issues, for example, food 
safety, and the connections between human rights and peace, 
security, and development. 
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Arctic Athabaskan Council
The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) has produced three 
short Arctic governance documents,15 as follows: 
1. Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Arctic Council: 
A Discussion Paper (AAC 2007), a short discussion paper on 
the Arctic Council and its development from its March 2007 
meeting;
2.  A special paper, Europe and the Arctic: A View from the Arc-
tic Athabaskan Council (AAC 2008) based on the September 
2008 Arctic Conference, “Common Concern for the Arctic,” 
supported by and organized in cooperation with the Nordic 
Council of Ministers and held in Ilulissat, Greenland. 
3. The most recent, the 2017 AAC’s Arctic Policy (AAC 2017).
Here we analyze and compare two of these documents: the 2017 
AAC’s Arctic Policy and the 2008 Europe and the Arctic: A View 
from the Arctic Athabaskan Council. The AAC’s Arctic Policy, 
adopted in 2017 by the Arctic Athabaskan Council, has ten 
pages (excluding maps and pictures) and covers the following:
i) It explains (a) the expected outcomes of international pol-
icy initiatives regarding the Arctic, and (b) the thematic 
areas and current process of Canada’s 2017 Arctic Policy 
Framework development which is aimed at replacing Can-
ada’s Northern Strategy (2009) and the Statement on Cana-
da’s Arctic Foreign Policy (2010).
ii) It refers to a joint Statement on Climate, Energy and Arc-
tic Leadership by the USA and Canada (President Obama 
and Prime Minister Trudeau) in March 2016, and a USA–
Canada Joint Arctic Leaders Statement in December 2016 
to launch actions ensuring a strong, sustainable and viable 
Arctic economy and ecosystem.
iii) It sets out the nine principles of partnership of a new Shared 
Arctic Leadership Model (by Mary Simon Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada INAC 2017) to provide advice 
on two important topics: 1) “New ambitious conservation 
goals for the Arctic in the context of sustainable develop-
ment”; and 2) “The social and economic priorities of Arc-
tic leaders and Indigenous peoples living in remote Arctic 
communities” (2017, 3).
iv) The document covers the following thematic areas of Can-
ada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Economy and Trade; Defence, 
Safety and Security; Environmental and Scientific Cooper-
ation; and Social and Cultural Cooperation. 
The 2008 document Europe and the Arctic: A View from the 
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC 2008) (eight pages, excluding 
maps or pictures), relates to the AAC’s view on the relations 
15  There are also two more recent documents which we will mention in the report: AAC and Arctic EIA: Good Practice Recommendations for Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Public Participation in the Arctic; and AAC - Arctic Resilience Action Framework.
between Europe and the Arctic, wider international coopera-
tion, and international treaties and organizations relevant to 
the Arctic.
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator is dis-
cussed in both the 2008 and 2017 documents. The 2008 paper 
states that the Athabaskan people have traditionally “used and 
occupied up to 3 million kms2 of territory in North America” 
and that “[AAC] represents internationally Athabaskan peo-
ples and communities” (2008, 2) in this territory as well as 
within the Arctic Council. There is, additionally, an internal 
definition of the Arctic as a ‘home’ to the Athabaskan and other 
aboriginal peoples of the region, as AAC International Chair 
Bill Erasmus (2008) wrote to the European Union. Moreover, 
the AAC recognizes that “it has been clear for many years that 
decisions made outside the Arctic have a significant bearing 
on what takes place within the region, for both good and ill” 
(2008, 2). It further states that in 2003 the United Nations En-
vironment Programme (UNEP) “effectively characterized the 
Arctic as the world’s barometer of environmental change and 
urged states worldwide to heed the reading on the barometer” 
(2008, 3) and also “to amend the UNFCCC [United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change] to embed the 
Arctic-as-global-barometer principle” (2008, 7). This so-called 
barometer refers to the rapid decline of multi-year sea ice in 
the Arctic Ocean, which could mean, as the 2008 document 
speculates, that the Arctic Ocean is soon destined to become 
like North America’s Great Lakes—frozen over in winter and 
completely thawed in summer. 
The 2017 Arctic Policy, on the other hand, states that the AAC 
is “an international treaty organization established to defend 
the rights and further the interests internationally of American 
and Canadian Athabaskan members First Nation governments 
in the eight-nation Arctic Council and other international fora” 
(2017, 4–5). It further states that the AAC also “seeks to foster 
a greater understanding of the shared heritage of Athabaskan 
peoples of the Arctic North America” (2017, 5). They have lived 
in Arctic and sub-Arctic Alaska (USA) and Yukon and North-
west Territories of Canada for at least 10,000 years and occupy 
about 3 million square kilometers of this territory (2017, 5).
Concerning the Human Dimension indicator, the 2008 paper 
notes briefly that the AAC “represents internationally Athabas-
kan peoples and communities in sub-Arctic Alaska and north-
ern Canada” (2008, 2). While the 2007 discussion paper states 
clearly that the AAC is “one of six ‘permanent participants’ to 
the Arctic Council” (AAC 2007), the 2017 Arctic Policy states 
that “The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) is an international 
treaty organization established to defend the rights and further 
the interests internationally of American and Canadian Ath-
abaskan members… [and] authorized ’Permanent Participant’ 
in the Arctic Council.” (2017, 4–5). 
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The 2017 document also includes a special section on social 
and cultural cooperation emphasizing “a number of factors that 
put stress on Northern Indigenous people’s health, languages, 
and social well-being.... [including] struggles with building 
new housing,… food availability”. The section also stresses that 
climate change is “increasing hazards for those… harvesting 
on the land” and “can bring new disease vectors… as well as 
contaminants”. Recommendations for Canada’s Arctic foreign 
policy include to support, among other things, “human health 
and mental wellness”, to “encourage and enable conferences and 
exchanges at both the academic and community level”, and to 
“provide seed funding to allow Indigenous organizations and 
communities to develop programming designed to work in 
their specific circumstances” (2017, 6).
The Governance indicator is well represented in both docu-
ments and addresses different governance topics. According to 
the 2017 policy, “Forms of political and cultural organization 
vary, depending upon the place of residence of a particular Ath-
abaskan people.” Also, “in Alaska, Athabaskan peoples have or-
ganized themselves in accordance with federal and State statutes 
which provide funding for government operations including the 
Indian Reorganization Act for tribal governments” (2017, 5).
The negotiated agreements referred to are based on the Arctic 
Athabaskan Council’s strategic objectives “to defend the har-
vesting rights and interests of Athabaskan peoples, communi-
cate Arctic Council activities… and promote the evolution and 
strengthening of the Arctic Council to address and balance the 
competing issues of environmental protection and sustainable 
development” (2017, 5).
The 2008 paper addresses issues of self-governance and self-de-
termination, stating that “land-claim agreements… provide a 
basis for Athabaskan peoples to own land and natural resources 
and to chart their own paths in the two nation states in which 
they reside” (2008, 2). Furthermore, the document comments 
on regional governance structures, such as the Arctic Council 
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS) in a pan-Arctic context. Regarding the Arctic Council, 
the 2008 document states that, “importantly, strengthening the 
Arctic Council may require giving it a more formal, authorita-
tive, and legally-binding foundation. Of interest may be the draft 
Arctic convention prepared by Donald Pharand and published 
by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC) in 1991” 
(2008, 5). As for UNCLOS, in a bigger picture, “all five Arctic 
Ocean rim states need to apply the science-based UNCLOS pro-
cess to determine the geographical extent of national rights to 
the offshore seaward of exclusive economic zones (EEZ),… this 
is exactly what the five rim states agreed in Ilulissat [in 2008]. 
At the end of this process… only a small zone around the North 
Pole will remain ‘common property” (2008, 6).
Concerning governance of natural resources, the 2008 paper 
states that the AAC states are “committed to the principle that 
development in the Arctic be environmentally, socially and cul-
turally sustainable no matter how the UNCLOS process unfolds. 
It is our view that the need for additional legal instruments, and 
the application of global agreements in our region, be evaluated 
from this perspective” (2008, 7). The views of the AAC “are sim-
ilar to those of Canadian Inuit… that the Northwest Passage is 
‘internal waters’ to Canada” (2008, 6).
Although, the 2017 AAC Arctic Policy is, first of all, meant as 
a policy paper on the “harvesting rights and interests of Ath-
abaskan peoples” (2017, 5), it also deals with the International 
Treaties and International Cooperation indicator. For exam-
ple, it includes recommendations that “Canada’s Arctic Foreign 
Policy communicate fundamental information about Canada’s 
modern treaties, land claims and self-government agreements 
as a fundamental element of our Arctic Foreign Policy” and also 
“embed the need for input from and consultation with Canadi-
an Arctic Indigenous peoples when negotiating trade treaties in 
its Arctic Foreign Policy” (2017, 9). The 2008 paper defines the 
Arctic Council as “the key intergovernmental forum for co-op-
erative action in the circumpolar Arctic and in conveying Arctic 
perspectives to international and global bodies. A ‘high level’ 
forum but rarely a political decision-making body, the council 
does excellent technical work and informs and enables states to 
adopt progressive and environmentally and socially responsi-
ble policies, if they wish.” Furthermore, the fact that six IPOs, 
including AAC, “are ‘permanent participants’ to the council… 
enables the region’s permanent residents to contribute tradi-
tional knowledge as well as policy and political perspectives to 
circumpolar debate” (2008, 3). Among the recommendations to 
Global Affairs of Canada for the international dimension of a 
new Arctic Policy framework is to “explore opportunities for ex-
panded Canadian diplomacy and leadership in multilateral and 
bilateral forums and ways in which AAC leaders can effectively 
engage” (2017, 5) in several fields from the economy and trade 
to cultural cooperation.
The 2008 paper, which has a greater focus on international coop-
eration than the 2017 paper, first defines that the AAC “partic-
ipates in the Arctic Council… the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Stockholm Convention 
on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)” (2008, 2); it then rec-
ognizes the success of a few international agreements involving 
the AAC, such as the Convention on Long-range Atmospheric 
Pollution (1998) of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE) and the Stockholm Convention on Persis-
tent Organic Pollutants (POPs) of UNEP (2001). It also refers 
to UNEP’s effective characterization of “the Arctic as the world’s 
barometer of environmental change” (2008, 3). With respect to 
the growing interests of the European Union (EU) towards the 
Arctic and its development of an Arctic policy, the 2008 paper 
stresses that “that [the term] ‘common concern’ is not confused 
with ‘common property’. As Athabaskan peoples acquired legal-
ly recognized property rights in 1971… AAC is well aware of the 
difference” (2008, 7). The AAC believes “strongly that member 
and observer states use the Arctic Council as a forum in which 
to engage China and we welcome ideas from European states 
and the EU about how best to do so” (2008, 5). Here, the hope 
is expressed that the European AC observer states, as well as the 
European Union, will support the AAC’s goal “that the Arctic 
Council be strengthened to take a ‘hands on’ role in conveying 
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Arctic perspectives, concerns and interests on climate change, 
contaminants, biodiversity conservation and other issues to in-
ternational and global bodies” (2008, 4).
The Environmental Protection indicator shows that the AAC 
takes environmental protection seriously, even if the issue is 
only briefly mentioned in the two documents; for example, 
the 2017 document comments on the Tlicho Aquatic Ecosys-
tem Monitoring Program. The 2008 document also recognizes 
the role of UNCLOS in environmental protection, but takes a 
cautious approach as the AAC “is committed to the principle 
that development in the Arctic be environmentally, socially 
and culturally sustainable no matter how the UNCLOS process 
unfolds” (2008, 7). The 2008 document also explains that en-
vironmental protection requires management of the Northwest 
Passage as Canadian internal waters, which “makes sense from a 
practical, environmental management and regulatory perspec-
tive… [and] is the best means to protect the area’s fragile natural 
environment” (2008, 6). Additionally, with regard to environ-
mental protection and pollution, the document states the hope 
that the European observer states and the EU will support the 
AAC’s goal of strengthening the Arctic Council “to take a ‘hands 
on’ role in conveying Arctic perspectives, concerns and interests 
on climate change, contaminants, biodiversity conservation and 
other issues to international and global bodies” (2008, 4).
 
The Pollution indicator is briefly mentioned in both documents, 
although each identifies different pollutants. For instance, the 
2017 policy comments on the presence of POPs and atmos-
pheric mercury, while the 2008 paper mentions contaminants 
linked to the biodiversity convention. Approaches to pollution 
problem-solving are addressed only in the 2017 policy, which 
mentions the Stockholm Convention on POPs. 
The Climate Change indicator comes straight to the forefront in 
the 2017 policy, which states that “the Indigenous peoples of the 
North are dealing with the effects of climate change on a daily 
basis. Work by the Arctic Council on the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA) 2004 provided a broad brush examination 
of climate change in the Arctic” (2017, 7). The AAC has observ-
er status at the UNFCCC. 
The starting point of the 2008 paper, which places more atten-
tion on climate change than the 2017 policy, is: “the rapid de-
cline in recent years of multi-year sea ice in the Arctic Ocean 
has attracted considerable attention worldwide” (2008, 6) with 
UNEP having characterized the Arctic as “the world’s barometer 
of environmental change” (2008, 3). The document also men-
tions that the 2004 ACIA report “has significantly influenced 
the climate change mitigation and adaptation positions of some 
non-Arctic as well as Arctic states” (2008, 4). The AAC thus 
“suggests that a formal adaptation protocol to the UNFCCC be 
considered which references the Arctic as well as other vulnera-
ble regions of the globe” (2008, 7). Furthermore, the document 
recognizes the EU’s leading role in climate change negotiations 
and that “the EU may even become the main interpreter of Arc-
tic concerns” (2008, 4). The paper, therefore, notably states that 
although “the EU’s efforts on climate change mitigation… are of 
considerable importance to the Arctic… we strike a real note of 
caution about who is best positioned to be the ‘main interpret-
er of Arctic concerns’ to the broader international community”. 
The paper continues: “This is not to defend the undeniably weak 
positions on climate change mitigation taken, in particular, by 
the governments of Canada and the United States. Rather than 
assuming the burden of interpreting Arctic concerns we suggest 
that Europe continue to… engage with those who live in the 
region, particularly its Indigenous peoples, and help them inter-
pret and convey Arctic concerns to the world” (2008, 4).
The Security indicator is explicitly mentioned in the 2017 policy 
by the following statement: “Where Canada’s defence, securi-
ty, and boundary issues will be impacting its Indigenous and 
Northern residents well-being… it is of utmost importance that 
the residents are consulted and informed of any actions Cana-
da proposes to undertake” (2017, 9). Based on that, the AAC 
aims to include “defence, safety and security” by providing 
recommendations on them to the Global Affairs of Canada for 
the international dimension of a new Arctic Policy framework 
“to explore opportunities for expanded Canadian diplomacy 
and leadership in multilateral and bilateral forums and ways in 
which AAC leaders can effectively engage” (2017, 5) in them.
Without explicitly mentioning sovereignty, the 2008 paper states 
that “the legal status of the Northwest Passage is an issue of the 
first political importance, particularly in Canada” (2008, 6), be-
ing ‘internal waters’ to Canada. It is thus important for the mar-
itime boundary disputes between Canada and the USA in the 
Beaufort Sea to be resolved. Furthermore, “all five Arctic Ocean 
rim states need to apply the science-based UNCLOS process to 
determine the geographical extent of national rights to the off-
shore seaward of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)” (2008, 6). 
The document notes that flag planting on the Arctic Ocean floor 
by the 2007 Russian Expedition “has been interpreted—misin-
terpreted in our view—as a sign of coming conflict” (2008, 6), 
while noting that outside pressures from this kind of discourse 
are nothing new. 
The Safety and SAR indicator is not covered in either document.
The Economy indicator is briefly noted by the 2017 policy, 
stating that “the trade treaties which the Canadian Govern-
ment negotiates at the International level… can have impacts 
on treaty rights… [and] intellectual property” (2017, 6). There 
is thus a “need for input from and consultation with Canadian 
Arctic Indigenous peoples when negotiating trade treaties in its 
[Canadian] Arctic Foreign Policy.… [to] recognize the cultural 
and food security barriers.… [and provide] resources to Arctic 
universities and institutions” (2017, 7) so as to develop innova-
tive ways of addressing housing in the Arctic North, including 
energy-efficiency. 
The 2008 paper briefly recognizes that there is a strong connec-
tion between the aspirations of the EU to be/become a “more 
visible and important player in the Arctic and Europe’s attitude 
to the wildlife-based renewable resource economy which re-
mains important in many northern communities and to Arctic 
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Indigenous Peoples” (2008, 5). The document, however, states 
bluntly that “exempting Indigenous peoples from broader re-
strictions in trade on wildlife products has not [worked] and 
will not work [in the future]” (2008, 5).
The Tourism indicator is not covered by the two documents.
Concerning the Infrastructure indicator, the 2008 paper firmly 
states that “transcontinental shipping through the [Northwest] 
passage will… inevitably lead to additional development with 
impacts further South” (2008, 6). It also shows the AAC’s con-
cerns that, due to the rapid warming of the Arctic Ocean, it is 
destined, as mentioned earlier, to soon become “frozen over 
in winter and completely thawed in summer – [thus] further 
‘opening’ the region to oil, gas and mineral development and 
intercontinental shipping” (2008, 6). Among the recommenda-
tions for Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, the 2017 AAC policy 
asks for “resources to Arctic universities and institutions to de-
velop Arctic innovations that considers and addresses northern 
housing and energy-efficient infrastructure, renewable energy, 
food security, community based monitoring, resource develop-
ment and technology” (2017, 7).
For the Science and Education indicator, the 2008 paper brief-
ly notes that having six Indigenous Peoples Organizations as 
‘Permanent Participants’ to the Arctic Council enables “the re-
gion’s permanent residents to contribute traditional knowledge 
as well as policy and political perspectives to circumpolar de-
bate” (2008, 3). Further, the AAC is well aware “of the significant 
contribution of Germany, France and the UK to polar science” 
(2008, 5). The 2017 policy paper, concerning the Canadian High 
Arctic Research Station (CHARS) and Polar Knowledge Cana-
da, recommends that Canada’s Arctic foreign policy should en-
sure “to the maximum extent possible, [that] research be co-de-
veloped, produced and communicated in full partnership with 
Arctic Indigenous people” including “Indigenous participation 
on Canadian delegations” (2017, 8). The aim is to strength-
en Arctic [research] links, engaging broadly in dialogue with 
First Nations, Yukon and Northwest Territories governments, 
co-management bodies, individuals, and organizations with re-
spect to research plans, instead of the current situation, namely, 
where all communication is directed via CHARS and providing 
input or exploring research synergies is impossible.
The Implementation indicator is an element in both docu-
ments. The 2017 AAC Arctic Policy has several recommen-
dations on each theme and includes three additional recom-
mendations as follow-up to the Arctic Athabaskan Council’s 
policy formulation process regarding how Indigenous northern 
think-tanks could be used to advise governments on Arctic is-
sues: first, “a co-creation Policy-making group comprised of In-
digenous and Northern experts alongside federal and industry 
experts [should] be created to advance economic development 
in a sustainable manner within the Territorial North” (2017, 9); 
second, Canada will establish “an Indigenous Northern based 
‘think-tank’ for research and social science advisors to ensure 
that Canada’s Arctic people have an informed voice and mean-
ingful participation on Arctic decision-making at all levels” 
(2017, 9); and third, Canada will “provide multiyear funding to 
the three Canadian Permanent Participants” (2017, 10) in the 
Arctic Council. 
Correspondigly, as a follow-up, the 2008 paper discusses “seven 
ideas/initiatives for consideration as policy priorities” (2008, 7). 
Finally, to note that the document was sent to the [then] Presi-
dent of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso (on 29 
September 2008), and the first of the six points of the letter from 
the AAC, is that “the Arctic is considered the sovereign terri-
tory of eight states, not common property to which interested 
non-Arctic parties have property rights” (Erasmus 2008). 
To sum up 
The two AAC documents are strong statements on behalf of 
Athabaskans and the Arctic Athabaskan Council. They also 
send strong messages to ‘outsiders’ from one Arctic nation, 
which is a minority but proud to live there, regarding the 
staunch sovereignty of the Arctic states. The 2017 Arctic Policy, 
in particular, is meant, first of all, as a policy paper on strategic 
objectives with respect to the “harvesting rights and interests 
of the Athabaskan peoples” (2017, 5). It shows how strong-
ly protective the AAC is of the sovereignty and rights of the 
Athabaskan peoples, and it can be interpreted as challenging, 
if not questioning, the second footnote (see (*2) above) of the 
Ottawa Declaration (1996), namely, that “the use of the term 
‘peoples’… shall not be construed as having any implications as 
regard the rights which may attach to the term under interna-
tional law” (1996, 3).
It is encouraging to read in the 2008 paper and in the ACIA 
Report (2004) on mitigation and adaptation of UNEP’s char-
acterization of the Arctic as “the world’s barometer of environ-
mental change” (2008, 3). The basis of this characterization is 
the 2007 discussion paper on improving the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of the Arctic Council (AAC 2007), which was the 
first to recognize that “global interest in the Arctic is growing. 
Energy and mineral development, pollution, climate change, 
transportation and other issues in the Arctic are attracting in-
creased attention internationally, and this process continues” 
(2007, 3). The 2007 paper goes on to state that “decisions made 
in non-Arctic states and by global institutions have a growing 
influence on the well-being of Athabaskans who continue to 
adjust to a rapidly changing world” (2007, 3).
  
As the nature and purpose of the 2017 and 2008 documents 
differ greatly, comparing the papers makes little sense. Briefly, 
among the most striking similarities are, i) the dominant areas 
of the documents are those related to indicators of Governance 
and International Cooperation; ii) security is explicitly, and 
evenly, discussed in the both documents; and iii) the Arctic 
Council itself is highlighted in the documents. The 2008 policy 
paper defines the Arctic Council as “the key intergovernmen-
tal forum for co-operative action in the circumpolar Arctic” 
(2008, 3), stating its wish to strengthen the Council in its goals 
(of environmental protection and sustainable development). 
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The biggest difference between the two documents lies in their 
purposes. The 2017 one is a general policy document by the 
AAC, which concentrates on the rights, interests and self-deter-
mination of Athabaskan peoples as part of the human dimen-
sion, and of science and education. The 2008 paper is all about 
the AAC’s view on “Europe and the Arctic,” and thus the docu-
ment very much concentrates on International cooperation, as 
well as climate change.
Gwich’in Council International
The only Gwich’in Council International (GCI) document 
which we found for the project was the April 2018 Impact As-
sessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indigenous-Led Re-
view submitted to Gwich’in Council International. This report 
is a study on environmental assessment, in particular, an In-
digenous-led impact assessment with two research questions. 
First, the document asks what the key features of this impact 
assessment are; and second, what the outcomes are there, and 
how they have worked. To answer these questions, the docu-
ment uses specific case studies on environmental impact as-
sessment, referring to ‘community based assessment.’ 
The key findings of the Gwich’in study report, consisting of 54 
pages, including maps and pictures, are: “Indigenous parties 
are creatively using legislation and negotiated agreements to 
give force to Indigenous-led reviews. Indigenous-led impact 
assessments can be effective with a wide range of primary re-
lationships.... All processes require a clear set of steps defining 
how the review will be conducted.... Creation of Indigenous-led 
approach does not negate participation and use of findings 
from state-led processes.... There are a variety of specific en-
abling factors that will improve the chances of success of an 
Indigenous-led impact assessment.... There are distinguishing 
elements that make Indigenous-led impact assessment attrac-
tive, such as the ability to ensure culture, language, and way of 
life” (Gwich’in Council International 2018, 4–5).
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining indicator briefly defines 
the Gwich’in territory, with the 2018 document noting that 
the Gwich’in Council International represents “9,000 Gwich’in 
in the Northwest Territories (NWT), Yukon, and Alaska as a 
Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council, the only inter-
national organization to give Indigenous peoples a seat at the 
decision-making table alongside national governments” (2018, 
2). However, there is no detailed discussion or definition of the 
Arctic, only a consideration of “how to establish their own In-
digenous-led impact assessment processes over resource devel-
opment in their homelands” (2018, 7).
The Human Dimension indicator explains that “Indigenous 
parties are creatively using legislation and negotiated agree-
ments to conduct reviews” (2018, 4). “However, even absent 
these powers, Indigenous-led assessments can successfully oc-
cur, especially in high leverage situations” (2018, 42). Further-
more, the document seeks to identify ‘enabling factors’ contrib-
uting to the success of Indigenous-led impact assessment. This 
is, in particular, due to the fact that “historically, Canadian Indig-
enous groups have often not had a meaningful voice in impact 
assessment” (2018, 10), because, according to Gibson (2017), 
“Indigenous culture, traditional activities, rights, and title have 
by and large not been taken into comprehensive… account in 
the Crown-led and proponent-driven Canadian environmental 
assessment processes” (2018, 10). Here human capacity critically 
consists of “three elements related to capacity: funding, human 
resources, and relationship building” (2018, 38). 
The Governance indicator reveals that the document is about 
“Indigenous-led impact assessment,” which is mentioned mul-
tiple times (e.g., five times in one paragraph on p. 7). Within 
this context, the study illustrates how Indigenous governments 
can and have led their own impact assessment processes, how 
they established their own Indigenous-led impact assessment 
processes over resource development in their homelands, and 
how legislation and land claims set clear processes for impact 
assessment review. The document furthermore states that 
“where this powerful enabling factor is absent, the nation can 
seek such clarity through the establishment of a contract (IBA) 
[Impact Benefit Agreement] to define requirements for consent 
and impact assessment review” (2018, 42).
Interestingly, the document, which is based on a study com-
missioned by Gwich’in Council International to inform its 
participants about “Good Practice Recommendations for En-
vironmental Impact Assessment and Public Participation in 
the Arctic project” (under the auspices of the Sustainable De-
velopment Working Group, SDWG of the Arctic Council) de-
scribes in detail the “common characteristics that distinguish 
Indigenous-led impact assessment.” Those characteristics in-
clude, among others, “a process derived from and steeped in 
the culture, traditional knowledge, and stewardship approach 
of the nation.... legitimate elements of an Indigenous group’s 
overall governance/stewardship rights and responsibilities 
within its territory.... Indigenous laws and norms.... Indigenous 
knowledge… brought in systematically through every phase 
of decision-making.... Cultural values tend to be more broadly 
defined in Indigenous-led assessment.... [with] more focus on 
oral discussion of issues.... [and there is] a greater willingness 
to consider a future without the project if costs are deemed to 
outweigh benefits” (2018, 13).
This method is about ‘self-governance’ and ‘self-determination’, 
as the document’s working definition for ‘Indigenous-led im-
pact assessment’ indicates: “a process that is completed prior 
to any approvals or consent being provided for a proposed pro-
ject, which is designed and conducted with meaningful input 
and an adequate degree of control by Indigenous parties— on 
their own terms and with their approval. The Indigenous par-
ties are involved in the scoping, data collection, assessment, 
management planning, and decision-making about a project” 
(2018, 10). As a result, and based on the definition of ‘Indige-
nous-led impact assessment,’ decision-making is carried out by 
the Indigenous parties.
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The document also mentions the “willingness to support and 
engage the Indigenous-led review…[and the] pre-existing re-
quirements for Indigenous engagement in both the NWT and 
Quebec There was also a willing and engaged proponent, which 
at least partially funded the effort” (2018, 40). Finally, central 
governments [for example,] “also play a role in supporting In-
digenous-led impact assessment… governments and industry 
may be assets, not opposition… to encourage and support In-
digenous-led impact assessment” (2018, 40).
Finally, the report identifies three different ‘lessons learned’ 
which are listed in the document. First, “effective Indigenous-led 
impact assessment includes a clear process for defining how 
consent will be given.” Second, “creation of an Indigenous-led 
approach should not negate participation [in] and use of find-
ings from the state-led process. In fact, there are high benefits 
to at least ‘shadowing’ the state-led processes.” Finally, govern-
ments and industry may be “assets, not opposition” (2018, 42). 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation 
indicator is briefly discussed, first, through the mention that 
Gwich’in Council International is a “Permanent Participant in 
the Arctic Council, the only international organization to give 
Indigenous peoples a seat at the decision-making table along-
side national governments” (2018, 2) and second by identifying 
and proposing a potential “for international comparative work, 
including and especially significant to the Arctic, that focuses 
on Indigenous impact assessment processes, particularly those 
that are being led by Indigenous groups in other jurisdictions” 
(2018, 43).
The following indicators are not explicitly discussed in the doc-
ument: Environmental Protection, Pollution, Climate Change, 
Security, Safety and SAR, Tourism and Infrastructure.
The Economy indicator is discussed substantially via three case 
studies of the Indigenous-led impact assessment, that include 
the Tlicho of the Nico Project (North-West Territories), The 
Sivumut Project (Quebec), Squamish Nation Woodfibre LNG 
Project (British Columbia). These all address governance and 
co-management of resources, but have different relationship 
models: the Tlicho of the Nico Project is co-managed, the Sivu-
mut Project co-developed, and Squamish Nation Woodfibre 
LNG Project is independent. As they all are about utilization 
of natural resources (mining and natural gas), and sustainable 
development, they are included in the economy indicator here. 
The Science and Education indicator is not explicitly discussed 
in the Gwich’in Impact Assessment, but is implicit, given that 
the document is a study with methods and an ambitious re-
search approach.
To sum up 
The Impact Assessment in the Arctic: Emerging Practices of Indig-
enous-Led Review report by the Gwich’in Council International 
is first of all a study—and an interesting one—on environmen-
tal impact assessments, and in particular on Indigenous-led im-
pact assessment. Thus, it is also a study on self-governance and 
self-determination, how governance is interpreted, and how this 
plays a more important role in the globalized Arctic region, and 
possibly in world politics, too. Therefore, the document does 
not cover, nor is it intended to cover, most of the indicators of 
this overall analysis. The content of the report is, however, rich 
and includes both theoretical approaches and case studies. Its 
value is to examine, discuss and define environmental impact 
assessment, in particular Indigenous-led, through three case 
studies with different relationship models: co-managing, co-de-
velopment, and independently run. Indeed, this report is more 
than a study of environmental impact assessment in a changing 
Arctic influenced by grand environmental challenges and big 
international/global actors from outside of the region. It is also 
an important contribution and presentation from Indigenous 
peoples’ perspectives to discuss, brainstorm, and (re)define 
self-governance/self-determination in general, and good prac-
tices on impact assessment in the global Arctic, in particular.
Inuit Circumpolar Council
The Inuit Arctic Policy of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) 
was adopted in 2010 (ICC 2010) and is currently in its third 
edition. The 121-page information-rich policy document (in-
cluding pictures) was edited and revised by Aqqaluk Lynge and 
Marianne Stenbaek. It has eight sections: I. Goals and Objec-
tives; II. Inuit Rights, Peace and Security Issues; III. Environ-
mental Issues; IV. Social Issues; V. Cultural Issues; VI. Economic 
Issues; VII. Educational and Scientific Issues; VIII. Implementa-
tion and Appendixes.
Another important ICC document is the Utqiagvik Declaration 
2018 (ICC 2018), consisting of 13 pages (with no pictures) by the 
Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Chukotka, presented at 
the 13th General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council on 
16–19 July 2018 in Utqiagvik, Alaska. The main themes/sub-ti-
tles are: International Indigenous Human Rights and Interna-
tional Partnerships; Food Security; Families and Youth; Health 
and Wellness; Education and Language; Indigenous Knowledge; 
Sustainable Wildlife Management; Environment; Sustainable 
Development’ and Communication and Capacity Building. 
A General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) 
is held every fourth year. There are thus several Inuit declara-
tions available, such as the Kitigaaryuit Declaration of July 2014 
(ICC 2014), the Nuuk Declaration of July 2010, and the Utqiag-
vik Declaration of 2006 (ICC 2006). Better known, however, is 
A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, 
adopted by the ICC in April 2019 (ICC 2009), and inspired, per-
haps even provoked, by the Illulissat Ministerial meeting and 
Declaration of May 2008.
In the 2018 Utqiagvik Declaration, the (Re)mapping and (Re)
defining the Arctic indicator clearly defines, or redefines, the 
Arctic region by explaining the Inuit as “one Arctic people liv-
ing in four nations across Inuit Nunaat, our shared homeland, 
that today encompasses northern Alaska, Chukotka, Canada, 
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and Greenland” (ICC 2018, 1). The Declaration continues that 
the Arctic region “poses extreme challenges to connectivity and 
[that] overcoming these challenges requires political will and in-
frastructure” (2018, 10); “Inuit are more connected today than 
ever before due to the advent of the internet and social media” 
(2018, 11). Finally, “ICC will pursue novel initiatives that foster 
greater social, cultural, and political exchange between Inuit re-
gions in order to enrich Inuit cooperation and unity” (2018, 12).
The 2010 Inuit Arctic Policy (ICC 2010) makes a more politi-
cal definition of the region arguing that “the Arctic is the Inu-
it Homeland and has been inhabited by Inuit for thousands of 
years” (Inuit Arctic Policy 2010, 26). Hence “Inuit and other Arc-
tic Indigenous peoples are ancient societies using and occupying 
vast traditional territories which pre-date the creation of modern 
states” (2010, 21). The “Inuit own or have jurisdiction over half 
the entire Arctic… [and] we are, in fact, the largest landholders 
in the world [and] The Arctic has been our home and our suste-
nance for centuries” (2010, 9). “The Arctic is first and foremost 
the ancestral homeland of Inuit and other northern peoples” 
(2010, 22). Overall, the Arctic region and sub-Arctic areas, as 
well as the entire northern circumpolar world, is said by the Pol-
icy to “form a single region in which many states and peoples are 
found. This region includes the Inuit homeland (Inuit Nunaat), 
which transcends the geographical boundaries [of the region] 
(2010, 21) and given that a “large part of the Arctic Ocean is 
contiguous to Inuit Nunaat, Inuit should therefore be consulted” 
[on all relevant issues] (2010, 45). 
The 2010 Inuit Policy also discusses changes in the Arctic. “The 
Inuit world has changed profoundly… [and] Inuit Nunaat, our 
homeland, has become a major force in international and na-
tional politics, in climate change research and science, in culture 
and arts, in minority human rights and models of Indigenous 
self-government. Arctic Sovereignty is one of our main concerns 
and is now also an international concern” (2010, 9). Finally, that 
“The Inuit Circumpolar Council and its Arctic Policy principles 
have played an important role in this development” (2010, 9).
Concerning the Human Dimension indicator the 2010 Policy 
clearly states how critical it is that “Inuit be recognized and re-
ferred to both nationally and internationally as a distinct ‘peo-
ple.’ Inuit are not mere ‘populations’ or ‘minorities’” (2010, 13). 
In recognition of their distinctness, the seventh of November 
each year has been proclaimed ‘Inuit Day’ (2010, 11). The 2010 
Policy further clarifies: “The Inuit are an integral part of Arctic 
ecosystems in harmony with… the dynamic processes of Arc-
tic ecosystems” (2010, 34). In terms of Inuit history, “Inuit and 
other Arctic Indigenous peoples are ancient societies using and 
occupying vast traditional territories which pre-date the creation 
of modern states. These first inhabitants of the Arctic have their 
own laws, customs, institutions, cultures and rights which also 
pre-date those of Arctic states” (2010, 21). “The archaeological 
record of the Arctic is the history of Inuit and other northern 
Indigenous peoples” (2010, 73), but “people have underestimat-
ed our adaptability and resilience. We were a rag-tag and young 
group of Inuit… but we were determined” (2010, 9).
Correspondingly, the 2018 Declaration reaffirms that “Inuit are 
one Arctic people living in four nations across Inuit Nunaat, our 
shared homeland” (2018, 1).
The 2010 Policy includes requests to both the Inuit Circum-
polar Council (ICC) and to Arctic states regarding subsistence 
rights. “An Inuit Arctic Policy must recognize that Indigenous 
‘subsistence’ is a highly complex notion” (2010, 29) [and the] 
ICC shall be greatly encouraged to undertake a comprehensive 
study on how best to address global forces, such as the ‘animal 
rights’ and other destructive movements that aim to destroy In-
uit sustainable use of living resources” (2010, 82). This matter 
is seen as consistent with the “principles of self-government, 
[given that] Inuit and other Arctic peoples should have direct 
input in the formulation and implementation of Arctic co-oper-
ation agreements” (2010, 22). On the other hand, Arctic States 
“should recognize that Inuit have the right to engage in tradi-
tional contacts and in all forms of cooperation, including eco-
nomic and social exchanges, and travel and trade across state 
and other boundaries” (2010, 88), and “trade among themselves 
regardless of national jurisdictions or boundaries” (2010, 81). 
 
The issue of ‘Inuit rights’ is an important part of the 2010 Poli-
cy, both in general and at the national level (see the chapter on 
‘Inuit Rights, Peace and Security Issues’). Nationally, the Inuit 
as “distinct Indigenous peoples… have both fundamental col-
lective and individual [basic] rights”… [that] “must be guar-
anteed in the national legal system of their respective states” 
(2010, 13) “across the circumpolar regions, including marine 
areas, and [that] transcend the national boundaries of Arctic 
states” (2010, 13). In general, the 2010 Policy strongly states 
that “Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, 
as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fun-
damental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and inter-
national human rights law[s]” (2010, 21). The 2018 Declaration 
correspondingly reaffirms “that the rights to lands, resources 
and territories and the right of self-determination [recognized 
and] affirmed by the United Nation Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) [as an international human 
rights instrument], applies to our entire homeland, including 
lands, waters, ice, air space and resources” (2018, 1). Indeed, the 
2018 Declaration goes back to the very roots of the ICC—“con-
cern for the security and integrity of the Arctic environment 
prompted the establishment of ICC” as “the first non-govern-
mental organization to call for the precautionary principle and 
vocalize the human rights dimension of the implications and 
impacts of a rapidly changing Arctic environment” (2018, 9). 
The 2010 Policy states that some of these human rights exist to 
“protect and promote Inuit rights and status within each state” 
(2010, 13). In pursuit of these rights, “Inuit must seek to obtain 
full participation in all national and governmental discussions 
and major issues affecting Inuit interests” (2010, 13) which “not 
only ensures recognition and respect for Inuit rights and inter-
ests, but also protects the human and other fundamental rights 
and freedoms” (2010, 11). The 2018 Declaration echoes this 
opinion in terms of supporting Inuit “rights and self-determina-
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tion on wildlife management issues” (2018, 8) and of directing 
the ICC “to participate collectively and strategically to ensure 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) action plans sup-
port and enhance monitoring and sustainable use of Arctic bio-
diversity” (2018, 8). Furthermore, Inuit aim to “exchange infor-
mation amongst ourselves to build capacity regarding human 
rights instruments and apply them to co-management regimes 
and other governance bodies to advance our food sovereignty 
and self-governance of land, wildlife and ecosystems” (2018, 8).
It should be recognized that “there is a profound relationship 
between human rights, peace and development” (2010, 20) in 
“formulating a comprehensive Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 9). 
This is because, on the one hand, these rights “are considered as 
individual and collective rights [including both] rights and du-
ties” (2010, 20), and on the other, “severe economic disparities 
and human rights violations can pose a threat to world peace” 
while “peaceful relationships and peace are generally vital fac-
tors in striving towards social progress and development” (2010, 
20). Regarding Inuit subsistence rights, these include “hunting, 
fishing, trapping, and gathering” (2010, 29), being “both col-
lective and individual in nature. Inuit rights to harvest flora 
and fauna… are not limited to traditionally harvested species” 
(2010, 29). The feasibility of creating an “Arctic Environmental 
Bill of Rights” should be studied in this context (2010, 28).
The 2010 Policy also states that “The harvesting practices 
of Inuit are a crucial part of their ancestral rights and tradi-
tions” (2010, 30). And this economic self-sufficiency also in-
cludes a reference to the problems Inuit encounter regarding 
“animal rights groups” (2010, 33). The ICC is asked to “rep-
resent Inuit by promoting their rights and protecting their 
interests” in relevant international organizations, such as 
WIPO, the EU, NAFTA, IWC, IUCN, WTO (2010, 82). Ac-
cording to the 2018 Declaration “elements of an overall strat-
egy to counter international anti-harvest and animal rights 
groups would include [for example].... securing of expanded 
markets for products of Indigenous harvesting” (2010, 33). 
 
According to the 2010 Policy, rights are also connected to access 
to resources. For example, the document explains that “Inuit 
have the right to manage Arctic renewable resources including 
hydro-power” (2010, 29) and have “extensive rights in inland 
water areas within their traditional territories, as outlined in 
agreements with their respective nation states” (2010, 39). They 
should also “be involved in all aspects of economic development 
in order to enjoy such fundamental human rights as the right to 
work and the right to an adequate standard of living” (2010, 79).
The 2010 Policy also speaks to issues of children’s rights. In par-
ticular, “in ensuring that the rights of Inuit children are clearly 
recognized, it is beneficial to determine what children’s rights 
already exist at the international level and within the Arctic 
states concerned” (2010, 58). Here the “right to education is a 
fundamental right” (2010, 89), which is recognized in the 2007 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Final-
ly, the ICC promises to “work to have the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child fully implemented in regard to all chil-
dren in the Arctic” (2010, 59). Additionally, other international 
agreements and instruments should be consulted regarding the 
rights of children, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, and ILO Conventions. 
A fundamental part, even the foundation, of human rights, ac-
cording to the 2010 Policy, is to “integrate Inuit cultural values 
and concerns in all aspects” (2010, 11) including creative aspects, 
given that “the diverse cultures of Inuit… are part of the cultural 
heritage of all humankind” (2010, 65). Here the ICC can play 
an important role in circumpolar relations, providing “an ideal 
forum for Inuit from the various Arctic states to engage in social 
and cultural relations” (2010, 22). The 2010 Policy emphasizes 
that “language is central to the continuity of culture and to cul-
tural identity.... the universe… [is] manifested through the Inuit 
language” (2010, 65), and “the Inuit language should [thus] be 
a working language in Inuit schools.... [as well as used] at home 
with [our] children” (2010, 92). The 2018 Declaration echoes 
this viewpoint, stating that “our languages are the foundation 
of our culture and identity. Legally protecting and revitalizing 
those languages is urgent and paramount” (2018, 6). In order for 
the Inuit language to remain strong, “Inuit language schools and 
learning institutions need to be established by the appropriate 
authorities” (2018, 6).
Interestingly, the 2010 Policy argues that, on the one hand, 
“most of Inuit material culture is derived from the land and 
sea mammals” (2010, 66) and this”‘cultural property’ includes 
property of archaeological, ethnological, artistic, literary, scien-
tific, or historical interest and importance” (2010, 71). On the 
other hand, “non-material cultures are [also] part of the cultural 
heritage of Inuit. The collective rights of Inuit to those non-ma-
terial cultures are to be respected and Inuit credited with the full 
benefits” (2010, 66). For example, “the spiritual expression of a 
traditional Inuit culture is part of its greatest treasures” (2010, 
74) and must be respected and protected (2010, 66). Religious 
beliefs are not limited to organized religions” (2010, 76), as ‘cul-
tural property’ also “merits adequate protection, foremost be-
cause of its cultural, spiritual, and educational value and use” 
(2010, 71). This means that “cultural sites of particular signif-
icance to Inuit should be protected through regional, national, 
and international measures” such as the UNESCO Convention 
on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the 
UN Convention on Cultural Diversity (2010, 74). One of the 
goals of the 2018 Declaration is to “support communities who 
are working to reclaim formal recognition of their original place 
names” (2018, 12). Overall, the 2010 Policy stresses that “Inuit 
have a right to the protection of their intellectual property. In 
particular, special attention is required to substantially reduce 
or eliminate the trade of counterfeit Inuit art or other objects 
and products” (2010, 88).
Inuit rights also includes supporting families and youth. The 
2018 Declaration considers equality as “the unique needs and 
challenges based on gender in Inuit communities” (2018, 5). 
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Correspondingly, the 2010 Policy argues that with respect to 
“threats of violence in the home, special measures must be im-
plemented both in regard to women and men… [and] when 
possible, safe houses should be located in each community” 
(2010, 55). Health and well-being are also considered impor-
tant: the chapter on “Sexual Equality and the Changing Roles 
of Women and Men in the Arctic“ argues on behalf of greater 
equality for the Inuit, including education about AIDS and oth-
er sexually transmitted diseases. To open the doors to equality 
of opportunity, the Inuit and other distinct peoples may need 
to be treated differently, with the obstacles which they alone 
face for no justifiable reason needing to be eliminated” (2010, 
54–55). Moreover, “dissemination of hate literature, incitement 
to violence, and other forms of promoting racial, religious, or 
other prejudices must be effectively prohibited throughout the 
Arctic” (2010, 77).
Health is also addressed in the 2018 Declaration. “Healthy Inu-
it families are central to the sustainability of our communities” 
(2018, 4). While food security will be discussed under the Se-
curity indicator, this means more broadly that “Inuit health and 
wellness must be approached in a holistic way that recognizes that 
physical and mental health cannot be addressed separately and 
solutions should build upon the knowledge and strengths found 
within our communities” (2018, 5). The 2018 Declaration com-
mits to taking “full and effective action to prevent suicide among 
Inuit” (2018, 1) and to “advocate for infrastructure and Inuit-spe-
cific interventions that will address family violence” (2018, 5). 
 
One of the priorities of the 2010 Policy is “improving the qual-
ity of life in Inuit communities” (2010, 11) and to “improve the 
quality of life in Arctic communities” (2010, 19), namely “issues 
of food security, unemployment, housing shortages and many 
chronic health issues” (2010, 25), and “a right to safe drinking 
water” (2010, 39. Moreover, “if the right to health as a funda-
mental human right is to have real meaning in the Arctic, a com-
prehensive strategy must be devised and carried out” (2010, 51). 
“Health is more than the absence of disease. It refers to the state 
of the whole person and has a direct bearing on the develop-
ment of the individual and her or his quality of life” (2010, 51). 
“An approach which addresses a wide range of basic needs, such 
as nutrition, education, housing, water and sanitation, medical 
care and social services, must be developed if health goals are to 
be achieved” (2010, 51–52). “The well-being of children is vital 
to all Inuit. Children represent the future of the Arctic” (2010, 
55). For example, as Inuit youths are facing chronic unemploy-
ment, childhood abuse and violence, and a high suicide rate, 
“the education system and its ability to prepare them for the la-
bour market” is important (2010, 59). Moreover, Inuit Elders 
are mentioned “as traditional leaders [who] must be encouraged 
and permitted to re-establish a leadership role and participate 
in decision-making” (2010, 64). “Traditional knowledge, be it 
cultural, environmental or ecological, should be part of the cur-
riculum in schools” (2010, 64).
All in all, the 2010 Policy fully supports “traditional Inuit adop-
tion and encourage states to legally recognize Inuit traditional 
adoption” (2010, 53). Moreover, it is “of primary importance 
that Inuit values and traditions with respect to family planning 
and treatment of children be given full recognition by the Arc-
tic states concerned” (2010, 54). “Inuit health and social service 
organizations must ensure the creation or improvement of ser-
vices in Inuit communities” (2010, 64).  
Finally, the 2010 Policy briefly mentions migration, stating that 
“mobility rights are generally recognized throughout Inuit re-
gions” (2010, 81).
The core of the Governance indicator here is undoubtedly 
‘self-governance’/‘self-determination.’ The 2010 Policy (in its 
chapter on self-government) states that Inuit “as Indigenous 
peoples… have the right to exercise sufficient control over mat-
ters affecting their traditional territories, communities, and in-
terests. An integral part of this right of self-determination within 
states is the right to self-government”, consistent with “recog-
nized rights and principles applicable to Indigenous peoples 
under international law” [so that they can exercise] “adequate 
powers of self-government within their traditional territories” 
(2010, 15). Finally, “the rights to lands, resources and territories 
and the right of self-determination, affirmed by the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), applies 
to our entire homeland, including lands, waters, ice, air space 
and resources” (2018, 1).
The 2010 Policy claims that “there is insufficient recognition 
and respect for Indigenous societies and rights in some coun-
tries, inadequate protection of the Arctic environment, and of-
ten, the imposition of centralized state policies unsuited to Arc-
tic conditions and needs” (2010, 22) and that “state government 
policies that continue to deny Indigenous peoples their full 
rights to non-renewable resources and that treat such peoples 
as obstacles to development are colonial and out-dated” (2010, 
36). Instead, states should actively “promote Inuit self-reliance 
[and] the Inuit Arctic Policy must elaborate a comprehensive 
Arctic economic strategy” (2010, 79). For example, “a vital step 
towards achieving full and meaningful employment… must be 
the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive train-
ing and education strategy designed especially for the Arctic” 
(2010, 83). “Where lacking, direct political representation by 
Inuit in national and regional political institutions should be 
actively sought, in order to obtain a more adequate government 
response to Inuit concerns” (2010, 13).
 “Consistent with principles of self-government, Inuit and other 
Arctic peoples should have direct input in the formulation and 
implementation of Arctic co-operation agreements” (2010, 22) 
and be involved “when devising policies and implementing in-
ternational conventions or other agreements” (2010, 40). The 
term ‘self-government’ is mentioned several times and the es-
tablishment a “committee to examine the state of Inuit rights for 
self-determination as recognized in international law” is pro-
posed (2010, 16). The committee should also ascertain how to 
secure these rights within Inuit Nunaat (2010, 16). Finally, it is 
proposed “to establish a comprehensive Inuit Arctic Policy… in 
regard to matters of economic, social, cultural, environmental 
as well as political concerns”, “to achieve a broad consensus on 
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the priorities, policies, and principles to be advanced in Inuit… 
regions”, and “to encourage co-ordination of policy-making and 
decision-making in the international community” (2010, 11). 
 
According to the 2010 Policy, “self-regulation is a key element in 
the relationship between Inuit and harvested resources” (2010, 
30) and “an integral part of the cultural relationship between Inuit 
and the subsistence harvest” (2010, 34) “if fundamental principles 
of self-government are to be respected” (2010, 34). Furthermore, 
“Inuit traditions, customs, and rules relating to harvesting and 
resource management should be an integral part of any Arctic 
renewable resource management regime” (2010, 34).
Correspondingly, the 2018 Declaration states that “Inuit have a 
right to self-determination in all facets of life, including in the 
promotion of Indigenous Knowledge and research” (2018, 7). 
To achieve this, it is necessary “to advance self-determination 
and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge… [and to] instruct 
ICC to engage with appropriate international fora” (e.g., AC, 
UNFCCC, CBD, IPCC) (2018, 7). Furthermore, “sustainable 
wildlife management is an important element for achieving In-
uit food security. Inuit have rights in national and international 
agreements that protect Indigenous hunting and fishing activi-
ties…. [which] affirm Inuit rights to self-determination” (2018, 
7). As far as sustainable development is concerned, the Inuit 
know that “economic development and social and cultural de-
velopment must go hand-in-hand, resulting in self-sufficiency, 
which is an essential part of greater political self-determination” 
(2018, 10). The 2018 Declaration recommends continued shar-
ing of “our unique knowledge and experiences with each other 
to advocate for the utilization and equity of Indigenous Knowl-
edge within wildlife management practices… and support our 
rights and self-determination on wildlife management issues” 
(2018, 8).
The 2010 Policy recognizes that “multilateral and transnational 
cooperation among Arctic and other states is a prerequisite to 
the development of a circumpolar system of marine manage-
ment” (2010, 43), and insists that Arctic states’ “policies regard-
ing the management and development of the seabed and its re-
sources must be established in collaboration with Inuit” (2010, 
43). In addition, “ship-owners and oil drilling rig owners should 
be subject to strict liability for ocean pollution (2010, 48) as “in-
creased exercise of Inuit offshore rights in the Arctic is crucial 
for the survival, development and future of Inuit” (2010, 40). 
Also, “comprehensive Arctic marine management and devel-
opment policies… must meet the social, cultural, political, and 
economic needs and priorities of Inuit” (2010, 42).
 
Concerning public consultations and environmental impact 
assessments, the 2010 Policy states that “proposed projects 
subject to environmental and social impact assessment must 
include potential economic impacts as an integral part of the 
overall assessment” (2010, 80) and, for example “study the so-
cio-economic, environmental and cultural impacts of the open-
ing of the north polar sea routes on our communities” (2010, 
82). “Environmental and social impact assessment procedures 
must be mandatory for proposed defence related projects… in 
particular, the siting, construction, and operation of military 
bases, installations, and facilities” (2010, 18). “National security 
restrictions… must not be used as a means of avoiding a full 
and open process of impact assessment” (2010, 19). Overall, 
“Inuit and other Arctic peoples must be assured timely access 
to relevant information and full participation in the impact as-
sessment process” (2010, 19), for example, through an Arctic 
Environmental Bill of Rights, as mentioned above. 
According to the 2018 Declaration, [Inuit] “self-determination 
and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge” (2018, 7) are cru-
cial. The ICC should also be directed “to advocate its positions 
on contaminants through the implementation and effectiveness 
monitoring regimes” of for example, UN Stockholm Conven-
tions on POPs and UN Minamata Convention on Mercury 
(2018, 9). The Declaration (2018, 10) refers to the 2017 Report 
of the Pikialasorsuaq  Commission, ‘People of the Ice Bridge: 
The Future of Pikialasorsuaq’ should be adopted. The main ob-
jective here should be “improving the self-sufficiency of Inuit 
over time with the overall objective of aligning economic devel-
opment and [the Inuit] cultural way of life” (2018, 10).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator plays an important role here—both Inuit documents 
greatly appreciate and emphasize international cooperation, 
and note, for example, that “multilateral and transnational co-
operation among Arctic and other states is a prerequisite to the 
development of a circumpolar system of marine management” 
(2010, 43). 
The 2010 Policy is clearly committed both to international co-
operation and to international organizations and treaties which 
promote “international understanding and co-operation in 
Arctic matters through collaborative, co-operative research; 
informational, cultural, and educational exchanges; and inter-
national agreements” (2010, 11). It states that “cooperation, in-
formation sharing, and solidarity among northern peoples are 
increasingly vital” and that “multilateral forums, such as the 
Arctic Council, are required in the Arctic” (2010, 22). It is im-
portant for Inuit and other northern peoples to “work together 
to ensure that… key Arctic issues and concerns are made the 
focus of the international community. This is particularly im-
portant in this age of climate change” (2010, 22). Young people 
should also be encouraged to pursue activities “that emphasize 
the need for international peace, co-operation, and understand-
ing” (2010, 61). Inuit have a right to be involved in international 
agreements and treaties as they are often “concluded between 
states on matters that directly affect Inuit rights and interests” 
(2010, 14). Such “treaties and other agreements for cultural and 
other forms of Arctic cooperation between states should involve 
Inuit in the policy formulation, negotiation, and implementa-
tion stages” (2010, 68). It is also vital that Inuit “have formal 
and direct representation in international policy and law-mak-
ing forums relating to Indigenous peoples’ interests or Arctic 
concerns” (2010, 14).
According to the 2018 Declaration, “self-determination and rec-
ognition of Indigenous Knowledge” need to be advanced and, 
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in this context, the ICC should be instructed to engage in the 
“appropriate international fora” (e.g., the AC, UNFCCC, CBD, 
IPCC) (2018, 7). The Declaration calls for participation in “Arc-
tic science and research,” namely, “contributing to activities that 
achieve partnerships and reflects the utilization of both Inuit 
Knowledge and science” and thereby advancing Inuit self-de-
termination, for example, in the framework of the “Inuit review 
of the consultation process of the Arctic Council Arctic Science 
Cooperation Agreement” (2018, 7). The Declaration further 
urges the ICC “to promote the interconnectedness of drivers 
of change and the interrelated impacts and implications on our 
health, economy and environment in high level political discus-
sions and decision-making at fora” (2018, 9). The ICC should 
be mandated to “participate actively in the operationalization 
of the United Nations ‘Local Communities and Indigenous Peo-
ples Platform’… and build capacity for Indigenous peoples to 
engage in the [UNFCCC]” (2018, 9). To achieve these goals, the 
ICC is urged “to promote sustainable economic and business 
development” through the AC and its working groups, the UN 
agencies and its collaborations with economic development fora 
and networks, including the Arctic Economic Council” (2018, 
11). One of the actions needed is to “improve capacity to fully 
engage in the work of the Arctic Council at [SAO] and Working 
Group [WG] levels” (2018, 2)—an important forum for achiev-
ing the aims of “Inuit—The Arctic We Want” (2018, 1–2).
Both the 2010 Policy and the 2018 Declaration broadly discuss 
the indicator of international cooperation in the context of, for 
example, human rights, Inuit youth and children, peace and se-
curity, environment and climate change, wildlife management, 
science and research, and Inuit rights. Both also include (long) 
lists of major and minor international agreements and treaties, 
important and relevant for Inuit, and also forums, where Inuit 
act or are asked to act. 
The 2010 Policy ties together Inuit rights and international co-
operation, beginning with the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, which is frequently referred to, as are 
other UN declarations. “It is of utmost importance that Inuit, 
together with the ICC, work towards having all countries en-
dorse the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” 
(2010, 15) and for the ICC to “work for the implementation of 
Article 31” (2010, 33). The ICC having NGO status within the 
United Nations “provides Inuit with increased opportunities” 
and ICC “participation in the Arctic Council and in the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues significantly advanc-
es Inuit interests” (2010, 14). As a result, (i) “Inuit and other 
northern peoples have a responsibility to respond to the call of 
the United Nations for concerted and comprehensive action on 
the part of the world community. In this regard, the Inuit Arc-
tic Policy should clearly support the overall goal established by 
the UN General Assembly [GA] of general and complete disar-
mament under effective international control” (2010, 16); and 
(ii) the ICC “should use its Permanent Participant status in the 
Arctic Council to promote legal and administrative reforms to 
strengthen the Council and increase the ability of Inuit to par-
ticipate fully in the Council internationally” (2010, 14). “Inuit 
and other Indigenous peoples must have a stronger voice at the 
Arctic Council and be adequately funded to participate fully” 
(2010, 15). Finally, the Policy recognizes “the NGO… status of 
the ICC within the United Nations… ICC participation in the 
Arctic Council and in the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues” (2010, 14) which significantly advances Inuit interests 
and provides increased opportunities. For example, “the com-
mon heritage of humankind principle… must not be applied 
in a manner that may in effect deny or diminish Inuit offshore 
rights” (2010, 35), while “in addressing navigational, economic 
and environmental concerns, reference should be made to the 
1982 UNCLOS]” (2010, 47–48).
 
Correspondingly, the 2018 Declaration first, acknowledges “the 
value of each ICC General Assembly Declaration as instrumen-
tal for guiding action on our shared priorities and for moni-
toring ongoing issues” (2018, 2) and also the importance of the 
ICC’s “advocacy work and participation in decision-making 
processes and… [in strengthening] Inuit rights throughout In-
uit Nunaat and globally” (2018, 2). Second, it encourages the 
“ICC to enhance Inuit participation and capacity within the 
United Nations General Assembly” (2018, 3), and to implement 
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals in Inuit Nunaat—for 
example, to “support the mandate of the Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) and to defend the 
rights of the Inuit at the United Nations Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) and expand its mandate to engage with states” (2018, 
3). The UN agencies and organizations referred to are: UNEP, 
UNESCO, WHO, IMO, FAO, as well as the UN 2030 SDGs. 
The 2010 Policy also notes international agreements and organ-
izations relevant to health and social well-being: the UN Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN 2007), and 
the rights of Inuit children under the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. 
The 2010 Policy chapter on “Peaceful and safe uses of the Arc-
tic” (2010, 19–20) emphasizes that “when formulating the Inuit 
Arctic Policy, the various meanings of ‘peaceful purposes’ un-
der international law, should be carefully examined” (2010, 20), 
and refers to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. It further states that the Arctic Council and other in-
ternational forums “have already taken important steps on spe-
cific issues, for example, in regard to safety navigation, search 
and rescue, environmental monitoring and disaster response 
and scientific cooperation, which are relevant also to the Arctic 
Ocean” (2010, 45). “In addressing navigational, economic and 
environmental concerns, reference should be made to the 1982 
[UNCLOS]” (2010, 47–48). For its part, the 2018 Declaration 
states that “to support food security in Inuit Nunaat” (2018, 4), 
the ICC must be directed to “advocate for the enforcement of 
the International Marine Organization Polar Code… and phase 
out heavy fuel oil (HFO) in order to minimize impacts on ma-
rine mammals and fish and to prevent disruption of seasonal 
hunting, and for safety and environmental protection” (2018, 4). 
 
In the context of environmental protection and climate change, 
the following list of international bodies and agreements is in-
cluded in the 2010 policy: CITES, IUCN, IWC, NAMMCO; 
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and WHO, NAFTA and EU; and UNCLOS and ILO; and the 
AC UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; the 
1998 POPs Protocol to the UN/ECE Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Atmospheric Pollution, Stockholm Convention 
2001 on POPs, and the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UNFCCC. 
The 2010 Policy also takes a more global scale and perspective 
by proposing that the “ICC should establish a committee to ex-
amine the state of Inuit rights for self-determination as recog-
nized in international law, including the right to self-govern-
ment, and recommend options to the ICC General Assemblies, 
to secure these rights everywhere in Inuit Nunaat” (2010, 16). 
This is prompted by the fact that “Indigenous peoples and their 
vital economic issues are often excluded from the structural ar-
rangements and institutionalized practices and policies of states 
at the bi-national and international level [particularly with re-
spect to the GATT and the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement]. 
Such exclusions of Indigenous peoples may in effect be contrary 
to the 1985 International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the 1978 UNESCO Decla-
ration on Race and Racial Prejudice” (2010, 86).
Referring to International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the UN Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples, the 2010 Policy also notes that “Inuit should 
co-operate with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO)” (2010, 73); “the UNESCO Convention on the Safe-
guarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the UN Conven-
tion on Cultural Diversity should be respected” (2010, 74), and 
“cultural sites of particular significance to Inuit should be pro-
tected through regional, national, and international measures… 
[as] some sites have already been protected as UNESCO Her-
itage Sites or national parks” (2010, 74). The 2018 Declaration 
mostly refers to the traditional international level by reaffirming 
that “the interrelated, interdependent and indivisible rights of 
Inuit” (2018, 2) “to lands, resources and territories and the right 
of self-determination” (2018, 1) “are recognized and affirmed in 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN-
DRIP) as an international human rights instrument” (2018, 2), 
and mandates the “ICC to strengthen its role within other inter-
national, multinational and bilateral fora including the Europe-
an Union (EU)” (2018, 3).
With respect to the Environmental Protection indicator, the 
2010 Policy recommends that “the circumpolar Arctic should 
be the world’s barometer of environmental health and Inuit 
should support resolution 22/11 Sustainable Development of 
the Arctic” adopted by UNEP in 2003 (2010, 27). Further, the 
ICC should commit to participating in future COP conferences 
“to ensure that any international agreements on climate change 
recognize the unique... issues faced by Inuit” (2010, 26). The 
2010 policy emphasizes the protection of “the delicate Arctic 
environment, including marine and other resources upon which 
Inuit depend” (2010, 11), as well as the need to, to “identify the 
mounting and diverse threats to ecological processes, biological 
diversity, and the future of Inuit harvesting” (2010, 34). “The 
integrity and abundance of fresh water resources in the Arctic 
must be protected as one of its most important resources” (2010, 
38). Environmental protection also includes protecting wildlife 
and recognizing the “continuing significance of whales, polar 
bears, seals, and other marine mammals” (2010, 31) given that 
“most of Inuit material culture is derived from the land and sea 
mammals” (2010, 66). The document also recognizes that the 
need for environmental protection and development should be 
balanced in order to “protect the delicate environment, includ-
ing the marine and other resources” (2010, 11) and to provide 
“adequate laws and enforcement procedures… to protect the 
many facets of the Arctic environment” (2010, 28). To reach 
these environmental objectives, the Inuit Arctic Policy “should 
support the punishment of crimes against the environment… 
[and] encourage studies on the feasibility of creating an Arc-
tic Environmental Bill of Rights” (2010, 28) as well as to ensure 
the protection of sea ice “as a habitat and platform for marine 
mammals and other biological resources” (2010, 42). “In cases 
where fresh waters, plants, wildlife and their habitats… [are de-
graded], Inuit have a right to full and fair compensation” (2010, 
39). “Conventions concerning migratory birds, sea mammals, 
polar bears, fish and other animals should be regularly exam-
ined from an Inuit perspective” (2010, 31), and “wildlife, in par-
ticular, requires an ecologically based system of management… 
[where] habitat management should be a key part of species 
management” (2010, 34) with respect to “[implementing] the 
Convention on Biological Diversity” (2010, 28).
The 2010 Policy particularly emphasizes the Arctic marine 
environment. While “the conservation of marine resourc-
es [is] fundamental to the maintenance of global ecological 
health and stability”, the Inuit should also be recognized as “a 
primary user of marine life” (2010, 42). This means that the 
prevention of pollution is important, especially oil spills. The 
Inuit policy should also “support an express ban of any burial 
of radioactive wastes in the sea bed” (2010, 44) and “in light 
of all the above risks, the construction or use of nuclear reac-
tors anywhere in the Arctic must be prohibited” (2010, 20). 
The 2010 Policy also notes that as “Inuit Traditional Knowledge 
has provided critical information about climate change in Arc-
tic ecosystems, completing scientific knowledge … [it] should 
be incorporated… into… the UN system or by the IPCC” (2010, 
23). Further, the ICC, in cooperation with national Inuit leaders, 
“should call on the international community, particularly the 
G20 countries, to use an International Climate Change Adapta-
tion Fund to aid Arctic regions in developed countries” (2010, 
23) and also “work to have the following human rights con-
ventions respected due to their relevance for Climate Change” 
(including UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ICE-
SCR, ICCPR, ILO Convention 169, UNDRIPs) (2010, 26). The 
ICC also “recognizes the on-going need for Inuit to be actively 
engaged with the circumpolar and international processes [in-
cluding UNFCCC, CBD, UNPFII, AC] and international sci-
ence bodies (e.g., ICSU, IASC, IASSA)” (2010, 25).
The 2018 Declaration requires support for “Sustainable Wild-
life Management [and urges the] ICC to support the [CIWN] 
to link activities on various bi-lateral and international wildlife 
activities including [CAFF, IUCN, CBD]”. The ICC should be 
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directed to “participate collectively and strategically to ensure 
the [CBD] post-2020 action plans support and enhance our 
monitoring and sustainable use of Arctic biodiversity and for 
the Convention on Biological Diversity”. The ICC should also 
“collaboratively identify opportunities for our collective engage-
ment in the United Nations Convention on the International 
Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) Rural Communities to 
safeguard the distinct rights of Inuit as an Indigenous Peoples” 
(2018, 8).
Correspondingly, the 2010 Policy requires that the “ICC should 
participate in international bodies, in particular the Convention 
on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), the 
[IUCN], the [IWC], and the [NAMMCO] to defend the right of 
Inuit to harvest marine mammals and to trade their products on 
a sustainable basis”. ICC should also be directed to use and, where 
appropriate, “lobby international and regional bodies such as the 
[WTO], the [NAFTA] and the [EU] to help promote trade of In-
uit goods and services world-wide in ways that do not adversely 
affect Inuit hunting, fishing and gathering rights” (2010, 30).
The 2018 Declaration has an even more comprehensive ap-
proach, stating: “Our environment continues to undergo pro-
found, rapid and unpredictable change. Our communities 
witness and suffer the effects of these changes and respond by 
sharing our knowledge, adapting our communities, working 
with researchers and negotiating national, bilateral and inter-
national agreements to reduce or eliminate the causes of these 
changes where possible. We know that the Arctic environment 
is unique and plays a fundamental role in global climate change 
regulation. Our culture is dependent on the land and sea. There-
fore, the sustainability of the Arctic environment and its living 
resources is crucial to our communities and a focus on support-
ing families and Inuit society” (2018, 8–9).
The 2018 Declaration also makes clear that the issue of sustaina-
bility and living resources is crucial to Inuit communities. “Sus-
tainable wildlife management” (2018, 7–8) is needed to achieve 
food security for the Inuit to support families and Inuit socie-
ty. “Inuit have rights in national and international agreements 
that protect Indigenous hunting and fishing activities” (2018, 7) 
and “ICC was the first non-governmental organization to call 
for the precautionary principle and vocalized the human rights 
dimension of the implications and impacts of a rapidly chang-
ing Arctic environment” (2018, 9). According to the Declara-
tion, the following are Inuit goals: “to advance self-determina-
tion and recognition of Indigenous knowledge” (2018, 7); “[to] 
instruct ICC to share research and actions that build climate 
change resilience and to share and showcase the adaptation and 
innovative mitigation responses, including… monitoring the 
movement of animals due to climate change” (2018, 9); and [to] 
“direct ICC to participate collectively and strategically to ensure 
the [CBD] post-2020 action plans support and enhance our 
monitoring and sustainable use of Arctic biodiversity” (2018, 8).
Both documents include brief notions on the Pollution indica-
tor. According to the 2010 Policy the following pollutants are 
recognized: “acid rain and snow, mercury pollution, pesticides, 
[PCBs], [POPs], radionuclides, and other toxic and persistent 
substances” (2010, 38) are in many instances “from trans-
boundary sources” (2010, 40) “outside the Arctic” (2010, 38). 
On ocean contamination in general, “of particular concern to 
Inuit are vessel noise, ship tracks, and oil spills and their conse-
quences on marine mammal migration” (2010, 45). A particu-
lar concern is that “transboundary nuclear pollution could [be] 
devastating” and “even if nuclear technology is excluded from 
the Arctic, circumpolar regions may still be adversely affected 
by nuclear accidents arising from outside the Arctic” (2010, 48). 
Considering these pollutants, it is “important to identify and 
effectively address the principal sources of oil pollution in ma-
rine environments” (2010, 44)…. [and] to recognize that by far 
the principle source of oil pollution in the world’s oceans are 
not accidents… but intentional ‘operational’ discharges” (2010, 
45) “from ships (e.g., deballasting), ocean dumping of wastes 
or major spills from offshore drilling rigs” (2010, 44). Also, “it 
must be recognized that military activities in circumpolar seas 
can pose unacceptable environmental and other security risks 
to Inuit and the Arctic” (2010, 44). The Policy includes interna-
tional and local, pan-Arctic perspectives on pollution: “the in-
ternational trade and development policies of Arctic and other 
developed countries require closer scrutiny. Toxic products… 
are being supplied to less developed countries that are not in 
a position to properly store and dispose of toxic substances” 
(2010, 88) and “mining activities can be a major source of water 
pollution within circumpolar regions” (2010, 40).
In terms of approaches to problem solving, the 2010 Inuit Arctic 
Policy first states its concerns about transnational pollution. A 
“clean and safe Arctic environment cannot be assured without 
effectively controlling pollution hazards both in and outside the 
Arctic” (2010, 48) for example] by strongly promoting “the need 
to keep the Arctic environment safe from [POPs] and heavy 
metals” (2010, 39). Second, international co-operation and man-
agement, such as international agreements on acid rain, impact 
assessment procedures, participate in the mitigation of GHGs 
including SLCFs, such as Black Carbon, and are all necessary 
measures. The following international bodies are mentioned as 
being relevant to this issue: AC, CITES, EU, ILO, IUCN, IWC, 
NAFTA, NAMMCO, UNCLOS, WHO, as well as the following 
international treaties: UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples, 1998 POPs Protocol to the UN/ECE Convention 
on Long-range Transboundary Atmospheric Pollution, Stock-
holm Convention 2001 on POPs, Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 
FCCC. The 2010 Policy on nuclear pollution holds that the 
ICC “should support an express ban of any burial of radioac-
tive wastes in the seabed and insist that nuclear states assume 
the full responsibility and costs of dealing with the wastes they 
generate” (2010, 44). “As long as nuclear power continues to be 
used by some countries, the international community has a duty 
to protect peoples and the global environment from accidental 
transboundary harm” (2010, 48). “Special measures must be de-
vised to deal with any possible consequences of accidental trans-
boundary pollution by radioactive material in the Arctic, as well 
as with international terrorist activities” “involving radioactive 
materials, transport of plutonium and other radioactive sub-
stances in or over the Arctic should be prohibited” (2010, 49). 
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The 2018 Declaration proposes actions needed “to advance 
self-determination and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge” 
(2018, 7). The ICC should be directed “to advocate its positions 
on contaminants through the implementation and effective-
ness monitoring regimes [e.g., POPs, UNs Minamata Conven-
tion on Mercury]… recognize the importance of short-lived 
climate forcers such as black carbon” (2018, 9) and “support 
national and global programs that safeguard our marine eco-
systems and wildlife from marine litter and micro-plastics” 
(2018, 10). It is also necessary to “advance self-determination 
and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge” (2018, 7) and “di-
rect ICC to advocate for Inuit-led environmental monitoring 
and management of Inuit Nunaat (marine and terrestrial) and 
adopt in principle, the report, People of the Ice Bridge: The Fu-
ture of Pikialasorsuaq, and establish a committee to advance 
the implementation of the recommendations” (2018, 10). Fi-
nally, the declaration states that “these initiatives should be 
undertaken with an objective of improving the self-sufficiency 
of Inuit over time with the overall objective of aligning eco-
nomic development and [the] cultural way of life” (2018, 10).
According to the 2010 Policy, “climate change is a major dan-
ger” (2010, 38) and “the ICC believes in preventing danger-
ous climate change that will adversely affect Inuit livelihoods” 
(2010, 23). It thus recognizes the Climate Change indicator, 
though this is not among the major themes in these Inuit doc-
uments. “The overriding concern is the increased melting of 
ice and other potentially detrimental effects of climate change 
on the oceans and waterways” (2010, 47). There are “potential 
impacts of climate change on the culture, health, spirituality 
and economy of Inuit throughout the Arctic” (2010, 23). “Inuit 
should work towards making international organizations rec-
ognize the impact of climate change on Inuit and put resourc-
es in place to help Inuit adapt” (2010, 23) by “[minimizing] 
climate change impacts”, “[stabilizing] greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentrations” (2010, 23), “[devising] an overall policy on 
sea ice in circumpolar regions” (2010, 42), and “the effects of 
climate change on sea ice [have] to be taken into considera-
tion” (2010, 42).
The 2018 Declaration starts with a notion about the Arctic 
environment being ‘unique’ and playing “a fundamental role 
in global climate change regulation. Our culture is depend-
ent on the land and sea” (2018, 9). It goes on to say that “loss 
of multi-year sea-ice and thawing permafrost are leading to 
enhanced cycling of contaminants that may have adverse im-
pacts throughout the food web” (2018, 4). For example, there 
are changes in temperatures, sea ice coverage and movement, 
thawing permafrost. Moreover, the “arrival of new species is 
resulting in a need to adjust hunting strategies and ways of 
storing food” (2018, 4). It is not surprising, therefore, that mit-
igation and adaptation are mentioned in both documents. The 
2010 Policy explains that “adaptation processes should deal 
with issues of food security, unemployment, housing shortag-
es and many chronic health issues” (2010, 25) and “partici-
pate in the mitigation of [GHG emissions], including [SLCFs], 
such as Black Carbon, in order to limit global temperature 
rise” (2010, 25). As a result of these impacts on the population, 
“immediate financial assistance should be provided to assist 
Arctic communities already significantly affected by climate 
change” (2010, 25). 
Similarly, the 2018 Declaration states the need to instruct the 
ICC “to share research and actions that build climate [change] 
resilience and to share and showcase the adaptation and inno-
vative mitigation responses, including… monitoring and move-
ment of animals due to climate change, erosion and community 
relocation” (2018, 9). The “Inuit and other northern peoples 
should work together to ensure that… key Arctic issues and 
concerns are made the focus of the international community” 
(2010, 22). “Traditional knowledge should be recognized as 
having validity and the Inuit should make representation to 
the IPCC to develop a complementary assessment on climate 
change and Indigenous peoples” (2010, 23).
The 2010 Policy ties together climate change and human rights, 
and brings them onto the international / global stage, stating 
that ICC should “work to have… human rights conventions re-
spected due to their relevance for Climate Change [e.g., the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Convention 169]” 
(2010, 26). “The ICC, in cooperation with national Inuit lead-
ers, should call on the international community, particularly the 
G20 countries, to use an International Climate Change Adapta-
tion Fund to aid Arctic regions in developed countries [and to 
commit themselves to participate in future COPs]” (2010, 23).
The Security indicator is explicitly discussed in both the 2010 
Policy and the 2018 Declaration. The 2010 Policy has a substan-
tial sub-chapter on Arctic and Global Security (2010, 16–19) 
“promoting peace, and global security (2010, 18)… [and fos-
tering] peaceful diplomacy and the use of appropriate and safe 
technologies in circumpolar regions” (2010, 11). The document 
says bluntly that although national defence and foreign policy 
issues are “traditionally the domain of state governments”, but 
“policy-making concerning Arctic and global security is too 
crucial to exclude northern communities and should not be left 
solely to experts within the military and government” (2010, 
16). Furthermore, “For true Arctic security to be achieved, there 
must be greater global security. New concepts of common secu-
rity are urgently needed that incorporate environmental, health, 
social, cultural, and economic aspects” (2010, 16).The goal of 
this must be the attainment by “general and complete disarma-
ment under effective international control… [here] is essential 
that the concept of an Arctic zone of peace be formally accepted 
by Arctic states and others as an explicit and political objective” 
(2010, 18). For example, “it must be recognized that military ac-
tivities in circumpolar seas can pose unacceptable environmen-
tal and other security risks to Inuit and the Arctic“ (2010, 44). 
The 2010 Policy thus proposes that “environmental and social 
impact assessment procedures must be mandatory for proposed 
defence related projects… In particular, the siting, construction, 
and operation of military bases, installations, and facilities must 
be subject to impact assessment” (2010, 18). Moreover, “secu-
rity shall not only be defined in military terms. In this context, 
respect for the rights, values, and perspectives of the Arctic’s 
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Indigenous peoples in vital” (2010, 16) and “national security 
restrictions should only apply where strictly necessary and must 
not be used as a means of avoiding a full and open process of 
impact assessment” (2010, 19). 
The 2010 Policy also states that, for the Inuit, “Arctic Sovereign-
ty is one of our main concerns and is now also an internation-
al concern” (2010, 9). Of fundamental importance is that the 
Inuit Arctic Policy should recognize “a profound relationship 
between human rights, peace and development”. “The human 
rights of peace and development are considered as individual 
and collective rights: they include both rights and duties” (2010, 
20). It is important to take them into account when formulating 
a comprehensive Inuit Arctic Policy, and ensuring that there is 
“a uniform, consistent meaning of ‘peaceful purposes’ under the 
Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 20). Within the Arctic region is “the 
Inuit Homeland [Nunaat]… inhabited by Inuit for thousands 
of years. Therefore, its inhabitants should be involved in and 
can contribute significantly to the issues of Arctic Sovereignty” 
(2010, 26). “The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation of 
November 19, 1794 (the Jay Treaty) between the [USA] and the 
[UK] promised to allow Indigenous peoples free passage and 
trade across the U.S.–Canada border”. “Similar steps must be 
taken in relation to borders in other Arctic states within Inuit 
Nunaat” (2010, 88).
The 2018 Declaration also has a special perspective on food se-
curity which “is central to Inuit identity and way of life” and 
“will be promoted and endorsed in all aspects of ICC’s work” 
(2018, 1). “Inuit food security is multi-faceted and reflective 
of interconnecting elements, such as language, child develop-
ment, mental and physical health, high cost of transportation, 
economic development and management. The Arctic’s living 
resources and the ability of our hunters to harvest and process 
these resources are fundamental to food security and is core to 
Inuit identity” (2018, 3). “Recognizing the health of our people 
are connected to the health of the animals and overall environ-
ment, climate-related changes provide both opportunities and 
challenges that contribute to food security or insecurity” (2018, 
4). Both ‘food security’ and ‘food sovereignty’ are defined. To 
achieve “food security will require holistic approaches, Inuit 
innovation, and depends on the capacity to mobilize govern-
ments, regional stakeholders and community residents” (2018, 
4). To support food security in Inuit Nunaat and achieve food 
sovereignty the following actions, inter alia, are needed: “Urge 
ICC to continue its work to enhance food security through re-
search and advocacy… Direct ICC to address components of 
food security that will aid in enhancing self-governance across 
Inuit Nunaat… Direct ICC to advocate for the enforcement of 
the International Marine Organization Polar Code… and phase 
out heavy fuel oil (HFO) in order to minimize impacts on ma-
rine mammals and fish and to prevent disruption of seasonal 
hunting, and for safety and environmental protection” (2018, 4). 
As measures to “achieve real and lasting security in the Arctic” 
(2010, 22) and solve problems across the jurisdictional bound-
aries of the Arctic states, the 2010 Policy recognizes first, “in-
ternational cooperation” (2010, 18); and second, that “northern 
peoples should encourage the development of new notions of 
common security” (2010, 22) and “encourage activities of youth 
that emphasize the need for international peace, co-operation, 
and understanding” (2010, 61). Suitable means “should be de-
vised to promote awareness and informed discussion in north-
ern communities of the dangers of nuclear weapons” “to teach 
students… the values of disarmament, non-violent resolution 
of conflicts, and world peace” (2010, 16). The 2010 Policy urges 
that “the concept of an Arctic zone of peace be formally accept-
ed by Arctic states and others as an explicit and political objec-
tive” (2010, 16). Such a “zone of peace must foster international 
cooperation for solely peaceful purposes and must be free of 
nuclear weapons; testing of nuclear and other weapons of mass 
destruction must not be permissible; as a general rule, the safe-
guarding of the Arctic environment must take precedence over 
military exercises and activities; peacetime military activities 
[including low-level and supersonic flight testing and training] 
that disrupt or undermine the territories, communities, rights, 
and security of peoples must not be allowed… and internation-
al, circumpolar, and national systems of verification pertaining 
to arms control must be encouraged” (2010, 18). Furthermore, 
for these purposes “it would be beneficial to devise an Arctic 
foreign policy as an integral part of the overall Inuit Arctic Poli-
cy” which is not “limited to defence-related issues but should be 
made consistent with environmental, social, and other aspects 
of the overall Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 18). The fundamen-
tal issue here is that “the Inuit circumpolar homeland… must 
only be used for purposes that are peaceful and safe” (2010, 
19). “Testing, use, manufacture, production, installation, or ac-
quisition of any nuclear weapons within the Inuit circumpolar 
homeland must be prohibited” (2010, 20). Finally, on this issue, 
the 2010 Policy states: “Severe economic disparities and human 
rights violations can pose a threat to world peace… peaceful 
relationships and peace are generally vital factors in striving to-
wards social progress and development” (2010, 20).
The 2010 Policy outlines a few interests and concerns with re-
spect to the Safety and SAR indicator First, the Inuit have a 
“right to safe drinking water” (2010, 39). “The integrity and 
abundance of fresh water resources in the Arctic must be pro-
tected as one of its most important resources” (2010, 38). Sec-
ond, “an Arctic waters management regime [should] address 
conflicting uses [shipping, hydroelectric power, inter-basin 
transfers, mining, oil and gas developments]” (2010, 39), “Tank-
er traffic, in the Arctic, is highly risky and should be prohibited” 
(2010, 47). Third, due to domestic violence and vulnerability 
of Inuit children “the right to protection against external risks 
likely to endanger health. Special attention should be devoted 
to occupational health and safety” and “domestic violence must 
be eliminated” (2010, 52). Finally, as mentioned earlier, trans-
boundary nuclear pollution “could have devastating environ-
mental, health, economic, and cultural impacts in the Arctic” 
(2010, 68). Special measures for dealing with such occurrences 
and with “the dangers of terrorist attacks using radioactive ma-
terials” should be put in place (2010, 49).
The 2010 Policy acknowledges that international forums, like 
the Arctic Council, “have already taken important steps on spe-
Part III: Permanent Participants’ Documents
179
cific issues, for example, in regard to safety navigation, search 
and rescue, environmental monitoring and disaster response 
and scientific cooperation” (2010, 45). It concludes, however, 
that “a clean and safe Arctic environment cannot be assured 
without effectively controlling pollution hazards both in and 
outside the Arctic” (2010, 48), and proposes infrastructure and 
capabilities to increase safety. For example, “a system of regis-
tration should be implemented for all tankers and ships sail-
ing in the Arctic waters in order to track them in case of ac-
cident” (2010, 47), also “an urgent need to develop upgraded 
navigational or hydrographic charts for Arctic marine areas, 
according to the highest standards”, and “critical… to devel-
op a proven capacity for immediate and effective response to 
any oil spill” (2010, 47). For nuclear safety “the internation-
al community has a duty to protect peoples and the global 
environment from accidental transboundary harm” (2010, 
48). “Special measures must be devised to deal with any pos-
sible consequences of accidental transboundary pollution 
by radioactive material in the Arctic” “involving radioactive 
materials, transport of plutonium and other radioactive sub-
stances in or over the Arctic should be prohibited” (2010, 49). 
While the 2018 Declaration is brief and focuses on ‘food security’ 
as “central to Inuit identity and way of life” (2018, 1). It also seeks, 
as mentioned earlier, to “advance emergency response, and phase 
out heavy fuel oil (HFO) in order to minimize impacts on marine 
mammals and fish, and to prevent disruption of seasonal hunting, 
and for safety and environmental protection” (2018, 4). 
The 2010 Policy includes a substantial chapter concerning the 
Economy indicator, Economic Issues (2010, 79–88) which em-
phasizes “the importance of an economic base in the North, 
and the continuing [human] right of Inuit to participate in the 
management and development of the Arctic and its resources” 
(2010, 11). The Policy also states that “It is of utmost importance 
to emphasize that the lack of economic opportunities and devel-
opments have critical implications for the future of Inuit society 
and culture. Inuit should be involved in all aspects of economic 
development in order to enjoy such fundamental human rights 
as the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of 
living” (2010, 79).
Therefore, active promotion is needed of “Inuit self-reliance… 
Inuit Arctic Policy must elaborate a comprehensive Arctic eco-
nomic strategy” (2010, 79) including “an overall strategy to 
counter international anti-harvest and animal rights groups” 
(2010, 33). “At the regional level, action must be taken in every 
Arctic community towards establishing a viable base for com-
munity development.... including key elements [such as] ade-
quate infrastructures… and business and management train-
ing” (2010, 80). For enterprises doing business in Arctic regions, 
“consideration should be given to establishing principles or 
norms to guide [their] conduct…. promotion of innovation and 
transfer of technologies appropriate to the Arctic; and reinvest-
ment of profits in local regions” (2010, 81). Furthermore, “mul-
tinational corporations and others involved in Arctic economic 
development must respect all applicable aspects of the overall 
Inuit Arctic Policy” (2010, 81).
The 2010 Policy also requires renewable resources to be man-
aged and “protected in a manner that maintains ecological bal-
ance, respects Inuit resource rights, and sustains the renewable 
resource needs of Inuit, both now and in the future” (2010, 33). 
Only development that is “culturally-appropriate” should be 
promoted (2010, 27). “Inuit and other Indigenous peoples must 
have clear priority in terms of access to and use of Arctic renew-
able resources for subsistence purposes, including inter-com-
munity trade” (2010, 31). “An Inuit Arctic Policy on renewable 
resources and Inuit subsistence practices must take into ac-
count the devastating effects that international anti-harvest and 
animal rights groups continue to have on Inuit communities, 
culture, and economies. A comprehensive strategy must be de-
veloped and implemented to effectively counter these opposing 
forces” (2010, 33).
Regarding non-renewable resources, “Inuit rights include the 
right to manage Arctic non-renewable resources and to fully 
participate in, and benefit from, policies and projects associated 
with resource development” (2010, 36). This involves a few es-
sential principles: (i) “The overall prosperity of each state is af-
fected by the economic growth of its various parts. [Thus] if the 
Arctic regions are to contribute to strengthening the economies 
of their respective states, Inuit have to be included as full and 
active partners in northern development matters” (2010, 79); 
(ii) “Inuit and the circumpolar regions must substantially ben-
efit from Arctic offshore resource development [with] revenues 
generated from approved offshore projects [being] directed 
towards [safeguarding] the marine environment [and directly 
benefiting] Inuit communities” (2010, 43); (iii) “multinational 
corporations and others involved in Arctic economic devel-
opment must respect all applicable aspects of the overall Inu-
it Arctic Policy” (2010, 81); (iv) the ICC should “promote the 
redefinition of hunting and harvesting activities by Indigenous 
peoples as a profession” (2010, 31) and “subsistence hunting, 
fishing, and trapping rights must be assured for both economic 
and cultural reasons” (2010, 80).
Establishment of full and meaningful employment is a prima-
ry goal in the Inuit regions under the 2010 Inuit Policy. “An 
employment-intensive economic growth, which includes both 
subsistence and wage-earning activities, must be a clear prior-
ity” (2010, 82–83). The Policy recognizes that “the adequacy 
and costs of air transportation in the circumpolar region have 
a direct effect on economic development.... air transportation 
problems are… economic development problems [and have to 
be] dealt with in a coordinated and comprehensive manner” 
(2010, 84).
According to the 2018 Declaration “employment and wealth 
creation are building blocks for autonomy and… equitable, sus-
tainable economic development and employment must be a pri-
ority” (2018, 10). Under the heading, Sustainable Development, 
the Declaration argues: “Our economy is changing rapidly with 
growing international interest in marine shipping, commer-
cial fisheries, tourism and natural [resources] development. 
Economic development is central to the sustainability of Inuit 
communities….” The Declaration acknowledges that “economic 
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development and social and cultural development must go 
hand-in-hand,” which results in self-sufficiency— “an essen-
tial part of greater political self-determination” (2018, 10). To 
achieve these goals, the ICC is urged to first “promote sustain-
able economic and business development” through the Arctic 
Council and its Working Groups, the UN agencies, and the Arc-
tic Economic Council (2018, 11). Second, the ICC is directed to 
“advocate for our rights to fresh water,” and “utilize Indigenous 
Knowledge to advise all future processes of the Central Arctic 
Ocean Moratorium on Commercial Fisheries” (2010, 11).
A major question here is how economic activities are or 
should be regulated. The 2018 Declaration  concludes that 
the Inuit “have experienced international trade bans and 
treaties that prevent us from exercising our rights to use 
Arctic living resources with serious impacts on our cul-
ture, health and economies” (2018, 7). It directs the “ICC 
to advocate for policies that facilitate cross-boundary In-
uit trade, employment, and travel, across our circumpolar 
homeland,…. [and] urge ICC to support the formation of an 
International Association for Inuit Businesses” (2018, 11). 
The international level is also important here, in particular, be-
cause “Indigenous peoples and their vital economic issues are 
often excluded from the structural arrangements and institu-
tionalized practices and policies of states at the bi-national and 
international level… particularly evident in regard to… [the 
GATT] and the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)” 
(2010, 86). The 2010 Policy states that “ICC should participate 
in international bodies, in particular the Convention on the In-
ternational Trade of Endangered Species (CITES), the [IUCN], 
the [IWC], and the [NAMMCO] to defend the right of Inuit to 
harvest marine mammals and to trade their product on a sus-
tainable basis….” (2010, 81–82). Moreover, where appropriate 
the ICC should lobby “international and regional bodies [e.g., 
WTO, NAFTA, EU] to help promote trade of Inuit goods and 
services world-wide in ways that do not adversely affect Inu-
it hunting, fishing and gathering rights” (2010, 30). Promoting 
“the removal of international and national trade barriers that 
affect all forms of Inuit livelihood, in consultation with affect-
ed Inuit” (2010, 82) is another main objective with the aim of 
facilitating “transnational trade and travel by Inuit throughout 
Inuit Nunaat” (2010, 86). “Elements that should be considered 
in formulating the international dimensions of an Inuit/Arctic 
economic strategy include: … organize multilateral talks on in-
ternational trade and development issues affecting the world’s 
Indigenous peoples [through GATT]”… request relevant UN 
organs to carry out a “special study and consideration of the 
economic rights and concerns of Indigenous peoples in Arctic 
regions”… make continued representations in the EU and Euro-
pean countries “in regards to the seal hunt and… seal products, 
possibly through consultation with WTO “ (2010, 87).
The Tourism indicator is very briefly noted by the documents: 
the 2010 Policy states that “resource management and eco-
nomic development must be based on a common approach” 
as must eco-tourism (2010, 35). The 2018 Declaration briefly 
notes the rapid changes in the economy “with growing inter-
national interest in marine shipping, commercial fisheries, 
tourism and natural resources development” (2018, 10). The 
Declaration urges the “ICC to compile Arctic tourism best 
practices, and develop an ICC Statement on Tourism to help 
guide tourism initiatives,” (2018, 11) as part of overall actions 
to achieve the goals of sustainable development. 
The main focus of the Infrastructure indicator in the two doc-
uments, is telecommunications. The sub-chapter Communica-
tions, News Media, Information Technologies of the 2010 Policy 
(2010, 68–71) notes that the “communications media are a 
fundamental dimension of life in every society” (2010, 68) and 
“satellites make communications possible in the Arctic” (2010, 
70). Particularly, “the relationship and significance of commu-
nications, mass media, and other information technologies to 
Inuit language and cultural development must be recognized” 
(2010, 68). The Policy suggests the “ICC should work to ensure 
that broadcast and telecommunications regulatory agencies 
governing circumpolar regions recognize the special needs 
and challenges of the Arctic with respect to geographic iso-
lation, language and culture” (2010, 71). It also proposes that 
“Arctic education systems should provide both Inuit youth and 
adults with concrete opportunities to familiarize themselves 
with new and existing forms of communications, mass media, 
and information technologies in the Arctic” (2010, 69–70). 
This should be facilitated by the “establishment of a pan-Arc-
tic news agency and Arctic radio and television network… or 
by [use] of the Internet” (2010, 70). To support telecommuni-
cation and ICT, and infrastructure in general, the 2010 Policy 
urges adaptation to the inevitable changes and “to accelerate 
technology transfer” (2010, 25) for instance, “remote sensing 
and data gathering by satellites [which] already serve as a new 
global information system within the international commu-
nity” (2010, 70). As part of adaptation assistance, the “ICC 
should work towards…incorporating support for small-scale, 
green energy technology” (2010, 25) and “action must be tak-
en in every Arctic community towards establishing a viable 
base for community development, [including] adequate infra-
structures” (2010, 80).
The 2018 Declaration states that in an interconnected world, 
“connectivity or broadband, is crucial to provide societal ben-
efits” (2018, 10) and “Inuit are more connected today than 
ever before due to the advent of the internet and social media. 
However, practical measures should be taken that enhance 
communications with and between Inuit” (2018, 11). The ICC 
should thus “pursue novel initiatives that foster greater social, 
cultural, and political exchange between Inuit… to enrich In-
uit cooperation and unity…. [and] develop a comprehensive 
four year communications strategy and action plan” (2018, 
12). The 2018 Declaration lists the activities needed to achieve 
these goals. The ICC should “advocate for high capacity 
broadband internet, share best practices and engage in inter-
national discussions on broadband development in Inuit Nu-
naat” (2018, 11) in order “to support knowledge sharing and 
communication of Inuit innovation and best practices around 
mental health and wellness” (2018, 5) and “urge the use of the 
internet to increase availability of Inuit language program-
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ming through television, radio, and other platforms, as well as 
the connectivity of residents in Inuit communities” (2018, 11). 
The 2010 Policy document recognizes “that aviation is not a 
privilege but a necessity in the circumpolar region [as]…the 
only means of year-round transport between Inuit communi-
ties, regionally, nationally, and internationally” (2010, 84). “Ade-
quate and safe systems of transportation, including air transport 
infrastructures, must be developed and upgraded throughout 
the circumpolar region” (2010, 86). 
The 2018 Declaration explicitly mentions the need for adequate 
housing in the list of “the most important needs of families” 
(2018, 4), while the 2010 Policy mentions a “wide range basic 
needs… [which] must be developed if health goals are to be 
achieved” (2010, 51–52).
 
The 2010 Policy has a substantial chapter on Educational and 
Scientific Issues (2010, 89–96). Scientific research for the pur-
poses of the Inuit Arctic Policy, “refers to all basic and applied 
research in respect to the Arctic” (2010, 93). The chapter pro-
vides an interesting contribution to the Science and Educa-
tion indicator by recognizing “that the physical, biological 
and health sciences, as well as social, behavioral and human 
sciences, can all potentially contribute in significant ways to 
information and knowledge about the Arctic… both ‘western 
scientific’ opinion and Inuit knowledge and experience have va-
lidity and, therefore, should be utilized” (2010, 93). Significant 
efforts should be made by Arctic states, according to the Policy 
“to involve Inuit when determining the content of international 
agreements in regard to cooperative northern research” (2010, 
96) and “of scientific research affecting the Arctic, particularly 
when it affects their communities or Inuit rights and interests” 
(2010, 93). In terms of cooperative research involving different 
organizations, the ICC is asked to “develop a clearinghouse that 
will help record and protect the traditional knowledge of Inuit 
and facilitate information exchange between all Inuit in Inuit 
Nunaat” (2010, 94). Also, Inuit need to be actively engaged on 
an ongoing basis with the circumpolar and international pro-
cesses including international science bodies (e.g. ICSU, IASC, 
IASSA) (2010, 25, 96). “Collaboration with institutions such as 
the Inuit Center for International Understanding and the Uni-
versity of the Arctic should be encouraged” (2010, 92). “Large 
international Arctic research undertakings such as the… IPY 
should be urged to more fully include Inuit and other Arctic 
inhabitants” (2010, 96).
The 2018 Declaration requires actions “to protect Inuit Nunaat 
and guide academic institutions, governments, and researchers 
in the conduct of the Inuit Nunaat research… enhance ICC’s 
work with Arctic research efforts” for example, via AMAP, 
SAON, IASC, EU (2018, 9). Interestingly, the Declaration re-
quires that “during high-level ministerial processes,” Inuit views 
and concerns should be addressed regarding how research in 
the Arctic should be conducted and also that “ethical approach-
es for research in the Arctic advance Inuit self-determination in 
research” should be highlighted (2018, 9). 
The 2010 Policy recognizes “that Arctic scientific research can 
potentially provide vital information pertaining to a rapidly 
growing number of activities and subject matters of interest 
and concern in Inuit Circumpolar regions” (2010, 93). There-
fore, “the number of cultural, educational, scientific, and ath-
letic exchanges among Inuit from the various Arctic regions 
and states” (2010, 68) should be increased and “the Inuit Arc-
tic Policy should ensure that a key aspect of research involves 
community-based research (CBR)” (2010, 95). “As traditional 
leaders, elders must be encouraged and permitted to re-es-
tablish a leadership role and participate in decision-making” 
(2010, 64). “Traditional knowledge, be it cultural, environmen-
tal or ecological, should be part of the curriculum in schools 
” (2010, 64), “include both traditional ecological knowledge, 
environmental and cultural knowledge” (2010, 94) and “be 
recognized as having validity” (2010, 23). As “Inuit Tradition-
al Knowledge has provided critical information about climate 
change impacts in Arctic ecosystems, completing scientific 
knowledge… [it] should be incorporated into and made the 
focus of complimentary assessments through the UN system 
or by the IPCC” (2010, 23).
 
The 2018 Declaration is more straightforward stating that “Inuit 
have a right to self-determination in all facets of life, includ-
ing in the promotion of Indigenous Knowledge and research” 
(2018, 7). Here ‘Indigenous Knowledge’— “a systematic way of 
thinking applied to phenomena across biological, physical, cul-
tural and spiritual systems”—is recognized as a way of life, that 
“goes beyond observations, ecological knowledge, and research, 
offering a unique ‘way of knowing’…. [Therefore,] recognizing 
the work that ICC has done to advance the understanding and 
utilization of Indigenous Knowledge, it is important to contin-
ue this work” (2018, 7). The Declaration suggests focusing on 
advocating for Inuit driven research and monitoring. In order, 
however, “to protect Inuit Nunaat and guide academic institu-
tions, governments and researchers” (2018, 9) the ICC needs 
to be instructed “ to support knowledge sharing and commu-
nication of Inuit innovation and best practices around mental 
health and wellness.… and link Indigenous Knowledge and ac-
tion with scientific research” (2018, 5), “call for an Inuit review 
of the consultation process of the Arctic Council Arctic Science 
Cooperation Agreement” (2018, 7), and “utilize Indigenous 
Knowledge to advice all future processes of the Central Arctic 
Ocean Moratorium on Commercial Fisheries” (2018, 11).
The 2010 Policy calls for Inuit research priorities to be identi-
fied and considered and for Arctic objectives to be fully taken 
into account along with national and international considera-
tions. Moreover, it is seen important “to ensure that research 
and data on fresh water management issues are generated on an 
ongoing basis” (2010, 40), and that “research priorities should 
be determined in conjunction with Arctic Inuit and other Arc-
tic peoples” (2010, 45). The Policy also makes it clear that “in-
ternational cooperation in health and social research programs 
concerning the Arctic should be encouraged…. [and] deter-
mined in collaboration with the local people and communities 
involved” (2010, 53). Furthermore, “environmental education 
processes should be devised and implemented” (2010, 27) and 
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“governments and relevant private institutions should be urged 
to support Inuit research centers for the coordination and prac-
tice of Arctic research” (2010, 95).
The 2010 Policy further states that “large international Arctic 
research undertakings such as the [IPY] should be urged to 
more fully include Inuit and other Arctic inhabitants” and “close 
cooperation should also be developed with national research 
funding agencies” (2010, 96). Among others, the ICC is asked to 
“develop a close liaison with bodies within the [UN] and other 
international organizations interested in Arctic research,” such 
as ICSU, IASC, AMAP, IIASA (2010, 96). 
The 2018 Declaration requires that the Inuit Nunaat be protect-
ed and that “academic institutions, governments, and research-
ers [be guided] in the conduct of the Inuit Nunaat research 
[through the enhancement of] ICC’s work with Arctic research 
efforts, such as [AMAP, SAON, IASC, EU]”. Moreover, Inuit 
views and concerns on how research in the Arctic should be 
conducted should be addressed during high-level ministerial 
processes and ethical approaches for research in the Arctic to 
“advance Inuit self-determination in research” should be high-
lighted (2018, 9).
As previously mentioned, the 2010 Policy explains that “educa-
tion and training have a vital and on-going role to play in teach-
ing Inuit youth” (2010, 35), and “to meet the specific needs of 
Inuit and other aboriginal women must be made accessible on a 
regional or local basis” (2010, 55). “Culturally appropriate edu-
cation is the key to healthier and more prosperous Inuit commu-
nities and to a better future for all Inuit” (2010, 89). Based on the 
UN Expert Mechanism in the Implementation of Rights of In-
digenous Peoples to Education “educational institutions should 
[thus] be established in the Arctic and encouraged to provide 
educational and scientific opportunities over a broad spectrum 
of potentials. In addition, the practical questions of funding for 
ambitious programs… should be addressed” (2010, 90). 
As “children are the most valuable Inuit resource and repre-
sent future leaders of Inuit... a comprehensive education policy 
should be formulated and implemented in collaboration with In-
uit communities (2010, 89). “The knowledge and experience of 
Inuit elders and other traditional knowledge should be utilized in 
informing Inuit students and developing their skills” (2010, 36). 
“Eligibility for training programs should be based on aptitude 
for the particular skills rather than on educational requirements” 
(2010, 91). Education is also mentioned in the context of Social 
Issues as a “crucial component of a major youth strategy” (2010, 
61) in which “education programs and other means should be 
used to promote acceptance of the principle of non-discrimina-
tion, as well as understanding, tolerance, and respect for differ-
ent religions and for religious freedoms” (2010, 77).
In general, therefore, “educational, scientific and other termi-
nology should be standardized within the Inuit language and 
further developed on a regular basis… to meet the present and 
future needs of Inuit society” (2010, 66) and they should also 
be “made fully accessible for handicapped persons” (2010, 92). 
Finally, the 2010 policy calls for “the best strategies for allowing 
the greatest amount of choice in education and research among 
inhabitants of generally small and isolated Arctic communities 
[to] be explored and implemented [either by] tele-education and/
or courses over the Internet, or through such institutions as the 
University of the Arctic” (2010, 90). The Arctic states are also 
asked to “establish a university in its Arctic regions; at the mo-
ment only Canada does not have an Arctic university” (2010, 92).
 
The 2010 policy also demands the establishment of “prin-
ciples or norms to guide the conduct of enterprises doing 
business in Arctic regions [that] should relate [among oth-
er things] to: Inuit training and management development 
programs [and] use of the local language” (2010, 81). Em-
ployment and training programs and strategies “should 
take into account the Inuit way of life, and generally support 
ongoing Inuit cultural development through the introduc-
tion of culturally appropriate programs…. [while receiving] 
adequate community and financial support” (2010, 83–84). 
The 2018 Declaration states that “the model of education intro-
duced and utilized to this day has had limited success… [and 
therefore] effective education requires new pedagogies that re-
flect our values, culture and languages.” For example, “for our 
language to remain strong the Inuit language must be the pri-
mary language of instruction in our schools….—language and 
education supports our culture, and Inuit hunting, gathering 
and food practices are a way [in] which our culture is taught”. To 
strengthen education the ICC is called on to “support an Inuit 
Education Committee with membership from all Inuit regions,” 
for example, the ICC 2018 Education Summit in Greenland sup-
ported “the development and implementation of Inuit-focused 
educational initiatives, pedagogies, assessment and evaluation 
practices, curricula, teaching materials and resources” (2018, 6).
The Implementation indicator is mentioned explicitly in both 
documents. According to the 2010 Policy the “ICC should work 
towards having the Inuit Arctic Policy taken into account by 
all levels of government throughout the circumpolar world, as 
well as by Arctic residents and other users of Arctic resourc-
es…. [Moreover,] public policies and programs of government, 
and international agreements, should be aware of the ICC Inuit 
Arctic Policy” (2010, 99). To follow up, there should be “discus-
sions of the Inuit Arctic Policy by Inuit from the various Arctic 
states; at the ICC general assemblies, a multi-year work plan 
should be prepared, major areas of priority and concern should 
be identified for further work…. Inuit organizations at all lev-
els should ideally be involved” (2010, 100). Finally, “it should 
always be remembered that the Inuit Arctic Policy is a ‘living 
and resilient document,’ adaptable to ongoing changes in Inuit 
Nunaat” (2010, 100). “To ensure that the ICC Inuit Arctic Policy 
is achieving the desired effect, its implementation must be mon-
itored by the ICC” (2010, 99).
The 2018 Declaration includes a list of implementation items for 
each main theme, prefaced by words such as ‘Mandate,’ ‘Direct,’ 
‘Urge,’ ‘Support,’ ‘Develop,’ ‘Instruct,’ ‘Engage,’ ‘Facilitate.’ ‘En-
courage.’ Neither a budget nor follow-up mechanism are men-
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tioned. Finally, with respect to the creation of an Arctic zone of 
peace mentioned under the 2010 Policy, the 2018 Declaration 
gives a mandate to the ICC “to initiate diplomatic talks for the 
purpose of laying the groundwork for negotiations to declare 
the Arctic as a Peaceful Zone” (2018, 3).
To sum up 
The two Inuit ICC documents are rich and substantial, with the 
2010 Inuit Arctic Policy being particularly full and rounded. The 
documents are strong statements by Inuit themselves, on the In-
uit as a nation or distinct people, as well as on the Arctic region 
of the Inuit, that is, “The Arctic We Want” (ICC 2018, 1). The 
table of contents of the 2010 Policy (ICC 2010a), is impressive, 
covering many relevant themes: Inuit Rights, Peace and Secu-
rity, Environment, Social Issues, Culture, Economy, Education 
and Science. Reading these substantial thematic chapters gives 
the impression of a nation that is proud, knows what it wants, 
and knows how to accomplish that. Take, for example, the 2010 
Inuit Policy (i) to “achieve real and lasting security in the Arctic” 
(2010, 22) and to solve problems across the jurisdictional bound-
aries of the Arctic states through international cooperation and 
having greater global security; and (ii) that “northern peoples 
should encourage the development of new notions of common 
security” (2010, 22) and “activities of youth that emphasize the 
need for international peace, co-operation, and understanding” 
(2010, 61). This honest and holistic approach is not usually part 
of national conversations and hardly exists in state policies. 
The Utqiagvik Declaration (ICC 2018) has a very precise lists of 
issues required, making frequent use of words such as ‘Direct,’ 
‘Urge,’ ‘Support,’ and ‘Instruct’. At the same time, it covers all 
relevant issues from food security, families and health to envi-
ronment and communication. 
As was the case with the two Athabaskan Arctic Council docu-
ments, the nature and purpose of the two ICC documents differ 
greatly, and are thus not really intercomparable. That being said, 
the most striking similarity is the domination of the Human Di-
mension indicator, which is clearly the major indicator in these 
documents. The Governance and International cooperation 
indicators, which are the second-most dominant indicators, 
are also almost even between Athabaskan and Inuit indicators. 
This clearly shows how much the ICC, like other small nations, 
depend on international cooperation and international agree-
ments to protect the people and enhance their rights. All in all, 
the two documents are in balance, as most of the indicators are 
fairly even, when the texts are measured quantitatively.
 
The main difference comes from the status of the two docu-
ments. The 2010 Policy is a comprehensive policy paper and the 
2018 Utqiagvik Declaration is the declaration of an assembly 
held every fourth year.
Based on the latest (2010) Inuit Arctic Policy and the 
declaration of the latest (2018) ICC general assembly, it is clear 
that the policy priorities of the ICC, representing Inuit across 
the circumpolar Arctic, are as follows: 
• the health and well-being of the Inuit people and, in  
particular, their children;
• the governance of their homeland, Inuit Nunaat,  
meaning the rights of Inuit to their self-government;
• being active in international cooperation, and being  
supported by international agreements and organizations.  
When taking into consideration this and the emphasis on inter-
national agreements and organizations, which are noted several 
times in the documents, it is rather clear that ‘self-government’ 
does not mean here only Inuit interests or Inuit nationalism. 
It should be interpreted more widely to mean and emphasize 
the importance of international cooperation, including inter-
national organizations, in particular the UN and the AC, for 
protecting and supporting small (Indigenous) nations, and in-
ternational agreements, such as UN Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (referred to many times), as international 
legal regimes to be relied upon.  
Saami Council
The Saami Council did not have an official Arctic policy or strate-
gy for the Arctic, although, according to Asa Larsson-Blind, pres-
ident of the Saami Council, this has been discussed among Saami 
politicians, until early autumn 2019. The Sami Arctic Strategy was 
adopted in September 2019 by the Saami Council as to “serve tool 
for implementing long-term and sustainable programs that im-
prove access for the Sami people to the same opportunities that 
are afforded to other Arctic inhabitants. The strategy also shines 
the path towards decolonizing Sami society and aims at securing 
the Sami people’s right to self-determination now and for future 
generations” (The Sámi Arctic Strategy 2019, 3).
The Sami Arctic Strategy / Sami Arktalas Aigumusat / Samisk 
Strategi for Arktiske saker. Securiting enduring influence for the 
Sami people in the Arctic through partnerships, education and ad-
vocacy (10 pages, attachment of 13 pages, no pictures) is with 
the five substantial chapters, which can be interpreted to indi-
cate the priority areas: Acting as a robust and reliable partner 
on Arctic Sami issues, Ensuring the right to choose, Addressing 
climate change and environmental protection, Deploying Sami 
Indigenous knowledge and science as a catalyst for Sa’pmi part 
forward, and The Saami Council as a partner in policy-making 
and decision-making on Arctic issues. Each of them includes a 
separate list of measures.
Another recent Saami policy paper on the Arctic, or actually on 
the Saami land, Sápmi (in Finland, Norway, Russian Federation, 
and Sweden), is the Tråante Declaration (2017) adopted at the 
21st Saami Conference, by representatives of the Saami Coun-
cil member organizations. The conference took place on 9–11 
February 2017 in Tråante (Trondheim), Norway on the occasion 
of the centennial jubilee of the first national Saami Conference. 
Prior to the Tråante Declaration official policy statements on the 
Saami territory have been adopted by the Saami Council every 
fourth year at the Saami conferences (e.g., in 2013 in Murmansk, 
Russia, and in 2008 in Rovaniemi, Finland).
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The 2017 Tråante Declaration (7 pages, no pictures) states: “The 
Saami people have the rights described below [i.e., in the decla-
ration]. All requirements and positions presented below are in 
line with current or… rapidly developing rules of international 
law. [The Saami people] commits to work for these rights to be 
realized, and requires that States inside Sápmi to do the same” 
(2017, 2). This statement is short and clear and permeates the 
entire declaration which has strong, substantial and concentrat-
ed messages. 
This document is interpreted and analyzed here as an offi-
cial policy document of the Saami people based on two facts 
(downloaded from internet, pages not marked when quoted): 
(i) the Saami Council member organizations come from the 
four countries of Finland, Norway, the Russian Federation and 
Sweden, where the Saami live, and thus the Council is eligible 
to represent all the Saami people; (ii) at the 20th Saami Coun-
cil Conference in 2013 the representatives of the Saami Coun-
cil’s member organizations confirmed their membership of the 
Council “by ratifying the Declaration by their highest repre-
sentative bodies” as mentioned in the Murmansk Declaration 
(2013), which is also included the analysis.  
The 2013 Murmansk Declaration (4 pages, no pictures) says 
a great deal about ‘responsibility’— both state and corporate 
responsibility—which ties into human and Saami rights. The 
document also, unlike the 2017 Declaration, discusses the 
changing climate and the environment. These two declarations 
are interpreted and analyzed here as official policy documents 
of the Saami people based on two facts: (i) the Saami Council 
member organizations come from the four countries of Fin-
land, Norway, the Russian Federation and Sweden, where the 
Saami live, and thus the Council is eligible to represent all the 
Saami people; (ii) at the 20th Saami Council Conference in 2013 
the representatives of the Saami Council’s member organiza-
tions confirmed their membership of the Council “by ratifying 
the Declaration by their highest representative bodies,” (2013, 
1) as mentioned in the 2013 Declaration.  
For the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator, 
the 2013 Declaration emphasizes that “the Saami people has 
inhabited its traditional homeland— Sápmi —since time im-
memorial and long before national borders were drawn” (2013, 
1). Thus, for the Saami the Arctic is their traditional homeland. 
Correspondingly, the 2017 Declaration goes deeper: on the 
cover of the document it is clearly stated that the basis for the 
life “Sápmi the legacy of our mother, the Sun and our father, 
the Earth. Lands and waters where we have lived in all times, 
before national boundaries divided our country” (2017, 1). The 
states inside Sápmi “shall [thus] support and under no circum-
stances counteract the Saami people and the Saami nation’s ef-
forts to establish a common Saemiedigkie [Saami Parliament]” 
(2017, 2). The Declaration also deals with geographical Saami 
place names, with States officially being asked to “recognize 
16  The 2017 Declaration uses both ‘Sami’ on the cover and ‘Saami’ in the rest of the text, and the 2019 Strategy uses ‘Sami’. We use here ‘Saami’, as it has been used 
in general (e.g., the name of the Saami Council).
and highlight the Saami traditional names of mountains, lakes, 
rivers and other places, as well as communities” (2017, 6). Fi-
nally, according to the 2019 Arctic Strategy the traditional Sami 
land is defined as Arctic region, and “All Sápmi is included, 
when the Saami Council address Arctic questions… The Arctic 
strategy will support the Saami Council’s relations to the global 
discussion” (2019, 3).
The Human Dimension indicator is already focused on by the 
cover of the 2017 Declaration, which addresses Saami rights 
clearly by stating that “the Sami are an independent people; 
like other people, we have the right to our lives and to decide 
on matters concerning us”16 (2017, 1). Furthermore, “a central 
element of the Saami people’s right to self-determination is the 
right to define which individuals are included in the Saami 
people, Saemiedigkie and the nation” (2017, 3). Under the Con-
stitution and Common Saami Parliament, as well as historically, 
the Saami themselves have decided on their destiny and lives; 
the Saami right to self-determination is “rooted in the Saami 
people, who make up a nation…. The Saami have always had 
these rights and others cannot define or deprive the Saami of 
them” (2017, 6).
Echoing this, the ultimate goal of the 2019 Strategy is stated 
that “Sápmi is recognized and that Saami people are treated as 
equals by the greater society… [as] rights Indigenous peoples 
have under international law, shall guide the work of the Saami 
Council in the Arctic” (2019, 3, 5). Furthermore, the measures 
of the Strategy include that the Council “should advocate the 
right of Indigenous peoples to give or withhold their free, pri-
or, and informed consent in non-coercive negotiations prior to 
activities being established and developed on their customary 
lands” (2019, 6). 
The Strategy highlights an importance of the Human Dimen-
sion, when dealing with resources stating that resource devel-
opment proposals for the Saami area “must serve the needs of 
the Sami people today without compromising the ability of the 
Sami people to meet their needs in the future. And the pro-
jects must meet the legal international standards that protect 
Indigenous peoples…. [and] promote the physical and mental 
health of communities and individuals within Sápmi” (2019, 
8). As well as, when dealing with culture and language, as “Cul-
turally and linguistically appropriate services are respectful of 
and responsive to the beliefs, practices and needs of the Sami 
People. Cultural competency is crucial as a resource for health 
care providers and educational institutions (and others) to im-
prove their knowledge and understading of culture, kanguage, 
and helath literacy.” (2019, 10).
 
The 2017 Declaration also states that the Saami people “have a 
right to the best attainable standard of health, including men-
tal health” (2017, 6) and states are therefore asked to “provide 
health care that is linguistically and culturally appropriate to the 
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Saami,” and, even more, they “should implement this right… 
[avoiding] discrimination and marginalization of the Saami 
people” (2017, 6). Correspondingly, the 2013 Declaration also 
reiterates that “as people, the Saami have the right to self-de-
termination, including the right to determine our economic 
and social development” (2013, 1). It contains an ultimate aim 
and demand that “Saami traditional livelihoods should be safe-
guarded, and their rights recognized and implemented in all 
levels of national legislation efficiently” (2013, 4). Interestingly, 
this declaration is very specific in that it demands that states 
should acknowledge that Saami rights to fish rivers, in particu-
lar “fishing in border-rivers has since time immemorial been 
carried out jointly between Sami communities irrespective of 
citizenship and borders” (2013, 4). 
Concerning the Governance indicator, the 2019 Strategy states 
that “The Sami people have the right to self-determination”, 
and as mentioned earlier, “shines the path towards decoloniz-
ing Sami society and aims at securing the Sami people’s right 
to self-determination now and for future generations” (2019, 5, 
3). The whole section Acting as a robust and reliable partner on 
Arctic Sami issues much indicates, even demonstrates, the main 
aim of the Strategy “to establish the Saami Council as an active 
partner for the civil Sami society, governments, NGOs, IGOs, 
and others that, though international cooperation, will build a 
strong and sustainable Sapmi in the Arctic” (2019, 3). This is, 
first of all, meant to strengthen the self-determination of Sápmi, 
and self-governance by the Saami.
Similarly, the 2017 Declaration straightforwardly states that the 
Sami have acquired the right to manage their territory through 
long-term use. The Saami “have the knowledge and cognizance 
of the conditions of life in these areas…. To enable the Sami 
people to live in a responsible way… mercenary states in Sáp-
mi must cease to impede our right to self-determination” (2017, 
1). This quotation, as well as the first statement that “the Saami 
people[s] have the rights described below” (2017, 2) show very 
well, under this indicator, the emphasis on self-determination 
on the part of the Saami people. This is not surprising, given the 
Saami’s current situation and main trends affecting the Arctic 
Indigenous peoples. 
The States in which the Saami live, are asked—even demanded— 
by the 2017 Declaration to “accept that the right to self- 
determination… is a right to exercise effective influence on the 
outcome of those things that are essential to the Saami people” 
(2017, 3). Under the title Self-determination: Constitution and 
common Saami Parliament, the Declaration continues by stating 
that “the right to self-determination is a right other than the 
right to consultation… the Saami people will [and] should not 
be subordinate to the will of the Nordic and the Russian people” 
(2017, 3). This right is extended to (traditional) knowledge and 
(traditional) cultural expressions, and therefore the 2017 Decla-
ration states: “The Saami have the right to decide about Saami 
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions…. 
[and] States should implement these rights through legislation” 
(2017, 6).
Interestingly, the work for self-determination is said to begin 
by establishing “a Saemiedigkie representing all Saami who be-
long to the Saami nation. The States shall respect Saemiedigkie 
as the institution though which the Saami Peoples’ rights to 
self-determination mainly is exercised.… Meanwhile States 
shall respect that the Saami people—like other Nordic peoples 
—exercise their rights to self-determination [which] means 
that in issues of local and regional nature Saami decisions will 
be made on local or regional level” (2017, 2).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation 
indicator plays a growing role in the documents. While the 
2017 Declaration states that Saami traditional knowledge and 
traditional cultural expressions in those states should be im-
plemented “through legislation… as well as by international 
agreements and international cooperation… [in particular] in 
relation to the tourism industry” (2017, 6). The 2019 Strategy 
in general emphasizes an importance of international coopera-
tion, when defining the Saami Council as an active partner for 
several actors (the Saami society, governments, NGOs, IGOs) 
“though international cooperation”, and in particular, that as a 
Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council, the Council “also 
sits at the decision-making table on Arctic issues” (2019, 3–4). 
Though, the 2013 Declaration briefly responds to the Environ-
mental Protection indicator, there is nothing explicit in the 
2017 Declaration about this topic. Unlike, the 2019 Strategy 
includes a short section on climate change and environmen-
tal protection for example stating that the Saami people “have 
for millennia depended on, and adapted to, the environment” 
(2019, 6). One of the measures under Resource development on 
Sami land is to “Promote the recommendations in the ‘Arctic 
Environmenatal Impact Assessment and Meaninful Engage-
ment in the Arctic’ report (2019) and call for holistic approach 
and meaningful engagement in Environmental Impact As-
sessment and similar strategic planning processes in Sápmi” 
(2019, 9).
There is nothing explicit on the Pollution indicator in the 
2017 Declaration. Also the Strategy is brief here including the 
measures to “enhance the Saami Council’s efforts in the Arctic 
Council Indigenous Peoples Contaminat Action Program (IP-
CAP) Expert Group under ACAP” (2019, 6). 
Likewise, there is nothing explicit on the Climate Change in-
dicator in the 2017 Declaration. Correspondingly, the 2019 
Strategy includes a short section on climate change and envi-
ronmental protection, as mentioned earlier. Among the meas-
ures of this section is to “develop a climate and socio-econom-
ic model for Sápmi focusing on the impacts of climate change, 
the economic and societal costs of climate change damages, 
risk mitigation, and adaptation” (2019, 6).
Nothing is explicitly mentioned about the Security indicator 
in either of the documents. 
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The Safety and SAR indicator is noted by the Strategy, as first, 
the above-mentioned measure mentions “the impacts of cli-
mate change, the economic and societal costs of climate change 
damages, risk mitigation”; and second, one of the Saami Indige-
nous knowledge section measures is to “understand the impacts 
– both ecological aand societal – of extreme weather events” 
(2019, 7). Furthermore, one of the measures of the Deploying 
Sami Indigenous knowledge and science as a catalyst for Sápmi 
part forward section mentions food security among the issues 
to “perform integrative analyses of sustainability and actiona-
ble adaptation policies and challenges for Sami communities” 
(2019, 7). 
Interestingly, the 2013 Declaration identifies economic activi-
ty as a safety issue for the Saami. “Resource extraction in the 
Saami territories today carries huge risks and little advantag-
es…. [and] pollution constitutes serious possible pressures to 
the Saami livelihoods and its food security” (2013, 3). The Dec-
laration calls “for a moratorium on further resource extraction 
in Sápmi until the states with Saami populations have…. a regu-
latory framework in place… and installed effective remedies for 
violations of Saami rights” (2013, 2). 
The Economy indicator is a substantial topic in the both dec-
larations and it is bound, rather tightly, to the Saami rights to 
land, water and natural resources. The 2017 Declaration, en-
titled Saami rights to land, water and natural resources, builds 
on the Conference’s first statement “The Saami people have the 
rights described below” (2017, 2) by explaining, or stating, that 
“Saami use of land, water and natural resources constitute the 
foundation of the Saami culture, identity and society. Sápmi is 
the land and water that the Saami have owned and possessed by 
traditional use” (2017, 3). This is followed by an interpretation 
that “intrusion, such as mines, hydropower, wind power and 
other ‘green energy’ and infrastructure, steals land from Sápmi 
and thus causes the Saami living space to decrease” (2017, 3).
Under the title Saami holders of rights to land, water and natural 
resources, the 2017 Declaration continues that “the Saami peo-
ple have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources in the areas they possess and have pos-
sessed due to traditional ownership, use, disposal or otherwise 
obtained…. [in particular] Saami reindeer herding is a central 
part of the Saami culture and is in big parts of Sápmi the basis for 
maintaining and developing the Saami language, Saami culture 
and the Saami way of life” (2017, 4). Clearly, the Saami appear to 
have their own economies that are in conflict with other forms 
of economic development. Finally, the document state that this 
Saami right “to land, water and natural resources is not limited to 
the areas that the Saami traditionally have used and continually 
[use],” (2017, 4) meaning that the Saami have a vested interest in 
what happens outside of their traditional territory. 
The section The Saami Council as a partner in policy-making 
and decision-making on Arctic issues of the Strategy includes two 
sub-sections which directly deal with the Economy indicator. 
The “Resource development on Sami Land” sub-section states 
that resource development proposals for the Saami area “must 
serve the needs of the sami people today without compromising 
the ability of the Sami people to meet their needs in the future... 
[and] promote the physical and mental health of communities 
and individuals within Sápmi” (2019, 8). Among the measures is 
to “Develop a toolkit for Sami communities for natural resource 
projects on Indigenous land… combined with training cpurses 
to empower communities” (2019, 9). Correspondingly, the “Eco-
nomic growth on Sami premises” notes that “Sami traditional 
subsistence living is an old form of entrepreneurship. Sami prod-
ucts were, and still are, important commodities on both national 
and international markets… Reindeer husbandry plays a crucial 
role in Sami societies, but other ways of life are also important to 
protect, such as traditional gathering culture and te use of marine 
products.” It also proposes to organize a Sami Business Summit 
“at which Sami entrepreneurs and potential investors can meet 
and share ideas, innovations, and new technologies” (2019, 9).
Interestingly, the 2013 Declaration, with regard to industrial ac-
tivities on Saami land, includes a special section under the ti-
tle Corporate responsibility with the starting point that although 
“states are primarily responsible for ensuring respect for Saami 
rights, the private sector too has a responsibility to respect, pro-
tect and fulfill human rights. Business must not use inadequate 
state regulation as an excuse for not respecting Saami human 
rights” (2013, 2). The 2017 Declaration continues this under the 
title, The Green colonialism and states that “the foregoing con-
siderations apply correspondingly in relation to the ‘Green Nor-
dic industry,’ including wind power, hydro power, wave power, 
etc.… Saami livelihoods— including reindeer herding— are 
among the ‘greenest’” (2017, 4–5). 
The Tourism indicator is explicitly noted by the 2017 Declara-
tion, which places special emphasis on tourism, namely, that 
“states must coordinate with the Saami people around the devel-
opment of tourism related to the Saami culture, including within 
Sápmi… [and] ensure that the tourism industry operates in a 
cultural, social, and economically sustainable manner” (2017, 5). 
Furthermore, states should implement the rights to Tradition-
al knowledge and traditional cultural expressions through legis-
lation, as well as by international agreements and international 
cooperation, in general and in particular “in relation to the tour-
ism industry” (2017, 6). Finally, the Sami Parliaments with the 
tourism industry are asked “to compile guidelines on appropri-
ate conduct, to ensure that the Saami culture, the Saami society, 
way of life and nature is respected” (2017, 5). 
Correspondingly, the Deploying Sami Indigenous knowledge and 
science as a catalyst for Sápmi part forward section of the Strate-
gy very briefly mentions tourism among the fields to have more 
research “to understand the consequences of continued resource 
development, including risk-based assessments” (2019, 7). 
There is nothing explicitly mentioned about the Infrastructure 
indicator in the 2017 document. Unlike, the Strategy briefly 
mentions hydro- and wind-energy projects, forestry and railway 
tourism among the fields to have more research “to understand 
the consequences of continued resource development, including 
risk-based assessments” (2019, 7). 
Part III: Permanent Participants’ Documents
187
The Science and Education indicator is largely discussed in the 
2017 Declaration and the 2019 Strategy. The 2017 Declaration 
concentrates on Traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions, as this traditional approach “will constitute the ba-
sis for the management of the area’s resources” (2017, 1). “The 
Saami have the right to decide about Saami traditional knowl-
edge and traditional cultural expressions…. States should im-
plement these rights through legislation... as well as by inter-
national agreements and international cooperation” (2017, 6). 
This is extended to include the Saami language, as “all Saami 
children have the right to education, including early childhood 
education, in and on Saami and otherwise adapted to the Saami 
culture…. Within the traditional Saami areas, the right to ed-
ucation in and on Saami is absolute…. States are required to 
effectively implement this right” even outside traditional Saami 
areas so that “children have rights to receive education in and on 
Saami and Saami culture” (2017, 5).
Correspondingly, the 2019 Strategy emphasizes knowledge and 
science, as well as ties them together with climate change and 
other Arctic changes, and clearly states that “there is a need for 
new knowledge about how these changes affect the Arctic… The 
Saami Council believes that the best way of producing these tools 
is through respectful use and acknowledgement of Sami Indige-
nous knowledge” (2019, 6–7). The measures include for example, 
“Build constructive relationship between procucers and users of 
knowledge, including Sami Indigenous knowledge, in order to 
improve undwerstandiing of the vulnerability and resilience of 
Arctic environment and Sami socities… Assess the diverse im-
pacts of climate chage and human activities on Arctic biodiver-
sity… Examine the role of institutions, resources, and traditional 
and emerging economies as factors and instruments of sustaina-
ble development” (2019, 7). 
Concerning the Science and Education indicators there is a con-
tinuity, since the 2013 conference calls to “seek strengthen and 
support the establishment of knowledge of Indigenous issues… 
for traditional knowledge and research in Sápmi… [and] expand 
already existing institutions of higher education in such a manner 
that a Saami or Indigenous university can be established,” (2013, 
4) is echoed in the following statement from the 2017 Declaration 
(entitled Academia and research): “Research that is relevant for 
the Saami is useful for both the Saami and the majority society 
[therefore] Saami self-determination in research relevant for the 
Saami [should] be strengthened” (2017, 7). Finally, all research 
institutions are recommended to “cooperate with the Saami com-
munity regarding ethical rules applicable for Saami research” 
(2017, 7).
Furthermore, the Strategy also includes an attachment, Building 
Knowledge in Sapmi – A List of Knowledge Gaps and Research 
Needs with lists of identified knowledge gaps and ideas for further 
research on the following topics: Data and demography, Cultur-
al heritage and history, Indigenous Peoples Rights connected to 
land amd territories, Environment, climate change and ecosystem 
services, Animal health and ethics, Indigenoius knowledge, Sami 
languages, Health and well-being, Entrepreneurship, business 
and industry in Sapmi, and Duodji: Art and cultural expressions.
This attachment (to identify knowledge gaps and ideas for fur-
ther research) clearly indicates an explicite Implementation of 
the strategy. The objectives of this kind of list is said to be two-
fold: “i) To provide guidance for Sami institutions, students and 
politicians to make priorities for their knowledge production 
and identify research topics. ii) To provide guidance for Sami 
institutions to identify topics when seeking collaborfators in 
Arctic research” (2019, 7). Unlike, the 2017 Declaration does 
not explicitly mention implementation or evaluation, although 
it does include de facto follow-up by stating that the rights of the 
Saami people include commitments “to work for these rights to 
be realized, and requires that State inside Sápmi do the same.” 
To sum up 
The nature and status of these two Saami documents—a decla-
ration of a Saami conference and the first Saami strategy on the 
Arctic—is different, although they both are official policy doc-
uments of the Saami Council in the 2010s. It thus makes sense 
slightly to compare them.  
The most striking similarity is the dominance of the Human 
Dimension indicator. This conclusion has been reached not just 
due to the quantitative measuring (of indicators), but more due 
to the strong wording of the declarations on behalf of human 
and Saami rights. This is already clear from the cover of the 
Tråante Declaration – the message of this short text is very pow-
erful. In addition of the explicit text, the focus on Indigenous 
(human) and other Saami rights is expressed by connecting 
‘responsibility’ —both state and corporate responsibility—with 
(Saami) human rights. The Strategy continues by stating that the 
Saami Council “should advocate the right of Indigenous peoples 
to give or withhold their free, prior, and informed consent in 
non-coercive negotiations” (2019, 6). 
The second similarity is that the Economy indicator, and also 
the Science and Education indicator, is not only explicitly noted, 
but also discussed in detail in both documents. Third, the Secu-
rity and Infrastructure indicators are not explicitly mentioned. 
Finally, it is surprising how little the environment, climate 
change and pollution are explicitly noted by the declarations. 
The first difference in the content of these two Saami documents 
is that the 2017 Declaration concentrates on self-determination, 
under the Governance indicator. The second difference is that 
the Environmental protection, Pollution, Climate change, and 
Safety & SAR indicators are explicitly noted only in the Strategy. 
The third one is the strong emphasis on implementation by the 
2019 Strategy, which also expands the Saami Council’s relations 
to global.
All in all, the two Saami documents are strong statements (i) on 
human rights, which also belong, and are actually required to 
belong, to Saami people, and (ii) on the right to self-determi-
nation, including solid argumentation, concrete proposals and 
demands to the states (where the Saami live). The 2017 Dec-
laration argues for strengthening Saami self-determination in 
research: “Research that is relevant for the Saami is useful for 
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both the Saami and the majority society,” (2017, 7) and the 2019 
Strategy continues this a substantial lists of knowledge gaps 
and research needs. All this shows mature thinking, and aims 
to create a win–win situation. Interestingly, the term ‘self-de-
termination’ is used instead of ‘self-government,’ and is a term 
frequently used in ICC policy, as discussed earlier. 
Finally, it is interesting and refreshing to read how the 2017 
Declaration discusses the greening of Nordic industry, calling 
it the Green colonialism (including wind power, hydro power, 
wave power, etc.), while Saami livelihoods (including reindeer 
herding) are noted to be among the “‘greenest” ones. To define 
these so-called alternative energy sources as ‘green energy’ “is a 
paradox” (2017, 5) according to the document.
Comparing and Discussing  
the Documents
The previous sections provide an overview of the contents of the 
policy documents of the four Indigenous peoples’ organizations 
(IPOs) and Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council—the 
AAC, the Gwich’in Council International, the ICC and the 
Saami Council—and how they have recently developed. To gain 
a more holistic picture of the state of Arctic governance of the 
21st century, and better understanding of how the region is cur-
rently being governed, there needs to be a comparison of these 
papers to see how they combine and contrast with each other.  
Although some of the national policy documents, which are 
still current, were released between 2009 and 2013, most of the 
documents studied here are much more up to date. With the 
exception of the 2010 Inuit Arctic policy, the three others were 
released between 2017 and 2019. 
A real comparative study, where policy papers are compared 
indicator by indicator does not make much sense in this case, 
however. The policy papers highlighted here are rather frag-
mented, and do not cover the indicator fields in full detail. They 
also come from different directions, being Arctic strategies, or 
declarations, and a study. They are thus neither coded and with 
figures, nor quantitative comperation included. Instead, we can 
make a slight comparison, by way of a discussion, to identify a 
few of the similarities and differences between the most cur-
rent policy papers of the four PPs. We also discuss here some 
of relevant findings with possible have implications for Arctic 
governance and development of the entire region. 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator is ex-
plicitly discussed in all the documents. The AAC Arctic Policy 
2017 has a traditional definition of the Arctic region inhabited 
by the Athabaskan peoples for centuries on both the Canadi-
an and US sides, “occupying” about three million square kilo-
metres of territories. However, the AAC is defined as “an inter-
national treaty organization”, (AAC 2017, 4) which defends the 
rights and interests of Athabaskan First Nation members inter-
nationally. It should also be noted that the 2008 Europe and the 
Arctic: A View from the Arctic Athabaskan Council refers to the 
UNEP’s characterization of the Arctic as “the world’s barometer 
of environmental change” (AAC 2008, 3). 
 
The Gwich’in report notes that the Gwich’in live in the North-
west Territories, Yukon, and Alaska, and that the GCI is a Per-
manent Participant of the Arctic Council. Although it gives no 
detailed definition of the Arctic, it does discuss how to establish 
an “Indigenous-led impact assessment processes over resource 
development in  their homelands” (Gwich’in Council Interna-
tional 2018, 7). 
The Inuit Arctic Policy 2010 clearly defines that the Inuit, as one 
Arctic people living in four nations across Inuit Nunaat, are a 
part of a connected world. Even more relevant that the Arctic is 
the Inuit Homeland—a “shared homeland” (ICC 2010).
Based on the narrative on the cover of the Saami Tråante Dec-
laration (2017, 1) the basis for the life is ’Sápmi’, the tradition-
al homeland of Saami, “the legacy of our mother the Sun and 
our father the Earth”, where the Saami have lived long before 
national boundaries divided these areas. The Declaration also 
demands that states officially recognize and use the Saami tra-
ditional names of mountains, lakes, rivers and places. And ac-
cording to The Saami Arctic Strategy the traditional Sami land 
is defined as Arctic region, and “All Sápmi is included, when the 
Saami Council address Arctic questions” (2019, 3).
It is thus fair to conclude that there is a relevant key similarity 
in this indicator, in how the different Indigenous groups define 
the Arctic region. The documents all make clear that their terri-
tory, ‘homeland’ is where their respective populations live, and 
that this spans traditional state boundaries, although in differ-
ent ways. 
The Human Dimension indicator also emphasizes self-identi-
fication, which is explicitly discussed in all the documents. The 
AAC policy (i) emphasizes social and cultural cooperation due 
to growing stress on Northern Indigenous people’s health, lan-
guages and social well-being, including housing, food availabil-
ity, and climate change; and (ii), includes recommendations for 
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy to support, among others, hu-
man health and mental wellness. 
The Gwich’in 2018 report emphasizes that identifying ‘enabling 
factors’ will contribute to the success of Indigenous-led im-
pact assessment, and that human capacity critically consists of 
“three elements related to capacity: funding, human resources, 
and relationship building”Gwich’in Council International 2018, 
38. The report also emphasizes the Arctic Council is “the only 
international organization to give Indigenous peoples a seat 
at the decision-making table alongside national governments” 
(Gwich’in Council International 2018, 2). 
The ICC policy is precise in stating that Inuit should “be rec-
ognized and referred to both nationally and internationally as 
a distinct ‘people’” (ICC 2010, 13) and that they are an integral 
part of Arctic ecosystems. Furthermore, the Arctic states are re-
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quired to recognize the Indigenous right to ‘subsistence’ that In-
uit rights to manage resources of the Inuit homeland are much 
emphasized, as well as strong relationships “be recognized and 
referred to both nationally and internationally” and “are consid-
ered as individual and collective rights” (ICC 2010, 13, 28). Last 
but not least, human health and well-being (of Inuit children), 
and non-material cultures are part the Inuit cultural heritage. 
The Saami Tråante Declaration (2017) defines the Saami as “an 
independent people”, who like other people have “the right to 
our lives and to decide on matters concerning us”, (2017, 1) in-
cluding “the best attainable standard of health” (2017, 6). Cor-
respondingly, The Sámi Arctic Strategy states that “Sápmi is 
recognized and that Saami people are treated as equals by the 
greater society… [as] rights Indigenous peoples have under in-
ternational law, shall guide the work of the Saami Council in 
the Arctic” (2019, 3, 5). A central element of the Saami right 
to self-determination is “the right to define which individuals 
are included in the Saami people, Saemiedigkie and the nation” 
(2017, 3).
There is a striking similarity between these documents in that, 
in general, they all address issues broadly surrounding Indig-
enous individual and collective rights, although in different 
contexts. Some of them also address issues around health, and 
relations between Indigenous people and states. There are also 
a few differences; for example, the ICC aim to build a strong 
relationship between human rights, peace and security, and de-
velopment is highlighted. 
The Governance indicator is explicitly discussed in all the doc-
uments. The AAC policy (AAC 2017) recognizes differences in 
political and cultural organizations, depending on the location 
of residence of Athabaskan People. Among AAC’s strategic 
objectives, as mentioned, the document defines defense of the 
harvesting rights and interests, and strengthening of the Arctic 
Council “to address and balance the competing issues of envi-
ronmental protection and sustainable development” (2017, 5).
The Gwich’in report, being about ‘Indigenous-led impact assess-
ment’ places the emphasis on governance, with ‘self-governance’ 
and ‘self-determination’ being the main pathways. The report 
looks at how Gwich’in can “establish their own Indigenous-led 
impact assessment processes over resource development in 
their homelands”, (Gwich’in Council International 2018, 7) and 
links this to legislation and land claims.
The ICC policy is very precise in its view that an integral part 
of the right of self-determination within states is “the right to 
self-government… recognized rights and principles [are] appli-
cable to Indigenous peoples under international law…. [Indig-
enous peoples should have the right to exercise] adequate pow-
ers of self-government within their traditional territories” (ICC 
2010, 15). Supported and affirmed by the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, these rights to lands, resourc-
es and territories, as well as to self-determination, applies to the 
Inuit Homeland, “our shared homeland” with jurisdiction “over 
half the entire Arctic” (ICC 2010, 9). The policy also recognizes 
the NGO status of the ICC within the UN, for example, the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, as well as its participa-
tion in the Arctic Council. 
Likewise, the Saami policy documents are precise in stating that 
the Saami people have always had “the right to manage their 
territory” (Tråante Declaration 2017, 1), and “have the right to 
self-determination” (The Sámi Arctic Strategy 2019, 5). And, in 
order to be able to live in a responsible way “mercenary states in 
Sápmi must cease to impede [the Saami] right to self-determi-
nation” (2017, 1).
Again, all the policy documents explicitly discuss govern-
ance, both broadly and in detail. There are some differences: 
the Gwich’in report is clearly about aiming for ‘Indigenous-led 
impact assessment’ and mentions the process and methods 
of achieving this; the Saami documents use the term ‘self-de-
termination’; and the ICC policy documents use the term 
‘self-government’.
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator is explicitly discussed in all the documents. The AAC 
Arctic Policy, as a policy paper on the “harvesting rights and 
interests of Athabaskan peoples” (AAC 2017, 5) includes rec-
ommendations that treaties, land claims and self-government 
agreements be a fundamental element of Canada’s Arctic for-
eign policy. The Arctic Council is defined as a key internation-
al forum for Indigenous Peoples Organizations, including the 
AAC, and on how best to engage with non-Arctic states, such as 
China and European states, including the EU. Only a few inter-
national agreements and organizations are mentioned.
The Gwich’in report 2018 mentions the status of Gwich’in 
Council International as a Permanent Participant of the Arctic 
Council and only deals with international cooperation by pro-
posing an international comparative work on Indigenous im-
pact assessment processes.
The ICC 2010 policy begins by promoting international under-
standing, and ties Inuit rights with international cooperation, 
emphasizing the importance of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The ICC policy pro-
motes cooperation, information sharing, and solidarity among 
northern peoples, as well as multilateral forums, such as the 
AC. According to the ACC, these are greatly needed in the Arc-
tic, particularly in this age of climate change. In addition, the 
document includes long lists of international agreements and 
international organizations, on which the ICC preferentially de-
pends to protect Inuit peoples and their rights.
The Saami Strategy 2019 clearly emphasizes an importance of 
international cooperation, when defining the Saami Council 
as an active partner “though international cooperation”, and in 
particular, its status as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic 
Council, “the decision-making table” on Arctic issues. 
The main similarity here is that all the Indigenous documents 
explicitly, though briefly, note the importance of international 
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cooperation. Most of them look to international agreements 
and international organizations, such as the United Nnations 
and the Arctic Council (instead of the gatherings of the five lit-
toral Arctuc states, when searching for support for Indigenous 
peoples and their rights.
The Environmental Protection indicator is explicitly noted 
in the AAC, ICC and Saami documents, although to a limited 
extent. For example, environmental protection is briefly men-
tioned in the AAC policy with respect to research projects on 
ecosystem monitoring. 
Similarly, The Saami Strategy briefly states that the Saami peo-
ple “have for millennia depended on, and adapted to, the en-
vironment”, (2019, 6) as well as calls for holistic approach and 
meaningful engagement in Environmenatal Impact Assessment 
in Sápmi.
Unlike, the ICC documents include substantial discussion on 
the issue. The ICC 2010 policy even emphasizes the protection 
of the fragile Arctic environment, in particular marine and 
other resources, on which Inuit and the future of Inuit har-
vesting depend. Conservation of marine resources for Inuit is 
seen as a fundamental factor in maintaining global ecological 
health and stability. 
Environmental protection is not explicitly covered by the 
Gwich’in report, though it is all about Indigenous-led impact 
assessment.
The Pollution indicator is explicitly, though briefly, mentioned 
in the AAC, ICC and Saami documents. For instance, the AAC 
Arctic Policy notes some of the pollutants affecting the region, 
such as POPs, and that the Stockholm Convention on POPs is 
a problem-solving tactic. The ICC policy also identifies a range 
of pollutants and argues that pollution outside the region must 
be addressed. The Saami Strategy briefly mentions the Saami 
Council’s efforts in the Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Con-
taminat Action Program (IPCAP) Expert Group under ACAP.
In contrast, pollution is not explicitly discussed in the Gwich’in 
document. 
Similarly, the Climate Change indicator is explicitly discussed 
in the AAC, ICC and Saami documents. The first two docu-
ments explain that climate change poses a significant challenge 
and major danger to their respective populations and ecosys-
tems, and express that climate action is required at an interna-
tional level through processes, like the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, or the UNFCCC (AAC), or through human rights 
conventions (ICC). 
Correspondingly, the Saami Strategy proposes a measure to “de-
velop a climate and socio-economic model for Sápmi focusing 
on the impacts of climate change, the economic and societal 
costs of climate change damages, risk mitigation, and adapta-
tion.” (2019, 6). Unlike, the Gwich’in document is not explicit 
about this topic. 
The Security indicator is explicitly discussed only in the AAC 
and ICC documents: The AAC 2017 policy recognizes that se-
curity issues impact Indigenous peoples’ and other residents’ 
well-being, and therefore includes recommendations on ‘De-
fence, Safety and Security’ for a new Arctic Policy framework 
for Canada.
The ICC Policy has a special sub-chapter promoting the impor-
tance of peace, and global security, and peaceful diplomacy for 
the Arctic region. This illustrates that peace and security are un-
derstood in a comprehensive way, including military and food 
security, and that specific features, such as (environmental) im-
pacts of traditional security and the military, are recognized. 
The Security indicator is not covered by the Gwich’in report and 
the Saami documents, showing the striking difference between 
these Indigenous policy documents—two of them explicitly dis-
cussing security including defence— ICC even in detail —and 
the rest not. 
The Safety and SAR indicator is explicitly, though briefly, men-
tioned in the ICC and Saami documents. The former one de-
mands a right to safe drinking water, as well as nuclear safety, 
and underlkines that important steps are taken by international 
organizations and forums with regard to safety navigation. The 
latter document includes economic and societal costs of climate 
change damages and risks related to climate change, and risks 
of extreme weather events, as well as food security among the 
issues when analyzing sustainability and actionable adaptation 
policies and challenges for Sami communities. 
The Economy indicator is explicitly discussed and mentioned 
in all the documents, although in different ways. The AAC pol-
icy, for example, explicitly mentions the economy in regard to 
trade in the context of treaty rights and intellectual property. It 
also recognizes the need for input from Canadian Indigenous 
peoples when the Canadian Government is negotiating trade 
agreements at international level. The Gwich’in report exten-
sively discusses the economy via the Indigenous-led impact as-
sessment case studies (Tlicho of the Nico Project, The Sivumut 
Project, and Squamish Nation Woodfibre LNG Project, which 
deal with resource governance and sustainable development). 
The ICC policy considers the protection and management of 
renewable resources through the maintenance of ecological 
balance to be very important; it therefore emphasizes right of 
Inuit to participate in the management and development of the 
Arctic and its resources. It also calls for the promotion of “In-
uit self-reliance”— explicitly mentioned in the document is the 
need for Inuit Arctic Policy to elaborate a comprehensive Arctic 
economic strategy to potentially include “full and meaningful 
employment” (ICC 2010, 82), and air transportation. 
Based on the Saami right to own, use, and develop its own lands 
and resources, resulting from their traditional ownership, the 
economy plays an important role in the 2017 Declaration. In 
particular, Saami reindeer herding is interpreted as a central 
part of the Saami culture, as are maintaining and develop the 
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languages, culture and the entire Saami way of life, as well as 
among the ‘greenest’, unlike the Green colonialism. Correspond-
ingly, two sub-sections of the Saami Strategy directly deal with 
the Economy indicator by stating that resource development 
proposals for the Saami area should consider “the needs of the 
Sami people today without compromising the ability of the 
Sami people to meet their needs in the future”, (2019, 8) and 
considering Saami traditional subsistence living as “an old form 
of entrepreneurship” (2019, 9). In this context, finally, the pro-
posal of a Sami Business Summit is interesting.
All the documents unsurprisingly recognize and emphasize the 
rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples to use and utilize, and to 
manage, the resources of their homelands. An interesting differ-
ence is that the Gwich’in report has detailed case studies.
The Tourism indicator is explicitly mentioned only by the ICC 
and Saami documents. The ICC 2010 policy briefly states that 
common approach to resource management and economic de-
velopment “also applies to eco-tourism” (2010, 35). Tourism is 
a special concern of the Saami 2017 Declaration, which states 
that the development of tourism related to the Saami culture 
and within the Saami areas should be coordinated by states in 
order to “ensure that the tourism industry operates in a cultural, 
social, and economically sustainable manner” (Tråante Decla-
ration 2017, 5). The Sami Parliaments are also asked to compile 
guidelines on tourism to respect the Saami culture and way of 
life, and nature. 
Neither the AAC document nor Gwich’in one explicitly discuss 
this topic. 
The Infrastructure indicator is explicitly discussed in the AAC 
and ICC documents, although with different foci. For instance, 
the AAC policy stresses that innovative solutions are needed to 
address northern housing and energy-efficient infrastructure, 
renewable energy, and food security. The policy recommends 
that Canada’s forthcoming Arctic foreign policy provides re-
sources for Arctic universities and institutions to develop these 
innovations. In contrast, the ICC 2010 Arctic Policy stresses 
that communications and media, including satellites, are of fun-
damental importance, as they make communications possible 
in the Arctic; it is particularly important that the relationship 
of these, together with information technologies, with the Inuit 
language and cultural development be recognized. The docu-
ment also explicitly mentions, unlike the others, that air trans-
portation a necessity in the large Arctic regions, as “the only 
mean of year-round transport between Inuit communities, re-
gionally, nationally, and internationally” (ICC 2010, 84).
Correspondigly, the Gwich’in 2018 and Saami 2019 documents 
briefly mention issues (directly or indirectly) dealing with in-
frastructure. 
The Science and Education indicator is explicitly discussed 
in all documents, in particular in the Gwich’in report, which 
should be defined as a scientific paper. The AAC policy makes 
recommendations for Canada’s Arctic foreign policy to ensure, 
by large extent, that research will be co-developed, produced 
and communicated in full partnership with Arctic Indigenous 
people. The ICC policy recognizes Arctic research as providing 
vital information for a growing number of activities, subjects, 
and interests in Inuit communities, in particular communi-
ty-based research; it also requires ‘traditional knowledge’ to be 
included in school curricula as it has provided critical informa-
tion about climate change. 
Correspondingly, The Saami Strategy emphasizes knowledge 
and science, as well as ties them together with climate change 
and other Arctic changes, and clearly states that “there is a 
need for new knowledge about how these changes affect the 
Arctic” (2019, 6). The document includes several measures 
directly concerning Indigenous knowledge, as well as science 
and education. 
The first similarity of this indicator is, not surprisingly, an em-
phasis on ‘Traditional knowledge’, and the second one, that sci-
entific findings should be produced and developed further in 
partnership with Indigenous peoples. 
The final similarity between the four Indigenous policy docu-
ments is that the Implementation indicator is explicitly includ-
ed, at least de facto, by all the documents. For instance, as a fol-
low-up of the Arctic Athabaskan Council’s policy formulation 
process, the AAC Policy includes three additional recommen-
dations on how Indigenous northern think-tanks could be used 
to advise governments on Arctic issues. For the Gwich’in report, 
in addition to the short list of recommendations, the report pro-
poses further work on monitoring and Indigenous impact as-
sessment, and stresses that “this costs money” (2018, 43). 
The Inuit Arctic Policy (ICC 2010, 99) is defined as a ‘living and 
resilient document’; to achieve its desired effect “its implemen-
tation must be monitored by the ICC”. Finally, while the Saami 
Declaration includes de facto follow-up by emphasizing rights 
of the Saami to include commitments to realize these rights, 
and requires that “the States inside Sápmi do the same”, the 2019 
Strategy includes an explicit attachment Building Knowledge in 
Sapmi – A List of Knowledge Gaps and Research Needs with iden-
tified knowledge gaps and ideas for further research.
As a conclusion, this section shows that the policy documents 
of these four Indigenous peoples’ organizations, as Permanent 
Participants of the Arctic Council, are rather fragmented. They 
do not cover all the indicator fields in full detail, as they come 
from different directions. There is a striking similarity that all 
policy documents explicitly address issues broadly surround-
ing Indigenous (individual and collective) rights, although in 
different contexts, and governance both broadly and in detail, 
as well as the importance of international cooperation. Unlike, 
environmental protection, pollution and/or climate change are 
not explicitly covered by all documents. Unsurprisingly, all the 
documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous peoples 
to use / utilize the resources of their homelands, as well as the 
importance of ‘Traditional knowledge’.
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Finally, at the end of the full scientific report, as conclusions and 
synthesis of the different parts of this study, this analysis of these 
Indigenous peoples’ policy documents - as well as those of the 
national strategies and policies of the Arctic states and the AC 
observer countries, and the Arctic Council Ministerial declara-
tions - will be used as a foundation for new and emerging trends 
of Arctic governance and geopolitics from the points of view of 
all these categories of Arctic actors or stakeholders. 
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Part IV: 
Strategies and Policies of the Observer States
When the Arctic Council (AC) was established in 1996, eight 
Arctic States became ‘Members’ of the Council, and six In-
digenous Peoples Organizations became ‘Permanent Partic-
ipants’ (PPs). No more categories were created. However, in 
the Joint Communique on the Establishment of the Arctic 
Council (1996), the governments of the Arctic countries also 
recognized the need to provide an opportunity for “non-Arc-
tic countries, governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions with Arctic interests to participate actively, as Observers, 
in the work of the Council, and to draw on their experiences.” 
Following on from this, the Declaration of the First Minis-
terial Meeting of the Arctic Council in September 1998 (the 
Iqaluit Declaration) approved observer status for i) several 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the IASC, UNEP, 
and the Nordic Council; ii) international non-governmen-
tal organizations, such as the WWF; and iii) four non-Arctic 
states—the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, 
Poland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland (UK).
Germany, Poland, and the UK were already observers at the 
very first ministerial meeting of the Arctic states in June 1991 
in Rovaniemi, Finland, when the 1991 Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) was signed. Other AC observers 
were the ICC, the Saami Council, and the USSR Association 
of Small Peoples of the North (later accorded PP status and 
named the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, 
Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation (RAI-
PON)), as well as the UN-ECE, UNEP, and IASC. Germany, 
Poland, and the UK, together with Japan and the Netherlands, 
were also present at the establishing ceremony of the Arctic 
Council in Ottawa in September 1996. 
Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic 
states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary, global and 
regional, and international non-governmental organizations. 
There are certain criteria for admitting observers, namely, 
they should i) “accept and support the objectives of the Arc-
tic Council; ii) recognize Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign 
rights, and jurisdiction in the Arctic; iii) recognize that an ex-
tensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, 
notably, the Law of the Sea; and iv) respect the values, inter-
ests, culture and traditions of Arctic Indigenous peoples and 
other Arctic inhabitants” (Arctic Council 2015b).
Observers are reminded that “decisions at all levels in the 
Arctic Council are the exclusive right and responsibility of 
the eight Arctic States with the involvement of the Permanent 
Participants.” (Ottawa Declaration 1996). They are then invit-
ed to the meetings of the Arctic Council (once observer status 
has been granted) to observe its work, which is their primary 
role. Observers are further expected to “make relevant con-
tributions through their engagement in the Arctic Council 
primarily at the level of Working Groups,” and they are also 
informed that they “may propose projects through an Arctic 
State or a Permanent Participant,” although financial contri-
butions from observers to any given project may not exceed 
the financing from Arctic States. Finally, in Council meetings 
“observers may, at the discretion of the Chair, make statements 
after Arctic states and Permanent Participants, present written 
statements, submit relevant documents and provide views on 
the issues under discussion.” 
Thus in the AC meetings—the Ministerial and SAO Plenary 
meetings—observers, unlike the Permanent Participants, do 
not per se have a right to take the floor and give statements or 
provide views, but they may be allowed to do so. They have, 
first of all, a mandate to be present and to observe, and to at-
tend the meetings of the Working Groups. The observer sta-
tus only allows to participate in the Arctic Council SAO and 
Ministerial meetings, not necessary in other meetings by the 
Arctic states, such as the Ilulissat Ministerial by the five littoral 
states of the Arctic Ocean in 2008. 
In spite of these restrictions and the narrow mandate, the 
position of (permanent) observership at the Arctic Council 
has become attractive, and several non-Arctic states, IGOs, 
and international NGOs have applied for this status. By the 
11th Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2019 
a total of 39 states and organizations—13 non-Arctic states, 
14 intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations 
(e.g., NCM, SCPAR, UN-ECE, UNEP), and 12 international 
non-governmental organizations (e.g., IASC, Northern Fo-
rum, UArctic, WWF)—had been approved as Arctic Council 
observers. The non-Arctic state observers are (with the year 
of approval) France (2000), Germany (1998), Italian Republic 
(2013), Japan (2013), Netherlands (1998), People’s Republic 
of China (2013), Poland (1998), Republic of India (2013), 
Republic of Korea (2013), Republic of Singapore (2013), 
Spain (2006), Switzerland (2017), and the United King-
dom (1998). 
Of the observer countries, the following have approved an Arc-
tic policy or strategy (with the year it was announced): France 
(2016), Germany (2013), Italy (2015), Japan (2015), Nether-
lands (2014), People’s Republic of China (2018), Republic of 
Korea (2013), Spain (2016), and United Kingdom (2013 and 
2018). Each state has one document relating to the Arctic, 
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apart from the UK, which has two. The Netherlands document, 
Strategy for the Netherlands Polar Programme 2016–2020, and 
the Spanish document, A Spanish Polar Strategy, focus on the 
Arctic and Antarctic. As Germany released its newest, up-dat-
ed strategy in August 2019, it is not analyzed here.
Of the remaining non-Arctic observer states, Poland is in the 
process of finalizing a report. India does not have a strategy 
per se, but sets out the main objectives of the Indian research 
in a short paper India and the Arctic on the Arctic region and 
the Arctic Council (see Indian Ministry of External Affairs 
website for public diplomacy (India MEA 2013). Switzerland 
also has an Arctic science document, which is not a strategy as 
such (Switzerland. Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Af-
fairs 2015). 
Other observers of the Arctic Council have also released doc-
uments. For example, the Northern Forum (2019) released its 
new Development Strategy 2030 in April 2019. As these docu-
ments do not have the status of a national strategy or policy, 
they are neither coded nor analyzed here. 
Also the European Union (EU) has an official policy / strategy 
on the Arctic since 2008, when the first EU Communication 
on the Arctic has adopted. Building on this communication 
and other initiatives the 2016 Joint Communication “sets out 
the case for an EU policy that focuses on advancing interna-
tional cooperation in responding to the impacts of climate 
change on the Arctic’s fragile environment, and on promoting 
and contributing to sustainable development, in particularly 
in the European part of the Arctic” (European Commission 
2016, 2). Behind is that the Union “has a strategic interest in 
playing a key role in the Arctic Region” (ibid). As the EU does 
neither have, yet the status of a (permanent) observership of 
the Arctic Council, nor it is state, these documents are neither 
coded nor analyzed here. 
France
The document The Great Challenge of the Arctic —The National 
Roadmap for the Arctic, was approved and launched in 2016 by 
the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International De-
velopment (France MAEDI 2016). 
The 60-page document, including several maps and pictures, 
is a collaboration between the French ministries of Defence, 
Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, Education 
and Research, and Finance, working “under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development” 
(2016, 12). Their goal was “to draft a ‘National Roadmap for 
the Arctic’ identifying, ranking, and coordinating France’s pri-
orities with regard to the Arctic” (2016, 12). The seven chap-
ters are entitled: Scientific research and cooperation; Economic 
opportunities and cooperation; Defence and security issues; 
Protecting the Arctic marine environment; France’s presence 
in international forums on the Arctic; The European Union 
and the Arctic region; and National interests and the common 
interest in the Arctic region. The work has four main areas, 
which are seen as the French priorities: i) identifying France’s 
interests in the Arctic; ii) enhancing the legitimacy of France 
in Arctic affairs; iii) working to balance national and gener-
al interests of Arctic Ocean governance; and iv) promoting 
protection of the fragile Arctic marine ecosystem (2016, 12). 
The Roadmap explicitly notes that “France already has politi-
cal and economic interests in the Arctic (Total, Engie, Technip, 
Thales, etc.) which are bound to grow” (p. 11). France has a long-
standing relationship with the Arctic, with its famous French po-
lar explorers and scientists and the country having a permanent 
scientific base in Svalbard since the 1960s (e.g., Plouffe 2012). 
Furthermore, the title of the concluding chapter reveals France’s 
national interest there, “France, an Arctic player” (2016, 3). 
France received the status of permanent observership at the 
Arctic Council in 2000 (Arctic Council 2015b).
The substantial (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic in-
dicator provides a fairly good understanding of how France de-
fines and would like to map the Arctic. France defines the Arctic 
“as an ocean surrounded by continents” (2016, 6). A document 
subchapter has a list of different definitions of political and ad-
ministrative boundaries in the Arctic (2016, 21–22), The docu-
ment also explains that “the Arctic Ocean, a unique and fragile 
marine environment,” (2016, 39) “has been severely affected by 
climate change [which] is a key component in the regulation of 
the planet’s climate” (2016, 10). The Arctic is also described as 
being “a region with very few inhabitants” (2016, 29), but also 
a “home to some forty ethnic communities” (p. 22). The Arctic 
is “also defined as one of the seven ‘socio-cultural regions’ of 
the world recognized by the UN Permanent Forum on Indige-
nous Issues” (2016, 22). Finally, in the Roadmap, the Arctic is 
defined as “an ecologically sensitive area,” which find itself in 
a situation, “where economic opportunities and environmen-
tal and climate challenges are inextricably linked” (2016, 60). 
The French Roadmap also notes that “the Arctic is both far from 
France and near to it” (2016, 4). This means that “from France, 
the Arctic Ocean… seems like a natural extension of the North 
Atlantic, which laps at the western shores of our country…. 
Until recently, however, the Arctic seemed far away because it 
remained, if not untouched, at least largely preserved from the 
changes caused by people. But the Arctic is [now] feeling the 
full force of climate change” (2016, 4), and “is the canary in the 
coal mine for the climate change occurring all over the world” 
(2016, 9). The Arctic is “a worldwide concern” (2016, 11), the 
Roadmap states, and France is “an Arctic player” (2016, 3). 
Figure 18 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
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Figure 18. France 2016
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the nearest whole num-
ber and represent the percentage of the total number of quotes coded for each 
document. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 5 % of the to-
tal coded quotes of the French National Roadmap for the Arctic 
(see Figure 18). The indicator is a dual one. On the one hand, 
“the Indigenous populations of the North” (2016, 17) are men-
tioned several times, and their ways of life, rights, and Indige-
nous languages, are discussed, although their health and well-
being are less mentioned. For example, the Arctic Indigenous 
peoples “claim specific rights that are more than human rights 
or minority rights…. These rights have been set out in the Inter-
national Labour Organization Convention No. 169 and in the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, which is not legally binding” (2016, 30). The document 
also explains that some of the Indigenous communities cross 
international borders: for example “the Sami people… the only 
Indigenous population in the ‘European Arctic’... [who] inhabit 
the northern territories of Finland, Norway, Northwest Russia 
(Murmansk Oblast) and Sweden; the Inuit people live in the 
northern territories of the United States, Canada, Greenland 
and the Russian Federation (Kola Peninsula)” (2016, 29)17.
On the other hand, the document notes that “the Arctic can be 
described as the juxtaposition of northern territories with very 
small populations (approximately 4 million individuals) that 
have a wealth of natural resources in countries where the main 
economic, political and population centres are, with the excep-
tion of Iceland, located much further south” (2016, 22). Only 
“10 % of the Arctic population… consists of Indigenous popula-
tions who have been living in… the Arctic for more than a thou-
sand years in some cases…. [This is] in contrast to the average 
figures for the whole Arctic region, in Nunavut (Canada), and 
in Greenland (Denmark), [where] Indigenous inhabitants are 
in the majority and Westerners are in the minority” (2016, 29). 
The Governance indicator accounts for 10 % of the total coded 
quotes of the National Roadmap of France (see Figure 18). The 
Roadmap identifies an increase in “collective governance issues 
17  This is, in fact, mistake, as the Inuit live in the Russian Far East, not on the Kola Peninsula, which is the European part of the Russian Federation. 
that potentially concern the international community… [due 
to] the current process in which coastal states are consolidating 
their sovereignty in their northern regions (maritime border 
disputes, extension of the continental shelf, legal status of po-
lar straits, national security issues, etc.)” (2016, 10). One of the 
main areas of this work are efforts “to balance national and gen-
eral interests of Arctic Ocean governance” (2016, 12). This focus 
is on the five Arctic coastal States (Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Russia, United States) of the Arctic Ocean which “by virtue of 
their sovereignty and their jurisdiction over large areas of the 
Arctic Ocean… are on the front line in the face of these chal-
lenges” (2016, 4). Here the Roadmap notes that:
1) These five states solemnly stated in the 2008 Ilulissat Decla-
ration that under the terms of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, “governance issues in the Arctic 
Ocean require balancing the interests of the coastal states 
with those of other states” (2016, 10); 
2) “Maritime boundaries between neighbouring coastal coun-
tries are defined through an advanced bilateral or trilateral 
negotiation process… including a historic treaty between 
Russia and Norway in 2011” (2016, 33); 
3) “The coastal states’ claims to the continental shelf extending 
more than 200 nautical miles offshore are addressed as part of 
a UN process under the terms of the Convention” (2016, 33); 
4)  “The central Arctic Ocean… is a maritime space where 
each state has control and jurisdiction over its own vessels. 
France, working alongside the European Commission, in-
tends to assert its obligations and rights in discussions on the 
regulation of future activities in the central Arctic Ocean…. 
As a maritime power, France… is committed to preserving 
freedom of navigation in the Arctic seas” (2016, 57); 
5) “France will [thus] work with other directly and indirectly 
concerned states to promote a balance between national in-
terests and the common interest in the Arctic Ocean, which, 
year after year, reveals a new inter-oceanic connection be-
tween the North Atlantic and the North Pacific” (2016, 60); 
6) The five Arctic coastal states [thus] signed in 2015 a “Dec-
laration Concerning the Prevention of Unregulated High 
Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean,” and “the Euro-
pean Commission was invited… to participate in the five 
Arctic coastal states’ negotiation of a draft legally binding 
agreement on preventing illegal fishing in the central Arctic 
Ocean” (2016, 40). This agreement was signed by nine states 
and the EU in October 2018. 
These points made regarding Arctic Ocean governance under-
line that “France promotes the principle of the empowerment 
of the non-Arctic states that are potential users of the Arctic 
through greater involvement of these states in the planning and 
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decision-making processes relating to sustainable and respon-
sible governance of the Arctic Ocean” (2016, 58). The Roadmap, 
however, notes that “the nature and scale of the issue calls, now 
more than ever, for greater international cooperation” (2016, 
4). International cooperation in the Arctic, including cooper-
ation between the Arctic states, is identified as “a recent ini-
tiative stemming from a shared political commitment to over-
come the strategic past of the former cold war theatre” (2016, 
10). It quotes the famous 1987 Murmansk Speech by President 
Mikhail Gorbachev: “Let the North Pole be a pole of peace” 
and “a genuine zone of [...] fruitful cooperation” (2016, 10). It 
is emphasized that “Russia’s participation in regional coopera-
tion bodies and bilateral cooperation programmes means that 
the Arctic has progressively become a region of cooperation 
between the eight countries directly concerned” (2016, 33). 
For example, by the Ilulissat Declaration, the five Arctic littoral 
states “made a commitment to peaceful settlement of maritime 
disputes based on the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea” (2016, 33).
Although the French Roadmap emphasizes cooperation be-
tween the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean, the Arctic 
Council is identified as a young organization “which explains 
why it does not deal with governance issues... [but] plans to 
adopt a more comprehensive approach, encompassing issues 
relating to the role of potential non-Arctic users of the region 
or to economic issues in the Arctic” (2016, 45) ). Concerning 
France’s observership within the Arctic Council, “scientific ac-
tivities relating to the Arctic strengthen its [France’s] legitima-
cy in dealing with Arctic affairs and are an essential condition 
for the renewal of its observer status” (2016, 19).
‘Self-governance’ or ‘self-determination’ are not explicitly dis-
cussed in the document, though, as mentioned earlier, the 
“right to self-determination” is briefly noted as an example of 
“human rights or minority rights” (2016, 30).
Echoing the previous indicator, international cooperation in 
the Arctic is largely identified as the International Treaties and 
International Cooperation indicator, accounting for 13 % of 
the total coded quotes of the National Roadmap (see Figure 18, 
p. 195). This provides a good understanding of how highly val-
ued international Arctic cooperation is in several fields, such as 
science and research, economy, and environmental protection 
(e.g., as “adopting processes that ensure an ecological expert as-
sessment” (2016, 41). The same applies when combining differ-
ent fields, for example, the “regulation of extractive industries’ 
activities [must be] commensurate with environmental risks in 
the Arctic [or there could be a] complete ban in cases where the 
risks appear to be too great” (2016, 41). There is also a need for 
“French companies’ compliance with best practices… to miti-
gate the environmental impact of these industries by prevent-
ing and fighting air and sea pollution” (2016, 41). 
The two highly focused values of international cooperation 
which the Roadmap addresses are: i) international cooperation 
with respect to the Arctic Ocean and the maritime environ-
ment and (regional) cooperation between the five littoral states; 
and ii) “France’s presence in international forums on the Arc-
tic” (2016, 43). Among these international and inter-regional 
forums, the Arctic Council is identified as “the key political 
forum for regional cooperation on Arctic issues… [adopting] 
texts that are not legally binding, but… carry[ing] enough 
political weight that countries comply with them” (2016, 45). 
Other international forums identified as dealing with Arctic 
issues are “the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, on which the Eu-
ropean Union sits as a member and France as an observer, and 
the European Union’s Nordic Dimension” (2016, 45). The lat-
ter’s relation with the European Union are noted (2016, 52–53).
Among the Arctic-related international organizations and 
agreements identified by the Roadmap are the Internation-
al Maritime Organisation (IMO) which “drew up a ’Polar 
Code’”… and a collection of amendments to the SOLAS and 
MARPOL Conventions on the safety of vessels operating in 
polar waters.” The Roadmap explicitly mentions that “France 
has played an active role on the Marine Environment Protec-
tion Committee (MEPC), the Marine Safety Committee (MSC) 
and the ad hoc working group that drafted the texts,” as well 
as in the Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission (ARHC) 
of the International Hydrographic Organization (2016, 45–46). 
France has also conducted international scientific cooperation, 
namely, the International Polar Years, the International Arctic 
Science Committee, and the European Polar Board, are iden-
tified (2016, 17, 20). UNCLOS is also noted. Otherwise, there 
is no clear global perspective, apart from a mention of mostly 
Asian observer countries of the Arctic Council. 
Concerning France’s diplomatic action in, and relating to, the 
Arctic, the Roadmap focuses on maintaining “a presence in 
all the relevant forums in order to promote France’s interests, 
maintain the positions of French players and promote a com-
mon interest vision” (e.g., on conservation of the environment 
(2016, 46). The Roadmap includes eight special recommenda-
tions on diplomacy, primarily that “France’s diplomatic action 
is based primarily on steady and sustained participation in the 
Arctic Council… Our action must also aim to enhance France’s 
scientific cooperation through bilateral initiatives and involve-
ment in other technical forums,” and, further, “strengthen our 
links and plan cooperation projects with the Permanent Partic-
ipants… identify opportunities for synergy with the observers; 
[and] take an active part in the dialogue between the observers 
and the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council at ‘Warsaw For-
mat’ meetings” (2016, 47).
Finally, the Roadmap includes a special chapter on “the Euro-
pean Union and the Arctic” (2016, 49–54) first, emphasizing 
the EU as “the world’s largest maritime economic power (trans-
port, insurance, shipbuilding techniques, tourism, offshore 
energy production, research) and a key player in the trade of 
fishery products in the European sub-Arctic and Arctic” ; and 
second, supporting “EU policy on the Arctic and [adding that 
it ]coordinates its action with this policy… the view [is] that 
the EU is significantly involved in the Arctic and a key actor in 
this region” (2016, 51). To implement the coordination with the 
EU, several objectives are listed in the Roadmap with respect to 
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supporting EU action in the Arctic, such as the establishment 
of “a regional fishery management organization and a regional 
sea convention for the Arctic ocean”; upholding “the princi-
ples of international law, particularly in terms of freedom of 
navigation and the right of innocent passage”; strengthening 
“the Arctic dimension within the Northern Dimension and the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council, especially for environmental and 
transport issues”; and integrating “the Arctic into long-term 
planning for the European Energy Security Strategy” (2016, 
54). In addition, with reference to the EU’s strategic priorities 
in the Arctic, “combating the effects of climate change; [under-
taking ]sustainable development; [and ]international cooper-
ation” (2016, 52): here, the Roadmap explicitly notes the EU’s 
Northern Dimension.
As mentioned earlier, the Arctic is described in the Roadmap as 
a “particularly fragile marine environment”, and although the 
region is thought to remain “at least largely preserved from the 
changes caused by people… [it] is feeling the full force of cli-
mate change” (2016, 4). The Environmental Protection indica-
tor, accounting for 13 % of the total coded quotes of the French 
National Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195), states that “France 
will do everything that it can, here in the Far North of the plan-
et, to take action, mobilise its researchers and its businesses, to 
enable us to preserve this part of the world, which is undoubt-
edly one of the most beautiful” (2016, 60). In particular, the 
country is “committed to protecting the Arctic marine environ-
ment” (2016, 39). The mission here is twofold: first, “Protection 
of Biodiversity and Conserving the Environment” including, 
among others, support of “the process of defining marine pro-
tected areas in the Arctic,” encouraging “measures to mitigate 
the impact of shipping on sea mammals; work with the Euro-
pean Union to monitor the sustainable management plan for 
Arctic fisheries; [promotion of] policy decision-making based 
on the best scientific knowledge available”; and second, France 
will “support, within the context of the Common Fisheries Pol-
icy, any initiative aimed at establishing a framework for the sus-
tainable management of Arctic fisheries” (2016, 41).
It is also explicitly noted in the Roadmap that “each economic 
prospect comes with several challenges that are largely related 
to the key issues in the marine Arctic, which are maritime safe-
ty and the environment (search and rescue, fighting pollution)” 
(2016, 9). This is echoed in the identification of France’s multi-
dimensional interests in the Arctic: economic, defence, scien-
tific, influence, etc. At the same time, the document includes 
a substantial chapter on economic opportunities and France’s 
economic interests in the Arctic, and the foreword remarks that 
there are new economic opportunities due to climate change. 
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total 
coded quotes of the Roadmap of France (see Figure 18, p. 195), 
does not recognize any specific pollutants other than oil in the 
Arctic region. Instead, it notes that “each economic prospect 
comes with several challenges that are largely related to the key 
issues in the marine Arctic, which are maritime safety and the 
environment (search and rescue, fighting pollution)” (2016, 9). 
Further, commercial shipping, oil spills, and mining are identi-
fied as challenges and potential risks, but polluters are named. 
For problem solving, the document mentions the Polar Code 
of the IMO, the SOLAS Convention on safety at sea, and the 
MARPOL Convention on pollution from ships (2016, 39), as 
well as the Arctic Council’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guide-
lines which act “to mitigate the environmental impact of these 
industries by preventing and fighting air and sea pollution,” 
and are applied by French companies, and a “non-binding 
agreement on preventing and fighting oil spills,” adopted by the 
Arctic coastal states (2016, 41).
 
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 6 % of the total 
coded quotes of the National Roadmap for the Arctic of France 
(see Figure 18, p. 195). The Roadmap explicitly notes both mit-
igation and adaptation: “France will promote or support adap-
tation by the competent international bodies of international 
regulations to the new uses of the Arctic Ocean made possible 
through increased accessibility” (2016, 11). Moreover, “an envi-
ronmental transformation such as this [climate change] would 
certainly bring major economic opportunities for the Arctic re-
gion, in terms of both shipping and fisheries, but it would also 
pose immense challenges, such as the need to mitigate the in-
evitable loss of biodiversity, the increased risk of sea pollution 
and the impact on the ways of life of Indigenous populations” 
(2016, 4). Well-known consequences, and “the full force of cli-
mate change” (2016, 4), are also identified, among which are 
“the large decrease in the extent of Arctic sea ice at the end of 
the summer… [which is] one of the most spectacular manifesta-
tions of current climate change” (2016, 9). The decrease in Arc-
tic ice has “strategic consequences” [with] the prospect of regu-
lar use of new Arctic shipping routes… growing nearer” (2016, 
12). Finally, the region is re-identified as “an important natural 
laboratory for studying climate change at the global level, mak-
ing it an area of scientific interest for all of humanity” (2016, 60). 
The Security indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total 
coded quotes of the Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195) shows 
skepticism or caution by reason of its concern that “even 
though the military role of the Arctic has faded into the back-
ground… it offers room for manoeuvre… [and once again has] 
become a theatre for contradictory ambitions, especially as 
Russia’s strategic stance changes” (2016, 33). These are again 
shown in the notion that “Russia’s participation in region-
al cooperation bodies and bilateral cooperation programmes 
means that the Arctic has progressively become a region of 
cooperation between the eight countries directly concerned. 
Under the terms of the Ilulissat Declaration of 28 May 2008, 
these countries [the five littoral states] made a commitment to 
peaceful settlement of maritime disputes based on UNCLOS” 
(2016, 33). As mentioned, the Roadmap makes reference to 
the maxim “Let the North Pole be a pole of peace” spoken 
by President Gorbachev in his Murmansk Speech in 1987. 
As a NATO member state, “France is concerned by the issues of 
stability and security that could concern the Arctic states that 
are members and partners of the [NATO] Alliance” (2016, 58). 
Furthermore, “France’s main interests in the Arctic primarily 
concern its economy, security and the environment, rather than 
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military and defence issues” (2016, 34). The Roadmap remarks: 
“the Arctic made its first appearance in the French Defence 
and National Security White Paper in the section on ‘threats 
and risks amplified by globalization’ [because] “the decrease in 
the extent of sea ice in the Arctic has strategic consequences, 
and the prospect of regular use of new Arctic shipping routes 
is growing nearer” (2016, 12). The Roadmap also includes a 
chapter on defence and security issues (2016, 31–35) with sev-
eral recommendations on activities in the field, inter alia, to 
“monitor regional political and military developments and de-
velop in-depth understanding of the area [e.g.,] step up the ex-
change of oceanographic information between the French navy 
and its foreign counterparts, possibly by offering information 
in our possession about other regions of the world”; in order 
to “support our economic and industrial interests [e.g.,] main-
tain the technological understanding and know-how needed to 
design Arctic equipment with due consideration of the opera-
tional needs of the armed forces”; to “enhance the legitimacy 
of France’s participation in regional governance through its 
contribution to the stability and security of the region”; and to 
“promote outside of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable a 
bilateral approach focusing on practical objectives with coun-
tries having proven capabilities in the Far North” (2016, 35). 
Finally, the Roadmap greatly reflects “France’s scientific, eco-
nomic, ecological ethics, political and defence interests in the 
Arctic [which] are bound to grow stronger” (2016, 57).
‘Sovereignty’ is explicitly identified in the Roadmap, as is the 
“jurisdiction over large areas of the Arctic Ocean” of the five 
Arctic littoral states (2016, 4). The document is clear in stating 
that “by virtue of their sovereignty, their sovereign rights and 
their jurisdiction over vast portions of the Arctic Ocean, the five 
coastal states are in a special position to respond to the chal-
lenges and issues in the Arctic.” As an observer country of the 
Arctic Council, “France recognises the Arctic states’ sovereign-
ty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic” (2016, 57). 
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the Roadmap of France (see Figure 18, p. 195). The 
Roadmap does not explicitly mention the SAR Agreement, but 
instead focuses on the Polar Code of the International Mar-
itime Organization, which is “a collection of amendments to 
the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions on the safety of vessels 
operating in polar waters” (2016, 45), and plays “an active role 
in the process of harmonising national regulations and the new 
international regulations on shipping in polar waters” (2016, 
59). As the Roadmap identifies, “the existing shipping monitor-
ing systems are insufficient in number and do not yet operate 
as a network…. There is a lack of satellite surveillance [and of] 
search and rescue capabilities” (2016, 39). Here the document 
reflects that France “supported the drafting of a Polar Code in 
the form of amendments to the SOLAS Convention on safety 
at sea and the MARPOL Convention” (2016, 39). Further, it 
recognizes a need to “implement the regulatory framework for 
vessels operating in the Arctic (‘Polar Code’)”, as well as “main-
tain our involvement in the IMO’s work to broaden the scope of 
the binding Polar Code (Phase II) to include vessels that are not 
covered by the SOLAS Convention… [and] ensure that ship-
owners comply scrupulously with the provisions of the Polar 
Code... [as] pleasure cruises, run by specialised French compa-
nies, are booming” (2016, 40). 
The Economy indicator accounts for 17 % of the total coded 
quotes of the French Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195). The doc-
ument’s foreword notes that “an environmental transformation 
such as this [due to climate change] would certainly bring major 
economic opportunities for the Arctic region in terms of both 
shipping and fisheries” (2016, 4). Later the document notes 
that “France already has political and economic interests in the 
Arctic (Total, Engie, Technip, Thales, etc.) which are bound to 
grow” (2016, 11). 
Among the main natural resources of the Arctic region the 
Roadmap includes “gas, oil, wood, nickel, cold-water fish, di-
amonds, rare earth elements, etc.” (2016, 7). In particular, it 
explains that “in terms of energy security, Europe relies on im-
ports for more than 50 % of its energy, and over two-thirds of 
its imports are from Russia and Norway, which have large off-
shore oil fields in the Arctic that are in production or under de-
velopment” (2016, 51). On the other hand, the Roadmap notes 
that an environmental transformation, such as melting of sea 
ice in Arctic waters “would also pose immense challenges, such 
as the need to mitigate the inevitable loss of biodiversity, the in-
creased risk of sea pollution and the impact on the ways of life 
of Indigenous populations” (2016, 4). Following on from this, 
“France has also expressed ecological ethics concerns about the 
region in its ‘Grenelle’ environment project… ’with the aim of 
protecting the Arctic environment’’’ (2016, 11), while “the Blue 
Book explained [in 2009] that ‘appointing a polar ambassador 
will underline France’s commitment to contributing to an inte-
grated sustainable development plan for this region, where the 
ecosystem is particularly fragile’ and that the Arctic is ‘a world-
wide concern’” (2016, 11). 
The Roadmap does, however, note that “France does not cur-
rently have any major interests in commercial shipping in the 
Arctic. If this sector should develop we must ensure that ship-
owners comply scrupulously with the provisions of the Polar 
Code” (2016, 40). It also lists several “French companies in the 
Canadian, Norwegian and Russian Arctic,” such as: 
• Areya: uranium exploration project in Nunavut, Bouygues, 
and Colas 
• PPP for the renovation of Iqaluit airport 
• Canada Rail (Systra) rail infrastructures related to mining 
• Ponant: polar cruise company (in Canada) 
• GDF Suez (oil and gas) 
• COFELY Fabricom (platform maintenance) 
• Technip (underwater engineering) 
• Nexans (cables) 
• CGG Veritas (underground exploration and  
oil-related services) 
• Seabed Geophysics (collection of seismic data,  
sale of cables and surveillance) 
• Bourbon Offshore Norway (shipping services for  
offshore oil drilling) 
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• FROM Nord and Euronor (fishing)
• MA-CGM (commercial transportation) 
• Ponant, GNGL
• 66° Nord (Specialised travel companies) (in Norway) 
• Total & Technip (oil and gas) 
• Ponant (polar cruise company) (in Russia) (2016, 27). 
As for economic actors, the Roadmap identifies the EU, the Arc-
tic Council and its new observer countries, and particularly, the 
Arctic Economic Council. There are also comments about busi-
ness events, such as the Arctic Business Forum, Arctic Business 
Council, and Arctic Oil and Gas Symposium, in which French 
companies are encouraged to participate (2016, 28). 
  
The Tourism indicator, accounting for 3 % of the total coded 
quotes of the National Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195), reflects 
concerns that “the gradual opening of Arctic shipping routes, 
the increase in commercial shipping traffic (pleasure cruis-
ing and, to a lesser extent, cargo)… raises new challenges for 
France in its capacity as a leading naval power. [Among these 
challenges are] protection and rescue of ships and passengers, 
fighting pollution, critical legal issues concerning freedom of 
navigation, etc.” (2016, 34). It states, too, that “pleasure cruises, 
run by specialised French companies, are booming” (2016, 40). 
Among the recommendations on economic opportunities and 
cooperation of the document is to “promote the development of 
fair trade tourism that respects local populations and encourage 
French companies operating in the Arctic to hire and train local 
residents” (2016, 28). 
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded 
quotes of the Roadmap (see Figure 18, p. 195). This indicator 
specifies France’s interest in (technical) innovations in the Arctic 
region “where climate change opens up prospects for economic 
and commercial development, green growth is a crucial issue…
and renewable energy sources, green technology and investment 
in innovation” (p. 27). Here the Arctic is named “a laboratory for 
new technologies in information and communication, robotics, 
automation, airborne systems and sensors” (2016, 27), which re-
quires promotion of “French expertise in environmental tech-
nology” (2016, 28).
Concerning transportation, however, France does not have ma-
jor interests in commercial Arctic shipping. As mentioned ear-
lier, the Roadmap explicitly discusses i) that “the waters of the 
Arctic Ocean are key components for climate regulation in the 
northern hemisphere. Their ecosystems are undergoing major 
changes as a result of [environmental] changes… global warm-
ing and increasing pressure from human activity,” and therefore, 
“shipping traffic is increasing… pleasure cruising is developing” 
(2016, 39); and ii) how “the Northeast Passage reduces the dis-
tance from Rotterdam to Yokohama by 40 % compared to the 
route through the Suez Canal,” although, to date, there has been 
little traffic on the sea route (2016, 25).
 
The Science and Education indicator, which accounts for 10 % of 
the total coded quotes of the Roadmap for the Arctic (see Figure 
18, p. 195), reflects the second-highest priority of France’s Arctic 
policy, namely, “scientific research and academic cooperation in 
the Arctic” (2016, 15–20). Linked to this are the long-standing 
polar exploration and research tradition of France: “France was 
the first country to set up, in 1963, a scientific research base in… 
Svalbard, where it shares a permanent base with Germany in the 
international scientific village Ny-Ålesund” (2016, 17). The doc-
ument also argues: i) that “in historical terms, the polar regions 
have had a special place in international scientific cooperation” 
(2016, 17) for example, “the International Polar Year 2007–2008, 
which involved several thousand researchers from 63 countries” 
(2016, 9); ii) that “non-Arctic states must engage in research in 
the Arctic to obtain official observer status in the Arctic Council” 
(2016, 18); and iii) that “France’s scientific activities relating to 
the Arctic strengthen its legitimacy in dealing with Arctic affairs 
and are an essential condition for the renewal of its observer sta-
tus in the Arctic Council” (2016, 19).
Based on its long-standing polar tradition, France “ranks 9th 
among scientific countries for publications on the Arctic, where-
as it ranks 5th in the world for scientific publications on Antarc-
tica” (2016, 17) France “was the first country to establish in 1963 
a scientific research base in Svalbard” (2016, 17). The Roadmap 
includes a list of ten main scientific interests of France in the 
Arctic, as well as recommendations on research. Among the ten 
main scientific interests, which mostly relate to natural sciences 
are: “Arctic and global atmospheric variability,” “water cycle and 
land ice,” the “changing ocean,” “Arctic terrestrial ecosystem dy-
namics,” “Indigenous societies and global change,” and “sustain-
able development in the Arctic” (2016, 19). Correspondingly, 
recommendations (2016, 19, 20) include raising “France’s profile 
by building up the community of French scientists working on 
the Arctic and, more specifically, by ensuring that the develop-
ment of the Arctic project that involves France’s research bod-
ies… [especially] the Paul-Emile Victor Polar Institute (IPEV), 
the national agency that provides resources for French scientific 
activities in the polar regions.” 
There are also recommendations to “build up France’s scientific 
role in the Arctic Council working groups and task forces, by 
bringing in French human and social science specialists in partic-
ular… [and] ensure that France participates fully in international 
scientific organisations, such as the International Arctic Science 
Committee”; to “develop the European aspects… of French sci-
entific research on the Arctic, as part of the European Union re-
search and innovation programme (Horizon 2020), and at the 
institutional level, through the European Polar Board (EPB) 
and its initiatives (e.g., the EU-PolarNet project)”; [to] “promote 
France’s scientific expertise in human and social sciences and 
the teaching of Arctic languages in France to the Arctic states”; 
and [to] “develop research contracts with businesses that may be 
interested by economic opportunities in the Arctic.” Finally, the 
document notes that “all of these initiatives require development 
of French Arctic research with strong institutional and scientific 
support” (2016, 20) (see Implementation indicator). 
The Roadmap mentions that “with regard to human and social 
sciences… France is one of the few countries in the world that 
teaches Inuktitut (the language of the Inuit in Canada) at the Na-
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tional Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INAL-
CO)” (2016, 19), and asks for the promotion of “France’s scien-
tific expertise in human and social sciences and the teaching of 
Arctic languages in France to the Arctic states” (p. 20). Although 
the Roadmap comments that “France has a long-standing tra-
dition of internationally recognised scientific work in human 
and social sciences (anthropology, ethnography, etc.) related to 
the Indigenous populations of the North” (2016, 17), traditional 
knowledge is not explicitly mentioned. 
Concerning research funding the EU is mentioned “as both a key 
player and a major donor, in the field of Arctic research” through 
the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technologi-
cal Development, the Creative Europe, Horizon 2020. and other 
research, development. and innovation programmes (2016, 51). 
Finally, the Roadmap directs attention to a growing need for 
satellites, as “new activities and rapid change in the Arctic 
stemming from global warming mean that satellites and space 
programmes are bound to become helpful tools in the follow-
ing areas: telecommunications; maritime safety and navigation 
aids… environmental surveillance… sustainable management of 
marine resources” (2016, 26).
The Implementation indicator is explicitly noted by the French 
Roadmap for the Arctic, as it is interpreted as providing “a work-
ing framework and [setting] guidelines and priorities, which 
should make it possible in the coming years to align and priori-
tise action on Arctic issues and challenges that concern France, 
with a broader focus on sustainability and the common interest” 
(2016, 12). This is related to “France’s growing interest in the new 
scientific, environmental and economic issues in the Arctic, and 
that of the international community [which has given rise to] 
a national initiative to coordinate Arctic research” (2016, 17). 
Indeed, each of the substantial, thematic chapters—on science, 
economy, defence, environmental protection, international co-
operation and diplomacy— has a (longer or shorter) list of rec-
ommendations (several being referred to earlier). For example, 
the last recommendation on Diplomacy states that “France’s dip-
lomatic network in the Arctic states and in the Arctic Council 
observer states must play its full role in implementing the Na-
tional Roadmap for the Arctic” (2016, 47). 
Although the document does not include any figures for bud-
geting, the recommendations on research are finalized by the 
firm statement that “all of these initiatives require development 
of French Arctic research with strong institutional and scientific 
support: allocating operating grants for the coordination struc-
ture based on the Arctic project and the Paul-Emile Victor Polar 
Institute; placing greater priority on the main scientific issues 
relating to the Arctic defined by the Arctic project in the other 
research funding agencies” (2016, 20).
To sum up 
Based on the quantitative measuring of our 12 indicators, Econ-
omy is the highest major priority of the Arctic policy of France 
according to the French National Roadmap for the Arctic. This 
interpretation is supported, too, by its substantial chapter on the 
economy, which explicitly identifies new economic opportuni-
ties in the Arctic and notes that French companies are already 
present there, such as Total in the Yamal LNG Project. However, 
as mentioned earlier, the Roadmap has two sides to it, as it also 
places an emphasis on the immense environmental challenges 
present in the Arctic, such as the inevitable loss of biodiversity, 
the increased risk of sea pollution, and societal impacts on Indig-
enous and local populations. This poses a classic question about 
national policies and strategies, namely, which of the two is the 
priority in an Arctic heavily impacted by climate change: the en-
vironment or the economy? The main conclusion here might be 
‘both–and’ rather than ‘either–or’, an approach that reflects the 
realities of life rather than environmental politics, especially in 
the case of the Arctic. 
It is noteworthy that both ‘sovereignty’ and ‘defence’ are explicit-
ly discussed. The Roadmap comes down firmly on the side of the 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the five Arctic coastal states, 
and it is clear that France recognizes the Arctic states’ sovereignty. 
The Roadmap also discusses defence and security issues, which 
are excluded from the Arctic Council agenda; it notes that the 
security of the Arctic states is of concern to NATO and promises 
that France will contribute to Arctic stability remaining strong. 
France’s national Arctic policy is also a strong statement on be-
half of the EU and its Arctic policy and the latter’s legitimate in-
volvement in and presence there. A little surprisingly, the EU’s 
Northern Dimension is identified as playing a role in the Arctic, 
and the EU’s membership of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council is 
explicitly noted. 
It can be concluded that the French Roadmap emphasizes the 
interests of both France and the EU in the Arctic. The national 
and general interests of Arctic Ocean governance are clearly ex-
pressed, but it is not clear if they are in balance. Environmental 
protection is, however, high on the agenda. Regarding the legit-
imacy of France’s involvement in Arctic affairs, this is impossi-
ble to measure; it is thus unclear as to whether actual legitimacy 
exists, especially legitimacy that is in any way enhanced. Finally, 
according to the Economy and Security indicatorss, there is, in 
fact, a greater focus on economy than the official priorities re-
veal, therefore better reflecting, perhaps, France’s focus on na-
tional interests in the Arctic and Arctic affairs.
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Germany
Germany released its strategy, Guidelines of the Germany Arc-
tic Policy: Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities, in 2013 
with 19 pages of text, published by the Federal Foreign Office. 
While the 2013 strategy does not explicitly state priorities, the 
document opens with a list of 11 issues that the federal govern-
ment seems to be interested in. Broadly, these include economic 
development, environmental protection, research, technology, 
maritime governance, peace and stability, Indigenous rights, 
international cooperation, and EU involvement in the region 
(German Federal Foreign Office 2013, 1–2). 
In August 2019, Germany released a new adopted Arctic Policy 
Guidelines in its Cabinet with the aims to “work towards world-
wide climate and environmental protection” and “environmen-
tally-friendly technology”, and for the rights of the Arctic Indig-
enous population, free and responsible research, and finally, for 
“the future of the Arctic” (German Government, August 2019). 
However, due to its late release the up-dated Arctic policy doc-
ument is not included this analysis. 
Germany was accepted into the Arctic Council as an Observer 
at the 1998 Iqaluit Ministerial meeting (Arctic Council 2015b).
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides insights into how Germany understands the region. There 
is a focus on the Arctic waters. The document explains that “the 
heart of the Arctic—that is, the area within the Arctic Circle—is 
the Arctic Ocean” (2013, 4) and that “the Arctic comprises not 
only the Arctic Ocean, which is bordered by the continents of 
Europe, North America, and Asia, but also the northernmost 
areas of the Atlantic Ocean (i.e., the Norwegian Sea and the 
Greenland Sea), to which the Arctic is connected via the Fram 
Strait, as well as Baffin Bay, the Nares Strait and, finally, the Ber-
ing Strait, which connects the Arctic with the Pacific Ocean” (p. 
4). Within the context of the Arctic waters, the document also 
recognizes that “climate change is bringing about a fundamen-
tally new geographic constellation” (2013, 4). As for the Arctic 
states, the strategy remarks that “the Arctic also includes parts 
of the landmass of Russia, the United States (Alaska), Cana-
da, Denmark (the autonomous Danish-dependent territory 
of Greenland), Norway (including Spitsbergen) and Iceland” 
(2013, 4), thus leaving out Sweden and Finland. 
Considering the comments about the potential changes to the 
region, the federal government “views the Arctic as a region in 
transition” (2013, 1). Moreover, the strategy asserts that “due to 
global warming and the rapid increase in the melting rate of the 
polar ice sheets, the Arctic is of steadily growing geopolitical, 
geoeconomic and geo-ecological importance for the interna-
tional community” (2013, 1). At the same time, the strategy also 
describes the region in terms of the environment. For example, 
with climate change, the Arctic is “the earth’s ‘early warning sys-
tem’” (2013,5), and it remarks that the Arctic is “an ecologically 
significant and sensitive region” (2013, 7). 
The 2013 German Guidelines primarily call the region the “Arc-
tic,” although they do once use the term “High North” (2013, 5). 
Figure 19 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Figure 19. Germany 2013
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
Not too much has been captured in the Human Dimension 
indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total code quotes (see 
Figure 19), perhaps because Germany is geographically outside 
the region. That being said, the Guidelines recognize that “ap-
proximately ten percent of the four million people in the Arctic 
belong to the more than 30 groups of Indigenous peoples who 
inhabit the Arctic region” (2013, 4). As such, the Guidelines rec-
ognize “the special situation of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic 
and campaigns for the protection of their right to a free and 
self-determined life in their homeland” (2013, 2). This seems to 
mean that “attention must be paid to respecting the Indigenous 
peoples’ territorial claims, ensuring that they share in the profits 
of Arctic economic development, and that they can adapt to the 
significantly changed living conditions” (2013, 11) and to recog-
nize that “conflicts may arise, for example when countries bor-
dering the Arctic Ocean assert claims to territorial sovereignty 
in this region” (2013, 11). 
The Governance indicator, which accounts for 15 % of the to-
tal coded quotes for the Guidelines (See Figure 19), confirms 
Germany’s commitments to “existing international agreements 
and treaties that are of relevance for the Arctic” (2013, 19). The 
Guidelines further explain that Germany also advocates for the 
creation of an “agreed international political and legal frame-
work” in the Arctic (2013, 4) and that “The Federal Government 
backs preventive action that aims to avoid conflicts through 
confidence-building measures, cooperation and coordination, 
and works to settle disagreements through consensual solutions 
based on existing legislation” (2013, 10). Furthermore, Germa-
ny believes that “increased use should be made of existing struc-
tures in regional and multilateral institutions [in the Arctic], to 
promote scientific collaboration and international cooperation 
with a view to tackling challenges and seizing economic oppor-
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tunities in the Arctic region” (2013, 11). At the same time, Ger-
many argues that “legally-binding regulations are required for 
the exploration and development of mineral resources”, as well 
as “sustainable development of living marine resources” (2013, 
11, 6). The Guidelines explains that “This includes, among oth-
er things, setting high environmental standards, developing 
multinational strategies for protecting the environment in the 
event of accidents, and establishing a binding regime concern-
ing environmental damage and liability” (2013, 11). Moreover, 
“high safety and environmental standards are an absolute pre-
requisite for shipping and maritime transport in the Arctic re-
gion” (2013, 8). For these purposes, “the Federal Government 
is ready to embark on maritime-sector cooperation (e.g. in the 
area of polar technology) with countries bordering the Arctic 
Ocean” (2013, 1). With regard to “issues concerning shipping 
in the Arctic, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
is the foremost body for multilateral cooperation” (2013, 13). 
Furthermore, “Germany supports efforts to ensure that existing 
shipping regulations, as well as the environmental and safety 
standards of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
are equally implemented for all vessels, regardless of their flag 
state” (2013, 8). 
The Guidelines also address the situation of Indigenous popu-
lations and protection of their “right to a self-determined and 
free life in their homeland.” In this connection, “attention must 
be paid to respecting the Indigenous peoples’ territorial claims, 
ensuring that they share in the profits of Arctic economic de-
velopment, and that they can adapt to the significantly changed 
living conditions” (2013, 11).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator, which accounts for 21 % of the total coded quotes (see 
Figure 19, p. 201), reflects the fact that the German Federal 
Government “support international cooperation in all areas of 
Arctic research through the International Arctic Science Com-
mittee (IASC), which is based in Potsdam… It is the leading 
forum for cooperation among all states and scientific bodies in-
volved in Arctic research” (2013, 10). The Federal Government 
also “remains committed to international and regional conven-
tions—in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, the MARPOL Convention, the conventions for the 
protection of the marine environment and on biological diver-
sity, and the Spitsbergen Treaty—which form the legally binding 
framework for states’ rights and obligations with respect to the 
Arctic.” Furthermore, the Government “supports an active EU 
Arctic policy and is working to ensure horizontal coherence on 
Arctic issues within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
as well as in the domains of research, environmental protection, 
energy and raw materials, industry and technology, transport, 
and fisheries” (2013, 1, 2). 
Germany favors multilateral cooperation on Arctic issues, first 
and foremost in the Arctic Council. The Federal Government is 
also “aware of the global consequences of developments in the 
Arctic region, including their political, economic and environ-
mental significance, and Germany is therefore prepared to do its 
share as an observer country” in the Arctic Council (2013, 13). 
Germany recognizes the relevance of important international 
conventions that are connected to the Arctic and “In Germany’s 
view, the most central body for Arctic policy is the Arctic Coun-
cil, which was established in 1996 and is the only regional forum 
dealing with Arctic issues” (2013, 12). According to the Ger-
man Arctic Guidelines, “the significance of the Arctic Council 
as a forum for international cooperation is steadily increasing— 
to the same extent that interest in the region is growing.With 
its increased workload and importance, the Arctic Council is 
becoming more and more institutionalised, and the issues it 
deals with are gaining in scope” (2013, 12-13). However, “the 
body still does not address any questions related to security” 
(2013, 13). Still, the Arctic Council “represents a unique oppor-
tunity for balancing regional and international interests in the 
Arctic through multilateral cooperation” (2013, 13). Germany 
also addresses the SAR Agreement as “the first binding interna-
tional agreement drawn up exclusively for the Arctic… [which] 
represents progress towards setting up a specially-tailored le-
gal regime for the region. For the same reason, Germany wel-
comes the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, 
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic” (2013, 13). Germa-
ny aims to further strengthen its observer status in the Arctic 
Council and is “interested in increasing Germany’s ad hoc par-
ticipation in Arctic Council working groups” (2013, 1, 2).
Furthermore, Germany considers UNCLOS as particularly 
important, as it “contains obligations for the protection of the 
marine environment. All states parties are bound to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment… 
The UNCLOS is a valuable instrument for delimiting maritime 
boundaries and clarifying the resulting development rights. 
However, the regulations set out therein are limited in scope, 
and they do not resolve all issues related to the Arctic” (2013, 
12). The Federal Government also mentions in the strategy the 
support of “the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) as a suit-
able framework for addressing in detail Arctic issues specific to 
the Barents Sea” (2013, 16). On the international level, Germany 
“favours and supports an active role by the European Union in 
Arctic policy, as set out in the European Union strategy for the 
Arctic” (2013, 15). Specifically, “a close coordination must be 
ensured between the Northern Dimension policy (ND) and the 
continually developing Arctic policy of the European Union” 
(2013, 15). The Federal Government is “working to ensure stra-
tegic integration of, and horizontal coherence on, Arctic issues 
with respect to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
as well as to the domains of environmental protection, research, 
industry and technology, energy and raw materials, transport, 
and fisheries” (2013, 19).
The Environmental Protection indicator, which accounts for 
7 % of the total coded quotes for the document (see Figure 19, 
p. 201) identifies Germany’s environmental actions. As men-
tioned earlier, the Arctic is considered an “ecologically signif-
icant and sensitive region” (2013, 7). Therefore, “safeguarding 
the Arctic’s unique environment, living conditions and biologi-
cal diversity, also through establishing protected areas, is a high 
priority for the Federal Government. It stresses the importance, 
from a global point of view, of protecting the Arctic environ-
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States
203
ment through circumspect and precautionary action” (2013,18). 
The Guidelines further asserts that “particularly in the Arctic, 
precautionary action must be taken to protect the environment. 
The lack of absolute scientific certainty is no reason to delay ac-
tion, if there is a danger of severe or lasting damage being done” 
(2013, 4-5). This includes finding a balance between economic 
activities and environmental protection (see: 2013, 1, 4, 6, 14). 
As mentioned, protected areas and biodiversity are import-
ant. Indeed, “the Federal Government … supports efforts to 
pinpoint ecologically and biologically unique areas, and to es-
tablish a representative and coherent network of marine pro-
tected areas, with a view to safeguarding biological diversity in 
the Arctic” (2013, 7). This means respecting the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (2013, 7), and 
recognizing that “other problems are created by the introduc-
tion of invasive species or by increased soot deposits stemming 
from the burning of heavy fuel by ships” (2013, 7). 
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) identifies different pollutants 
that are affecting the Arctic. The policy identifies the following 
pollutants throughout the document: greenhouse gases, meth-
ane, soot, black carbon, sulphur, nitrogen oxide, and shipping 
waste (2013, 5, 7, 14, 18). Some of the causes of pollution, there-
fore, are “the exhaust generated by the burning of fossil fuels 
[and ]the burning of heavy fuel by ships (2013, 7). 
The Guidelines addresses pollution prevention through dis-
cussions on formal structures. This includes the IMO’s Polar 
Code that “sets out technical requirements for ships and crews. 
It also contains a chapter dedicated to the environment, with 
binding regulations regarding waste and wastewater that go be-
yond those introduced by the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention)” 
(2013, 14), by UNCLOS where “all states parties are bound to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environ-
ment” (2013, 12), and by “the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arc-
tic, which was signed by Arctic Council members in May 2013” 
(2013, 13). 
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the to-
tal coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) identifies issues associated 
with climate change. The Guidelines remarks that “already today, 
the consequences of climate change in the Arctic are dramatic. 
The Arctic region is currently warming at twice the rate of other 
areas on the planet, compared to the global average” (2013, 5). 
The Guidelines thus outlines a number of consequences associat-
ed with climate change. For example, “the consequences are many 
and diverse: these developments generate both opportunities and 
risks, and their effect is felt far beyond the Arctic region as such. 
They touch upon environmental, economic, research and safety 
issues, and are becoming a focus of foreign and European policy” 
(2013, 4). Moreover, “the positive economic prospects that are 
being created by the warming of the Arctic region may also carry 
considerable risks. Development of Arctic mineral resources and 
increased shipping can endanger the environment and health of 
the Indigenous peoples” (2013, 7), and “global warming is chang-
ing the local ecosystems in a major way, and thus significantly 
impacting the environment, livelihood and culture of the Indig-
enous peoples” (2013, 11). There are also consequences for Ger-
many, for instance: “not only the shrinking sea ice in the Arctic 
Ocean, but also the increased melting of the Greenland ice sheet 
and the thawing of the permafrost that covers a considerable area 
of the Arctic, have a global effect. This will also directly impact 
Germany” (2013, 5). 
In terms of addressing climate change and global warming, the 
Guidelines states that “efforts to slow the rapid further increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions have been unsuccessful so far” 
(2013, 5), which is rather pessimistic. The Guidelines does not 
provide a more detailed discussion around mitigation and ad-
aptation efforts. 
The German government does appear to listen to the scientific 
community, with the document stating that “in recent years, the 
Arctic summer ice cap has shrunk by an area equivalent to four 
times the size of Germany. According to model calculations, in 
20 to 30 years the Arctic Ocean will be mostly free of ice during 
the summer months, and therefore increasingly navigable” 
(2013, 5). 
The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
ed quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) highlights the fact that the Fed-
eral Government “backs preventive action that aims to avoid 
conflicts through confidence-building measures, cooperation 
and coordination, and works to settle disagreements through 
consensual solutions based on existing legislation” (2013, 10). 
While the Federal Government “is convinced that the Arctic 
must be used for peaceful purposes only, it recognises that se-
curity issues do arise in conjunction with developments in the 
Arctic, and that possible security risks need to be addressed” 
(2013, 17. The Guidelines warns about the “overlapping interests 
of Arctic countries” which might “trigger a geopolitical race for 
sovereignty, or for rights to develop the seabed and its natural 
resources, which would pose an economic, environmental and 
security policy threat to stability in the region and would also 
affect Europe’s security interests” (2013, 10, 17). Furthermore, 
“political attention must also focus on the Indigenous popula-
tion in the Arctic region. Here, conflicts may arise, for example, 
when countries bordering the Arctic Ocean assert claims to ter-
ritorial sovereignty in this region” (2013, 11). 
Germany also recognizes the key role that the “UNCLOS plays 
a key role in clarifying usage rights and regulatory powers, 
by introducing regulations that delimit the coastal areas and 
maritime zones of the states parties. This can prevent conflict 
between states over maritime boundaries” (2013, 10-11). The 
Guidelines also mentions potential consequences, as “these de-
velopments generate both opportunities and risks, and their ef-
fect is felt far beyond the Arctic region as such. They touch upon 
environmental, economic, research and safety issues, and are 
becoming a focus of foreign and European policy” (2013, 4). In 
the Guidelines, Germany also mentions the role of NATO. From 
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the Federal Government’s perspective, “NATO’s wide-ranging 
partnership formats, which are open to all countries bordering 
the Arctic Ocean, provide suitable forums for dealing with Arc-
tic security policy issues. If necessary, this can be supplemented 
with discussions in other groups, such as the Arctic Security 
Forces Roundtable, a forum that brings together the security 
forces of Arctic countries, and in which Germany and other Eu-
ropean partners have an observer role” (2013, 17). The Federal 
Government is further “campaigning for freedom of navigation 
in the Arctic Ocean (Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar Pas-
sages) in accordance with high safety and environmental stan-
dards” and also “working hard to ensure free, safe and peaceful 
passage through Arctic waters in compliance with strict environ-
mental guidelines” (2013, 1,9).
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the to-
tal coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201), shows that safety was 
addressed primarily in the context of maritime transit as there 
are concerns about the impact of shipping on the environment. 
The Guidelines states that “the Federal Government is working 
hard to ensure that environmental protection and sustainability 
aspects are respected by all economic activity in the Arctic, which 
includes shipping” (2013, 7). Part of the concern is about oil spills 
“which may be caused by the operation of vessels, or by the very 
real risk of maritime accidents” (2013, 7). There are also concerns 
about existing rescue capabilities. For instance, the Guidelines 
comments that “a Northeast Passage that is ice-free year round 
would be the shortest shipping route between the ports of Eu-
rope’s Northern Range and East Asia. Here, the advantages of 
shorter shipping routes must be weighed against several factors: 
the sea ice’s unpredictability, the fact that, as of yet, there is insuf-
ficient emergency rescue capacity, and the lack of Arctic-capable 
cargo ships” (2013, 8). There is also concern about cruise ships as 
“already today, cruise companies are looking towards the Arctic, 
both as a destination and a future sea route. Yet there still is a very 
large risk of collision with sea ice or icebergs” (2013, 8). 
To help address these concerns, the Guidelines discusses different 
safety agreements. The primary focus is on the IMO because of 
its “environmental and safety standards” (2013, 8); it also notes 
that Germany would like “to have the Arctic either wholly or 
in part dedicated a special area” (2013, 14). The Guidelines fur-
ther recognizes that not all maritime areas are the same and that 
“IMO environmental and safety standards must be re-examined 
on a regular basis and adapted to the polar regions (also through 
development of the Polar Code), to meet the special challeng-
es posed by the Arctic environment” (2013, 8). Aside from the 
IMO, the Guidelines also recognizes that “the Agreement on Co-
operation in Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic, which was signed by Arctic Council members in Feb-
ruary 2011, is the first binding international agreement drawn 
up exclusively for the Arctic” (2013, 13). 
In terms of capabilities, the focus remains on Germany’s work 
with the IMO, which makes sense as Germany is not on the Arc-
tic Ocean. To this end, “the Federal Government is campaign-
ing within IMO to achieve better maritime surveillance, infra-
structure expansion, and Arctic search and rescue capabilities” 
(2013, 9). The Guidelines also asserts that “in 2002, IMO drafted 
guidelines for ships operating in areas of the Arctic Ocean cov-
ered by ice. The Federal Government is campaigning for making 
these guidelines binding and for further adapting them to the 
special conditions in the Arctic” (2013, 13-14). Additionally, the 
Guidelines states that “sea marks, nautical charts, lines of com-
munication, and outposts need to be established as widely and 
extensively as possible” (2013, 9). 
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 12 % of the total 
coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) reveals a few different types 
of economic activity. For instance, as a result of climate change, 
“new opportunities are arising in this connection, for example 
for fisheries, maritime routes and tourism” (2013, 4) more gen-
erally in the region. As for Germany, there are also opportuni-
ties to participate in the Arctic economy. For instance, “thanks 
to the increasing navigability of the Arctic Ocean, there is great 
potential in the market for innovative shipbuilding that meets 
high environmental standards. Germany, especially through its 
shipyards and maritime contractors, is a global leader in this 
domain. German companies have specialised in building inno-
vative and environmentally-friendly ship propulsion systems, 
special vessels, including ice class ships, as well as cutting-edge, 
environmentally-friendly maritime technology” (2013, 9). Ad-
ditionally, “as one of the world’s largest importing and exporting 
nations, Germany has a strong interest in new passageways to 
East Asian trading centres. Germany has the third-largest mer-
chant marine in the world and the world’s largest fleet of con-
tainer ships” (2013, 8). 
The resource industry is also important to the regional econo-
my, especially considering “some 20 to 30 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered fossil fuels, such as oil and natural gas, are sus-
pected to lie north of the Arctic Circle. The region is also be-
lieved to be rich in metals such as copper, nickel, zinc and rare 
earths” (2013, 6). However,“harsh climatic conditions and the 
technical challenges that need to be mastered to access Arctic 
raw materials, as well as the particularly sensitive Arctic envi-
ronment, are leading to an increased need for specialised tech-
nology and know-how. New opportunities are opening up for 
German companies. There is great potential for German mari-
time technologies, due to the increasing importance of the sea 
in the development of raw materials” (2013, 6). 
Energy is also of importance to Germany. Indeed, “development 
of Arctic raw materials, which is already under way, can con-
tribute to energy and raw material security in Germany and the 
EU” (2013, 18). 
As much of Germany’s economic opportunity in the Arctic is 
connected to maritime technology, the government has creat-
ed a plan to help facilitate these activities. In fact, “the Nation-
al Master Plan for Maritime Technologies (NMMT) agreed in 
2011 aims to help unlock the full potential of these technologies. 
By driving forward this cutting-edge maritime technology that 
meets high environmental standards, high-quality jobs are be-
ing created and secured in a key future market that is of great 
strategic importance” (2013, 6). 
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The Guidelines also recognizes the importance of sustainable 
development. For instance, “Germany’s Arctic policy, which is 
strongly committed to global environmental protection, stress-
es the importance of developing Arctic resources in a peaceful 
and sustainable way, by ensuring that the highest environmental 
standards are met and the principle of precautionary action is 
adhered to, and by respecting the concerns of the Indigenous 
population” (2013, 7). The Guidelines also explores how Germa-
ny can help with this process. For example, “with its know-how 
in cutting-edge research, sophisticated technology, and high 
environmental standards, Germany is in a position to support 
sustainable economic development in the Arctic” (2013, 18). In 
addition to the principles of sustainable development, econom-
ic activities are also regulated through formal structures. The 
Guidelines, in particular, recognizes that the OSPAR Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic fails to protect fisheries. However, “this domain 
is addressed by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC), which covers almost exactly the same geographic 
area as the OSPAR Commission” (2013, 15). 
In terms of economic actors, the Guidelines does not name many. 
It comments only on “Germany and its companies” (2013, 7) and 
that “the Federal Government encourages the promotion of in-
vestments in parts of the Arctic through the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB)” (2013, 16). 
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 1 % of the total cod-
ed quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) reflects on new opportunities 
in connection to increased shrinkage of the Arctic sea ice, “for 
example for fisheries, maritime routes and tourism.” However, 
“all economic activities in the sensitive Arctic ecosystem must 
go hand in hand with high economic and safety standards.” Fur-
thermore, the policy reflects on the new transit routes. “Cruise 
companies also stand to profit from such routes. To provide sus-
tainable tourism, however, they must meet the most stringent 
safety and environmental standards. Already today, cruise com-
panies are looking towards the Arctic, both as a destination and a 
future sea route. Yet there still is a very large risk of collision with 
sea ice or icebergs” (2013, 4, 8).
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the 
total coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) focuses on issues of 
shipping. In particular, “the Federal Government actively backs 
the opening of new shipping routes in the Arctic” (2013, 8) and 
“is campaigning for freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean 
(Northeast, Northwest and Transpolar Passages) in accordance 
with high safety and environmental standards” (2013, 1). This 
is likely because “as one of the world’s largest importing and 
exporting nations, Germany has a strong interest in new pas-
sageways to East Asian trading centres” (2013, 8). Germany also 
recognizes that “high safety and environmental standards are an 
absolute prerequisite for shipping and maritime transport in the 
Arctic region. Germany supports efforts to ensure that existing 
shipping regulations, as well as the environmental and safety 
standards of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), 
are equally implemented for all vessels, regardless of their flag 
state” (2013, 8). 
The Science and Education indicator, which accounts for 7 % of 
the total coded quotes (see Figure 19, p. 201) primarily focuses 
on science. The Guidelines suggests that drivers of research tend 
to be related to the environment and climate change (see: 2013, 
4, 9, 10), although this research serves different purposes. For ex-
ample, there are economic reasons why the Federal Government 
“is convinced that, as a partner with vast expert knowledge in 
the areas of research, technology and environmental standards, 
Germany can contribute to sustainable economic development 
in this region” (2013, 1). The Federal Government also sees re-
search as a way to make policy and “is working to guarantee the 
freedom of Arctic research, based on the conviction that scien-
tific findings are of fundamental importance for Arctic policy” 
(2013, 1; see also: 18). Research can also inform decision making 
as “the AWI has significant and broad expertise, also through 
its collection of long-term data. This knowledge base is made 
available to inform future discussions on all issues related to the 
Arctic” (2013, 9).
The Guidelines mentions different types of research infrastruc-
ture. First, it mentions research institutes such as the Alfred 
Wegener Institute, Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine 
Research (AWI), and that “together with France, it operates 
its own Arctic research base on Spitsbergen” (2013, 9), and the 
Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) 
(2013, 9–10). Second, there are formal networks such as the 
IASC (2013, 10) and also the fact that “German institutes par-
ticipate in research programmes of the EU, the Nordic Council 
and the Arctic Council. The European Polar Board (EPB) con-
sists of a group of experts of the European Science Foundation 
which is headquartered in Strasbourg and provides advice on 
research in polar regions. Similar advisory bodies exist for the 
Nordic and Pacific countries” (2013, 10). Finally, there are infor-
mal networking opportunities like conferences. “Germany has 
hosted three international Arctic conferences in Berlin: a first in 
cooperation with Norway and Denmark in 2009, a second with 
Finland in 2011, and a third with Norway in 2013” (2013, 10). 
There is no discussion of traditional knowledge or education. 
The Implementation indicator reveals that there is no list of rec-
ommendations or actionable items. Instead, the summary (at 
the end of the document) recaps German priorities and makes 
statements about what the Federal Government is currently 
doing or where it thinks action should be taken. For example, 
“the Federal Government is campaigning to ensure free pas-
sage by international vessels through Arctic maritime routes, 
and it fully backs high safety and environmental standards for 
shipping” (2013, 18) and that “effective action must be taken to 
close existing loopholes with respect to the Arctic, for example, 
through the development of the Polar Code by the International 
Maritime Organization” (2013, 19). There is no mention of a 
budget for Germany’s Arctic work, no follow-up plan, and no 
evaluation processes. 
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To sum up 
Based on our quantitative analysis, International Cooperation 
is the most discussed indicator, followed by Governance. This 
reflects the Germany’s interest in being involved in key issues, 
such as peace and stability, maritime governance, international 
cooperation, and the EU involvement in the Arctic. Germany 
highly supports the existence of international agreements which 
are relevant for the Arctic. At the same time, the Government also 
advocates for legally binding regulations for sustainable explora-
tion of mineral resources and living marine resources. In Germa-
ny’s view, it is crucial to maintain high-level cooperation within 
the Arctic Council as the most prominent body with intergov-
ernmental decision-making process for Arctic policy. Germany 
recognizes the importance of keeping the Arctic outside potential 
conflicts and supports preventive efforts to avoid conflicts, for ex-
ample, in the case of overlapping territorial claims.
Economic development is one of the main issues the German 
policy seeks to address, and , the Economy indicator is the third 
most-coded indicator. The indicator recognizes that climate 
change is opening up new economic opportunities and that Ger-
many has a place in these through shipbuilding and providing 
technology for the extractive resources industries. These activ-
ities, together with tourism, will adhere to sustainable develop-
ment processes and goals. Tourism is also reflected in the Guide-
lines in connection to the new transit routes, and to the safety and 
environmental standards that must be met.
While environmental protection is a major issue for Germany, in 
our quantitative analysis it ranks somewhere in the middle, along 
with pollution and climate change. However, when these three 
indicators are looked at together, they are discussed just as much 
as International Cooperation. The three indicators addressing 
environmental issues all recognize the negative effects of eco-
nomic activity on the region. As such, the Environmental pro-
tection indicator speaks to the importance of protected areas and 
biodiversity. The Pollution indicator looks toward international 
agreements (i.e., the MARPOL Convention and the Marine Oil 
Pollution Agreement) as mechanisms to address pollution. The 
climate change indicator does not suggest how mitigation or ad-
aptation efforts could be used. 
Indigenous rights, as part of the Human Dimension indicator, is 
one of the issues Germany’s strategy seeks to address, although 
it is the second least coded indicator. Nevertheless, in the space 
allotted to this topic, it is argued that rights should be protected 
through land claim settlements and self-determination. 
Research is one of the issues of the German Guidelines, although 
the Science and Education indicator is in a middle of our quan-
titative analysis. The indicator focuses solely on research, recog-
nizing the environment and climate change as important areas of 
research and linking research to environmental protection and 
economy. To conduct research, Germany uses different types of 
infrastructure, such as its own Arctic research base on Spitsber-
gen, run together with France, and through formal research net-
works, like IASC, and more informally through conferences. 
The Infrastructure indicator prioritizes shipping and, in part, 
speaks to safety issues. The Safety and SAR indicator is concerned 
with environmental safety, especially from shipping. As such, the 
indicator notes that the IMO is the key international structure for 
safety as it sets shipping guidelines and contributes to environ-
mental safety. The policy also recognizes that the Arctic Council’s 
SAR Agreement can help with rescue efforts, but also recognizes 
that more needs to be done.
Considering the above and the quantitative analysis, it seems, 
according to the 2013 Arctic Policy, that Germany’s main pri-
orities are environmental protection (when accounting for 
the three indicators on the environment, pollution, and cli-
mate change), international cooperation, maritime governance 
(through the governance and safety indicators), and economy. 
Italy
Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic—National Guidelines 
was adopted in 2015 by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC). It has 21 pages 
including maps and pictures. The headings of the chapters of 
the version analyzed (updated in May 2016) are: 1. Italy in the 
Arctic: A Centenary History, 2. Italy in the Arctic: The Political 
Dimension, 3. Environmental and Human Dimension, 4. The 
Scientific Dimension, and 5. Economic Dimension (Italy MFA-
IC 2015, 2, 3, 7, 10, 15)
As there are no explicit priorities, four headings of these head-
ings can be interpreted as priorities: 1) Political Dimension; 2) 
Environmental and Human Dimension; 3) Scientific Dimen-
sion; and 4) Economic Dimension.
Italy was accepted as a permanent observer of the Arctic Council 
at the Kiruna Ministerial in May 2013 (Arctic Council 2015b).
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator reflects 
on Italy’s Arctic expeditions, and in particular the successful 
1926 airship expedition to the North Pole by Umberto Nobile, 
Roald Amundsen, and Lincoln Ellsworth. The Guidelines also 
mentions the establishment of an Italian scientific base, Dirigi-
bile Italia, in Svalbard (2015, 2, 11).
The Arctic is described, inter alia, as a “complicated” and “vul-
nerable” region with a “peculiar and sensitive ecosystem,” which 
“each Arctic stakeholder has an interest in respecting” (2015, 
16). Moreover, “many Arctic territories are highly fragile due to 
their natural isolation and vulnerability” (2015,10). 
Figure 20 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States
207
Figure 20. Italy 2015
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Italian national Guidelines explicitly refer to the Human 
Dimension indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the total coded 
quotes of the Italian Arctic Strategy (see Figure 20) as follows: 
by making the human dimension of primary relevance, Italy 
“considers it to be extremely important to raise awareness on 
such issues... through a growing, internationally coordinated ef-
fort, working in concert with the Arctic States” (2015, 4). This 
indicator includes two main aspects: “urban areas” and “Indig-
enous peoples.” Given the extreme features and vulnerability of 
the Arctic “urban development has a role of remarkable impor-
tance” (2015, 10). Among the Arctic states, Sweden is said in 
the Guidelines to promote “a holistic approach to sustainable 
urban development, involving not only architectural and urban 
design, but also the careful planning of interactions among all 
relevant subsystems… planning [which] ensures cities’ effec-
tiveness and sustainability, thus improving the quality of life of 
citizens” (2015, 10). Correspondingly, Indigenous people are 
said to be “the real experts in the Arctic environment, with their 
unique, millennial heritage of traditions and culture, which 
should be protected and treasured by all companies operating 
in the region” (2015, 16). 
The Governance indicator accounts for 6 % of the total coded 
quotes (see Figure 20). According to this indicator “the recog-
nized national jurisdictions of the Arctic States are completed 
and integrated by customary international sea law and by a num-
ber of Treaties…. [of which] the most important is the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)” (2015, 
4). Italy’s firm confidence in the existing Arctic and international 
governing structures is also shown. The Arctic Council, with its 
wide structure of members, permanent participants, observers, 
and working groups, is considered to be “the main debate forum 
for the Arctic, where the different features and issues of this com-
plicated region and all viable forms of cooperation are discussed” 
(2015, 3). Concerning governing structures for the Arctic, the 
Guidelines mention that Italy is one of the original signatories 
to the Svalbard Treaty. Nothing explicit about self-determination 
of Indigenous peoples is noted. International legal instruments 
are mentioned, such as the Convention on Biological Diversi-
ty (CBD), the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution (CLRTAP), the International Convention for the Pre-
vention of Pollution from Ships (Marpol 73/78), and UNCLOS. 
However, as changes in the Arctic region are global and mainly 
result from impacts from lower latitudes, the Guidelines calls for 
“a global approach, implying new responsibilities not only for 
the Arctic States but for the whole international community… 
[dealing] with the new challenges arising, from global warming 
to the opening of Polar navigation routes” (p.4). In this context, 
the Italian Guidelines also notes “the principles and goals of the 
European Union environmental policy…[and] all relevant inter-
national obligations, with special reference to sustainable devel-
opment” (2015, 19).
As indicated by the previous indicator, the Italian Arctic Guide-
lines reflect international cooperation and agreements. Further-
more, the International Treaties and International Coopera-
tion indicator, which accounts for 14 % of the total coded quotes 
of the strategy (see Figure 20), highlights first, the role of the 
Arctic Council, where Italy “provides an active contribution in 
different fields of research thanks to the considerable expertise of 
its scientific community” (2015, 5); and second, UNCLOS as the 
most important body for “responsible management of the Arctic 
Ocean” (2015, 4). 
Among the international agreements and relevant operational 
tools for problem solving in environmental protection, the Ital-
ian Guidelines notes the Marpol Convention “on the prevention 
of pollution from ships… as the key international instrument 
for its parties, including Italy,” and the EU Directive 2013/30 on 
offshore safety for establishing “strict rules for the construction 
and management of extraction facilities as well as technical and 
financial requirements for the granting of licenses to oil and gas 
operators” (2015, 8). A short list of other “main international in-
struments dealing directly or indirectly with atmospheric pol-
lution and climate change” (2015, 8) follows, such as the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Conven-
tion on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP). In 
addition to the above-mentioned international agreements, the 
Guidelines also mentions the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Urban Development (HABITAT 
III), and the global negotiation process in the framework of the 
Paris Climate Agreement.
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 12 % of 
the total coded quotes of the Italian Guidelines (see Figure 20). 
Italian institutions are “ready to put their expertise at Arctic 
States’ disposal, by cooperating in the framework of the Arctic 
Council to ensure that the highest standards of safety and envi-
ronmental protection are applied to exploration and extraction 
of oil and gas in the Arctic” (2015, 6). Here the focus is “on cru-
cial Arctic environmental issues,” including, among other things, 
protection of biodiversity, prevention of air pollution, reversal of 
climate change, marine conservation, environmental risks posed 
by transport by sea, tourism, mining (2015, 7). Of special con-
cern is the protection of the region’s biodiversity, which is de-
fined as “one of the most vulnerable of our planet” (2015, 9).
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In the context of economic activity and the environment, the 
Arctic is also said to represent “a huge technology and man-
agement challenge for all companies…. [offering] oppor-
tunities to explore new mineral resources… [however] its 
environmentally sensitive and remote areas require excep-
tional safety measures” (2015, 18). Moreover, “cooperation 
and exchange of experiences with Arctic States can and must 
also offer development opportunities for Italy in some fields, 
such as sustainable urban environment, which is one of the 
priorities of the Italian Ministry of Environment” (2015, 7). 
Under the subtitle “Air pollution and climate change” the Ital-
ian Guidelines refers to the Pollution indicator, which accounts 
for 9 % of the total coded quotes of the strategy (see Figure 20, 
p. 207). The Guidelines recognizes [the challenges of] Short 
Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs), such as methane, tropospheric 
ozone, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and black carbon, as well as, 
at international level, ship emissions, and “environmental risks 
posed by transport by sea, tourism, mining and harbour opera-
tions” (2015, 7) which are also polluting the Arctic. 
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 10 % of the 
total coded quotes of the Italian Arctic Strategy (see Figure 20, 
p. 207), reflects that “Italian presence in the Arctic is motivated 
also by global warming, which has severe repercussions on the 
region, and the new, urgent challenges it poses” (2015, 3). The ex-
plicitly mentioned reason for this is that “Italy bears a number of 
similarities with the Arctic… especially the Alps” (2015, 7) given 
that “the Italian mountain areas and the Arctic region both suffer 
from geographical, social and technological isolation” (2015, 7). 
The Guidelines states that “Italy is deeply committed to studying 
climate change through the work of its research agencies” (2015, 
16), and lists “the priorities and actions set out by the scientific 
community and by international scientific (ICSU, IASC, EPB) 
and political (Arctic Council, European Commission) coordi-
nating bodies to deal with climate change” (2015, 12). One of 
Italy’s aims is to increase “the spatial and temporal extent of the 
Arctic observation system” and promote “the study and knowl-
edge” of the complexities “of the Arctic system” (2015, 12). The 
Guidelines states that the main international agreements and 
mechanisms, mentioned above, such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), also deal with cli-
mate change. 
Interestingly, an Italian company, Eni is explicitly noted, even 
highlighted, in the Guidelines as having “extraction programs 
in Norway and Russia and implementing some remarkable 
projects aimed at improving safety conditions of transport by 
sea (against oil spills), mitigating its environmental impact and 
safeguarding Indigenous communities in a rapidly changing 
ecosystem hit by climate change” (2015, 3). Further, the Guide-
lines states that “Eni acknowledges the scientific evidence on 
climate change as exposed in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report 
(AR5), which defines [as]‘extremely likely’ the link between cli-
mate change and human activities” (2015, 17).
The Security indicator, accounting for 1 % of the total coded 
quotes of the strategy (see Figure 20, p. 207), is brief. It notes, 
first, that large areas in the Arctic “are subject to national sover-
eignty. Italy fully respects these sovereign rights” (2015, 4); and, 
second, that “the Arctic Council today goes beyond its original 
concept of an inter-Arctic consultation forum. It has become 
a vehicle for regional stability, whose increasing relevance is 
proved not least by the growing number of its Observer coun-
tries—including some European Union Member States and var-
ious Asian countries” (2015, 3–4). 
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 6 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the Guidelines (see Figure 20, p. 207). Although this 
indicator does not explicitly note SAR, it recognizes growing 
sea trade in Northern waters as a “major challenge as it entails a 
growing risk of accidents and environmental damage connected 
to possible oil spills.” In this connection, Italy relies the 2013 
EU Directive no. 30/2013/EU “on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations” with “proposals aimed at consolidating safety stan-
dards” (2015, 5). The EU Directive states that “the serious envi-
ronmental concerns relating to the Arctic waters require special 
attention to ensure the environmental protection of the Arctic 
in relation to any offshore oil and gas operation, including ex-
ploration, taking into account the risk of major accidents and 
the need for effective response” (2015, 6), especially given the 
growing volumes of trade through Northern sea routes. More-
over, the company Eni has “remarkable projects aimed at im-
proving safety conditions of transport by sea (against oil spills), 
mitigating its environmental impact and safeguarding Indige-
nous communities in a rapidly changing ecosystem” (2015, 3). 
The Economy indicator, accounting for 12 % of the total coded 
quotes of the Guidelines (see Figure 20, p. 207) shows Italian 
interests in energy and sustainable use of resources. For exam-
ple, “urban sustainable development is one of Italian national 
priorities” (2015, 10) as, too, is support for “an eco-sustainable 
management of Arctic fisheries stocks,” which should be taken 
into account and applied by commercial fishing” (2015, 16). 
Among the explicitly noted economic actors are “companies 
with offshore activities in the Arctic (Canada, Greenland, Ice-
land, Norway, Faroe Islands)” (2015, 11), and in particular the 
Italian company Eni (covering two pages). “Eni’s approach to 
Arctic activities” is said to be based on key principles, such as 
“activities… to be performed in ice-free offshore areas only and 
assisted by satellite iceberg control and remote monitoring of all 
drilling activity,” and “operations… to be conducted only during 
periods of the year when repercussions on the marine environ-
ment (in particular, on mammals) are minimal”… “local inhab-
itants have to be involved and informed” (2015, 18). 
The Tourism indicator only accounts for 2 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the Guidelines (see Figure 20, p. 207) being noted 
twice: first, with respect to activities which pose environmen-
tal risks for the Arctic ecosystem; and second, the comparison 
between the Arctic and the Alps as having particularly fragile 
ecosystems (2015, 7).
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The Infrastructure indicator is also brief and accounts for 3 % 
of the Guidelines’ total coded quotes (see Figure 20, p. 207). 
Investments in renewable energy and development of “green” 
products are noted, although the Guidelines mainly focuses 
on innovations, such as promoting “innovative organizational 
structures in scarcely populated areas” (p. 10). Furthermore, it 
mentions Italy’s capacity “to combine advanced technology and 
the preservation of its environmental and cultural heritage [as] 
its added value to economic growth and sustainable develop-
ment in the Arctic” (2015, 16).
The Science and Education indicator is clearly priority num-
ber one of the Italian Arctic Guidelines, accounting for 19 % of 
the total coded quotes (see Figure 20, p. 207). Expeditions to the 
North Pole are noted as “the first Italian scientific missions in the 
Arctic region” (2015, 2), and it is easy to understand why this 
indicator is the most extensive of the whole Arctic strategy of 
Italy. Under “Environmental and Human Dimension” the Guide-
lines highlight that “a major role is to be played by scientific and 
technological research, in which Italy excels” (2015, 7). Indeed, 
Italy’s contribution to Arctic research is rich and includes sever-
al elements and activities, such as the Svalbard scientific station 
(Dirigibile Italia), opened in 1997 in Ny-Ålesund, for multidisci-
plinary research; and also OGS Explora as an “Ocean-going Mul-
tipurpose Research Vessel classified as ice class IB” (2015, 12) 
for collecting data in the Arctic waters. Here Ny-Ålesund, as an 
international hub for Arctic research, is identified as playing an 
important role by enabling and enhancing “the study of the com-
plex interconnections between biological phenomena and physi-
cal, chemical, dynamical and radiation processes” (2015, 11).
The Guidelines includes two pages of information about how the 
Italian scientific community, supported by the national research 
agencies (CNR, ENEA, INGV, OGS) and in line with interna-
tional efforts, will reinforce Italian presence in the Arctic by: 
A) Promoting Italian participation in Arctic research giving 
prominence to national scientific and technological excellence 
B) Expanding the Italian presence in the pan-Arctic observa-
tion system, mainly through bilateral agreements 
C) Reinforcing internationalization
D) Participating in the action to strengthen European Arctic in-
frastructures promoted by the European Commission, Arc-
tic countries and also Mediterranean countries like France 
E) Creating synergies between the activities of Italian research 
agencies in the Arctic and PNRA (National Antarctic Re-
search Programme) activities 
F) Promoting and strengthening the collaboration among na-
tional actors (Agencies, Universities), including the first 
Italian Master’s course dedicated to Arctic issues offered by 
MFAIC and Ministry of the Environment and Protection of 
Land and Sea (2015, 6) 
G) Promoting activities of technological innovation and exper-
imentation (2015, 13–15).
Finally, the Guidelines provides a concrete example of imple-
menting the interplay between science, politics and business, 
the recently reactivated Tavolo Artico (Arctic Table), as “an in-
formal, open-ended consultation group on the Arctic,” includ-
ing “members from academic, scientific and business commu-
nities” (2015, 6). 
The Implementation indicator is not explicitly mentioned in 
the strategy document.
To sum up 
The Science and Education indicator is the most substantial 
in the Italian Arctic Guidelines. In particular, the Guidelines 
strongly addresses how the Italian scientific community, “sup-
ported by the national research agencies… and in line with… 
international efforts,” is committed to the overall national goal 
“to reinforce Italian presence in the Arctic” (2015, 13). The list 
is long and impressive. 
Related to and supporting this, the International Cooperation 
indicator takes up a big share of the Guidelines, emphasizing the 
importance of both international cooperation in general and in-
ternational agreements. It also highlights the role of the Arctic 
Council and of UNCLOS, as the most important bodies for the 
management of the Arctic Ocean.
Further, closely related the two above-mentioned indicators, the 
Guidelines focuses on Arctic environmental issues, including 
protection of biodiversity, prevention of air pollution, reversal 
of climate change, marine conservation, environmental risks 
posed by transport by sea, tourism, and mining. Of special con-
cern is biodiversity of the Arctic ecosystem. If taken together, 
the three indicators, Environmental protection, Pollution, and 
Climate change, could easily be interpreted as another priority, 
a dominant one, of the strategy.
Based on our quantitative measuring the Economy indicator is 
almost equal to that of Environmental protection (for example, 
the ‘Eni and the Arctic’ subchapter alone covers two pages). In-
terestingly enough, the Economy indicator would become even 
more substantial, if some of Eni’s remarkable projects “aimed 
at improving safety conditions of transport by sea (against oil 
spills), mitigating its environmental impact and safeguarding 
Indigenous communities in a rapidly changing ecosystem hit by 
climate change” (2015, 3), were to be included as part of eco-
nomic and commercial activities in the Arctic. Here we face the 
same difficulty in measuring, as in the case of France. 
  
The explicit mention of the Tavolo Artico as an informal group 
on Arctic issues is interesting, given the important role of the 
science–politics–business interplay in Arctic research and 
geopolitics, and as an important precondition for high geopo-
litical stability. 
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Finally, when comparing the de facto priorities to our coding 
and analysis, it can be concluded that Italy does, indeed, have 
a presence in the Arctic first of all by having the scientific and 
economic dimensions as the focus, andincluding the political 
dimension via international cooperation, and also on the envi-
ronmental dimension. The human dimension is, however, less 
of a focus, though Italy does give this dimension more atten-
tion than most of the observers.
Japan
Japan’s Arctic Policy was adopted and announced by the Head-
quarters for Ocean Policy of the Government of Japan in Octo-
ber 2015. It was launched at the same time at the Arctic Circle 
Assembly in Reykjavik, Iceland.
Japan’s brief (11-page) policy document is structured around 
three main chapters: I) Background and Purpose of Basic Pol-
icy; II) Need to Address Arctic Issues, and III) Specific Initia-
tives. The “Need to Address Arctic Issues” chapter includes the 
following major subchapters as the main themes, if not prior-
ities of the policy: i) Global Environmental Issues, ii) Indig-
enous Peoples of the Arctic, iii) Science and Technology, iv) 
Ensuring the Rule of Law and Promoting International Coop-
eration, v) Arctic Sea Route, Natural Resources Development, 
and National Security (Japan The Headquarters for Ocean Pol-
icy 2015, i). 
As discussed in its Policy, Japan has previously shown interest 
in the Arctic region, and in particular the Arctic Ocean and 
Northern sea routes (e.g., the International Northern Sea Route 
Project, INSROP), scientific research (the first non-Arctic state 
to join the IASC), and Russian Far East. The strategic and com-
prehensive focus areas of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, ad-
opted by the Japanese Cabinet in 2013 are: 
1) observation of, and research on, the Arctic from a global 
perspective 
2) international cooperation on the Arctic 
3) examination of the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Route” (2015, 2) 
The aim of Japan’s Arctic Policy “is… to define policy for more 
specific measures (2015, 2) from the standpoint of a ‘Proactive 
Contribution to Peace.’” It is based on principles such as inter-
national cooperation, national security, environment, trans-
portation, science and technology, and “a multidisciplinary 
perspective with contributions from industry, academia, and 
the government... [with the aim of making] Japan an important 
player that contributes to the international community through 
its action to Arctic issues” (2015, 2).18 
18 Based on this background, the Policy notes that “Japan will: Make full use of Japan’s strength in science and technology from a global viewpoint; Give full consid-
eration to the Arctic environment and ecosystem, which is fragile, with a lower ability to recover; Ensure the rule of law, and promote international cooperation 
in a peaceful and orderly manner; Respect the right of Indigenous peoples to continuity in their traditional economic and social foundations; Pay full attention 
to security developments in the Arctic; Aim for economic and social compatibility with climate and environmental changes; and Seek possible economic chances 
for the use of the Arctic Sea Route and for the development of resource by implementing the following initiatives” (2015, 2).
The substantial subchapters are interpreted as the priorities, 
though there are quite a few of them: 1) Global Environmen-
tal Issues; 2) Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic; 3) Science and 
Technology; 4) Ensuring the Rule of Law and Promoting In-
ternational Cooperation; 5) Arctic Sea Route; 6) Natural Re-
sources Development; and 7) National Security (2015, i). 
Japan gained Observer status of the Arctic Council Japan at 
the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in Sweden in May 2013 (Arctic 
Council 2015b).
The (Re)mapping and (re)defining the Arctic indicator is brief, 
defining the Arctic as a “home to about four million people, in-
cluding Indigenous peoples” (2015, 3).
Figure 21 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Figure 21. Japan 2015
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 4 % of the total 
coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21). It states that 
“Indigenous peoples are easily affected by environmental change 
and expanded economic activity in the Arctic” (2015, 3) and that 
there is thus a need to “respect the right of Indigenous peoples 
to continuity in their traditional economic and social founda-
tions” (2015, 2). Here the Policy requires Japan to “examine how 
[it] can contribute to achieve sustainable development of which 
Indigenous peoples can see benefits while protecting the founda-
tions of traditional cultures and lifestyles” (2015, 3).
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The Governance indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the total 
coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210), re-
flects Japan’s promise to “ensure the rule of law, and promote 
international cooperation in a peaceful and orderly manner,” 
and to respect the rights of Indigenous peoples, as mentioned 
earlier (2015, 2). Discussions on this indicator are twofold. First, 
the Arctic Ocean, which, like other oceans, is “subject to inter-
national laws, including the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.… Freedom of navigation and other principles 
of international law [in the Arctic Ocean] must be respected” 
(2015, 5). Concerning living marine resources, the Policy states 
that Japan will “participate actively in discussions with coastal 
and other states toward the formulation of rules for preserva-
tion and management of fishery resources in high seas of the 
Arctic Ocean toward sustainable use on a scientific foundation” 
(2015, 8). Second, regarding the Arctic Council: “Japan will 
further strengthen its contributions to the work of the coun-
cil… [and] also examine further contributions that can be made 
through policy dialogues with the AC chair, member states, and 
others” (2015, 8). The Policy also notes that it is “important for 
Japan [also] to participate actively in international forums other 
than the AC, and to initiate constructive discussions based on 
its scientific knowledge when necessary” (2015, 5).
 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator accounts for 22 % of the total coded quotes of Japan’s 
Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). One of the three strategic 
and comprehensive focuses of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy of 
the Japanese Government is international cooperation, and this 
is also one of the three specific initiatives of the Arctic policy. 
It is thus no wonder that this indicator is one of the most dom-
inant overall of the Policy. The Policy notes that Japan’s Arctic 
policy has been established “from the standpoint of a ‘Proactive 
Contribution to Peace’ based, among other things, on principles 
of international cooperation” (2015, 2). Indeed, the term ‘inter-
national community’ is explicitly mentioned a few times, as is 
the fact that “Japan is an important player [contributing] to the 
international community through its action [on] Arctic issues” 
(2015, 2). It is also noted that Japan should participate active-
ly “in the international debates regarding the drafting of new 
rules” (2015, 6) and respond “to global issues regarding the Arc-
tic and formulation process of international rules for the Arctic” 
(2015, 8); moreover, it should become involved “in discussions 
with coastal and other states toward the formulation of rules 
for preservation and management of fishery resources in high 
seas of the Arctic Ocean toward sustainable use on a scientific 
foundation” (2015, 8). Concerning research and development, 
the Policy proposes to “establish research and observation sta-
tions in the United States, Russia, and other Arctic states, and 
promote closer international cooperation through observations 
in the Arctic and joint research projects” (2015, 7).
Other international agreements and forums identified in the 
Policy, in addition to the Arctic Council and the Arctic Eco-
nomic Council, are the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), which has developed the ‘Polar Code,’ as well as treaties 
such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), International Convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Sea-
farers (STCW) (2015, 8), and the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.
The Japanese Arctic Policy has a global approach. It correctly 
reminds us that “Japan has played a leading role in formulating 
the Kyoto Protocol, the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, and other 
agreements through which the international community has 
responded to global environmental problems such as global 
warming and the loss of biodiversity” (2015, 3). In the Arctic, 
Japan is thus required to “make the best use of its strengths, 
engage in active international cooperation, and enhance col-
laboration between stakeholders in comprehensive, cross-disci-
plinary research” (2015, 4).
The Environmental Protection indicator, accounting for 7 % of 
the total coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 
210), seems not to have the same priority in the Policy as climate 
change. The Arctic is recognized as being a vulnerable environ-
ment with fragile ecosystems and low resilience, and sensitive to 
global warming. Indigenous peoples are recognized as being “eas-
ily affected by environmental change and expanded economic ac-
tivity in the Arctic” (2015, 3). Linking the Environmental Protec-
tion indicator with global environmental issues, the Policy notes 
that “changes in the Arctic and their influence on the Earth as a 
whole must be understood with a comprehensive and wide-rang-
ing perspective, considering the climate, material cycles, biodi-
versity, and the effects of human activities” (2015, 4).
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210), identi-
fies greenhouse gases as pollutants. It also briefly pinpoints that 
“development and expanded economic activity will result in 
pollution of the air and water, such as leaking and discharge of 
pollutants from ships into the Arctic Ocean” (2015, 3) and that 
this is problematic. 
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 10 % of the total 
coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). The 
Policy opens with the statement that “the Arctic environment is 
responding very sensitively to global warming… Over the past 
35 years, the Arctic sea ice extent in the summer has declined 
by nearly two-thirds” (2015, 1). It goes on to express concerns 
that “environmental changes in the Arctic will accelerate global 
warming, lead to global sea-level rise, increase the frequency 
of extreme weather events, and adversely affect ecosystems,” re-
calling the “risk that rapid change in the Arctic environment 
will have a drastic and irreversible impact on the foundations 
of the lives of Indigenous peoples and others who live in such 
harsh environment” (2015, 1). Furthermore, the Policy seems to 
focus more on consequences than solutions, warning that, “if ef-
fective mitigation measures are not taken, and if global warming 
continues to accelerate at the maximum pace, a nearly ice-free 
Arctic Ocean in the summer by the mid-century is likely” (2015, 
1). Furthermore, “the mechanisms of environmental change in 
the Arctic are still not sufficiently understood… the impact of 
global warming is amplified to a greater extent in the Arctic 
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than in any other regions on the Earth” (2015, 1). Finally, Japan, 
having played a leading role in the Kyoto Protocol and other 
agreements dealing with global warming has already proposed 
“advanced efforts in both mitigation and adaptation” (2015, 3). 
  
The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210), notes that one 
of the aims of Japanese Arctic policy is to “pay full attention 
to security developments in the Arctic” (2015, 2). The Policy 
points out that “some Arctic states, with a view toward secur-
ing their national interests and protecting their territories, have 
become active in the area of national defense. Moves toward ex-
panding military presence may have an impact on the interna-
tional security environment.” (2015,1). The Policy further warns 
that “factors such as opening of new shipping routes and the 
development of natural resources may become a cause for new 
friction among states.” These factors may thus become factors 
that “change the international security environment, not only in 
the Arctic but for the surrounding states including Japan.” The 
Policy further advises that close attention be paid “to moves by 
the states concerned and also to promote cooperation with the 
Arctic and other states” (2015, 6). 
The Policy document also explicitly identifies that “land areas 
in the Arctic are under the sovereign authority of the states in 
the region… [and that a] large part of the Arctic Ocean con-
sists of the territorial waters of the coastal states… with sov-
ereignty or sovereign rights to exclusive economic zones 
(EEZ) and continental shelves” (2015, 1). It is thus important 
“to prevent moves to strengthen military presence in the re-
gion from leading to tension and confrontations” (2015, 6). 
The Safety and SAR indicator accounts for 5 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). Regarding “the 
use of ports and other infrastructure along the [sea] route, and 
the status of services and regulations of coastal states,” the Jap-
anese Policy warns that the Arctic Sea Route is not ready yet 
for safe and reliable use” (2015, 6). It recommends that “Japan 
should participate actively in the international debates regard-
ing the drafting of new rules… [on] the effect of [increasing] 
shipping on the marine environment and on securing the safety 
of navigation” (2015, 6). SAR is not explicitly mentioned. The 
‘Polar Code,’ developed by the IMO, is emphasized as “a bind-
ing international framework to specify standards for maritime 
safety in polar seas, protection of the marine environment, and 
the manning, certification, and training of sea farers” (2015, 8). 
The Economy indicator accounts for 10 % of the total coded 
quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). Given 
the Arctic’s “vulnerability to environmental changes” (2015, 2) 
Japan needs to examine how to contribute to the achievement 
of sustainable development that will benefit Indigenous peoples 
“while protecting the foundations of traditional cultures and 
lifestyles” (2015, 3). Japan has an advantage in the field of sus-
tainable development through its foresight and through policy 
which is… “based on science and technology” (2015, 2). Japan’s 
aim is “to play a leading role for sustainable development in the 
Arctic in the international community (2015, 2).
With respect to natural resource development, the Policy ex-
plicitly identifies mineral resources, which in the extreme cold 
and sea ice of the Arctic region “should be addressed steadily 
over the mid and long term [bearing in mind] continued di-
versification of resources supplies…progress in resources devel-
opment technology in sea ice regions, cooperative relationships 
with coastal states, and factors such as …private sector [needs]” 
(2015, 6) It also identifies marine living resources, in particu-
lar, unexploited marine living resources, the development of 
which needs to be promoted “through due cooperation with 
the coastal states and [in order to]secure the need for food se-
curity in balanced manner while ensuring the sustainability of 
the resources based on scientific evidences” (2015, 6). Finally, 
the Policy promises to “continue financial support for Green-
land Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. which is participating in 
an exploration project in an ocean area northeast of Greenland, 
via the Japan Oil, Gas, and Metals National Corporation (JOG-
MEC)” (2015, 9).
The Tourism indicator is not explicitly mentioned in Japan’s 
Arctic Policy.
The Infrastructure indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded 
quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). Not sur-
prisingly, this indicator explicitly discusses the Arctic Sea Route, 
which, if sea ice on the Arctic Ocean decreases will “be estab-
lished along the coasts of Russia and neighboring states… a voy-
age between Asia and Europe will [then ]become about 40 % 
shorter than a voyage via the Suez Canal” (2015, 6). The feasi-
bility of the Arctic Sea Route is identified as attracting mount-
ing interest from the international community. The Arctic Sea 
Route, in terms of sustainable use, is also related to a specific 
Japanese initiative to identify its different (natural, technical, 
systemic, economic) challenges, and to promote the “prepara-
tion of an environment for its utilization by Japanese shipping 
companies and others, by constructing systems to support mar-
itime navigation such as a system to predict sea ice distribution 
and one to forecast weather” (2015, 9).
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 23 % of the 
total coded quotes of Japan’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 21, p. 210). 
This is another dominant indicator of the Japanese Arctic poli-
cy, parallel to International Treaties and Cooperation. The Poli-
cy notes clearly that in 1991 “Japan became the first non-Arctic 
state to establish an observation station in the Arctic… [and] 
the first non-Arctic state to join the International Arctic Sci-
ence Committee (IASC)” (2015, 3–4). In 2015 “the Arctic Sci-
ence Summit Week (ASSW), the most important international 
conference on Arctic research, was held in Japan” (for the first 
time in Asia) (2015, 4). Outcomes from these activities are also 
noted, for example, “observation data and scientific knowledge 
from Japan have made major contributions to understanding 
the environmental changes in the Arctic… Japan has conducted 
satellite, ocean, and land observations and simulations at a high 
level, and has received a high evaluation from the international 
scientific community” (2015, 4). The Policy does, however, state 
that “scientific understanding of the Arctic is still inadequate” 
(2015, 4). Another aim of Japanese activities in the Arctic, and 
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scientific cooperation with other Arctic actors, is that “the Arc-
tic environment is responding very sensitively to global warm-
ing, and Arctic Ocean sea-ice is decreasing at a pace exceeding 
scientific predictions” (2015, 1).
The list of specific initiatives, under the Research and Devel-
opment title, is long: from “promotion of Arctic research to 
contribute to policy-making and problem-solving” to the “es-
tablishment of research a network” (2015, 7). Of major note 
is the Japanese Arctic research vessel being used as a “new in-
ternational Arctic research platform, with functions to enable 
participation in international Arctic observation projects using 
equipment such as autonomous underwater vehicles” (2015, 7). 
Among other interesting initiatives are: i) to “conduct work to 
strengthen observations using advanced satellites, observatory 
stations, and research vessels,” which are one of the country’s 
strengths, in order to “acquire and analyze scientific data to fur-
ther clarify the mechanisms of changes in the Arctic environ-
ment”; and ii) to establish research and observation stations in 
the United States, Russia, and other Arctic states, and promote 
closer international cooperation through observations in the 
Arctic” (2015, 7).
Except for three lists of specific initiatives, there is nothing ex-
plicitly mentioned about Implementation.
To sum up 
The Japanese Arctic Policy document includes two domi-
nant indicators: i) science and education and ii) international 
cooperation. 
Science and technology relates particularly to research and de-
velopment within the international science community. The 
theme is well represented among specific initiatives, including 
promotion of Arctic research, the contribution to policymaking 
and problem-solving, and concrete proposals, such as the new 
Arctic research vessel. Supporting this, international, world-
wide cooperation is one of the strategic and comprehensive fo-
cuses of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. The Policy identifies 
and highlights the Polar Code as the most important interna-
tional means to increase maritime safety. The Environmental 
protection indicator explicitly notes sustainable use of resources 
and growing concerns due to global warming. The list of specif-
ic initiatives under sustainable use mainly concerns economic 
activities, the Arctic Sea Route, and (mineral and marine living) 
resources. Correspondingly, whaling is not explicitly noted with 
respect to marine living resources, although it is relevant, prob-
ably because it is too sensitive an issue for Japan, which resigned 
from the IWC in 2019. 
Interestingly, although the Arctic is identified as being a home 
to Indigenous peoples, the Ainu people, a Japanese northern 
Indigenous people, living in the northernmost part of Japan, 
are not explicitly noted. Discussion by the Japanese of their 
own experiences in working with Indigenous peoples could 
have contributed substantively to the Human dimension and 
Indigenous peoples. 
Finally, comparing the results of the coding and analysis to 
the de facto priorities, it can be concluded that Science and 
Technology, Promoting International Cooperation, Nat-
ural Resources Development, and the Arctic Sea Route 
(economy), and Global Environmental Issues, including cli-
mate change, are much in focus. There is less of a focus on 
Indigenous Peoples, Governance, and National security. 
The Netherlands
The Netherlands released its first strategy on the Arctic, in 
Dutch, in 2009 with the release of the Poolpositie-NL: Nieuw 
Nederlands Polair Programma (NNPP) 2010–2014 by the Neth-
erlands Organisation for Scientific Research (The Netherlands 
NWO 2009). This strategy was evaluated through the Evalu-
ation of the (New) Netherlands Polar Programme 2009–2014 
(NWO 2014b). During this time frame, The Netherlands and 
the Polar Regions, 2011–2015 policy framework was released, 
including a five-page English summary (see: The Netherlands 
NWO 2011). The current Dutch strategy was released in 2014 
and is entitled Pole Position - NL 2.0: Strategy for the Netherlands 
Polar Programme 2016-2020, consisting of 33 pages including 
appendices, tables, and photos, and addressing both the Arctic 
and Antarctic. Many of the quotes in the analysis are thus ap-
plicable to both poles, and Arctic specific issues are identified 
where possible. 
The new strategy is “an updated continuation of the Master 
Plan,” and while focusing on research “as one of the building 
blocks, this Strategy Plan will contribute to the total polar policy 
of the Dutch government” (The Netherlands NWO 2014a, 5). 
The current 2.0 Strategy Plan is analyzed here and outlines some 
clear priorities. 
“The Strategy Plan creates a framework for Dutch research in 
two important and rapidly changing areas on earth. It presents 
new lines for future polar research and continues on points that 
merit continuation. Continuously amassing knowledge about 
the polar regions and the changes occurring there is necessary 
in order to deal properly with the changing conditions and to 
ensure that the Netherlands continues to play a role in interna-
tional (polar) issues” (2014a, 5). 
“In addition to the national economic priority areas policy, the 
NWO also strives for similar alignment of Dutch polar research 
with international polar research agendas of the European Polar 
Board (EPB), the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
(SCAR), the Arctic Council (AC) and the International Arctic 
Science Committee (IASC)” (2014a, 7). Finally, “the ambition 
of this strategy plan is the continuation of a long-term basis of 
financing for the Netherlands Polar Programme” (2014a, 7). 
Clearly, this strategy is focused on the Netherland’s contribu-
tions to polar research. 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro-
vides insights into how the region is discussed by the Nether-
lands. The Strategy Plan is different from others in that it fo-
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cuses on both polar regions, the Arctic and Antarctic. Thus, the 
document often uses the term “polar” when speaking more gen-
erally and then differentiates between the Arctic and Antarctic, 
as needed. 
In terms of defining the Arctic, the Strategy Plan primarily does 
so in the context of where the Netherlands has research inter-
ests. For example, the document states that “the precondition 
that the NPP’s activities were preferably to be concentrated in 
the geographic areas of the Antarctic Peninsula in the south and 
on Spitsbergen and Greenland in the north was formulated in 
the NPP. This does not exclude research in other areas” (2014a, 
13). The Strategy Plan further explains that “the choice of Spits-
bergen, and Ny-Ålesund in particular, is based on the presence 
of the Dutch polar station there. The choice of Greenland is pri-
marily based on the importance for the Netherlands of research 
into the melting of the Greenland ice cap” (2014a, 13). At the 
same time, the Strategy Plan also remarks that “this geographic 
focus can be expanded depending on the size of the NPP bud-
get. For example, one could consider the Russian Arctic region 
as a focus area, considering existing efforts by Dutch scientists 
there and the Dutch business community’s interest in that part 
of the North polar region” (2014a, 13). 
As for the government ministries’ participation in polar affairs, 
the Strategy Plan states that “the Netherlands Polar Programme 
(NPP) is a financing programme that invests in scientific re-
search into the polar regions. It is supported financially by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Culture and Science, 
Infrastructure and the Environment, Economic Affairs and by 
the NWO” (2014a, 7). 
Figure 22 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Figure 22. The Netherlands 2014
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator is not addressed in the 
strategy. 
The Governance indicator is rather brief in the Strategy Plan 
and accounts for 13 % of the total coded quotes (see Figure 22). 
First and foremost, it addresses the need for the Netherlands 
to “be able to influence international management regimes for 
both polar regions. In order to acquire that influence, to main-
tain it and, especially, to elaborate it properly, the Dutch govern-
ment must be adequately informed about the state of affairs in 
the polar regions, the imminent changes, and solutions to pos-
sible problems. For this, conducting clearly visible and valued 
scientific research under the Dutch flag and being able to make 
results available that are relevant to policy has turned out to be 
essential” (2014a, 7). 
According to the Strategy Plan “the policy-driven framework 
is geared toward application and policy relevance. In the poli-
cy-driven framework, research must be relevant for policy es-
tablished by the participating ministries. The challenge here is 
to fit the research extensions of the various ministries’ working 
areas into a collective, future-oriented approach to the policy” 
(2014a, 11). The Strategy Plan further states that “the increasing 
human activities in the polar regions will require further inter-
national consultation, governance and regulation. Knowledge 
of the changes that the various local communities in the Arc-
tic region are undergoing (have undergone) and knowledge of 
the local political, social and legal situation is also particularly 
important for Dutch organisations and companies that wish to 
operate in the Arctic region” (2014a, 16). 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator, which accounts for 8 % of the total coded quotes (see 
Figure 22) reflects throughout the document that the Neth-
erlands supports relevant “international regulations and the 
maintainability of existing treaties and/or the need for new 
treaties,” in order to “manage the polar regions” (2014a, 9). The 
Netherlands further highlights the relevance of international 
collaboration as a prerequisite for the Dutch polar research. The 
Strategy Plan especially emphasizes scientific cooperation in the 
Arctic with Russian, Norwegian and Belgian institutions and 
scientists (2014a, 19, 24). It also refers mainly to the importance 
of “science-driven research, which should include the effective-
ness of existing law—e.g., by a study of the way in which existing 
international treaties are implemented and enforced in practice 
in national law and enforcement” (2014a, 16). The government 
also supports the scientific research as it “can be important to 
the Dutch business community and to the Dutch government” 
(2014a, 7). The Strategy Plan also highlights the relevance of the 
European Polar Board (EPB), which “is an advisory body of the 
European Science Foundation and is part of the European Polar 
Consortium.” Since 2015, the EPB has been an independent en-
tity, with its Secretariat hosted by the Netherlands Organisation 
for Scientific Research (NWO) in The Hague (2014a, 20).
The Environmental Protection indicator does not capture 
much information, accounting for 4 % of the total coded quotes 
(see Figure 22), but it does recognize the importance of the 
polar environments. Indeed, the Strategy Plan states that “the 
poles are extremely sensitive to changes in climate: they form 
the heartbeat of our climatic system” (2014a, 9). It is not there-
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fore surprising that elements of the Dutch research agenda ad-
dress environmental issues. For example, the research topic on 
sustainable exploitation notes that “the development of clear pre-
conditions for sustainable exploitation and conservation of biodi-
versity and environmental quality are important in this” (2014a, 
15). Additionally, the research topic on polar ecosystems “the 
focus of policy-driven research includes the impact of changes 
in polar regions on migratory birds” and “protecting biodiver-
sity” (2014a, 15). There will also be policy-driven research in 
the research theme on the social, legal, and economic landscape 
addressing “the implementation of protection of biodiversity 
and wilderness values in the polar regions in treaties and permit 
systems” (2014a, 16). 
The Pollution indicator also does not capture too much infor-
mation on pollution, accounting for 2 % of the total coded quotes 
(see Figure 22, p. 214). It does, however, note that in the “ice, 
climate and rising sea level” research topic “important topics for 
science-driven research within this theme include... “studies of 
greenhouse gases, atmospheric tracers collectively referred to as 
‘air pollution ‘and ‘aerosols’” (2014a, 14,). Moreover, under the 
research topic for ‘polar ecosystems’ in this theme, the focus of 
policy-driven research includes: research into the provenance 
and behaviour of contaminating substances such as persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals that end up in the 
polar region via air and sea flows” (NWO 2014a, 15). These two 
quotes identify regional pollutants and also the Netherlands’ ap-
proach to problem solving through research. 
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 10 % of the 
total coded quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214), identifies a number of 
consequences of climate change. The Strategy Plan recognizes, 
for example, that “climate change in the polar regions has huge 
physical, ecological, social and economic consequences far be-
yond those regions” and that “what is now becoming visible in 
the polar regions in an accelerated manner is generally seen to 
be a precursor to what the Netherlands is facing in a deriva-
tive form” (2014a, 9). Indeed, “potential effects include changes 
in storm tracks, shifts in precipitation patterns, changes in the 
frequency and intensity of cold polar air flowing to lower lat-
itudes, a rise in sea level, loss of biodiversity and the resulting 
degradation of fish populations, shifting vegetation boundaries 
and diminishment of the existing agricultural acreage” (2014a, 
9). At the same time, the strategy also recognizes the econom-
ic opportunities that climate change may bring. For example, 
“the continuous retreat of Arctic sea ice gives room for shipping 
lanes from the Netherlands that may be 40 % shorter than the 
routes now in use” and “the tourist sector can expand” (2014a, 
9). Additionally, “exploration into raw materials that are present 
in the North Pole region such as oil, gas and minerals will be-
come technically and economically feasible. This also goes for 
new and shifting fishing grounds” (2014a, 9). 
The Strategy Plan does not mention plans for mitigation or 
adaptation efforts. It does, however, briefly mention the IPCC 
and AMAP (NWO 2014a, 14) and indicates that the scientific 
community would be heard. In particular, there is a research 
topic on “ice, climate and rising sea levels” which specifies that 
“the data arising from this is an important source of information 
for climate models” (2014a, 14,). Furthermore, science-driven 
research from the “social, legal and economic landscape” theme 
will address “global economic consequences from thawing in 
the polar regions” and “the effect of (climate) change on local 
inhabitants in the Arctic region” (2014a, 16). Perhaps more im-
portantly, the strategy also explains that “the results of Dutch re-
search into the polar climate system are increasingly finding an 
audience with (inter)national policymakers. See, for example, 
the Summary for Policymakers in the most recent IPCC report, 
the AMAP report about Greenland, the recommendation by the 
Terlouw Commission and the most recent report from the Ad-
visory Council on International Affairs (AIV). In “The Future of 
the Arctic Region” (September 2014)” (2014a, 14).
The Security indicator is not reflected in the strategy at all.
There is not much in the strategy regarding the Safety and SAR 
indicator, which accounts for 1 % of the total coded quotes (see 
Figure 22, p. 214). However, the Strategy Plan does recognize 
that increased economic activities could pose safety risks, and 
that risk management is needed for ecosystems and species; risk 
management, safety and social impact for local communities; 
and risk management and safety for the companies and their 
employees themselves” (2014a, 16). The Strategy Plan states that 
“these activities must be structured and performed within the 
preconditions of safety and sustainability.” (REF?)The expect-
ed increase in maritime operations in the Arctic (coastal) areas 
and in tourist activities in both polar regions will necessitate re-
search into methods and technologies for managing the risk and 
safety of such operations. 
The Economy indicator, which accounts for 13 % of the total cod-
ed quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214), identifies polar/polar-related 
economic activities. The Strategy Plan notes that “changes in the 
polar regions, primarily in the North Pole region, increase the 
economic importance for the Netherlands because of the new op-
portunities that these changes create for the Netherlands. The de-
sire to take advantage of natural resources, as well as the northern 
transport routes that will open up, make this area extremely in-
teresting to the Dutch business community” (2014a, 20). Indeed, 
“the Netherlands has a strong maritime and offshore services 
sector specialised in complex, specific systems and operations” 
(The Netherlands NWO 2014a, 16), and, of course, there are new 
opportunities foreseen for tourism (2014a, 9). 
In terms of resource utilization and energy, the climate change 
indicator notes that access to natural resources, such as oil and 
gas, will likely improve (2014a, 9). To that end, the Strategy Plan 
quotes the Shell website and notes that “developing the Arctic 
could be essential to securing energy supplies for the future, 
but it will mean balancing economic, environmental and social 
challenges” (Shell 2014a, 16). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
sustainable development or rather ‘sustainable exploitation’ is 
one of the Netherlands’ research themes, although the Strategy 
Plan does comment on “increasing global demand for natural 
resources, interest in mining activities and fisheries is increasing 
in the polar regions. New transportation routes and new op-
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portunities for polar tourism are also opening up” (2014a, 15). 
However, there is no specific mentioning oil and gas (unlike 
minerals). Regardless of industry, the northern economy will be 
of benefit to the Netherlands. Certainly, the “business commu-
nity forecasts for the coming 10 years indicate an expected gen-
eral increase in economic activity in various forms. With that, 
there is talk of rapidly developing business (on a scale of billions 
of euros) with the growing need for ‘polar expertise’ and influ-
ence in the region” (2014a, 7). Based on this, it seems that even 
though the Netherlands is not located in the Arctic, the country 
has much to offer. 
In terms of how northern economic activities are being priori-
tized, the strategy demonstrates synergies between the business 
and scientific communities. In the context of polar expertise 
and the strategy’s research areas, “scientific research can be 
important to the Dutch business community and to the Dutch 
government that (usually together with other countries) shoul-
ders responsibility concerning the permissibility and concrete 
substantiation of these developments within the frameworks 
of applicable international treaties. The topics within the NPP 
have many overlaps with a number of the economic priority 
areas” (2014a, 7): these have been identified as “Water, Energy 
and Transport” (2014a, 7). For example, under the sustainable 
exploitation research topic, “Policy-driven research within this 
theme should provide information about the capacity of and 
environmental effects on the polar regions when using natural 
resources, conducting maritime operations and using the area 
for transport.” Important topics within this theme include: 
• “Research that contributes to proper management of fish 
and marine krill populations; 
• Mining in cold regions and the associated environmental 
problems; 
• Research that contributes to knowledge of the local  
(territorial), social, legal, economic and political frame-
works under which companies operate (this topic  
overlaps with theme 4)” (2014a, 15). 
The Strategy Plan also comments that “polar research is a mo-
tor for technological development. In the near future, research 
into specific equipment and technologies and knowledge about 
safe and environmentally friendly ways of working in low tem-
peratures will be essential. Collecting data in extreme weather 
conditions and at extremely remote locations makes the design 
of specific equipment and methods necessary” (2014a, 20). 
 
The Tourism indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total 
coded quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214) recognizes that the tourist 
sector can expand. As a consequence, “the number of maritime 
operations will increase strongly through the years, along with 
the pressure to implement more permanent facilities (such as 
harbours, tourist facilities, etc.) in the polar regions.” At the 
same time, “the expected increase in maritime operations in 
the Arctic (coastal) areas and of tourist activities in both polar 
regions demands research into methods and technologies for 
managing the risk and safety of such operations.” Furthermore, 
“due to the current and predicted decrease in sea ice in po-
lar regions, in combination with the increasing global demand 
for natural resources, interest in mining activities and fisheries 
is increasing in the polar regions. New transportation routes 
and new opportunities for polar tourism are also opening up” 
(2014a, 9, 15, 16). 
There is not much in the Strategy Plan about the Infrastructure 
indicator which accounts for 2 % of the total coded quotes (see 
Figure 22, p. 214), all of which are connected to climate change. 
For example, the strategy notes that shipping times will likely be 
shorter (2014a, 9), and “as a consequence, the number of mari-
time operations will increase strongly through the years, along 
with the pressure to implement more permanent facilities (such 
as harbours, tourist facilities, etc.) in the polar regions” (2014a, 
9). The focus appears to be on maritime infrastructure. 
For the Science and Education indicator, which accounts for 
46 % of the total coded quotes (see Figure 22, p. 214), the em-
phasis is on science and not education. Regarding the Neth-
erlands science agenda, “with regard to research, this strategy 
plan combines ‘space for science’ and ‘space for policy’” (2014a, 
11). Within this context, there are four key drivers of the Neth-
erlands’ scientific agenda that address both science and poli-
cy. These are reflected in the Strategy Plan’s research themes, 
which are: “4.1. Ice, climate and rising sea levels; 4.2. Polar eco-
systems; 4.3. Sustainable exploitation; 4.4. Social, legal and eco-
nomic landscape” (2014a, 14–16). These themes cover drivers 
such as climate change, ecosystems, environmental protection, 
economic development, and the effect of these on people and 
communities. It is important to note that the Netherlands does 
not necessarily determine these areas by itself; “when formu-
lating the themes, the Grand Challenges as identified by the 
European Commission were included” and “the objectives of 
the European Polar Board, Europe’s strategic advisory body for 
scientific policy in the polar regions (EPB), the Arctic Council, 
the Antarctic Treaty and the International Arctic Science Com-
mittee (IASC) were included in the formulation of the research 
themes in this strategy plan” (2014a, 13).
One of the main functions of this research agenda is the cre-
ation of knowledge. The strategy states that “the NPP helps gen-
erate knowledge about the polar regions – knowledge that pro-
vides us insight into how our planet works and how it will react 
to the imminent changes, and knowledge that contributes to safe, 
responsible decisions with respect to the conduction of activities 
in the polar regions” (2014a, 5). There is a fifth research theme 
in addition to those mentioned above that seeks to generate 
interdisciplinary knowledge: ‘4.5. Transcending the themes’ 
whereby “connections between fields of research occur in var-
ious areas. These so-called cross-cutting issues connect the 
four themes... This interdisciplinarity within the Dutch polar 
research community can be strengthened by formulating re-
search questions that either fall within various themes or that 
connect the themes” (2014a, 17).
In addition to creating knowledge, there appear to be four oth-
er purposes served by the research. i) Research provides a bet-
ter understanding of the poles and their implications for the 
Netherlands. For instance, “knowledge about changes in the 
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polar regions and the consequences of these for the Nether-
lands remains strategically important” (2014a, 7); ii) Research 
can help with economic development. Along these lines, the 
Strategy Plan states that “the topics within the NPP have many 
overlaps with a number of the economic priority areas” (NWO 
2014a, 7) and “in the near future, research into specific equip-
ment and technologies and knowledge about safe and environ-
mentally friendly ways of working in low temperatures will be 
essential” (2014a, 20); iii) It helps support policy, as “the results 
of Dutch research into the polar climate system are increas-
ingly finding an audience with (inter)national policymakers” 
(2014a, 14). However, there can be a disconnect between re-
search and policy as “the questions that the ministries wish 
to see answered for purposes of policy support are not always 
the same questions that science itself generates: after a poli-
cy-driven call for proposals, the most important and urgent 
policy questions do not always generate the most excellent re-
search proposals. Conversely, the most excellent research pro-
posals do not always address the most important and urgent 
policy questions” (NWO 2014a, 11); iv) “this knowledge can 
also provide solutions. Changes in the polar regions —and, 
particularly, in the area around the North Pole—also provide 
opportunities for the Netherlands. Which opportunities and 
which threats arise in and due to a world of ice that is rapidly 
changing?” (NWO 2014a, 7).
The Strategy Plan mentions different types of science infra-
structure. There are research stations in the Arctic. In particu-
lar, the document notes that “since 1995, the Netherlands has 
rented a modest research facility in Ny-Ålesund. This research 
facility enables Dutch scientists to participate in international 
research activities and to use other research facilities present 
at Ny-Ålesund” (2014a, 24). The facility is, however, in need 
of renovation, and the Kings Bay Marine Laboratory cannot 
provide all the services needed. This means, however, that 
“there is now an excellent opportunity for building a new ac-
commodation in Ny-Ålesund in collaboration with AWI and 
IPEV (AWIPEV)” (2014a, 24). The Strategy Plan also recog-
nizes other infrastructure in the Arctic, such as the Svalbard 
Integrated Arctic Earth Observing System (SIOS) where “the 
Dutch research station in Ny-Ålesund can make an import-
ant contribution to this initiative” (2014a, 20). Additionally, 
the German Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeres-
forschung (AWI) “has also made research facilities available 
at the Koldewey Station on Spitsbergen” (2014a, 23) and “the 
Belgian Princess Elizabeth Base may be an interesting terres-
trial fieldwork location for Dutch scientists” (2014a, 19). The 
Strategy Plan acknowledges the importance of these other fa-
cilities and states that “the Netherlands will have to contribute 
proportionally to the maintenance/construction/rental of our 
international partners’ Arctic and Antarctic logistical and in-
frastructural facilities, if we want to be able to maintain our 
privileged collaboration with them” (2014a, 19). Moreover, 
the “polar research requires facilities such as research vessels, 
weather stations, satellites, drilling rigs, data and knowledge 
centres and the Netherlands will have to contribute to this in 
its collaboration with other countries” (2014a, 27). 
In addition to physical infrastructure, the Strategy Plan also 
recognizes scientific networks and international cooperation. In 
particular, “Dutch polar research is conducted from areas of its 
own strength and uses international collaborative partnerships 
that have been carefully built up” (2014a, 13). To this end, “polar 
research in the Netherlands has long-term collaborative part-
nerships in place with the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) and 
the German Alfred-Wegener-Institut für Polar- und Meeresfor-
schung (AWI)” (2014a, 19). The Netherlands also participated 
in a PolarNet proposal and “the University of Groningen co-
ordinates the Dutch involvement in this consortium” (2014a, 
20). The Strategy Plan also notes that in the case of the research 
agenda in the Dutch topic of transcending themes, “the Europe-
an Polar Board has also designated these two basic threads [ac-
quiring fundamental knowledge of the polar regions, and mon-
itoring and/or long-term research] as being hugely important 
for the European research agenda Horizon 2020” (2014a, 17), 
which could potentially expand the Dutch scientific network. 
There are also other research networks of importance to the 
Netherlands. In particular, the strategy notes that “the import-
ant activities and organisations for the polar region are
• Contract with the University of Groningen’s Arctic Centre 
concerning management of the Dutch Polar Station on 
Spitsbergen
• European Polar Board
• International Arctic Scientific Council (IASC)
• Workgroups in the Arctic Council (AC)
• European Framework programmes” (2014a, 21)
As mentioned, the Netherlands collaborates with Norway (see: 
2014a, 19), but there is also potential for other collaborations. 
For example, the Strategy Plan mentions Russia as a potential 
collaborator and “its large territorial presence in the North Po-
lar region…Dutch research efforts already present in Northern 
Russia… further collaboration with Belgian scientists might be 
important for the Netherlands” (2014a, 19). Partnering with 
Belgium would make sense considering their research station 
mentioned above. 
Research funding is also important. The “NPP’s financing 
is subdivided into three Clusters. Curiosity-driven—or sci-
ence-driven—acquisition of knowledge about the consequences 
of changes in the polar regions is included in the NPP’s Cluster 
I. Cluster II is structured in order to generate policy-driven and 
application-oriented knowledge. The intended collaboration 
with private partners is also included in this” (NWO 2014a, 11). 
The third cluster is a little different as it “is intended primarily 
for financing work for and contributions to international organ-
isations” (2014a, 11). 
There are two main ways funds will be awarded. First, “open 
rounds of competition will be held for the entire area of polar 
research, with a call amount of approximately €2 million, for 
which interested polar scientists may submit proposals. This 
concerns a programme for promising, but relatively small-
scale, top research (one Ph.D. or postdoc scientist)” (2014a, 
25). Second, “there is a provision to award a number of new 
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States
218
core programmes (each a total of €1–3 million for 5 years). The 
research proposals must fit within the four indicated themes” 
and can seemingly be for research and policy driven research 
(2014a, 25). There is also “the possibility of coordinating with 
international calls [which] will be reviewed each time an op-
portunity presents itself ” (The Netherlands NWO 2014a, 26). 
The Implementation indicator does not identify a particular 
list of recommendations or action items, but it does provide 
much information on the Netherlands’ research funding and 
made suggestions for improvement. The Strategy Plan is clear 
that “the Netherlands Polar Programme (NPP) is a financing 
programme that invests in scientific research into the polar 
regions” (2014a, 7). The NWO considers the amount of mon-
ey allocated in the past and suggests that more is needed. The 
strategy states that “the ambition of this strategy plan is the con-
tinuation of a long-term basis of financing for the Netherlands 
Polar Programme. In 2009, the Terlouw Commission evaluated 
the NPP and recommended financing on a scale of €6.5 mil-
lion per year. That level of financing was not achieved in the 
time period 2011–2015. Considering the high costs, mainly for 
the logistical and infrastructural facets within polar research, 
and the need to be able to make multiple-year financial com-
mitments to our international partners, NWO is calling for an 
effective and ambitious growing polar research programme… 
to achieve a proper first alignment with the economic priority 
areas, NWO considers budget growth to €10 million per year 
necessary” (2014a, 7–8). 
The Strategy Plan also provides a comparison with the UK, an-
other Observer country, to suggest that not enough funding is 
currently being provided. In particular, the Strategy Plan states 
that “the Netherlands Polar Programme invested €3.7 million 
per year in polar research and policy support in the 2011–2015 
period. NWO contributes €0.75 million per year to this. By way 
of comparison: the UK maintains an expensive logistical in-
frastructure and invests approximately €60 million annually in 
polar research” (2014a, 27). 
The Preface to the strategy notes that the current Strategy Plan 
is a follow-up to the previous one. In particular, the Preface 
states that “in 2010, at the request of Ronald Plasterk, the Min-
ister of Education, Culture and Science at that time, the Master 
Plan for Pole Position - NL was published, in which plans were 
elaborated for the New Netherlands Polar Programme (NNPP) 
for the period 2010–2014. The 2016–2020 Scientific Strategy 
Plan… is an updated continuation of the Master Plan” 2014a, 
5). This contributes to strategic implementation, as well as 
demonstrating policy continuity. 
There is also follow-up in the sense that the Netherlands Polar 
Committee carries out a number of duties in relation to admin-
istering the program. For example,“the NPC’s primary tasks 
are: writing the calls for proposals necessary for the NPP; rep-
resenting and promoting the interests of Dutch polar research 
in national and international committees and organisations; 
monitoring the progress of NPP research; making recommen-
dations about national and international developments in po-
lar research; encouraging, initiating and coordinating national 
and international scientific activities in the polar regions; or-
ganising an annual polar symposium; functioning as a nation-
al point of contact for issues related to the NPP” (2014a, 29). 
While this is not follow-up to specific tasks, it ensures the tasks 
are completed and that the program functions. 
Two forms of evaluation are also discussed in the strategy: the 
first is evaluation of the polar program overall. For example, 
the Strategy Plan references the evaluation document identi-
fied at the start of this discussion on the Netherlands. In par-
ticular, it notes that “the 2014 NPP evaluation showed that the 
various stakeholders considered NPP’s execution in the period 
from 2009-2014 to be very much professionalised. This pro-
vides encouragement for continuing the existing way of work-
ing, in which the necessary adjustments will be made to certain 
components” (2014a, 25). 
The second is the way in which research proposals are evaluated 
for funding. Both the science (cluster I) and policy (cluster II) 
streams have their own evaluation process. The strategy states 
that “research proposals are submitted and evaluated within 
one of the two assessment frameworks. In this manner, finan-
ciers have influence on the direction of the NPP’s movements” 
(2014a, 11). Moreover, “for both frameworks, NWO, the exec-
utive party and co-financier of the programme, ensures that all 
of the research to be financed is of high scientific quality. For 
both Cluster I and Cluster II, only those proposals whose final 
evaluations of scientific quality are in the category ‘very good 
to excellent’ make the grade” (2014a, 11). Furthermore, “the 
ranking of proposals within this framework is based on two 
sets of criteria (scientific versus policy) with a 50–50 weighting 
formula for scientific excellence versus importance for policy. 
If a decision must be made about awarding policy-driven re-
search proposals, then the members of the IPO issue a proposal 
for a decision, after which the NWO-ALW’s divisional board 
makes the formal decision” (2014a, 30). 
To Sum Up
As mentioned at the start of the discussion on the Netherlands’ 
Strategy Plan, there are three priorities: 1) increase research 
and polar knowledge; 2) align research priorities with interna-
tional polar research agendas; and 3) provide “long-term basis 
of financing” for research (2014, 7). It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Science and Education indicator is the most cod-
ed indicator, followed by the Economy and Governance ones. 
International cooperation is then discussed in connection with 
the polar research, and the document highlights collaboration 
with other Arctic states’ research institutions.
The Science and Education indicator provides a detailed over-
view of the Netherlands’ approach to polar research. Impor-
tantly, it notes that research is about both science and policy. 
Two of the research priorities are “Ice, climate and rising sea 
levels” and “Polar ecosystems” (2014, 14, 15), which largely 
focus on environmental and climate change issues. It is thus 
not surprising that both the Environmental Protection and 
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Climate Change indicators discuss research, as does the Pol-
lution indicator. 
Other research priorities are “Sustainable exploitation” and the 
“Social, legal, and economic landscape.” There is little in the 
Strategy Plan about people, as evidenced by the lack of quotes 
coded to the Human Dimension. In contrast, both of these 
priorities are concerned with economic activities, which is evi-
denced by the Economy indicator being one of the second most 
discussed indicators. Tourism, as part of the economy sector, 
is briefly mentioned in connection to the increased maritime 
operations and the need to research technologies for risk and 
safety of such operations. This indicator also discusses new op-
portunities in the Arctic for the Netherlands, especially in re-
lation to extractive resources and shipping. Considering these 
connections, it is understandable that the Strategy Plan states 
that “scientific research can be important to the Dutch business 
community” (2014, 7).
The Safety and SAR indicator is connected to both the Science 
and Education, and Economy indicators as a range of region-
al economic activities demands research for managing the risk 
and safety of such operations. The Infrastructure indicator is 
connected to the Economy indicator as there will be a need for 
more maritime infrastructure. 
As for financing, the Implementation indicator concerns fund-
ing sources. 
People’s Republic of China
China’s Arctic Policy was published in January 2018 by the State 
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 
The Chinese Government’s white paper was issued for, among 
other reasons, “to elaborate on its policy goals, basic principles 
and major policies and positions regarding its engagement in 
Arctic affairs” and the Arctic (People’s Republic of China. The 
State Council 2018, 2). 
Those policy goals, according to the Chinese Arctic Policy, are: 
“to understand, protect, develop and participate in the gover-
nance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of 
all countries and the international community in the Arctic, 
and promote sustainable development of the Arctic” (2018, 4). 
Correspondingly, the basic principles of how “China will par-
ticipate in Arctic affairs” and implement the policy goals are 
stated to be: ‘Respect’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Win–win result’, and ‘Sus-
tainability’ (2018, 4–5).
The contents for the policy document (10 pages, no pictures, 
in PDF from website) is as follows: Foreword; I. The Arctic Sit-
uation and Recent Changes, II. China and the Arctic; III. Chi-
na’s Policy Goals and Basic Principles on the Arctic; IV. Chi-
na’s Policies and Positions on Participating in Arctic Affairs: 
i) Deepening the exploration and understanding of the Arctic, 
ii) Protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic and address-
ing climate change, iii) Utilizing Arctic Resources in a Law-
ful and Rational Manner, iv) Participating Actively in Arctic 
governance and international cooperation, and v)Promoting 
peace and stability in the Arctic; and Conclusion (2018, 1). 
 
The policy goals of the Chinese Arctic Policy are thus interpret-
ed as the main priorities 1) “to understand, protect, develop 
and participate in the governance of the Arctic”; 2) internation-
al, global cooperation and the international community in the 
Arctic; and 3) sustainable development of the Arctic (2018, 4). 
These are well supported by the four basic principles. 
The People’s Republic of China was accepted as a permanent 
Observer of the Arctic Council at the Kiruna (Sweden) Minis-
terial in May 2013 (Arctic Council 2015b).
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator re-
veals that the Chinese Arctic Policy is substantial and exact 
when defining and mapping the Arctic region, which is “situat-
ed at a special geographical location [and refers] to the area of 
land and sea north of the Arctic Circle totaling about 21 million 
square kilometres [including] the northernmost landmasses of 
Europe, Asia and North America adjacent to the Arctic Ocean 
and the relevant islands, and a combination of sea areas with-
in national jurisdiction, high seas, and the Area in the Arctic 
Ocean” (2018, 2). Furthermore, “the continental and insular 
land territories… cover an area of about 8 million square kilo-
metres,” and “the Arctic Ocean covers an area of more than 12 
million square kilometres.” (2018, 2). The indicator also identi-
fies that the region has “a unique natural environment and rich 
resources, with most of its sea area covered under thick ice for 
most of the year” (2018, 2), as well as “abundant resources, but 
a fragile ecosystem” (2018, 7).
Finally, the Arctic Policy clearly states that “China is an im-
portant stakeholder in Arctic affairs,”, followed, first by a sim-
ple explanation that, “geographically, China is a ‘Near-Arc-
tic State,’ one of the continental States that are closest to the 
Arctic Circle”; and second, that “China is also closely in-
volved in the trans-regional and global issues in the Arc-
tic [and] has long been involved in Arctic affairs” (2018, 3). 
Figure 23 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
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Figure 23. People’s Republic of China 2018
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator, accounting for 4 % of the to-
tal coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23) explicit-
ly discusses residents of the Arctic region, and in particular, the 
Indigenous peoples. “China will… contribute to the economic 
and social development of the Arctic, improve the living condi-
tions of the local people and strive for common development” 
(2018, 4). It is especially noted that “to protect the Arctic, China 
will actively respond to climate change in the Arctic, protect its 
unique natural environment and ecological system… and re-
spect its diverse social culture and the historical traditions of 
the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 4).
 
Following on from the above-mentioned principles, the policy 
identifies: i) “the key basis for China’s participation in Arctic 
affairs, [namely] …that respect should be reciprocal. [This] 
means all States should… [also] respect the tradition and cul-
ture of the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 4). It next identifies ii) 
“‘cooperation’ as an effective means for China’s participation 
in Arctic affairs. [This] means establishing a relationship of 
multi-level, omni-dimensional and wide- ranging cooper-
ation… [in which] all stakeholders are encouraged to take 
part in cooperation on… cultural activities” (2018, 4). Cor-
respondingly, the third principle iii) a “’win–win result’ is the 
value pursuit of China’s participation in Arctic affairs. Itmeans 
all stakeholders in this area should pursue mutual benefit and 
common progress in all fields of activities. Such cooperation 
should… [also] accommodate the interests of local residents 
including the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 5). Finally, the fourth 
principle, iv)‘Sustainability’ is “the fundamental goal of Chi-
na’s participation in Arctic affairs… promoting the sustainable 
development of the Arctic by ensuring the sustainability of en-
vironmental protection, resource utilization and human activ-
ities in the area… realizing harmonious coexistence between 
man and nature…and intergenerational equity” (2018, 5). 
 
The Governance indicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded 
quotes of the Arctic Policy (see Figure 23). This indicator first 
notes that “there is no single comprehensive treaty for all Arctic 
affairs”; and second, identifies that “the Charter of the United 
Nations, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), the Spitsbergen Treaty and other treaties and gen-
eral international law govern Arctic affairs at present” (2018, 2). 
It notes, too, that “in 1925, China joined the Spitsbergen Treaty 
and started to participate in addressing Arctic affairs” (2018, 3). 
It later states that “China is committed to improving and com-
plementing the Arctic governance regime… China takes an ac-
tive part in the international governance of the Arctic... upholds 
the current Arctic governance system with the UN Charter and 
the UNCLOS as its core, plays a constructive part in the making, 
interpretation, application and development of international 
rules regarding the Arctic, and safeguards the common inter-
ests of all nations and the international community” (2018, 8). 
Furthermore, “China supports efforts to formulate a legally 
binding international agreement on the management of fisher-
ies in the high seas portion of the Arctic Ocean… supports the 
establishment of an Arctic fisheries management organization 
or making other institutional arrangements based on the UN-
CLOS” (2018, 8).
The Policy does not explicitly note ‘self-governance’ or ‘self-de-
termination,’ but clearly states that “China respects the sover-
eign rights of Arctic States over oil, gas and mineral resourc-
es in the areas subject to their jurisdiction in accordance with 
international law, and respects the interests and concerns of 
residents in the region” (2018, 7). The document also discusses 
Chinese involvement “in the trans-regional and global issues in 
the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, environ-
ment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, resource 
exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance” 
(2018, 3). Final, it states that “China enjoys the freedom or 
rights of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, lay-
ing of submarine cables and pipelines, and resource exploration 
and exploitation in the high seas, the Area and other relevant 
sea areas, and certain special areas in the Arctic Ocean, as stipu-
lated in treaties such as the UNCLOS and the Spitsbergen Trea-
ty, and general international law” (2018, 3).
Following on from this, the International Treaties and Inter-
national Cooperation indicator, which accounts for 16 % of the 
total coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23), em-
phasizes that China “stands for steadily advancing international 
cooperation on the Arctic” (2018, 8), and works “with the inter-
national community to safeguard and promote peace and sta-
bility in, and the sustainable development of, the Arctic” (2018, 
2). Furthermore, “as an important member of the international 
community, China has played a constructive role in the formu-
lation of Arctic-related international rules and the development 
of its governance system” (2018, 3). Final, the document explic-
itly mentions an aim “to strengthen such [international] coop-
eration under the Belt and Road Initiative according to the prin-
ciple of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared 
benefits and emphasized policy coordination, infrastructure 
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer 
people-to-people ties” (2018, 8).
At a global level, “China actively participates in the formulation 
of rules concerning the global environment, climate change, 
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international maritime issues, and high seas fisheries manage-
ment, and fulfills all its international obligations in accordance 
with the law… promotes global cooperation in tackling climate 
change, and upholds the principles of equity, common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities, and respective capabilities… advo-
cates stronger international cooperation in maritime technolo-
gy and a globally coordinated solution to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions from maritime transport” (2018, 9). At a regional 
level, China “takes part in Arctic intergovernmental mecha-
nisms… as an accredited observer of the Arctic Council, highly 
values the Council’s positive role in Arctic affairs, and recogniz-
es it as the main intergovernmental forum on issues regarding 
the environment and sustainable development of the Arctic” 
(2018, 9). Correspondingly, at bilateral and multilateral levels, 
“China promotes practical cooperation in all fields,” such as cli-
mate change, scientific expeditions, environmental protection, 
shipping routes, resource development, submarine fiber-optic 
cables, cultural exchanges” (2018, 9). 
Cooperative partnerships are proposed with the Arctic states 
and non-Arctic States. Of the Arctic states, it is first proposed, 
with the United States, to “set up an annual dialogue mechanism 
for bilateral dialogues on the law of the sea and polar issues”; 
secondly, with Russia, China has “been conducting dialogues 
on Arctic issues”; thirdly, with Iceland, China has “signed the 
Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation… [as] the first 
intergovernmental agreement on Arctic issues between China 
and an Arctic State” (2018, 9). Of the non-Arctic States, “bilater-
al dialogues on the law of the sea and polar issues [are identified] 
with the United Kingdom and France,” and “high-level trilateral 
dialogues on Arctic issues [with Japan and the Republic of Ko-
rea] to promote exchanges on policies, practices, and experience 
regarding Arctic international cooperation, scientific research, 
and commercial cooperation” (2018, 9). China has also partic-
ipated in platforms on Arctic governance and international co-
operation, such as The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue, The Arctic 
Circle, Arctic Frontiers, and in particular, the China–Nordic 
Arctic Research Center (CNARC) “promoting exchanges and 
cooperation among the stakeholders” (2018, 9).
Among major international agreement and organizations, as 
mentioned earlier, are identified first of all, the UN Charter 
and UNCLOs, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
at global level, and at regional level, Spitsbergen Treaty, Arctic 
Council and University of the Arctic.
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 12 % of the 
total coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220). 
This indicator notes that the Arctic “has abundant resources, but 
a fragile ecosystem” (2018, 7), and “is home to several endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora from around the globe” (2018, 6). 
At the same time, commercial activities “may also pose a poten-
tial threat to the ecological environment of the Arctic… [which] 
is now undergoing rapid changes” (2018, 2). Furthermore, “the 
natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct 
impact on China’s climate system and ecological environment, 
and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, 
fishery, marine industry and other sectors” (2018, 3).
China is thus “closely involved in the trans-regional and global 
issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, 
environment, scientific research” (2018, 3). China “follows in-
ternational law in the protection of the natural environment 
and ecosystem of the Arctic and conservation of its biological 
resources, and takes an active part in addressing the challenges 
of environmental and climate change in the Arctic (2018, 6)… 
China always gives top priority to resolving global environmen-
tal issues, earnestly fulfills its obligations under relevant treaties, 
and discharges its responsibility of environmental protection… 
[for example] China’s emission reduction measures have a pos-
itive impact on the climatic and ecological environment of the 
Arctic” (2018, 6). Finally, the Arctic Policy notes that China “is 
committed to properly protecting Arctic biodiversity and advo-
cates transparent and reasonable exploration and utilization of 
Arctic genetic resources… [and] hopes to strengthen coopera-
tion with the Arctic coastal States on the research, conservation, 
and utilization of fishery resources” (2018, 8).
In terms of international law in general, UNCLOS and the Arctic 
Council are identified as the international bodies regarding en-
vironmental protection and sustainable development. The Arctic 
Policy does not explicitly reflect on monitoring, except for noting 
that China “requires its enterprises to observe the laws of the rel-
evant States and conduct risk assessments for resource explora-
tion, and encourages them to participate in the exploitation of 
oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic, through cooperation 
in various forms and on the condition of properly protecting the 
eco-environment of the Arctic” (2018, 7).
The Pollution indicator, accounting for 2 % of the total coded 
quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220), is brief-
ly noted and mentions greenhouse gases and carbon (2018, 9), 
“ship discharge, offshore dumping, and air pollution” (2018, 6), 
and, in general, polluting of the marine Arctic environment, are 
also identified. The Policy also states that respects all the legally 
binding agreements adopted by the Arctic Council (2018, 9). 
China promises support to “the Arctic coastal States in their ef-
forts to reduce pollutants in the Arctic waters from land-based 
sources… [and] commits itself to raising the environmental re-
sponsibility, awareness of its citizens and enterprises” (2018, 6). 
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 7 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220, p. 222). 
This indicator is not one of the most substantial, although the 
Policy clearly states that “to protect the Arctic, China will ac-
tively respond to climate change in the Arctic, protect its unique 
natural environment and ecological system” (2018, 4). Further, 
although mitigation is not explicitly noted, the Policy states that 
“China’s emission reduction measures have a positive impact on 
the climatic and ecological environment of the Arctic” (2018, 6). 
Due to the existing and potential climate change consequences, 
it is obvious that “the Arctic natural environment is now under-
going rapid changes” (2018, 2). The policy identifies first of all, 
that “global warming in recent years has accelerated the melt-
ing of ice and snow in the Arctic region” (2018, 1); second, that 
“fish stocks have shown a tendency to move northwards due to 
climate change and other factors… the Arctic has the potential 
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to become a new fishing ground in the future” (2018, 7–8); and 
finally that, “the Arctic shipping routes are likely to become im-
portant transport routes for international trade” (2018, 7).
 
Again, in addition to international cooperation on climate 
change and international law in general, such the UN Charter, 
the Policy notes that China “also promotes global cooperation 
in tackling climate change, and upholds the principles of eq-
uity, common but differentiated responsibilities, and respective 
capabilities [and] urges developed countries to fulfill their com-
mitments under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, and 
provides support to fellow developing countries in addressing 
climate change” (2018, 9).
The Security indicator accounts for 6 % of the total coded 
quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220). As “pro-
moting peace and stability in the Arctic” is one of the priorities 
of China’s Arctic Policy, and peace is a core of security/security 
studies, it is natural that this indicator is greatly focused upon 
in the Policy. The document notes, first, that “peace and stability 
in the Arctic provides a significant guarantee for all activities in 
the region, and serves the fundamental interest of all countries 
including China” (2018, 10); second, it promises “to work with 
the international community to safeguard and promote peace 
and stability in, and the sustainable development of, the Arctic” 
(2018, 2); and finally, it appeals to others, calling “for the peace-
ful utilization of the Arctic and commits itself to maintaining 
peace and stability, protecting lives and property, and ensuring 
the security of maritime trade, operations and transport in the 
region” (2018, 10).
Clearly, China is considering reinforcing cooperation with the 
Arctic States in many fields, such as maritime and air search 
and rescue, and information sharing so that it can handle secu-
rity challenges properly, for instance, maritime accidents; it is 
also considering involvement “in the trans-regional and global 
issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, 
environment, scientific research, utilization of shipping routes, 
resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global gov-
ernance” (2018, 3). Moreover, “as a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council, China shoulders the important mission 
of jointly promoting peace and security in the Arctic” (2018, 3), 
and “supports the peaceful settlement of disputes over territory 
and maritime rights and interests by all parties concerned in ac-
cordance with such treaties as the UN Charter and the UNCLOS 
and general international law” as well as supporting efforts “to 
safeguard security and stability in the region” (2018, 10).
As already mentioned in the Governance indicator, sovereignty 
is explicitly noted, as the Policy first identifies that sovereignty 
over the land territories and waters of the Arctic region (cov-
ering about 8 million square kilometres) belongs to “Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the 
United States, respectively… [and that the] coastal States have 
within their jurisdiction internal waters, territorial seas, contig-
uous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves 
in the Arctic Ocean” (2018,2). Second, it identifies that “China 
respects the sovereign rights of Arctic States over oil, gas and 
mineral resources in the areas subject to their jurisdiction in ac-
cordance with international law, and respects the interests and 
concerns of residents in the region” (2018, 7). At the same time, 
and limited to the previous quotations, the document identifies 
that “the Arctic Ocean covers an area of more than 12 million 
square kilometers, in which coastal States and other States share 
maritime rights and interests in accordance with internation-
al law… [and] certain areas of the Arctic Ocean form part of 
the high seas and the Area” (2018, 2) (meaning the above-men-
tioned that of the Arctic Ocean). It also states that “China en-
joys the freedom or rights of scientific research, navigation, 
overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, 
and resource exploration and exploitation in the high seas, the 
Area and other relevant sea areas, and certain special areas in 
the Arctic Ocean, as stipulated in… international law” (2018, 3).
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total 
coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 23, p. 220), briefly notes that 
“China attaches great importance to navigation security along 
the Arctic shipping routes. It has actively conducted studies on 
these routes and continuously strengthened hydrographic sur-
veys with the aim of improving the navigation, security and logis-
tical capacities in the Arctic” (2018, 7). In addition, China prom-
ises to abide by the Polar Code and support the IMO “in playing 
an active role in formulating navigational rules for the Arctic.” 
It calls “for stronger international cooperation on infrastruc-
ture construction and operation of the Arctic routes” (2018, 7). 
The Economy indicator accounts for 22 % of the total coded 
quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, p. 220). This in-
dicator clearly shows the general ambivalence of Arctic devel-
opment in the 21st century. This is shown in the short sentence, 
“the Arctic has abundant resources, but a fragile ecosystem,” 
and the close-following statement that “China advocates pro-
tection and rational use of the region and encourages its enter-
prises to engage in international cooperation on the exploration 
for and utilization of Arctic resources by making the best use 
of their advantages in capital, technology and domestic mar-
ket” (2018, 7). This approach is supported by the two policy 
priorities: “deepening the exploration and understanding of the 
Arctic”, and “utilizing Arctic resources in a lawful and rational 
manner” (2018, 1). 
Among commercial activities in the Arctic explicitly identified 
in the Policy are “global shipping, international trade and en-
ergy supply,” which “bring about major social and economic 
changes, and exert important influence on the way of work and 
life of Arctic residents including the Indigenous peoples” (2018, 
2). Other activities are “the exploitation of oil, gas, and mineral 
resources” as well as other non-living resources (2018, 7), and 
tourism. In general, “the utilization of sea routes and explora-
tion and development of the resources in the Arctic may have a 
huge impact on the energy strategy and economic development 
of China, which is a major trading nation and energy consumer 
in the world.” (2018, 3). Finally, the “Polar Silk Road” initiative is 
identified as the Chinese tool for conducting economic activities 
in the Arctic, in particular in transportation and shipping. The 
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Policy notes that China encourages “its enterprises to participate 
in the infrastructure construction for these routes and conduct 
commercial trial voyages in accordance with the law to pave the 
way for their commercial and regularized operation” (2018, 7). 
This results, on the one hand, from China’s involvement “in the 
trans-regional and global issues in the Arctic, especially in such 
areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, utili-
zation of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, 
security, and global governance” (2018, 3), and, on the other 
hand, “the freedom or rights of scientific research, navigation, 
overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and 
resource exploration and exploitation in the high seas,” which 
China is also said to enjoy (2018, 3). All this is happening un-
der, and integrated into, the basic principles. For instance, under 
‘Cooperation,’ resource utilization is put together with cultural 
activities (2018, 4), and while ‘Sustainability,’ which is “the fun-
damental goal of China’s participation in Arctic affairs… means 
promoting the sustainable development of the Arctic by ensur-
ing the sustainability of environmental protection, resource uti-
lization and human activities in the area” (2018, 4). Finally, the 
Policy vows that China “attaches importance to the sustainable 
development and biodiversity protection of the Arctic” (2018, 6).
Following on from the previous indicator, the Tourism indica-
tor, accounting for 2 % of the total coded quotes of the policy 
(see Figure 23, p. 220), identifies ‘Arctic tourism’ as “an emerging 
industry [with China being] a source of tourists to the Arctic” 
(2018, 8). Indeed, “participating in developing tourism resourc-
es” is one of the sub-themes of utilizing Arctic resources, where 
China: i) “supports and encourages its enterprises to cooperate 
with Arctic States in developing tourism in the region, and calls 
for continuous efforts to enhance security, insurance, and res-
cue systems to ensure the safety of tourists in the Arctic”; ii) 
“conducts training for and regulates Chinese tourism agencies 
and professionals involved in Arctic tourism, and endeavors to 
raise the environmental awareness of Chinese tourists”; and iii) 
“advocates low-carbon tourism, ecotourism, and responsible 
tourism, and hopes to contribute to the sustainable develop-
ment of Arctic tourism” (2018, 8).
Concerning the Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 4 % 
of the total coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 23, p. 220), the 
focus is on shipping and technical innovation and on the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). The two first as activities are connected 
to the BRI. The Policy further notes that China “hopes to work 
with all parties to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ through developing 
the Arctic shipping routes” (2018, 7), and furthermore, “advo-
cates stronger international cooperation in maritime technology 
and a globally coordinated solution to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from maritime transport” (2018, 9). The Policy ends by 
stating that “on the basis of the principles of ‘respect, cooperation, 
win–win results and sustainability,’ China, as a responsible ma-
jor country, is ready to cooperate with all relevant parties to seize 
the historic opportunity in the development of the Arctic… [and 
to] advance Arctic-related cooperation under the Belt and Road 
Initiative, so as to build a community with a shared future for 
mankind and contribute to peace, stability and sustainable devel-
opment in the Arctic” (2018, 10). Finally, by standing for steadi-
ly advancing international cooperation in the Arctic, the policy 
notes that China “has worked to strengthen such cooperation 
under the Belt and Road Initiative according to the principle of 
extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits and 
emphasized policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, un-
impeded trade, financial integration, and closer people-to-people 
ties” (2018, 8).
The Policy also notes that “the availability of technical equip-
ment is essential to understanding, utilizing and protecting the 
Arctic,” and therefore that “China encourages the development 
of environment-friendly polar technical equipment, actively 
participates in the building of infrastructure for Arctic devel-
opment,… [and, for example] promotes technology innovation 
in Arctic oil and gas drilling and exploitation, renewable energy 
development, navigation and monitoring in ice zones, and con-
struction of new-type icebreakers” (2018, 6). It is a long list of 
aims of technical innovation. 
The Science and Education indicator, accounting for 10 % of 
the total coded quotes of China’s Arctic Policy (see Figure 23, 
p. 220), identifies that the Policy interprets the Arctic as hold-
ing “great value for scientific research” and that therefore “to 
explore and understand the Arctic serves as the priority and 
focus for China in its Arctic activities” (2018, 5). Following on 
from this, and in order to understand the Arctic, “China will 
improve the capacity and capability in scientific research on the 
Arctic, pursue a deeper understanding and knowledge of the 
Arctic science, and explore the natural laws behind its changes 
and development, so as to create favorable conditions for man-
kind to better protect, develop, and govern the Arctic” (2018, 4). 
Finally, international cooperation on Arctic research is noted as 
being actively promoted; the document pushes “for an open and 
inclusive international monitoring network of the Arctic envi-
ronment, supports pragmatic cooperation through platforms 
such as the International Arctic Science Committee, [and] en-
courages Chinese scientists to carry out international academic 
exchanges and cooperation on the Arctic” (2018, 5–6).
China began to conduct research in the Arctic in 1999, and 
since then “has organized a number of scientific expeditions in 
the Arctic, with its research vessel Xue Long (Snow Dragon) as 
the platform… In 2004, China built the Arctic Yellow River Sta-
tion in Ny Alesund in the Spitsbergen Archipelago. By the end 
of 2017, China has carried out eight scientific expeditions in the 
Arctic Ocean” (2018, 3). By using its research vessel and stations 
as platforms, “China has gradually established a multi-disci-
pline observation system covering the sea, ice and snow, atmo-
sphere, biological, and geological system of the Arctic” (2018, 
3). Among multi-disciplinary research topics identified are 
“Arctic geology, geography, ice and snow, hydrology, meteorolo-
gy, sea ice, biology, ecology, geophysics and marine chemistry” 
(2018, 5). An aim is to make “a greater effort to advance research 
in the fields of natural science, climate change and ecological 
environment, accelerate the development of basic subjects such 
as physics, chemistry, life science and earth science.” (REF?)
Furthermore, the Policy undertakes that China will “strengthen 
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States
224
social science research including Arctic politics, economy, law, 
society, history, culture and management of Arctic activities, 
and promote innovation in both natural and social sciences” 
(2018, 5). 
The Policy also states China’s aim “to strengthen person-
nel training and public awareness of the Arctic, support 
higher learning and research institutions to train profes-
sionals specialized in natural and social sciences on the 
Arctic… and publish cultural products on the Arctic to im-
prove public knowledge” (2018, 5). Finally, as part of inter-
national cooperation on Arctic research the Policy “encour-
ages Chinese higher learning and research institutions to 
join the network of the University of the Arctic” (2018, 6). 
The Implementation indicator is not explicitly noted in the 
policy document.
To sum up
Of all the Arctic policies of non-Arctic states and AC observer 
countries, the Chinese Arctic interests and policy has been in-
ternationally the most discussed and speculated upon, already 
before the Policy was launched, as well as studied, examined 
and discussed after the launch (e.g., Jakobson and Peng 2012; 
Kopra 2013; Lanteigne 2016; QIN and LI 2017; Heininen 2017; 
Lim 2018). 
The Policy does not have a very plentiful amount of text but is 
densely worded and takes a holistic approach. Based on our 
quantitative measuring, the Economy indicator is the highest 
priority of China in the Arctic and among Arctic activities. It 
is not surprising that the Belt and Road Initiative plays, as in 
general in China’s foreign (economic) policy, an important role 
in China’s Arctic policy. 
The second most-coded indicator is International Cooperation, 
although it could be interpreted as being more a means than a 
priority per se. Therefore, and taking into consideration quali-
ty, it is fair to identify the Environmental protection indicator 
and/or that of Governance as the second priority. In particular, 
as mitigation is not explicitly mentioned in the climate change 
indicator, the document notes that “China’s emission reduction 
measures have a positive impact on the climatic and ecological 
environment of the Arctic” (2018, 6). Here the Arctic Policy 
of China reveals the general ambivalence about how states, in 
particular non-Arctic states but also some Arctic states, consid-
er Arctic development in the 21st century of globalization: “the 
Arctic has abundant resources, but a fragile ecosystem” (2018, 
7), and at the same time commercial activities “may also pose a 
potential threat to the ecological environment of the Arctic… 
[which] is now undergoing rapid changes” (2018, 2). Therefore 
“China advocates protection and rational use of the region and 
encourages its enterprises to engage in international coopera-
tion on the exploration for and utilization of Arctic resources 
by making the best use of their advantages in capital, technolo-
gy and domestic market” (2018, 7). 
In the long run very relevant, even fundamental, is that the Gov-
ernance indicator notes that the sovereignty of the land territo-
ries and waters of the Arctic region belong to the Arctic states, 
and these coastal states “have within their jurisdiction internal 
waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic 
zones, and continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean” (2018, 2) 
which China respects, while at the same time, identifying that 
China enjoys “the freedom or rights of scientific research, navi-
gation, overflight, fishing” (2018, 3) and other activities and re-
source exploitation in the high seas in general, including certain 
special areas in the Arctic Ocean. It is a little surprising that 
Science and Education, although the first field under the title 
“Deepening the exploitation and understanding of the Arctic,” 
(2018, 5) is addressed in greater detail. 
The Human dimension is explicitly noted as meaning the inter-
ests of local residents, including the Indigenous peoples, who 
are mentioned a few times, and also “the safety of tourists in the 
Arctic” (2018, 8). All in all, based on the official Arctic policy, 
China is explicitly committed to maintaining peace and stability 
in the Arctic, as well as environmental protection there.
 
Finally, comparing the results of the coding and analysis to the 
de facto priorities it can be concluded from the two first policy 
goals, that the focus is on governance of the Arctic, and inter-
national, global cooperation, including the international com-
munity in the Arctic. The third goal, sustainable development 
of the Arctic, is less of a focus, as economy is the most quoted 
indicator. Again, it is important to take into consideration that 
this indicator includes sustainable development. 
Republic of Korea
The Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea was adopted in De-
cember 2013 based on the Government’s decision on a plan 
to implement “a comprehensive Arctic policy and follow-up 
measures” (Republic of Korea Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries 
2013, 4). The vision of the Policy, also called “the Master Plan” 
(15 pages including pictures), is to “contribute to sustainable 
future of the Arctic by enhancing cooperation with the Arctic 
states and relevant international organizations in the areas of 
science, technology and economy” (2013, 5). The Policy “aims 
for the ROK to: a) strengthen international cooperation; b) 
build a foundation for polar scientific research; and c) create 
new business areas (by participating in the Arctic Council and 
its Working Groups)” (2013, 5). 
These three aims are also included the Policy as the following 
policy goals: “1. Build a cooperative Arctic partnership, 2. En-
hance scientific research activities for the Arctic, 3. Explore new 
business opportunities in the Arctic” (2013, 6). Finally, based 
on these goals, “from 2013 to 2017, thirty-one key plans will be 
established to meet the following four major strategic goals: a) 
strengthening international cooperation with the Arctic region; 
b) encouraging scientific and technological research capacity; c) 
pursuing sustainable Arctic businesses; and d) securing institu-
tional foundation” (2013, 5).
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The three policy goals: 1) Build a cooperative Arctic partner-
ship; 2) Enhance scientific research activities for the Arctic; and 
3) Explore new business opportunities in the Arctic (2013, 6), 
are interpreted as the priorities.
The Republic of Korea was accepted as a permanent observer of 
the Arctic Council at the Kiruna Ministerial in May 2013 (Arc-
tic Council 2015b).
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator does 
not exist in the Korean Arctic Policy, as there is no definition 
either of the Arctic (region) or its (special) features. 
Among stakeholders mentioned as being involved in the prepa-
ration of the policy are six ministries: “Ministry of Oceans and 
Fisheries (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Minis-
try of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP), Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), Ministry of Environ-
ment (MOE), Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(MOLIT) - Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA),” as 
well as “national research institutes, such as the Korea Maritime 
Institute (KMI)” and “Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI)” 
(2013, 4). 
Figure 24 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Figure 24. Republic of Korea 2013
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 5 % of the total 
coded quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (see Fig-
ure 24). The Policy identifies the melting of the Arctic ice as pos-
ing “serious challenges to the livelihoods of residents in the Arc-
tic. It also states that “the increase in human activities may also 
affect the marine ecosystem… and threaten the livelihoods of 
residents, including the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic” (2013, 
3). There is a special focus on cooperation with Indigenous 
peoples through cooperation projects “to preserve the Arctic’s 
unique history, culture and traditional knowledge” (2013, 8). 
The Governance indicators, which account for 10 % of the total 
coded quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (see Fig-
ure 24), provides one of the major strategic goals of the Policy 
aimed at “securing [an]institutional foundation” (2013, 15). To 
implement that goal, the Policy promises to “Establish [an] in-
stitutional base to develop a national polar policy” and “build 
[a] polar information service center” (2013, 15). The Arctic 
Council is described as a “great opportunity to promote shared 
interests and cooperation in the Arctic” (2013,3). Among the 
ROK’s major goals here is an of expansion of “activities in the 
Arctic Council and its bodies” (2013, 6), and establishment of 
“a plan to increase the participation of Korean experts in the six 
Working Groups” of the AC (2013, 8).
It is thus not surprising to find that the International Treaties 
and International Cooperation indicator, which accounts for 
17 % of the total coded quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic 
of Korea (see Figure 24), is highlighted in the document. This is 
because “enhancing cooperation with the Arctic states and rel-
evant international organizations in the areas of science, tech-
nology and economy” (2013, 5) is making a contribution to the 
sustainable future of the Arctic: so, too, is strengthening “coop-
eration with the region’s major fisheries organizations that are 
associated with the Arctic and its adjacent seas” (2013, 13), and 
cooperating in “Ship Safety and Marine Environmental Protec-
tion” (2013, 8). 
Cooperation, both internationally and with bodies of the Arctic 
Council, is explicitly identified, in the Policy, particularly after 
ROK gained observer status in the Council, for example, ROK 
cooperation in the Arctic Hydrographic Commission (ARHC) 
which ensures provision of “safe nautical charts on the unchart-
ed waters of the Arctic” (2013, 10). Finally, the Policy notes that 
ROK joined the Svalbard Treaty in 2012. Other explicit refer-
ences in the document are the ROK’s intention to: i) “pursue co-
operation with Arctic coastal states and nearby nations to carry 
out Arctic spatial information development projects” (2013, 
10), for example, hosting international seminars with, and in-
viting experts from, the Arctic coastal states; ii) “cooperate with 
Observer States”; iii) in particular, “increase cooperation activ-
ities that contribute to achieving a sustainable Arctic with ob-
server states such as China and Japan”; and iv) “encourage par-
ticipation in international forums and consultative society such 
as the Arctic Frontier and Arctic Circle, etc.” (2013, 8), as a part 
of the goal of participating in “the cooperation programmes of 
the Arctic-related organizations.” 
Concerning the Environmental Protection indicator, which ac-
counts for 3 % of the total coded quotes of the document (see 
Figure 24), the ROK Policy is brief and a little ambivalent, point-
ing out that “the melting of the Arctic ice will provide new op-
portunities for growth,” while also posing “serious challenges to 
the livelihoods of residents in the Arctic and its biodiversity…. 
However, the increase in human activities may also affect the 
marine ecosystem, a vulnerable part of the environment, and 
threaten the livelihoods of residents, including the Indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic” (2013, 3). Finally, marine environmen-
tal protection and ship safety are explicitly mentioned, together 
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with “the feasibility of the Arctic Sea Routes” (2013, 6), and “re-
search on ways to improve the monitoring of the surrounding 
environment of the NSRs (Northern Sea Routes)” (2013, 9).
The Pollution indicator is not explicitly noted in the Arctic Pol-
icy of the Republic of Korea.
The Climate Change indicator, which accounts for 2 % of the 
total coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 24, p. 225), is briefly 
noted. The Policy promises first, to “carry out more researches 
on climate change in the Arctic” (2013, 6); second, to “devel-
op a model to identify the causes of Arctic climate change by 
conducting high-definition atmospheric and marine modelling 
of the Arctic Sea and reproducing a circulation model of the 
ocean and sea ice” (2013, 10); and third, to “Conduct Research 
on Climate Change Forecast Using Arctic Science Infrastruc-
ture” (2013, 11).
The Security indicator is not explicitly noted in the Arctic Poli-
cy of the Republic of Korea.
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 8 % of the 
total coded quotes of the Arctic Policy (see Figure 24, p. 225), 
shows the interest of the ROK in “Ship Safety and Marine En-
vironmental Protection.” This includes the development of 
“shipbuilding technologies for the Arctic and for different ves-
sel types… and materials technologies” and the setting up of 
“national safety standards for polar ships, in preparation for the 
Polar Code” (2013, 8). The discussion in the section, ‘Pursue 
sustainable Arctic businesses,’ includes the goal of developing 
“shipbuilding and safety technology for polar-class vessels [in-
cluding] core technology for safe navigation in the polar region” 
and “for safe navigation of ice class ships along polar routes and 
relevant testing technology” (2013, 14). There is also a promise 
in the Policy to develop “a safety training course that teaches the 
basics of glaciers, emergency responses, and survival methods 
for crews that board polar operating vessels” (2013, 12). 
The Economy indicator accounts for 21 % of the total coded 
quotes of Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea (see Figure 
24, p. 225). The Policy explicitly seeks to “explore new busi-
ness opportunities in the Arctic” (2013, 6) as a policy goal of 
the ROK. With respect to resource utilization, the Policy pro-
poses among other things, to “pursue joint research with Arc-
tic states in the fields of resources development, cargo shipping 
infrastructure, transshipment ports, and the commercial use 
of NSRs (2013, 12)… lay the foundation for sustainable arctic 
resource exploration cooperation” by launching “joint explo-
ration of minerals and geological survey with resource-related 
public entities and institutes” (2013, 13); and “develop offshore 
plant technology for deepwater resources development” (2013, 
14). Under scientific and technological research, it is proposed 
to introduce capacity to “conduct gas hydrate exploration and 
deep drilling in the Arctic Sea with Arctic States” (2013, 9). 
19 For more detailed information on this, see the presentation “Korea’s Scientifc Activities in the Arctic” by Jihoon Jeong, Korea Polar Research Institute at NPARC 
2016 meeting in 5 July 2016 at Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. 
Sea transportation and navigation is one of the main economic 
fields identified. For example, the Policy seeks to “establish and 
implement follow-up measures to the pilot navigations along 
the Arctic Sea routes…provide consulting services and market 
research support to make it easier for Korean maritime logistics 
companies to enter the Arctic Sea market [and] provide possible 
incentives for the vessels that use the Arctic Sea routes (2013, 
12). This is because “decreasing sea ice creates new business 
opportunities in the Artic in such areas as resources develop-
ment and commercialization of the Northern Sea Route” (2013, 
3). These new economic opportunities also include energy and 
cargo transport between Asia and Europe by Korean ship and 
cargo owners and bulk cargo between Asia and Europe. Anoth-
er noted field is fisheries where the aim is to “strengthen coop-
eration with the region’s major fisheries organizations that are 
associated with the Arctic and its adjacent seas,” and second, to 
“establish a project group led by the NFRDI (National Fisheries 
Research and Development Institute), KOFA (Korea Overseas 
Fisheries Association), PICES, KMI, and KOPRI, and develop a 
basic plan to strengthen cooperation” (2013, 13).
The Tourism indicator is not explicitly noted in the Arctic Poli-
cy of the Republic of Korea.
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for a small share 
(3 %) of the total coded quotes of the policy (see Figure 24, p. 
225), links the development of cargo shipping infrastructure 
and transshipment ports as part of pursuing joint research with 
Arctic states. The Policy aims to establish “a basic plan for ports 
to prepare for the commercialization of the Arctic Sea routes” 
(2013, 12), and conduct a “feasibility study and establish plan 
for building a second research icebreaker” (2013, 11).
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 32 % of the 
total coded quotes of the Arctic Policy of the Republic of Ko-
rea (see Figure 24, p. 225). This indicator reflects that scientific 
research is, without a doubt, the major priority of ROK in the 
Arctic region and Arctic affairs. The Policy’s main goal, namely, 
to “encourage scientific and technological research capacity” is 
substantial, providing more concrete goals to be implemented, 
such as to “support the scientific researches of Arctic stations; 
build science infrastructure… [and] carry out more researches 
on climate change in the Arctic” (2013, 6), and finally, to “con-
duct comprehensive arctic sea research by utilizing ARAON” 
(2013, 9).19
The Policy also explicitly identifies the Dasan Arctic Science 
Station in Svalbard, established in 2002 (in the same year as 
ROK joined the IASC), as well as support “to start research on 
geological, atmospheric, and ecological changes” there (2013, 
9). Education is explicitly noted, such as training courses on ice 
navigation and on safety on glaciers, emergency responses, and 
survival methods for crews that board polar operating vessels. 
Finally, the Policy aims to “strengthen cooperation with educa-
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tional institutions such as the University of the Arctic” (2013, 8).
The Implementation indicator is de facto included in the pol-
icy, as it was adopted based on the Government’s decision on 
a plan to implement “a comprehensive Arctic policy and fol-
low-up measures” (2013, 4). Many points in the document be-
gin with words like ‘establish’, ‘develop’, ‘pursue’, etc. and could 
therefore be interpreted as action items. Finally, the Policy states 
that it serves “as a framework for developing consistent policies, 
and Korea will have a committee that would put into action the 
above-mentioned three policy goals and review their imple-
mentation” (2013, 5).
To sum up 
The Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea has a clear vision 
and is rich in major goals, policy goals, and action items. It is, 
however, quite minimalistic and rather technical in nature. Ac-
cording to the policy goals, the three dominating indicators are, 
not surprisingly, Science and Education, Economy, and Interna-
tional Cooperation. It makes sense that these appear in combi-
nation leading to a policy document that is more credible and 
easier to implement. 
In contrast, the Environmental protection, Pollution, and Cli-
mate Change indicators are not explicitly reflected, but only 
briefly and partly ambivalently described, under the twofold no-
tion of i) creating “new opportunities for growth”, and ii) posing 
“serious challenges to the livelihoods of residents in the Arctic 
and its biodiversity” (2013, 3). 
Finally, comparing the coding and analysis results to the policy 
goals, as priorities, it is concluded that the goals of the Policy are 
among the most focused indicators in what is a short, straight-
forward, and precise document.
Spain
The Guidelines for A Spanish Polar Strategy (in Spanish and En-
glish) was released in 2016. The 35-page document includes 
four chapters: two introductory ones, one about geostrategic as-
pects and two more substantial chapters on scientific research, 
logistics and sectoral issues as action proposals (Spain 2016).
The Spanish Arctic Strategy focuses on Spitsbergen and Green-
land. It notes that there are historical reasons for Spain having 
developed and adopted a polar strategy. The continuing histor-
ical presence of Spain in the polar regions started in the 16th 
century, when “Spanish mariners sailed the coasts of North 
America, reaching the high northern latitudes of the Pacific… 
seeking the Northwest Passage and the possibility of establish-
ing new settlements” (2016, 7–8), and when “Spanish whalers 
from Galicia, Cantabria and the Basque Country was first doc-
umented” sailing not only “in northern latitudes higher than 
the Labrador Peninsula and Newfoundland,” but “in the waters 
of the Svalbard archipelago” (2016, 8). According to the Strat-
egy, “we should not forget that Spain’s pioneering presence in 
the polar regions is an asset that is still insufficiently known in 
international forums” (2016, 7). Moreover, “a large number of 
Spanish researchers increased their involvement in internation-
al polar science programmes in the early 1980s” (2016, 4). The 
Strategy concludes that “Spain has a considerable presence in 
the polar regions” (2016, 17).
According to the Strategy, the Spanish Polar Committee, creat-
ed in 1998, is “in charge of coordinating activities in the polar 
regions” (2016, 6). The Directorate for Technological and Scien-
tific Research of the Ministry of the Economy and Competitive-
ness is in charge of managing activities in Spain. The National 
Antarctic Region Research Programme (PNIA) was established 
in 1988, as a part of the 1988–1991 National Plan for Scientific 
and Technological Development, in the same year as Spain at-
tained the status of Consultative Party of the Antarctic Treaty 
(2016, 5).
Except for the mention that polar research, including education, 
is defined as a “strategic priority for the Spanish scientific sys-
tem” and, further, that “because Spain has a considerable pres-
ence in the polar regions, it should also have a high profile in 
the forums, initiatives and actions” (2016, 17), there is nothing 
major in the Strategy that could be interpreted as priorities. 
Spain has been an Observer country of the Arctic Council since 
2006 (Arctic Council 2015b). 
Concerning the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic in-
dicator, the Spanish Polar Strategy defines that “the polar re-
gions are acquiring an ever greater geostrategic and economic 
interest due, among other factors, to their location, improved 
potential of access to their natural resources, tourism, fishing, 
and maritime traffic” (2016,12). Further, these regions “are… 
extraordinarily fragile, at least until there is sufficient scientific 
knowledge to ensure their proper management in a sustainable 
and environmentally-friendly manner” (2016,13); they are also 
“among the most sensitive to climate change”(2016,10). Finally, 
the Arctic Ocean is specially identified as being “surrounded by 
inhabited continents, where the sovereignty of the coastal states 
can be clearly felt” (2016, 7). 
Figure 25 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
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Figure 25. Spain 2016
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the 
total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25), 
briefly identifies the Arctic regions (North of 60ºN latitude)as 
“inhabited by Indigenous populations, who are currently facing 
fast changes in their habitats and their ways of life” (2016, 7). 
The Strategy maintains that the Indigenous populations “must 
be taken into account and are entitled to benefit from the ac-
tivities carried out in their habitat, including respect for their 
environments and their lifestyles” (2016, 14).
The Governance indicators, accounting for 10 % of the total 
coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25), 
capture the fact that “the geostrategic situation is subject to the 
Arctic countries’ sovereignty and jurisdiction, and there is no 
specific multilateral instrument regulating international spaces, 
such as the Antarctic Treaty” (2016, 12). Furthermore, the influ-
ence of the littoral states of the Arctic Ocean “is compounded by 
the intervention of organizations, such as the OSPAR Regional 
Convention and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC), and other global organizations like the Internation-
al Maritime Organization (IMO), with its Polar Code and its 
MARPOL Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
and, above all, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), which the Arctic coastal countries have agreed 
to apply without exception… when they approved the Ilulissat 
Declaration in 2008” (2016, 12). Here UNCLOS and the IMO’s 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters are 
identified as “the natural multilateral framework for managing 
navigation issues, including polar navigation… [and promot-
ing] the necessary measures for free, safe and environmental-
ly-friendly trans-Arctic maritime transit” (2016, 14).
Inter alia, Spain considers it necessary to “foster peacekeeping, 
environmental protection and security in the polar regions,” as 
well as maintain a presence there “as an affair of State, and as the 
basis for its participation in polar activities with all its resources 
(both civilian and military)” (2016, 13). One important reason 
is that “any strategic Spanish approach to the fishing industry 
must consider… that the management of fishery resources is an 
EU mandate,” and that “Spain, as an EU Member State, is now 
a member of the NEAFC, whose remit includes Arctic waters” 
(p. 29). Here, as a general principle guiding Spain’s actions re-
garding fisheries, it is noted that to “ensure the sector’s sustain-
ability, which includes respecting the environment and combat-
ing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing… Spain only 
carries out fishing activities when permitted by international 
or national regulations, considering, among other reasons, that 
protecting the environment is important in order to prevent the 
pollution” (2016, 29).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator accounts for 15 % of the total coded quotes of the Span-
ish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25). The indicator notes that, in 
addition to the lifestyles and cultures of the Indigenous Arctic 
populations, the Strategy supports, “Spain’s involvement in all 
the major polar organizations [in order] to ensure its partic-
ipation in such fields of special interest as scientific research, 
environmental protection, natural reserves, energy, industry, 
resources, polar technologies, bioprospecting, tourism, trans-
port, fisheries” (2016,14). As it has a considerable presence in 
the polar regions, Spain “should also have a high profile in the 
forums, initiatives, and actions carried out in the areas of scien-
tific research, technology, sustainable use of natural resources, 
and freedom of navigation, respecting international and region-
al regulations and carrying out all of its actions in accordance 
with the strictest environmental standards” (2016, 17).
The Strategy identifies the major international organizations, 
where Spain has a member- or observership: i) an Observer 
country in the Arctic Council, which includes all the Arctic 
coastal countries as member states and is “gradually gaining in 
substance and influence at the regional and global levels” (2016, 
12). Here the strategy considers that it is in “Spain’s geopoliti-
cal interest [to have] an Arctic presence and [to maintain] its 
status as observer country in the Arctic Council” (2016, 14); 
ii) as a member of the International Arctic Science Commit-
tee (IASC) since 2009 ; iii) as a member of the OSPAR Con-
vention; iv) as a member of the European Polar Board (EPB), 
which promotes coordination among European countries’ polar 
programs, as well as supporting “the expansion to the Arctic of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity by being involved “in 
developing the EU’s Northern Dimension, in the same way that 
it promotes an EU Mediterranean policy” (2016, 31). More-
over, Spain is considering becoming a full member of the Bar-
ents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) to “align with the strategies 
drawn up by the EU regarding the Arctic” (2016, 14), and to 
foster the creation, within the framework of the EU Council, 
of a “specialized commission devoted to polar issues (CPO-
LAR) as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP); this would serve as a forum for agreement, coopera-
tion and discussion among the EU Member States and for fi-
nancing all kinds of activities related to the poles” (2016, 14). 
 
The Environmental Protection indicator, which accounts for 
5 % of the total coded quotes of the Strategy (see Figure 25), 
clearly identifies the polar regions as being among the most 
sensitive to climate change and its impacts and consequences, 
which are “having a far-reaching impact on the region’s envi-
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ronment and resident populations, and access to its natural re-
serves” (2016, 10). There is thus a need to protect “the polar envi-
ronment on the basis of the precautionary principle” (2016, 13). 
Furthermore, the Strategy alludes to fostering “environmental 
protection and security in the polar regions” (2016, 13); it also 
promotes “the implementation of environmental protection and 
sustainable exploitation policies in the Arctic” (2016, 15) for ex-
ample, by “promoting the conservation of polar environments 
and the sustainable use of their natural resources” (2016, 11). 
Finally, the Strategy states that “exploitation of resources in the 
polar regions and their transport must be carried out in a stable, 
sustainable and environmentally friendly manner [and that] a 
higher priority must be given to maintaining biodiversity and 
the living conditions of the local populations” (2016, 27). 
The Strategy thus reflects the importance of protecting the po-
lar environment by “making use of the best available scientific 
knowledge at any given moment, including the adoption of the 
necessary measures to reduce emissions…. [and] using the best 
scientific knowledge available at any given time” (2016, 13, 15). 
For example, support for “the creation of protected marine or ter-
restrial areas [must be] underpinned by the best scientific basis 
available at any given time” (2016, 15). Support for the protected 
areas used for the protection of fishing resources must continue, 
“as long as their definition is based on the best available scientific 
knowledge and their management is agreed with the major fish-
ery organizations in the region” (2016, 31). 
The Pollution indicator, accounting for 3 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 228), notes that the 
changes occurring in the polar regions are interpreted by Spain as 
“an accepted scientific fact [and that they] are induced, primarily, 
by greenhouse gas emissions.” These reach the polar regions due 
to “atmospheric and oceanic circulation and river runoff, all of 
which are generated, essentially, outside the polar regions in areas 
with high-intensity urbanization, industrialization and farming” 
(2016,9). As there is no “system for preventing and/or addressing 
the damage produced by marine pollution” (2016, 32), Arctic ma-
rine environments must be protected. As a solution, the Strategy 
offers “the opening of new routes cutting the transit distance… 
[which will favor] “the proportional reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, although this could be offset by an increase in transac-
tion intensity due to lower logistical costs” (2016, 34).
According to the Climate Change indicator, which accounts 
for 9 % of the total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy 
(see Figure 25, p. 228), the Strategy refers to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) propos-
al of “a set of measures to address both climate change mitigation 
and the adaptation to these changes” (p.10), as well as to “the Paris 
Climate Summit (COP21)” (2016, 10). It also identifies the Arc-
tic as being among the most sensitive regions to climate change, 
where the effects of climate change “are self-reinforcing,” for ex-
ample, “the heightened thawing of permafrost could trigger sub-
stantial emissions of methane and other short-life hydrocarbons, 
with a greenhouse gas effect that is far more potent than that of 
carbon dioxide” (2016, 10). These effects are equal to twice “the 
average recorded worldwide”; they have the effect of “reducing 
both the extension and the thickness of the ice, of increasing the 
seasonal contraction of sea ice, and the melting of permafrost” 
(2016, 9). 
Among other explicitly noted impacts are: i) “the gradual melt-
ing of the ice caps,” as shown by scientific research, and the 
effects this will have on “environmental, social, political, geo-
strategic and economic issues” (2016, 8); ii) “significant envi-
ronmental changes, which have a direct impact on global cli-
mate processes” (2016, 12); iii) “on our planet, polar regions are 
among the most sensitive to climate change with consequenc-
es that... are having a far-reaching impact on the region’s en-
vironment and resident populations, and access to its natural 
reserves” (2016, 10); and iv) “ intercontinental trade [through 
the Arctic passages] going to or from ports beyond the Arctic it-
self will occur in the medium term, possibly after approximately 
20 years, if the international scientific community’s forecasting 
models regarding sea ice decline in this polar maritime region 
are correct” (2016, 32).
These impacts need to take into consideration “the impact of 
climate change on human populations in the Arctic, including 
the necessary development of the social and human sciences in 
an inhabited area with extreme climate conditions and popula-
tion subjected to fast-moving, radical changes in their environ-
ment” (2016, 20). Furthermore, “exploitation of resources in the 
polar regions and their transport must be carried out in a stable, 
sustainable and environmentally-friendly manner… a higher 
priority must be given to maintaining biodiversity and the living 
conditions of the local populations in these biologically unique 
areas with such extreme weather conditions” (2016, 27). 
The Security indicator, which accounts for 2 % of the total 
coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 
228), identifies the geostrategic situation of the Arctic region as 
“subject to the Arctic countries’ sovereignty and jurisdiction” 
and remarks that there is “no specific multilateral instrument 
regulating international spaces, such as the Antarctic Treaty” 
(2016, 12). Therefore, “scientific research, productive activities 
and even environmental protection are, in the Artic, under the 
influence of the coastal countries” (2016, 12). Thereafter, the 
Strategy, as mentioned earlier, somewhat surprisingly, considers 
the fostering of; “peacekeeping, environmental protection and 
security” in the polar regions as a necessity… and that Spain’s 
presence in the polar regions is “an affair of State” (2016, 13).
The Safety and SAR indicator, accounting for 2 % of the total 
coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 
228), notes that “different Arctic routes do not currently have a 
complete, reliable, accessible system for cartographic informa-
tion or navigational assistance” and that there is no “a high-seas 
search and rescue system covering all of the interior seas and 
straits, nor a system for preventing and/or addressing the dam-
age produced by marine pollution” (2016, 32). It is thus vital to 
“promote the necessary measures for free, safe and environmen-
tally-friendly trans-Arctic maritime transit, in strict compliance 
with the 1982 UNCLOS and the IMO’s International Code for 
Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), the natural mul-
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tilateral framework for managing navigation issues, including 
polar navigation” (2016, 14).
The Strategy considers that different areas of activity are behind 
“Spain’s sectoral interests in the polar regions.” These are related 
“both to extractive activities and the available natural reserves, 
new navigable routes, commercial activity in the polar regions, 
and other fields related to the development of new technolo-
gies” (2016, 28), as identified by the Economy indicator. This 
accounts for 10 % of the total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar 
Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 228). This indicator notes that geo-
strategic and economic interests in the polar regions are caused, 
inter alia, by “improved potential of access to their natural re-
sources, tourism, fishing, and maritime traffic” (2016, 12). Fur-
thermore, “exploitation of resources in the polar regions and 
their transport must be carried out in a stable, sustainable and 
environmentally-friendly manner [and] a higher priority must 
be given to maintaining biodiversity and the living conditions 
of the local populations in these biologically unique areas with 
such extreme weather conditions” (2016, 27). 
Concerning fisheries, the Spanish Strategy is twofold: first, it 
notes that “Spain only carries out fishing activities when permit-
ted by international or national regulations [because] protecting 
the environment is important in order to prevent the pollution 
or deterioration of the fishing grounds from negatively impact-
ing the resources [and] ensure the sector’s sustainability, which 
includes respecting the environment and combating illegal, un-
reported, and unregulated fishing” (p. 29). Second, it notes that 
the “fishing industry must consider the fact that the management 
of fishery resources is an EU mandate, falling under the aegis of 
its Common Fisheries Policy. It must be taken into account that 
Spain, as an EU Member State, is now a member of the NEAFC, 
whose remit includes Arctic waters” (2016, 29).
Finally, the Strategy notes that the status of the Arctic Economic 
Council (AEC), established in 2014, “has yet to be defined, but… 
aims to be a forum for cooperation among companies interested 
in carrying out activities in the Arctic that maintain the high-
est environmental protection standards…. [and that the AEC] 
is promoting the development of joint projects with other coun-
tries having experience and investment potential regarding Arc-
tic projects, with strict respect for the environment” (2016, 28).
The Tourism indicator, accounting for 1 % of the total coded 
quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 228), is 
limited and identifies tourism as a field of “special interest,” to-
gether with other fields and interests, such as scientific research, 
environmental protection, energy, industry, resources, polar 
technologies, transport, and support for the lifestyles and cul-
tures of the Indigenous Arctic populations (2016, 14).
The Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total 
coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, p. 
228), is all about marine transportation and shipping. The strat-
egy highlights the “two factors favouring the intensification of 
commercial relations between areas of the Arctic and Spanish 
ports: Spain straddles major world navigation routes: the Straits 
of Gibraltar and the North-South maritime axis. Spain has an 
overcapacity of turnkey transport and logistical infrastructure” 
(2016, 32). Furthermore, it identifies that “perhaps the greatest 
difficulty” will be the inability to duly meet the requirement of 
regularity demanded by shipping agents regarding interconti-
nental transport services” (2016, 32) if the Arctic passages can-
not stay completely open year-round.
The Strategy remarks that trans-Arctic navigation is a reality, 
as “cabotage traffic between Arctic countries has been going 
on for decades, mainly through the Siberian passage, encom-
passing two major classes of commercial navigation” (2016, 31). 
Originally, destination or transit ships carried mineral and fish-
ing resources for international distribution. “This flow of com-
mercial traffic is related,” according to the Strategy “not only to 
raw materials, but above all to the intercontinental exchange of 
semifinished and finished goods (general merchandise), result-
ing from the consolidation of a global economy” ( 2016, 32). As 
a result, the Strategy concludes, or predicts, that “the real impact 
of the Arctic passages on intercontinental trade going to or from 
ports beyond the Arctic itself will occur in the medium term, 
possibly after approximately 20 years, if the international scien-
tific community’s forecasting models regarding sea ice decline 
in this polar maritime region are correct” (2016, 32). 
As a permanent opening, the “Northeastern Siberian passage… 
would lead to a commercial route competitive with the classic 
southerly routes. Routes crossing the Siberian Arctic connect-
ing ports in the north of China, Japan, and South Korea with the 
Atlantic coast of northern Europe would offer savings in terms 
of distance and time with regard to the Malacca/Suez/Gibraltar 
route” (2016, 33). Here, the Strategy also speculates about pos-
sible competition between northern and southern seas routes: 
“the impact of a fully operational Siberian passage on Spain’s 
logistical positioning in the container market is, unlike that of 
the Canadian passage, one of facilitating, in the long term, that 
Spain’s Atlantic/Straits of Gibraltar ports could opt to connect 
with the new transport chains polarized within the North Atlan-
tic arc” (2016, 34). Further, if the western Mediterranean will be 
competing with the North Atlantic carry goods from Asia, “the 
key for the southern ports is to improve their land accessibility, 
an issue addressed in the latest revision… of the Trans-Euro-
pean Transport Network” (2016, 34). All in all, “the opening of 
new routes cutting the transit distance is going to favour the 
proportional reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, although 
this could be offset by an increase in transaction intensity due to 
lower logistical costs. In any case, it would affect emissions [that 
are] not within the scope of the EU’s current targets, but rather 
[emissions from] international bunkering, which are being ne-
gotiated for inclusion in the mitigation obligations under the 
UNFCCC” (2016, 34).
The Science and Education indicator accounts for 29 % of the 
total coded quotes of the Spanish Polar Strategy (see Figure 25, 
p. 228). This indicator is the most substantial part of the strategy 
and greatly reflective of the main interests of Spain in the polar 
regions. It identifies the Spanish promotion of “polar scientific 
research that respects regional legislation and fosters interna-
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tional cooperation, out of the conviction that these extreme re-
gions of the Earth, the Arctic and the Antarctic, must be used 
for peaceful ends and for the sustainable development of the 
region and of the world” (2016, 10). Spain has had installations 
in the Antarctic for over three decades, and annually sends ex-
peditions there “representing high levels of development, expe-
rience, and findings” (2016, 18). One example is the Oceano-
graphic Research Vessel Hespérides with a “Lloyd Ice Class 1C 
hull equipped for physical oceanography, hydrography, marine 
geology and biology and a classification for young ice… to oper-
ate in the Antarctic and the Arctic” (2016, 26). Spain’s Institute 
of Geology and Mining (IGME) “is responsible for the National 
Polar Data Centre” (2016, 26). 
As Spain’s scientific activity in the Arctic is thus quite recent and 
the country does not have its own land infrastructure in the re-
gion, there is a “need for specific infrastructures and complex 
logistics, [as] scientific research in the polar regions requires a 
sufficient level of long-term financing, organization, stability 
and continuity” (p. 18). Furthermore, “it is necessary to for-
malize relations with other countries to order to gain access to 
installations in different geographic areas and to promote re-
search in Arctic waters through oceanographic campaigns us-
ing Spanish resources or taking into account the possibility of 
integrating our oceanographic vessels into Eurofleet” (2016, 21). 
The document acknowledges that “scientific cooperation is one 
of the most effective forms of international cooperation… it can 
be transformed into essential political capital enabling effective 
action and supporting the presence of Spain in polar institu-
tions and bodies, enabling it to defend both its own interests 
and global interests” (2016, 10). Therefore, Spain will advance, 
among other things, “the development of scientific and techni-
cal polar research in the framework of international coopera-
tion” (2016, 13). Moreover, as “participation in international 
forums is essential to polar research… there must be a strategy 
for promoting ongoing involvement in international forums 
based on results assessment and a cost-benefit analysis of the 
participation” (2016, 24–25), for example, the European Polar 
Board drafting its Strategic Plan (2016, 19). An example of the 
best available scientific knowledge and its management could be 
that “the data collected encompasses not only fishing statistics 
but also scientific information relevant to studies on biodiversi-
ty and biomass evolution” (2016, 30).
The Strategy emphasizes that polar research as a whole is “es-
sential for many branches of science, including environmental 
earth science and the role of the processes occurring in the en-
vironment.” For example, due to “our ability to predict the im-
pact of these variations on the local Arctic populations… [we 
can] foresee the possible effects of these changes in our own 
latitudes” (2016,10). “The creation of protected marine or ter-
restrial areas” is also a possibility and would be “underpinned 
by the best scientific basis available at any given time” (2016, 
15). Furthermore, “scientific research in the polar regions is es-
pecially important due to the global impact of the processes and 
discoveries taking place there… the understanding, knowledge 
and observation of the geological, biological, oceanographic 
and atmospheric processes occurring in both the Arctic and the 
Antarctic are critical to the advancement of our knowledge of 
the Earth’s land and ocean system processes” (p. 18). Finally, due 
to the isolation of Arctic regions, there is a “need for specific 
infrastructures and complex logistics…scientific research in the 
polar regions requires a sufficient level of long-term financing, 
organization, stability and continuity” (2016, 19).
Due to “the gradual melting of the ice caps as a consequence of 
climate change” interest in the Arctic and the Antarctic is grow-
ing with respect to scientific research and environmental, social, 
political, geostrategic and economic issues (2016, 8–9). “Scien-
tific research findings are of vital importance to our knowledge 
of the environmental processes and risks that climate change can 
bring to our planet,” increasing our ability “to foresee the possi-
ble effects of these changes in our own latitudes” (2016, 11). The 
Strategy notes, even emphasizes, that such changes make it im-
portant to redefine these extraordinarily fragile regions so that 
they treated and managed “in a sustainable and environmental-
ly-friendly manner… at least until there is sufficient scientific 
knowledge” available on how best to manage them (2016, 13). 
Spain thus wishes to promote “polar scientific research that re-
spects regional legislation and fosters international cooperation, 
out of the conviction that these extreme regions of the Earth, the 
Arctic and the Antarctic, must be used for peaceful ends and 
for the sustainable development of the region and of the world” 
(2016, 10). The Strategy also considers “polar research to be a 
strategic priority for the Spanish scientific system, due both to 
its scientific importance and its high internationalization and 
repercussions in areas of interest to Spain, both strategically and 
socio-economically” (2016, 20). 
The Strategy identifies many action proposals on scientific re-
search and scientific cooperation in the Arctic…so that Spain 
can achieve “a high profile in the forums, initiatives, and actions 
carried out in the areas of scientific research [and] technology” 
including sustainable use of natural resources, and freedom of 
navigation (2016, 17). These proposals include, for example, 
strengthening the Polar Data Centre “to guarantee future access 
to the data obtained in polar campaigns” (2016, 23); and to es-
tablish “a long-term programme to monitor and research rele-
vant aspects of polar science, with the participation of scientists 
from Spain and other countries… [and also] long-term promo-
tion of research and development programmes” (2016, 23). With 
respect to fishing resources, the Strategy proposes that Spain 
should “continue providing the information [it] collects for sci-
entific monitoring of its fisheries, for use within the framework 
of the different scientific bodies competent in each polar region” 
(2016, 31), creating “the best possible interaction between the 
scientific monitoring of Spanish fisheries with the National Polar 
Data Centre and Spanish polar research circles” (2016, 31)
Finally, this indicator also includes several requests which Spain 
wishes to promote and facilitate, such as “the involvement of 
Spanish researchers in the Arctic Council’s different working 
groups (2016, 15) … [as well as] stable financing, the avail-
ability of scientific infrastructure in Antarctica, and the use of 
facilities belonging to other countries as part of international 
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cooperation agreements, both in the Arctic and the Antarc-
tic—[are all] enabling Spain to develop an internationally re-
nowned scientific programme” (2016,6). The Strategy also 
requires Spain’s scientific effort in the polar regions should be 
promoted among policymakers and at educational centres, for 
example, by the “hiring of young researchers by the scientif-
ic teams having the highest training capacity, complementing 
contract calls with specific training programmes” (2016, 25, 26). 
The Implementation indicator is de facto included in the strat-
egy as the action proposals appear to provide a series of items 
linked to Spain’s aims in polar regions, for example, “the pro-
gramme should be proactive and invite potentially interested 
Spanish groups to participate in polar activities and to be sub-
ject to the usual evaluation and selection procedures” (2016, 24). 
To sum up
The Guidelines for A Spanish Polar Strategy starts with the as-
surance of Spain’s “considerable presence in the polar regions” 
(2016, 17), a statement reinforced not only by the presence of 
Spanish mariners and whalers in northern and Arctic waters in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, but also by the fact that Spain today is 
a Consultative Party of the Antarctic Treaty. Spain is also a Medi-
terranean country—almost a metaphor for the ‘South’ in the Eu-
ropean context. Spain’s aim is to “foster peacekeeping, environ-
mental protection and security in the polar regions” (2016, 13). 
The Strategy places emphasis on polar research, including edu-
cation, as a “strategic priority for the Spanish scientific system,” 
with polar research highlighted as being a “global geostrategic 
instrument.” Based on the coding and qualitative measuring of 
the 12 indicators, the Science and education indicator is identi-
fied as the main priority of the Polar Strategy of Spain. 
Other priorities identified are, on the one hand, maritime trans-
portation along northern sea routes, dealing with the Arctic 
(a part of the Infrastructure indicator), and with fisheries and 
the fishing industry (Governance and Economy indicatorss). 
A combination of these two indicators would suggest that an-
other main priority of Spain’s Arctic policy is free navigation in 
northern waters with better trade access, and involvement in the 
management of fishery resources, as an EU mandate, in ice-free 
Arctic waters. 
The Strategy has a twofold approach towards climate change 
vis-à-vis economic activities. It identifies, on the one hand, that 
“polar regions are among the most sensitive to climate change” 
and that there are “significant environmental changes, which 
have a direct impact on global climate processes” (2016, 12), and 
on the other hand, that the multi-dimensional and far-reaching 
impacts of climate change include (better) “access to its natural 
reserves” (2016, 10). This is, of course, true, and the Strategy is 
not the only Arctic policy document to have this two-dimen-
sional approach, or ambivalence. The two other indicators, Cli-
mate change and Economy are rather even in terms of quanti-
tative measuring (see Figure 25, p. 228), while within Action 
Proposals, scientific research is almost on a par with Logistics 
and Sectoral Issues, which mainly consists of fishing resources 
and navigation. The duality discussed above presents a holistic 
grand challenge and is a wicked problem. However, in general, 
a strategy does not have clear priorities, if it does not make a 
strategic choice between issues, even contradictory ones. 
It can be concluded the results of the coding and analysis are 
convergent with the priorities, as the main focus of the strategy 
is on international cooperation and polar research. 
United Kingdom
Adapting To Change–UK policy towards the Arctic was adopted 
and signed in 2013 (United Kingdom Foreign and Common-
wealth Office 2013), while the updated version, Beyond the Ice–
UK policy towards the Arctic was adopted and signed in 2018 
(United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2018).
The 2013 UK Arctic Policy (31 pages, including several pic-
tures) “is intended to be a clear exposition of Government pol-
icies towards the Arctic and will be reviewed regularly… it is 
designed to set the overall direction for further policies towards 
the Arctic as well as a way of presenting existing policies” (2013, 
9). The UK vision on “an Arctic that is safe and secure; well gov-
erned in conjunction with Indigenous peoples and in line with 
international law,” will be supported by, among other things, the 
following principles: i) “respect for the sovereign rights of the 
Arctic states… for the views and interests of people who live and 
work in the Arctic… for the environment, its fragility and its 
central importance to the global climate”; ii) leadership, accord-
ing to the UK “leadership for Arctic stewardship rests with the 
eight Arctic states and the peoples within those States… How-
ever, it would be wrong to say that the UK should not show any 
leadership on issues affecting the Arctic”; and iii) cooperation, 
as “the mix of actors, interests and expertise at play in the Arctic 
means dialogue and cooperation should be at heart of Arctic 
policy making” (2013, 7). 
Further, the 2013 Policy sets out “for the first time the detail of 
the United Kingdom’s interests in the Arctic, how we will work 
with Arctic States and the wider international community, and 
what expertise the United Kingdom can offer to help meet some 
of the long-term challenges facing the region”; it also “outlines 
the United Kingdom’s legitimate interests in the region, our pri-
orities for practical action and our willingness to show leader-
ship in appropriate areas. It recognises that what happens in the 
Arctic has a global impact and can be a legitimate concern of 
people far beyond the Arctic Circle. It commits the United King-
dom to working with international partners to balance the needs 
of human development with environmental protection. ”It does 
this by setting out “three tenets—covering the human, environ-
mental and commercial dimensions—that between them con-
tribute to the UK’s overall vision for the Arctic” (2013, 9). 
The updated 2018 UK Arctic Policy, is a review of achievement 
since the 2013 publication and purports to be based on the same 
three core principles (2018, 3). The 2018 Policy (33 pages, in-
cluding pictures and maps) states that the UK “holds fast to 
Part IV: Strategies and Policies of the Observer States
233
a vision of a Global Britain that is engaged in the world and 
working with our international partners to advance prosper-
ity and security in the Arctic” and that “UK science and in-
novation helps advance global understanding of how changes 
in the Arctic have global consequences and helps to find new 
solutions to the challenges” (2018 7). The UK has “always been 
a world leader in Polar affairs,” according to the 2018 Policy 
and “British views have long held sway in the fields of polar 
science, exploration, diplomacy, business and environmental 
protection. Even in spite of UK’s intended withdrawal from the 
European Union, the 2018 Framework “reaffirms our intention 
to remain a significant player in Arctic affairs” (2018, 2). 
In addition, the Policy refers to the speech of the First Minis-
ter of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, in 2016 at the Arctic Circle 
Assembly where she speaks of tackling climate change and to 
promote climate justice, noting the Scottish Government’s an-
nouncement “that it would develop its own Arctic Strategy on 
devolved matters at the Arctic Circle Forum in Edinburgh in 
November 2017” (2018, 9). Indeed, the Scottish Government 
released its first Arctic Policy Framework in September 2019, 
which understandably is not included this analysis. 
According to the 2018 Arctic Policy, UK actions and priori-
ties in the Arctic cover the following three areas: 1) Protecting 
global influence; 2) Protecting people and the environment; 
and 3) Promoting prosperity (2018, 4).
The 2013 UK Arctic Policy reflects to the (Re)mapping and (re)
defining the Arctic indicator by defining that “the area with-
in the Arctic Circle is home to 4 million people. On a slightly 
wider definition of the Arctic, its population is around 10 mil-
lion” (2013, 1). There is “no universally agreed definition of the 
Arctic, but a number of common definitions are in use” (2013, 
1: see also “Common definitions of the Arctic” map on p. 2). 
The Policy also notes that as “one of the most pristine areas 
of the world” the Arctic is “diverse in terms of its geographic, 
climatic and human dimensions.” Therefore, to understand the 
region and its ecosystem “it is not particularly useful to see it as 
a homogenous section of the world entirely covered by ice and 
snow” (2013, 1). 
Furthermore, the region has “a unique environment of glob-
al significance. It is an environment that is changing rapidly 
and will continue to change; [although] that is still not fully 
understood” (2013, 17). For example, there is “no doubt that 
the Arctic is on the frontier of global climate change impacts… 
[and also] seeing more commercial activity… non-Arctic States 
have long had an impact on the Arctic, for example, as sources 
of Arctic pollutants” (2013, 4). The 2013 document also identi-
fies that “the Arctic has been connected to the wider world for 
[a long time] through trade and with pollution” (2013, 1). It 
therefore has a history of non-traditional activities, such as oil 
and gas exploitation since the 1960s, as well as being a region 
is “inextricably linked to global processes, whether they are 
climatic, environmental, social, legal or economic” (2013, 4). 
The closeness of UK, as “the northernmost country outside of 
the eight Arctic States; the northern tip of the Shetland Islands 
being only 400 km south of the Arctic Circle…combined with 
a long tradition of exploration, has given the UK a historic in-
terest in the Arctic that dates back to the voyages of discovery” 
(2013, 7). 
Echoing this, the 2018 Arctic Policy briefly notes, using a map 
with “Arctic Definitions,” that “there is no single Arctic and no 
universally agreed definition of the Arctic” (2018, 5), and that 
“the Arctic is not one homogenous landscape” (2018,17). “Differ-
ent descriptions result in a variation in the number of people… 
estimates range from four to ten million people. Regardless of 
technical definitions, the Arctic is a vibrant mix of communities 
and cultures, languages and traditions; a place where people live, 
trade and visit.” (2018, 5). Furthermore, it is “an area of fascina-
tion for many people who first learned about the region from the 
stories of the early explorers. For others, their passion develops 
from a desire to protect the landscape and its wildlife” (2018, 5). 
Finally, the 2018 Policy echoes the 2013 Policy by noting that 
“although the UK is not an Arctic State, we are its nearest neigh-
bour, with Lerwick in the Shetland Islands closer to the Arctic 
Circle than it is to London” (2018, 2). 
Figure 26 shows how many quotes are assigned to the different 
indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes 
(rounded to the nearest whole number) in the document. 
Figure 26. United Kingdom Strategy Comparison
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 6 % of the total 
coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 7 % of those 
of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26). This indicator is 
explicitly noted in the chapter “protecting people and the envi-
ronment” of the 2018 Policy, as it refers to “the importance of 
taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts” 
based on the UN Global Goals for Sustainable Development. 
Here the Policy recognizes that “the Arctic is not one homoge-
nous landscape, neither are the people who live there. The tradi-
tions and cultures of the Indigenous people differ between each 
group, as much as they do between the Indigenous people and 
those who live in the cities” (2018, 17). 
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This diversity is supported by the statement that “the UK Gov-
ernment will respect the views, interests, culture and traditions of 
the Arctic Indigenous people” and “the inclusion of Indigenous 
peoples in the Arctic Council” is welcomed (2018, 17). Finally, 
among other things, the UK “supports safe, responsible and sus-
tainable tourism in the Arctic that enables visitors to experience 
the uniqueness of the region, which respects the preserve of local 
communities while supporting their economy and protects the 
fragile environment for future generations” (2018, 22).
 
Correspondingly, the 2013 Policy states in the chapter on the 
human dimension that the UK will “work towards an Arctic 
that is safe and secure; well governed in conjunction with In-
digenous peoples and in line with international law” (2013 13). 
Furthermore, it “will respect the views, interests, culture and 
traditions of Arctic Indigenous peoples and promote the partic-
ipation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making” (2013, 14). 
This links to one of the UK’s major approaches to the Arctic 
in terms of “respect for the views and interests of people who 
live and work in the Arctic and call it home” (2013, 7). Among 
other things, the Policy also promises that the UK “fully imple-
ments the EU-wide policy on trade in seal products,” including 
recognizing a “clear exemption to allow the free trade of seal 
products from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and other 
Indigenous communities that contribute to their subsistence” 
(2013, 20).
Non-Indigenous people(s) are only briefly identified as “peo-
ple who are defined as living in the Arctic estimates range 
from four to ten million” (2013, 5) and “those who live in the 
cities” (2013, 17).
The Governance indicators, accounting for 10 % of the total 
coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and 3 % of those 
of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), are sub-
stantial in the 2013 Policy. The latter notes that the “UK will 
work towards an Arctic that is safe and secure; well governed in 
conjunction with Indigenous peoples and in line with interna-
tional law; where policies are developed on the basis of sound 
science with full regard to the environment; and where only 
responsible development takes place” (2013, 7). The phrase 
“Promoting good governance of the Arctic through existing fora 
and legal mechanisms” (2013, 13) means: i) “ that governance of 
the Arctic rests with the sovereign Arctic States, supplemented 
and complemented by international agreements and treaties, 
in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS)”; ii) that through the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration the five 
littoral states of the Arctic Ocean “committed themselves to the 
existing legal framework and to the orderly settlement of over-
lapping territorial claims. The UK will strongly support moves 
by the Arctic States that promote governance in conjunction 
with international law… [and] considers [that] moving towards 
a specific Arctic Treaty at this time [is] neither necessary nor 
beneficial” (2013, 13); and iii) that the Arctic Council “has been 
successful in helping promote practical co-operation and en-
gagement between them, particularly regarding environmental 
and sustainable development issues” and that UK—as an active 
observer of the Council—contributes “scientific expertise to 
many of the Council’s Working Groups… [and] will support 
the Arctic Council as the pre-eminent regional forum for dis-
cussing Arctic issues and the stability it provides for discussion 
amongst Arctic States” (2013, 13)
 
Concerning exploitation of living natural resources, the UK’s 
overriding principles regarding the management of fishing 
activity in the Arctic are explicitly discussed in the 2013 Pol-
icy, in which the UK “supports the work of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs) in managing fish stocks 
and marine ecosystems, including in the waters of the Arctic” 
(2013, 27). Finally, as an active member of the International 
Whaling Commission, the UK “strongly supports the morato-
rium on commercial whaling” (2013, 20).
Based on the 2018 Policy, “the UK’s primary foreign policy 
objective continues to be the maintenance of the Arctic as a 
peaceful and stable region. Integral to this is the recognition 
that the vast majority of the Arctic region falls within the sov-
ereign jurisdiction of the eight Arctic States. “Their leadership 
is vital to sustain a safe, secure and peaceful region” (2018, 7). 
Regarding UNCLOS, it is explicitly noted that: “the rights and 
responsibilities of Arctic coastal states [provide] an overarch-
ing agreement that regulates the various uses of Arctic waters. 
Continuous decline in Arctic sea-ice will necessitate negotiat-
ed agreement to ensure that claims to Continental Shelf under 
the Arctic Ocean are conducted within international norms 
and that there is continued cooperation in areas of the Arctic 
Ocean that are beyond national jurisdiction” (2018, 8). Follow-
ing on from this, the 2018 Policy concludes that “while there 
were areas where rules and collaborative mechanisms could be 
further developed, no major governance gaps exist at present” 
(2018, 10). 
Finally, the Arctic Council, “with its vision for peace, stability 
and constructive cooperation in the Arctic,” is explicitly iden-
tified and heralded “for its role in promoting cooperation and 
coordination between the Arctic states and for ensuring that the 
Indigenous peoples are central to their discussions” (2018, 7). 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation 
indicator, which accounts for 9 % of the total coded quotes of 
the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 15 % of those of the 2018 
UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), reveals that the 2018 
policy builds on a global approach, noting that UK “holds fast 
to a vision of a Global Britain that is respected abroad, engaged 
in the world and working with our international partners to 
advance prosperity and security around the world” (2018, 4). 
Based on its close proximity to the Arctic and connections with 
the global systems, the UK reaffirms “our commitment to sup-
port and work in partnership with the eight Arctic States and 
the region’s Indigenous peoples, to uphold this position” (2018, 
7). The bilateral relations with the Arctic States bring “greater 
depth to our Arctic engagement”; they are “strong and mul-
tidimensional... [we work] with them bilaterally and within a 
multitude of international fora” (2018, 8): they include the 2011 
High Level Agreement on the Strengthening of UK and Nor-
wegian cooperation on polar research and cultural heritage, 
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and also scientific cooperation between the UK Science and 
Innovation Network (SIN) team and Russian research institu-
tions, together with the project run by the “British Embassy 
Helsinki to strengthen its policy relationships with Finland on 
Arctic affairs” (2018, 24). 
Diplomatic relationships with the Arctic Council with their 
“vision for peace, stability and constructive cooperation in the 
Arctic” and with most of the other multilateral organisations 
are also discussed in the 2018 Policy, in particular, the UK’s par-
ticipation in the 1st Arctic Science Ministerial meeting in 2016 
in Washington, and preparations for the second one in 2018, 
which explicitly aim “to increase capacity to respond to major 
societal challenges in the Arctic and encourage further scientific 
cooperation among [the states]” (2018, 13). 
Concerning international agreements and rules-based sys-
tems, the 2018 Policy identifies “the importance of negotiated 
and consensus driven agreements through multilateral organ-
isations [and] treaties,” such as UNCLOS, IMO and the Con-
vention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) (2018, 18). These “arrangements 
continue to provide an additional platform for cooperation 
and collaboration between the Arctic States and with the wider 
international community” (2018, 8). The UN Minamata Con-
vention on Mercury is defined as “an important global treaty 
to protect human health and the environment from the adverse 
effects of mercury” (2018, 20). Moreover, the Paris Climate 
Agreement and the United Nations Global Goals for Sustain-
able Development recognize “the importance of taking urgent 
action to combat climate change and its impacts; to conserving 
and sustainably using marine resources; and of life on land.” The 
UK “is firmly committed to delivering the goals at home and 
around the world” (2018, 4). From a number of international 
conferences focused on the Arctic, aimed at sharing expertise 
and experience, the Policy identifies the Arctic Circle Assembly 
and Arctic Frontiers as “the prominent” ones; these have be-
come significant annual events that bring together academics, 
civil society, scientists, businesses and governments” (2018, 9). 
Correspondingly, the 2013 Policy has an explicit global ap-
proach, stating that the inextricable links “to global processes, 
whether they are climatic, environmental, social, legal or eco-
nomic” (2013, 4) mean that non-Arctic states, such as the UK, 
“have legitimate interests and roles to play in finding solutions 
to many of the most pressing issues facing the Arctic” (2013, 
7). Furthermore, “global Arctic policy needs to keep up with 
the rapid changes being seen in the Arctic and use the scientif-
ic evidence available”; here, the UK “will encourage the timely 
feedback of robust evidence into decision making mechanisms” 
(2013, 17). The UK also “believes that those aspects of Arctic 
policy that are either affected by or contribute to wider global 
impacts are best discussed by open dialogue with a broad range 
of actors,” and that, therefore, the UK “will actively encourage 
the Arctic Council and other regional fora to further engage 
non-Arctic countries in Arctic matters of global importance” 
(2013, 13). The UK’s “long-standing aim of working closely and 
co-operatively with the Arctic States, Indigenous peoples and 
others on the issues facing the Arctic therefore remains central 
to the Government’s approach” (2013, 8). 
Concerning international agreements and rules-based systems, 
the 2013 Policy briefly identifies IMO, UNCLOS, SOLAS and 
MARPOL, noting the UK “does not believe that it will be nec-
essary or appropriate to make fundamental changes to existing 
international regimes for regulating Arctic, or other, shipping” 
(2013, 25)
 
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 12 % of the 
total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 10 % of 
those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233). The 
2018 Policy states that conservation is “of high importance but 
that this will be maintained alongside the utilisation of Arctic re-
sources” (2018, 10). Based on more than 300 treaties and agree-
ments, “each with an important role in protecting and improving 
the natural world… [and] playing “an active role in securing a 
new international agreement for the conservation and sustainable 
use of marine areas beyond national jurisdiction,” the UK’s aim 
is to be “at the forefront of global efforts to protect and improve 
the natural world, driving the international community to adopt 
higher standards” (2018, 16). Following on from this, “conserving 
the Arctic’s biodiversity remains a UK priority, for example, the 
nutrient-rich waters of the Arctic are critically important for as 
many as 17 different species of whale” (2018, 18). 
The links between the UK and the Arctic are not limited to cli-
mate and marine systems and marine... [as] “our shared bio-
diversity includes many migratory birds” (2018, 21). Protected 
areas are also explicitly identified, although it is noted that the 
Arctic region “is not about to become a national park, but will 
continue as a lived in, and managed, environment” (2018, 10). 
Here “the UK Government considers that the best way to deliv-
er universally accepted marine protected areas in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction would be through the new Implementing 
Agreement under UNCLOS. In support of this, the UK will 
continue to work with other Contracting Parties and the Arctic 
States through OSPAR to improve and extend the protection of-
fered by marine protected areas in the Arctic region” (2018, 18).
Finally, assessment is briefly noted, in particular “monitoring 
and further research into marine litter is underway” (2018, 19)
 
Correspondingly, the 2013 Policy includes a chapter on the 
environmental dimension, and affirms “respect for the envi-
ronment, its fragility and its central importance to the global 
climate” (2013, 7); this, in particular, means respect for biodi-
versity, as the Arctic region is described as “one of the world’s 
most pristine and biologically rich environments” (2013, 19). 
Based on its geographic location, the UK “shares a common 
marine and avian biodiversity with much of the Arctic and is 
thus intrinsically linked to the region with a significant stake in 
protecting the area’s ecosystem,” for example, protecting Arc-
tic migratory species (2013, 19). Likewise, the 2013 Policy also 
explicitly protects certain areas, and the UK is “a strong sup-
porter of the efforts of Parties to the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity to strive for marine protected areas… [and] will 
support the principle of designating Marine Protected Areas in 
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international waters, including in the Arctic, where the science 
supports it” (2013, 20). Finally, ecosystems-based management 
is said to provide “a flexible approach to managing ecosystems 
subject to… the rapid changes taking place in the Arctic,” where 
the UK “will encourage experts to engage with the Arctic States 
and Arctic Council… to help underpin the resilience of Arctic 
ecosystems and communities” (2013, 19).
The Pollution indicator, which accounts for 3 % of the total cod-
ed quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 8 % of those of 
the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is identified 
within the 2018 Policy: “the Arctic is becoming increasingly 
polluted and increasingly visited, while a growing number of 
non-Arctic nations are looking toward the Arctic as a place for 
commerce” (2018, 2), and as “the vast majority of litter and pol-
lutants impacting the Arctic originate outside of the region it is 
essential for us all to take action” (2018, 18). Among pollutants 
listed are: i) “marine litter, particularly marine plastic pollution 
[as] a serious and growing threat to our environment” (2018, 
19); ii), “a range of chemicals and pollutants that are having a 
harmful effect on the Arctic environment… for example, the 
contamination of the environment from mercury is not new” 
(2018, 20); iii) “noise in our seas and its impact on vulnerable 
species” (2018, 19), and iv), emissions of black carbon from in-
ternational shipping, and other “greenhouse gas emissions…the 
effects of climate change in the Arctic are accentuated by the 
impact of black carbon” (2018, 26). The 2018 Policy does not 
explicitly identify who are the polluters. 
As for pollution problem solving, the 2018 Policy notes that the 
UK “has committed to improve the situation [marine plastic 
pollution] through domestic and international action” (2018, 
19), and “will continue to display the same strong leadership 
shown when we became the 1st country in the world to set legal-
ly binding emission reduction targets through the 2008 Climate 
Change Act” (2018, 4). Moreover, international agreements are 
identified as important, among them the Intersessional Corre-
spondence Group on Marine Litter, and OSPAR through which 
the UK and other contracting parties “have developed and are 
implementing a Regional Action Plan on Marine Litter” (2018, 
19); the UN Minamata Convention on Mercury is identified as 
“an important global treaty to protect human health and the en-
vironment from the adverse effects of mercury” (2018, 20); the 
Polar Code, through the IMO and PAME reduce “risks of use 
and carriage of heavy fuel oil as fuel by ships in Arctic waters” 
(2018, 20). Finally, as far as assessment is concerned, the G7 
and the UN Environment Programme will “review and propose 
monitoring methods, share best practice and recommend fur-
ther research or action” (2018, 19).
The 2013 Policy is brief, noting that “non-Arctic States have 
long had an impact on the Arctic, for example as sources of 
Arctic pollutants such as mercury… [and as] contributors to 
climate change. Conversely, changes in the Arctic also impact 
on non-Arctic States” (2013, 4). Thus, “actions to reduce Short 
Lived Climate Forcers, including methane and black carbon 
(soot), are a crucial complement to reducing emissions of car-
bon dioxide in tackling climate change” (2013, 18). The UK also 
“considers that the Arctic should receive… protection from 
ship-source pollution… [and] that the expansion of shipping 
in the Arctic should not have a damaging effect on the envi-
ronment” (2013, 21). Furthermore, the UK “will build under-
standing of the climate impacts of black carbon in the Arctic; 
reduce its domestic emissions of methane,” and work with the 
IMO to reduce emissions of black carbon from Arctic and other 
shipping and through the UN Economic Commission for Eu-
rope’s Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
to address black carbon emissions (2013, 18). Here, UNCLOS 
“remains paramount in the prevention of pollution from ships 
[with MARPOL]… All environmental regulations contained in 
MARPOL apply to ships and fixed or floating platforms in Arc-
tic waters” (2013, 21).
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 11 % of the total 
coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 8 % of those 
of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233). The 2018 
Policy records that “for the last fifty years, Arctic temperatures 
have risen more than twice as fast as the global average” (2018, 
15). Possible and potential consequences of the situation are, 
among others, that “the Arctic may become effectively ice-free 
in the summer sooner than predicted, perhaps as soon as the 
late 2030s” (2018, 3); “less sea-ice results in more of the sun’s ra-
diation being absorbed by the sea… Similarly, thawing perma-
frost leads to more warming… emissions of methane and CO2 
increase as soil microbial activity increases” [and there is] “po-
tential damage to infrastructure built on it” (2018, 15). Because 
of this, the number of voyages between the Northern Sea Route 
ports and transits have increased rapidly as people’s appetite for 
the unique travel experiences the region has to offer increases, 
so does the number of visitors” (2018, 22). All this, “known as 
‘Arctic amplification,’ may have profound implications for the 
regional and global climate, as well as for the people who live in 
and around the Arctic” (2018, 15). 
As far as problem-solving is concerned, although the word ‘ad-
aptation’ occurs, the main term used is ‘mitigation’; the UK has 
“a strong record of implementing policies that mitigate the re-
lease of harmful emissions into the atmosphere” (2018, 16). The 
Clean Growth Strategy is noted as one of the mechanisms that 
will set out “how we will meet our climate targets while securing 
the economic benefits of clean growth for the UK… [and] legis-
lation and action plans developed by the devolved administra-
tion [of the UK] complement the UK’s emission reduction am-
bitions. [For example] the Scottish Government has announced 
plans to encourage an uptake of electric vehicles by phasing out 
new petrol and diesel cars by 2032” (2018, 16). Concerning in-
ternational cooperation the 2018 policy refers the UN Global 
Goals for Sustainable Development and the Paris climate agree-
ment. The UK is “fully committed to it… [but] would have pre-
ferred the USA to remain in the Paris Agreement” (2018, 16).
The 2013 Policy states that “climate change is the greatest threat 
facing the Arctic” (2013, 17), and the UK works with other 
countries “to build an understanding of the threats posed by 
climate change and the opportunities for action,” for example, 
by helping to build “mitigation capacity in countries around the 
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world” (2013, 17). Therefore, there is “no doubt that the Arctic 
is on the frontier of global climate change impacts [and] inextri-
cably linked to global processes, whether they are climatic, envi-
ronmental, social, legal or economic” (2013, 4). These processes 
include “decreasing sea-ice or increasing freshwater entering 
the Arctic Ocean [that] may have the potential to affect the UK’s 
weather and climate” (2013, 4). Finally, the document proposes 
that the UK “will play a leading role in diplomatic efforts to avoid 
dangerous climate change, including through the negotiation of 
a legally binding global climate change agreement to be agreed 
in 2015” (2013, 17). As mechanisms, the 2013 Policy identifies 
the Climate Change Act 2008 for reducing Short Lived Climate 
Forcers, and working “through the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe’s Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution to address black carbon emissions” (2013, 18).
Concerning the Security indicator, which accounts for 3 % of 
the total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 5 % 
of those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), the 
premise and objective of the 2018 Policy is to maintain “the Arc-
tic as a peaceful and stable region” (2018, 7). Hence, “the vast 
majority of the Arctic region falls within the sovereign jurisdic-
tion of the eight Arctic States. Their leadership is vital to sustain 
a safe, secure and peaceful region” (2018, 7). The cooperative 
and collaborative approach of the Arctic Council is also not-
ed to promote confidence between the Arctic States and their 
international partners, as well as “the various coastguard agen-
cies of the Arctic States and through the Arctic Coast Guard 
Forum, which provides a useful arena for cooperation” (2018, 
21). Under the sub-chapter “Defence” the policy first speculates 
whether “increased interest and commercial activity in the re-
gion provides potential for heightened tension… [as] Arctic 
nations may want to enhance their security presence in the re-
gion to protect their own territorial and commercial interests” 
(2018, 21); Second, it states that the UK “remains committed 
to preserving” this stability and security, and “will work with 
our international partners and allies through defence engage-
ment, bilateral and multilateral security cooperation,” including 
essential cold weather training exercises and participation in 
the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable; and finally, “NATO also 
remains a central plank for cooperation among its Arctic State 
members” (2018, 21). 
The 2013 Policy notes the UK’s “respect for the sovereign rights 
of the Arctic States to exercise jurisdiction over their territo-
ry” (2013 7), and that it “remains committed to preserving the 
stability and security of the Arctic region” (2013, 13). This lat-
ter objective “will be pursued through a wide range of defence 
engagement and bilateral security co-operation with a number 
of close allies and partners in the region” (2013, 13) in which 
NATO will play a central role; also central is “the UK’s partici-
pation in the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable forum, which 
promotes security co-operation on issues such as situational 
awareness and search and rescue missions” (2013, 13). 
Energy security is explicitly noted by the 2013 Policy to ensure 
“security of supply through a diverse set of sources” (2013, 24). 
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 7 % of the 
total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 4 % of 
those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), links 
tourism and maritime transport with safety in the 2018 Poli-
cy , as both have increased in recent years in the Arctic region. 
Although, “the majority of visits to the region are trouble-free” 
visitors are putting a strain “on modest search and rescue capa-
bility, and increase the potential for harm to the fragile environ-
ment” (2018, 22). The Policy thus notes that “when visiting the 
Arctic, we want British nationals to be safe and to ensure that 
all international travellers and operators refrain from harming 
the Arctic environment” (2018, 22). This will be done, for exam-
ple, by supporting “the work of the Association of Arctic Cruise 
Operators and its goal of managing responsible, environmen-
tally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and strive to set the 
highest possible operating standards” (2018, 22). Among inter-
national mechanisms for maritime safety are noted the manda-
tory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, the SAR agree-
ment by the Arctic states, and the Arctic Regional Hydrographic 
Commission, where UK will continue to seek Associate Mem-
bership status at “to maintain close links with other nations in 
the region and to share the UK’s knowledge and expertise of 
Arctic hydrography” (2018, 25).
The 2013 Policy clearly states that the UK works with the Arctic 
States and the Arctic Council to promote safety in Arctic ship-
ping. As means and mechanisms, the Policy notes i) that the 
mandatory Polar Code produces “a clear direction on the de-
sign, equipment and, where appropriate, operational methods 
of shipping”; ii) that the UK welcomes the steps by “the Arctic 
Council regarding Arctic shipping, particularly the 2011 SAR 
Agreement; and iii) the UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) has 
“considerable experience and expertise in surveying in the Arc-
tic” (2013, 26). Concerning monitoring, the Policy first men-
tions, “the significant contributions to the Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme’s ‘Snow, Water, Ice and Perma-
frost’ (SWIPA) report” by UK researchers; the “NERC funded 
Arctic Research Programme (2011–2016) [providing] detailed 
understanding of how ocean, sea-ice and atmosphere interact 
and respond under climate change” (2013, 22); and finally, that 
“the Arctic and Antarctic are experiencing increased levels of 
shipping resulting in more vessels transiting through hazard-
ous ice-infested waters.... Timely information also reduces costs 
for ships operating in sea-ice by allowing more efficient routing 
decisions and reducing the impact of hull damage from sea-ice” 
(2013, 29).
The Economy indicator, accounting for 20 % of the total coded 
quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 18 % of those of the 
2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is noted equally in 
both policy documents. Moreover, it is the most substantial field 
of the UK Arctic Policy.
The 2018 Policy is searching for a balance with the environment 
by “promoting the Arctic as a place where economic and com-
mercial development occurs in a sustainable and responsible 
manner. The 2018 Policy expresses the hope that people of the 
region benefit from the prosperity that a changing Arctic may 
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bring [while also] supporting UK companies investing in the 
Arctic; [the goals are] making them aware of, and connecting 
them to, the opportunities available” (2018, 4, also 23). At the 
same time, conservation is defined “of high importance but… 
will be maintained alongside the utilisation of Arctic resourc-
es” (2018, 10). Furthermore, “successful mining operations that 
meet the needs of customers, investors and local communities 
require strong governance frameworks and clear human rights 
policies” (2018, 27). The Arctic is also defined i) as “an area for 
maritime transport” (2018, 22) and “shipping originating from 
a destination within the Arctic itself ” (2018, 25); ii) as being 
able to provide transport links through the Barents Sea Trans-
port Plan in cooperation between Sweden, Finland and Russia, 
where ”UK companies will be encouraged to explore opportu-
nities…as these projects develop” (2018, 29); as a provider of 
energy, with the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC) in 
Orkney being defined as “the world’s first and only centre pro-
viding developers of both wave and tidal energy converters… 
with purpose-built, grid-connected open-sea testing facilities” 
(2018, 26); and iii) as providing fisheries, with Iceland’s “world-
class fisheries industry using efficient, integrated high-tech 
solutions to ensure the sustainability of its fish stocks, enhance 
the productivity of its fisheries and maximise the value of its 
catches” (2018, 27). Based on experience, “the UK Government 
will continue to adopt a science-led, precautionary and ecosys-
tem-based approach to the establishment and management of 
any new and emerging fisheries in the Arctic region” (2018, 27). 
The regulation of economic activities will be worked on “with 
the devolved administrations and regulators as part of UK-wide 
implementation mechanisms that ensure regulatory consisten-
cy across the UK for business and industry” (2018, 16). Relevant 
international mechanisms are identified as i) the Polar Code, 
an Agreement to prevent unregulated high seas fisheries in the 
Central Arctic Ocean; ii) the Arctic Economic Council; and iii) 
participation in initiatives, such as “the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights in the Extractive Industries [and] 
the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative, which ap-
ply to mines in the Arctic and elsewhere” (2018, 27). Finally, 
concerning global trade it is explicitly noted that to transport 
goods between Asia and Northern Europe through the North-
ern Sea Route “could significantly reduce travel time… thereby 
reducing costs… The amount of fuel utilised and consequently 
pollutants emitted into the environment currently, half of the 
world’s volume of trade travels through the South China Sea” 
(2018, 23). 
The 2013 Policy is even more substantial, as its chapter on the 
commercial dimension explicitly discusses energy security, 
shipping, tourism, fisheries and bioprospecting, as well as UK 
commercial expertise. The policy states that “the decision to in-
vest in commercial projects in the Arctic is a matter for the indi-
vidual companies concerned and the relevant national author-
ities of the Arctic States in whose jurisdiction they take place” 
(2013, 23). Therefore, the UK “will encourage UK business to 
engage directly with the Arctic Council, Arctic States, Indige-
nous peoples and other actors, as appropriate… [and] will facil-
itate responsible business activity in the region by UK compa-
nies” (2013, 23). The UK believes that fundamentally”: i) Arctic 
stewardship rests with the eight Arctic States and the peoples 
within those States” (2013, 8); ii) there must be “responsible de-
velopment” (2013, 23); and iii) that “the scale of the challenges 
facing the Arctic is immense and compounded by the speed of 
the changes.” Furthermore, responding “to these changes, while 
supporting rigorous protection of the environment, is one of the 
many challenges facing the region and wider world… in turn, 
the region is seeing more commercial activity,” as, due to reduc-
tions in sea-ice cover, “large reserves of oil, gas, metals and rare 
earths… are becoming more accessible with improvements in 
technology.” For example, “interest in exploration and develop-
ment of the region’s offshore oil and gas fields is steadily increas-
ing. There is also the growing possibility of increased mining for 
mineral and rare earth deposits” (2013, 21).
The 2013 Policy lists the following types of economic activity, 
in addition to tourism (the next indicator): i) energy, with UK 
energy security, global markets and the Arctic being tied togeth-
er (a case study in a box), and the UK’s import of natural gas 
from Norway; ii) “maritime transport, and shipping in partic-
ular, is an international, global industry in which the UK has a 
prominent role” (2013, 25); and iii) concerning global trade “the 
UK ports and shipping industry, together with the wider UK 
maritime cluster, are generally well placed to take advantage of 
any commercial opportunities that expansion of Arctic shipping 
may present in the short term” (2013, 25).
Among the regulations and regulators of economic activities 
(in the Arctic) the Policy identifies the International Whaling 
Commission and the UK “strongly supports the moratorium on 
commercial whaling” (2013, 20); the EU-wide policy on trade in 
seal products, which UK “fully implements” (p. 20); UNCLOS; 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
and MARPOL (2013, 25); Regional Fisheries Management Or-
ganisations (RFMOs) which are “managing fish stocks and ma-
rine ecosystems, including in the waters of the Arctic” (2013, 
27); and the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing 
“which allows fair access to genetic resources in return for a 
share of the benefits for their use, potentially paving the way 
for exciting new medicinal and genetic innovations” (2013, 27). 
The Tourism indicator, accounting for 3 % of the total coded 
quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 2 % of those of the 
2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is briefly noted by 
both documents. As already mentioned, in the 2018 Policy the 
hope is expressed that “British nationals [should] be safe and…
that all international travellers and operators [should] refrain 
from harming the Arctic environment” (2018, 22), in particular 
as all forms of tourism to the Arctic, “from small expedition 
ships to large conventional cruise liners… [have] increased in 
recent years” (2018, 22). Therefore, the UK supports, as men-
tioned earlier, “safe, responsible and sustainable tourism in the 
Arctic that enables visitors to experience the uniqueness of the 
region” (2018, 22). The UK also supports the goals of the As-
sociation of Arctic Cruise Operators of “managing responsible, 
environmentally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and 
strive to set the highest possible operating standards” (2018, 
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22). Finally, despite SAR and the legal regimes, “extra caution 
is required when planning all tourism activities and maritime 
operations in the Arctic” (2018, 22).
 
In a subchapter on tourism the 2013 Policy notes that “the Arc-
tic is an increasingly popular destination for British travellers, 
primarily as passengers on cruise ships but also for those un-
dertaking on-shore activities such as adventure tourism” (2013 
26). The Arctic coast of Norway and Svalbard are identified as 
popular destinations within the region. The challenges to safe 
tourism posed by “the isolation of certain parts of the Arctic 
combined with the harsh environment and modest capacity of 
search and rescue infrastructure… are likely to rise as the op-
portunities for Arctic tourism continue to increase” (2013 26).
As well as the Infrastructure indicator, which accounts for 2 % 
of the total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 
4 % of that of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), 
is briefly noted by the two documents. The 2018 Policy identi-
fies the Arctic as “an area of increasing importance for maritime 
transport”, as the number of voyages have rapidly increased, as 
mentioned earlier. “Although there were only 19 transits across 
the entire NSR in 2016, there were more than 1700 voyages,” 
which has implications for navigational safety (2018, 22). The 
European Arctic states prioritize improved transport links via 
the Barents Sea Transport Plan (2018 29). The policy also notes 
possible side-effects: first, that “declining Arctic sea-ice could in 
future open new shipping routes [and that] hostile conditions 
and a lack of infrastructure will make commercial operations 
difficult for some considerable time” (2018, 23); and second, 
that the Polar Silk Road, comprising road, rail and port infra-
structure built in partnership with the Arctic states means “po-
tential implementation risks that could be involved in delivering 
the Belt and Road Initiative” by China (2018, 25). 
The 2018 Policy also notes that the European Marine Energy 
Centre (EMEC) provides “an ideal base for the world-leading 
test facility with its excellent oceanic wave regime, strong tid-
al currents, close proximity to sheltered harbour facilities, and 
a wealth of renewable, maritime and environmental expertise 
within the local community” (2018, 26). Moreover, “digital 
connectivity through increased internet fibre cables and good 
broadband coverage” will benefit developed parts of the Arctic. 
In the underdeveloped and remote parts of the Arctic, the tech-
nological challenge is greater, but could be solved by innovative 
technical solutions (2018, 29).
The 2013 Policy states its belief that “the UK ports and ship-
ping industry, together with the wider UK maritime cluster, 
are generally well placed to take advantage of any commercial 
opportunities that expansion of Arctic shipping may present 
in the short term” (2013, 25). The UK aims to review over a 
longer term what can best be done do “to facilitate worthwhile 
trade opportunities and help ensure that [there is] due regard to 
safety and the environment” (2013, 25). The “sea routes to and 
from Asia are becoming increasingly ice-free for more days of 
the year” which would bring “the potential [for] growing levels 
of commercial shipping traffic between Europe and Asia over 
the coming decades” (2013, 4). Finally, the 2013 Policy notes 
that UK “supports investment in new infrastructure that would 
connect Norway’s new Arctic gas finds with the existing North 
Sea pipeline network” to satisfy projected long-term demand 
for imported gas and our transition to a low-carbon economy 
in the UK (2013, 24).
The Science and Education indicator, accounting for 16 % of 
the total coded quotes of the 2013 UK Arctic Policy and for 16 % 
of those of the 2018 UK Arctic Policy (see Figure 26, p. 233), is 
explicitly and evenly discussed in the both policy documents. 
The 2018 Policy states that “the UK research community has 
a strong record of collaborating internationally and delivering 
high impact Arctic research; nearly two-thirds of UK Arctic 
papers have international co-authors, while only three other 
countries—the US, Russia and Canada—produce more Arctic 
science papers than UK. High-level agreements, with Arctic 
States… provide strong frameworks for collaborative research” 
(2018, 11). The vision of a Global Britain in the Arctic com-
prises “the UK’s world leading science and innovation [and will 
help] advance global understanding of how changes in the Arc-
tic have global consequences and helps to find new solutions 
to the challenges” (2018, 4). Further, “as an original observer 
state, the UK has continued to influence Arctic Council policies 
by providing scientific analysis and evidence in its working and 
expert groups” (2018, 7). This is supported on the one hand, 
by the strong UK science infrastructure, including a summer 
research station in Svalbard since 1972, the ‘blue-water’ ships 
(the RRS James Cook and RRS Discovery), as well as a new 
ice-strengthened research vessel, the RRS Sir David Attenbor-
ough for “year-round access to state-of-the art facilities on this 
floating, multidisciplinary, research platform” (2018, 28); and 
finally, the UK Science and Innovation Network (SIN), “oper-
ates across the eight Arctic States in support of both UK Gov-
ernment Arctic policy and UK-based scientists and research 
bodies” (2018, 12). There is also the following research funding 
by the NERC through the Arctic Research Programme: “£15 
million available for research into changes in the Arctic and 
their possible future consequences worldwide» from 2011–
2016 (2018, 15), the Changing Arctic Ocean “£16 million in the 
5-year [period] (2017–2022)” on Implications for marine biol-
ogy and biogeochemistry,” and “£2.3m towards funding the UK 
research community participation in this truly international 
collaboration [MOSAiC]” (2018, 14).
The 2018 Policy also explicitly notes “that only by learning about 
the use of traditional and local knowledge from the Indigenous 
and local communities themselves can changes be properly 
understood and genuinely sustainable responses proposed… 
[therefore] “researchers in the UK are committed to listening 
to, and working with, Indigenous communities, to ensure the 
best outcomes for local communities and for science,” for exam-
ple, in the Yamal-Nenets region in Russia and among the Inuit 
in Canada, “It is increasingly recognised that only by learning 
about the use of traditional and local knowledge from the In-
digenous and local communities themselves can changes be 
properly understood and genuinely sustainable responses pro-
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posed” (2018, 17). Educational attainment is also included the 
2018 Policy, for example, “by providing educational tools and 
learning materials, schools can engage their pupils on a wide 
range of issues that affect the Arctic” (2018, 5), “Discovering the 
Arctic’ telling stories of Arctic people and places,” the Model 
Arctic Council initiative, and via the UArctic consortium and 
the UK Polar Network (2018, 12).
The 2013 Policy notes that “by its nature, science contributes 
directly to diplomacy, policy and our understanding of the Arc-
tic, and is the basis of much of our co-operation with Arctic 
States, the Arctic Council and other actors” (2013, 9). It also 
states that the UK “will work towards an Arctic that is safe and 
secure; well governed in conjunction with Indigenous peoples 
and in line with international law; where policies are developed 
on the basis of sound science with full regard to the environ-
ment” (2013, 7) It also states that “global Arctic policy needs to 
keep up with the rapid changes being seen in the Arctic and use 
the scientific evidence available” (2013, 17). As a result, “highly 
regarded UK science is present in most areas of Arctic research 
and also helps to underpin good policy, stable governance and 
responsible commerce” (2013, 8), and the UK “will encourage 
the timely feedback of robust evidence into decision making 
mechanisms” (2013, 17). Several examples, plus evidence of UK 
science in the Arctic, are also included in the 2013 Policy, such 
as the UK research station in Ny-Ålesund (a summer research 
facility), “two ice-capable research vessels operated by the Brit-
ish Antarctic Survey,” and “a large, active and growing Arctic 
science community, with at least 77 UK institutions involved 
in Arctic research, including 46 universities and 20 research 
institutes” (2013, 10). Moreover, steadily increased funding 
for Arctic environmental research activities, “with over £50m 
awarded to 138 individual research projects,…Top class climate 
research will continue to be funded, for example, through “the 
Met Office Hadley Centre’s Climate Programme and the Natural 
Environment Research Council’s £15 million, five-year Arctic 
Research Programme, to increase understanding of the changes 
in the Arctic and their impacts on the global system” (2013, 18). 
Innovation in technology is explicitly noted: submarines and 
more recently satellites (the UK-led European Space Agency 
satellite Cryosat 2) “demonstrate decreasing sea-ice thickness 
across the Arctic… [and also] provide insights into how the 
ocean circulation will alter as sea-ice diminishes over time” 
(2013, 22); new marine technology will provide insights into 
how the “ocean circulation will alter as sea-ice diminishes over 
time... [something which is also confirmed by] sophisticated 
models of this oceanic circulation developed by other UK re-
searchers” (2013, 22). 
This indicator interestingly reveals that UK’s Arctic research, ac-
cording to the 2013 Policy, consists of natural sciences, through 
the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) which is 
20 The UK government earlier “to develop an overarching formal Arctic strategy to bring together the diffuse strands of government policy… [it] would also send 
a clear signal to the Arctic States that while their sovereignty in the region is indisputable, pursuing greater exclusivity in the region is neither constructive nor 
warranted when so many ramifications of environmental and economic change in the Arctic reach out beyond the region” (Duncan 2012, 132). 
very influential in funding research programs. The Scott Polar 
Research Institute has a long tradition of social sciences and 
humanities research, for example, among the Inuit “to bridge 
their own traditional knowledge with the sciences can be traced 
back to the needs of 18th century scientific travellers to acquire 
local knowledge” (2013, 16). The Circumpolar History and Pub-
lic Policy Research Group at Scott Polar Institute “uses histori-
cal, ethnographic, and economic research to explore policy is-
sues and options over a longer timeframe, focusing in particular 
on science policy, traditional knowledge of northern peoples, 
and transnational governance” (2013, 16). Furthermore, “polar 
matters are part of the English National Curriculum for geog-
raphy at both primary and secondary school” run by the Royal 
Geographical Society (2013, 5). 
The Implementation indicator is not explicitly included in either 
of the UK Arctic Policy documents, nor is there a list of recom-
mendations. The 2013 Framework document is “reviewed reg-
ularly” (2013, 9) and updated “on a regular basis… In response 
to the House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Arctic in 
December 2015, the Government also [has] committed to keep 
our approach under review” (2018, 2). This is echoed by the 
2018 Policy which is considered to be a review of the 2013 one, 
given that “it was always the intention of the UK Government 
that the Framework would receive regular updates” (2018, 3). 
Another issue is the consideration given by 2018 Policy to the 
rapid environmental changes in the Arctic region.
To sum up
The United Kingdom was one of the first Arctic Council ob-
server countries, and among the first to launch its own na-
tional policy on the Arctic region; it was the only one in our 
analysis with an updated Arctic policy. Both documents are 
entitled ‘UK policy towards the Arctic.’ However, they are 
actually called ‘Framework’ (2013) and ‘Arctic Policy Frame-
work’ (2018). Why the term ‘framework’ was chosen, and not 
‘policy’ or ‘strategy,’ is unclear. It has been speculated that this 
was “in order to de-dramatize the statement and in particular, 
not to alienate states within the Arctic who might be sensitive 
about ‘outsider’ involvement” (Bailes 2013, 11).20 
In any case, the 2018 Framework, as the UK’s Arctic Policy, 
provides and emphasizes the interpretation that UK has “al-
ways been a world leader in Polar affairs where British views 
have long held sway in the fields of polar science, exploration, 
diplomacy, business and environmental protection” (2018, 2). 
Indeed, the UK “is well placed to transfer knowledge and ex-
pertise across both polar regions... [and] the UK’s wider Ant-
arctic science community is substantial,” as the 2013 Policy 
notes (2013, 11). Brexit is also taken into consideration here, 
as the Minister of State for the Polar Regions in his foreword 
to the 2018 document interprets the Framework as reaffirming 
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“our intention to remain a significant player in Arctic affairs,” 
as the UK leaves the European Union (2018, 2). 
This is supported by the projection of a vision of ‘Global Brit-
ain’ in the 2018 Policy that is respected abroad and engaged 
in the world, while “working with… international partners to 
advance prosperity and security around the world… [and] in 
the Arctic” (2018, 4, 7). 
Further, the UK will continue to “display the same strong lead-
ership shown” on becoming the first country in the world to set 
legally binding emission reduction targets through the 2008 Cli-
mate Change Act [and] one of the first Arctic Council Observer 
States” (2018, 4). 
The 2013 Policy has an explicitly global approach, stating that 
the inextricable links “to global processes, whether they are cli-
matic, environmental, social, legal or economic” (2013, 4) also 
give non-Arctic states, and the UK, “legitimate interests and 
roles to play in finding solutions to many of the most pressing 
issues facing the Arctic” (2013, 7). 
As mentioned earlier, the 2018 Framework is an updated ver-
sion of the 2013 policy document, as a result of review. It is thus 
to be expected that the (Re)mapping and (Re)defining indicator 
more or less reprises the notion of the 2013 Policy that UK is 
“the northernmost country outside of the eight Arctic States” 
and that of the 2018 Policy , namely, the UK as the “nearest 
neighbour, with Lerwick… closer to the Arctic Circle than it is 
to London.” These remapping and self-identified efforts based 
on geography are to convince a British audience, as well as audi-
ences outside the UK. 
Science and research are much discussed in, and reflected by, 
the policy documents on an even basis. They are thus, without a 
doubt, one of the priorities of the UK Arctic policy, as they are 
the main similarity between the two. Based on our coding and 
quantitative measuring, the second similarity between the two 
is the Economy indicator, which is more explicitly and evenly 
discussed in, and reflected by, the two documents. Furthermore, 
the quantitative measuring reveals that Environmental Protec-
tion and International Cooperation are also among the priori-
ties of the UK’s Arctic policy, the former being reflected more 
evenly by the policies and the latter less so.
Concerning other indicators, other similarities are: the Human 
Dimension indicator, the combined Environmental Protection 
and Climate Change indicators and, the Tourism indicator are 
discussed evenly, as are the indicators and the combined Securi-
ty and Safety and SAR themes. 
The main differences between the two policy documents are 
as follows: the 2013 Policy puts much more emphasis on the 
Governance indicator than the 2018 one; the International 
Cooperation indicator is more explicitly identified in the 2018 
Policy than in the 2013 one; the Pollution indicator and the In-
frastructure indicator are noted more in the 2018 policy than in 
the 2013 one. 
Taking into considetation the long British tradition of explora-
tion in the Polar regions, including the Arctic; the British voyag-
es of discovery; its national geostrategic and military interests, 
for example, British strategic nuclear submarines occasionally 
visiting the Arctic Ocean; colonialism and neo-colonialism, 
with Canada as a former British colony and current member of 
the British Commonwealth—the UK strategy is not just about 
geography, but also history, geopolitics, geostrategy, economics, 
and science. Is the UK the “forgotten Arctic state,” as Duncan 
(2018) put it? 
Finally, after comparing the results of the coding and analysis 
to the quite broad priorities, they are all concluded to be in fo-
cus, in particular Promoting prosperity, and Protecting global 
influence, including science and international cooperation; also 
Protecting the environment to a certain extent, but less so Pro-
tecting people. 
Comparing and Discussing  
the Strategies
The previous section provides an overview of, and analysis of, the 
contents of the national Arctic strategies and policies of the nine 
observer states of the Arctic Council policy, and how they have 
developed recently. To obtain a more holistic picture of the state 
of Arctic governance of the 21st century, a better understanding of 
how the region is currently being governed, and how these policy 
papers combine with each other, an inter-comparison is needed. 
What follows is a broader discussion and analysis on each policy 
document, which is then followed by some relevant findings and 
summing up of these national policies. Finally, there is a short 
comparative study and discussion of all the policies.
Interestingly, unlike most of the current national strategies of 
the Arctic states, released between 2009 and 2013, these doc-
uments are much more current, as they were released between 
2013 and 2018. 
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator. 
Except for the ROK, each national policy of the non-Arctic Ob-
server countries has its own definition of the Arctic and/or its 
special features, Many remap their geographical position, and 
even reidentify their relationship with the Arctic. 
All the strategies use the term “Arctic,” France also uses the 
term “the North,” while the UK comments on a region without 
a single “universally agreed definition.” The Arctic could mean 
“an ocean surrounded by continents” plus the Arctic Ocean 
(France); or “the area within the Arctic Circle with the Arc-
tic Ocean as the heart” (Germany); or a “home to about four 
million people including Indigenous peoples” (Japan); or “a 
region in transition” (Germany). The Arctic region is defined 
as “vulnerable” with “peculiar and sensitive ecosystem” (Italy), 
“extraordinary fragile” (Spain), with “a unique environment of 
global significance” (UK), and “the [climate change] canary in 
the coal mine” (France).
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A relevant difference between the policies is the self-identifica-
tion toward the Arctic region, either to include it or not. France, 
the PRC and the UK do (re)identify themselves vis-à-vis the 
Arctic: for France the Arctic is “both far from France and near 
to it.” The PRC re-identifies itself as a “‘Near-Arctic State.’” The 
UK is the “nearest neighbour” of the Arctic states. 
All in all, the (Re)defining the Arctic indicator shows striking 
similarities among states, and self-reidentification towards the 
Arctic region shows relevant differences. (see Figure 27. Current 
Observer Strategy Comparison, p. 243).
Based on our coding and quantitative measuring (see Table 27, 
p. 119), the most-quoted indicator in/by the national Arctic 
policies and strategies of the observer states is Science and Ed-
ucation. In particular, the policies of the Netherlands, the ROK, 
and Spain—all about 30 % or more—explicitly note and discuss 
issues on science and scientific cooperation, although there is 
less about education per se. These are followed by Japan and 
Italy — both 20 % or more. 
The second most-quoted is the International Cooperation & In-
ternational Treaties indicator, explicitly noted and discussed, in 
particular, by the policies of Japan and Germany—more than 
20 % each—followed by the ROK, PRC, and the UK—all higher 
than 15 %. The third most quoted indicator is the Economy one; 
the policies of PRC, ROK, the UK and France—all by more than 
17 %—explicitly note and discuss issues on economy/economic 
cooperation and trade, including sustainable development.
The least-quoted among indicators is the Tourism indicator—
between 0 and 3 %—with Japan, for example, not noting it at all. 
Among the other little-quoted indicators are the Infrastructure, 
Pollution, Security, Safety and SAR, and Human indicators. 
Finally, the remaining indicators, Governance, Environmental 
Protection, and Climate Change, lie in the middle. 
However, if the quotations concerning the Environmental Pro-
tection, Pollution, and Climate Change indicators are put to-
gether, this new indicator would be higher—by 20 % or more 
(with the exception of the Netherlands, the ROK, and Spain)—
than those of the International Cooperation and Economy indi-
cators, and only a little lower than that of the Science & Educa-
tion indicator. 
To conclude, based on quantitative measuring, the top three 
priorities of these nine policies are Science and Education, In-
ternational Cooperation, and Economy. If the newly formed 
Environment, Pollution, and Climate Change indicator is taken 
into account, the top four indicators accord more or less with 
the official priorities or policy goals/aims/principles of several 
national policies. The policy documents of Germany, Italy, Ja-
pan, and Spain, however, do not explicitly include priorities/
priority areas.
The Human Dimension indicator is not among the most-quot-
ed issues of the national policies of the nine Arctic Council’s 
observer countries. All but the Netherlands, however, include 
it, and it is particularly mentioned by Italy and the UK (higher 
than 6 %). These eight policies explicitly note Indigenous peo-
ples of the Arctic, or the North, and comment on their ways of 
life, rights, and languages. Arctic Indigenous peoples account 
for “ten percent of the four million people” (Germany), are rec-
ognized as being “easily affected by environmental changes and 
expanded economic activity” (Japan), and are “currently facing 
fast changes in their habitats and their ways of life” (Spain). 
There is thus a need for “protection of their rights to a free and 
self-determined life in their homeland” (Germany) and to “re-
spect the views, interests, culture and traditions of the Arctic 
Indigenous peoples” and their communities (UK). 
The policies of Germany, Italy, PRC, ROK and the UK also ex-
plicitly mention people other than the Indigenous populations, 
meaning the whole population of the Arctic region. France takes 
into consideration that the “northern territories [have] very 
small populations,” about four million people (Germany, Ja-
pan). Interestingly, Italy includes two aspects of the Human Di-
mension indicator: urban areas and Indigenous peoples. There 
is thus a need to “protect[ing] people and the environment” 
(UK) in general, and to realize “harmonious coexistence be-
tween man and nature… and intergenerational equity” (PRC). 
All in all, there is a striking similarity between those national 
policies including and explicitly discussing the Human indica-
tor, and it is noteworthy that five (out of nine) recognize the 
whole population, not only the Indigenous peoples. 
 
The Governance indicator is not among the most-quoted is-
sues of the national policies of these observer countries. Re-
ferring to the criteria for Arctic Council observership, several 
policies note the existing governance structures of the Arctic 
region, and the international agreements relevant to them, 
such as UNCLOS, the AC and the Spitsbergen Treaty, and 
commit to keeping the region peaceful and stable (e.g., Japan, 
UK). They also recognize the national jurisdictions of the Arc-
tic states (e.g., Italy, Spain, UK) and “respect [to] the sovereign 
rights of the Arctic states” (PRC). The emphasis here is on Arc-
tic Ocean governance, the five littoral states and their influ-
ence over the ocean, and also UNCLOS and other internation-
al regimes, such as OSPAR, MARPOL, and organizations, like 
the IMO. It is also stated that increasing human activities in 
the polar regions “will require further international consulta-
tion, governance and regulation” (the Netherlands) and legally 
binding regulations (e.g., Germany).
All, except the Netherlands, explicitly mention the Arctic Coun-
cil. It is recognized as the central body for Arctic cooperation 
(e.g., by Germany), not least due to the legally binding agree-
ments, such as SAR. The Ilulissat Ministerial Declaration is 
mentioned by France.
A few policy documents note that there is no comprehensive 
treaty on the Arctic, although UNCLOS plays an important role 
in Arctic Ocean governance. It is recognized that there are “col-
lective governance issues [that] potentially concern the interna-
tional community” (France). The term “international commu-
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Figure 27. Current Observer Strategy Comparison 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number 
and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document. 
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nity” is also used by Japan and PRC. The freedom of the seas 
is included—including rights to scientific research, navigation, 
overflight, fisheries, laying of submarine cables and pipeline—
which motivates non-Arctic (littoral) states to increase their 
involvement “in the planning and decision-making processes 
relating to sustainable and responsible governance of the Arctic 
Ocean” (France). A global approach is reflected by the policies 
of Japan. The EU and its interests in the Arctic, such as environ-
mental protection and sustainability, is recognized by France as 
“the world’s largest maritime economic power” (France), and 
by Italy and by Spain as part of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Only Germany explicitly notes Indigenous peo-
ples’ right to self-determination. 
Overall, a striking similarity is the observers’ recognition of the 
Arctic Council, and in the twofold interpretation of Arctic/Arc-
tic Ocean governance based on the existing Arctic structures, in 
particular, the AC and international regimes; and also the uni-
versal freedom and rights of non-Arctic states to be involved in 
Arctic Ocean governance. 
 
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in-
dicator is the second-most quoted issue in these national poli-
cies. That is why international cooperation in and for the Arctic, 
as well as international rules for the region based on agreements 
and treaties on the Arctic/Arctic Ocean, are so greatly empha-
sized by the national policies; for example, to stand “for steadily 
advancing international cooperation on the Arctic” (PRC); or to 
“reaffirm our commitment to support and work in partnership 
with the eight Arctic States and the region’s Indigenous peoples, 
to uphold this position” (UK). 
Following on from the previous indicator, the focus of a few 
policies (e.g., France) is on international cooperation concern-
ing the Arctic Ocean. “Science-driven research, which should 
include the effectiveness of existing law” is also reflected (the 
Netherlands). Being present in relevant international forums on 
the Arctic is important “to promote France’s interests” (France); 
or to “have a high profile in the forums, initiatives, and actions 
carried out in the areas of scientific research, technology, sus-
tainable use of natural resources, and freedom of navigation” 
(Spain). Bilateral relations with the Arctic states will bring 
“greater depth to our Arctic engagement” (UK). 
Among mentioned international agreements and treaties are: 
UNCLOS (France, Germany, Italy, PRC, UK); UN Charter 
(PRC); Polar Code (France, Japan); MARPOL (France, Ger-
many, Japan); CBD (Germany, Italy); CLRTAP (Italy); MEPC 
(France); SOLAS (France, Italy, Japan); HABITAT III (Ita-
ly); STCW (Japan); Kyoto Protocol (Japan, PRC); Spitsber-
gen Treaty (Germany, PRC, ROK); Prevention of Unregulat-
ed High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean (France); 
Ilulisat Declaration (France); OSPAR (Germany, Spain, UK); 
Minamata Convention (UK); UNSDG (UK); Paris Agreement 
(PRC, Spain, UK); Convention of Protection of Marine Envi-
ronment of N-E Atlantic (Germany); SAR and two other AC 
treaties (PRC, Germany).
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MARPOL X X X
OSPAR X X X
Paris Agreement X X X
SOLAS X X X
Spitsbergen Treaty X X X
UNCLOS X X X X X
Table 67. International Agreements and Treaties 
Among the international organizations mentioned are: BEAC 
(France, Germany, Spain); CBSS (Spain); EPB (France, Germa-
ny, Italy, Netherlands, Spain); EU (especially by France, EU’s 
CFSP by Germany, EU Mediterranean policy by Spain); EU’s 
ND (France, Germany, Spain); G7 (UK); IMO (France, Japan, 
PRC, UK); AHDR (ROK); IASC (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
PRC, ROK, Spain); IPCC (Italy, Netherlands); ICSU (Italy); 
NEAFC (Germany); UN Security Council (PRC); UNEP (UK); 
UNFCCC (PRC, Spain). 
FR
A
 2
01
6
G
ER
 2
01
3
IT
A
 2
01
5
JP
N
 2
01
5
N
LD
 2
01
4
PR
C 
20
18
RO
K
 2
01
3
ES
P 
20
16
U
K
 2
01
8
EPB X X X X X
EU X X X
IASC X X X X X X
IMO X X X X
Table 68. International Organizations 
Among the international forums mentioned are: Arctic Circle 
(PRC, ROK, UK); Arctic Frontier (PRC, ROK, UK); Territory 
of Dialogue (PRC). 
All in all, it is fragmented how international forums are pre-
ferred, as UNCLOS is explicitly mentioned by five policies, 
IASC by six ones, and IMO by four ones.
The Environmental Protection indicator is not among the 
most-quoted issues of the national policies of the nine Arctic 
Council’s observer countries, and is emphasized by France, Ita-
ly, PRC, and the UK (more than 10 % each). The starting point 
here is, not surprisingly, the consideration of the Arctic as “one 
of the most vulnerable of our planet” (Italy), an “ecologically 
significant and sensitive region” (Germany), including a “partic-
ularly fragile marine environment” (France), and that “the poles 
are extremely sensitive to changes in climate” (the Netherlands). 
Thus, any changes and their impacts “on the Earth as a whole 
must be understood with a comprehensive and wide-ranging 
perspective” (Japan); and environmental protection and secu-
rity are tied and fostered together (Spain). Arctic regional ac-
tion must also be taken for environmental protection and there 
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must be “sustainable exploitation and conservation of biodiver-
sity and environmental quality” (the Netherlands). Establishing 
“a framework for the sustainable management of Arctic fish-
eries” is defined as important (France). The PRC promises to 
support the Arctic coastal states “in their efforts to reduce pol-
lutants in the Arctic waters from land-based sources.” 
Protected areas and/or biodiversity are identified as being im-
portant (by France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, PRC, Spain, 
UK), although it is not proposed that the Arctic should “become 
a national park but…continue as a lived, and managed, environ-
ment” (UK). Monitoring is not explicitly discussed by most of 
the policies, except France which would “step up the exchange 
of oceanographic information between the French Navy and its 
foreign counterparts.” Only the PRC mentions risk assessment.
As a conclusion, protected areas are mentioned by seven poli-
cies, and monitoring by none.
 
The Pollution indicator is among the least-quoted indicators of 
the national policies, with only Germany, Italy, and the UK plac-
ing some emphasis on the issue (more than 7 % each). The ROK 
does not include the indicator. Echoing the previous indicator, it 
is not surprising that the starting point here is the consideration 
that “the Arctic is becoming increasingly polluted,” and visit-
ed (UK). “The vast majority of litter and pollutants impacting 
the Arctic originate outside the region” (UK); greenhouse gases 
that reach the polar environments… [are generated] outside the 
polar regions in areas [through] high-intensity urbanization, in-
dustrialization and farming“ (Spain). Pollution is “an accepted 
scientific fact” (Spain), and it “is essential for us to take action” 
(UK), with problem solving through scientific research (the 
Netherlands). 
A few policies explicitly mention the interdependence and in-
terrelations between the Arctic and global perspective and 
therefore the UK “will continue to display the same strong lead-
ership shown when we became the 1st country in the world to 
set legally binding emission reduction targets.” 
Among explicitly mentioned pollutants are: “pollutants… [that] 
originate outside the region” (UK); marine litter (PRC, UK); 
ship discharge, offshore dumping & oil spills, air pollution ( 
France, Germany, Japan, PRC); greenhouse gas emissions (Ger-
many, Netherlands, Spain); plastic (UK); mercury (UK); black 
carbon (Germany, Italy, UK); SLCFs (methane, HLC, black car-
bon) (Germany, Italy); sea transport, tourism, mining and har-
bour operations (Italy); mining (France).
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Marine litter X X
Ship discharge, oil X X X X
Greenhouse gases X X X
Black carbon X X X
Plastic X
Table 69. Pollutants
Polluters are not explicitly mentioned in any of the policies. 
However, it is noted that there are “pollutants… [that] originate 
outside the region” (UK), and that “expanded economic activi-
ties” are resulting in pollution of the air and water (Japan). 
All in all, there is fragmentation in pollutants, similarities with 
polluters, since they are only pointed indirectly, coming from 
“outside the region”.
The Climate Change indicator is not among the most-quoted is-
sues of the national policies of these observer countries. Climate 
change is, however, explicitly and evenly discussed in all the pol-
icies (between 6 and 10 %), except for the ROK (only 2 %). The 
countries note that “the consequences of climate change in the 
Arctic are dramatic” (Germany), and that the Arctic is warm-
ing much faster compared to global average warming (UK); 
“the Arctic environment is responding very sensitively to global 
warming” (Japan), and there are also consequences and impacts 
[of warming in the Arctic] for non-Arctic regions (Germany, 
Netherlands). The scientific evidence “defines [as]‘extremely 
likely’ the link between climate change and human activities” 
(Italy). Indeed, Italy explains that global warming is one of the 
motivations for Italian presence in the Arctic. To address warm-
ing in the Arctic we must be prepared to make use of “the best 
available scientific knowledge at any given moment” (Spain). 
Potential impacts on economic opportunities of Arctic warming 
are also recognized by France, the Netherlands, and the PRC. 
The scientific community is important in terms of problem-solv-
ing in the Arctic (Germany), with the region having become “an 
important natural laboratory for studying climate change at the 
global level.” The Netherlands in this regard mentions the work 
of the IPCC and AMAP.
Mitigation is explicitly noted by Japan “if effective mitigation 
measures are not taken… a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean… is 
likely…[and] advanced efforts in both mitigation and adapta-
tion” are needed. Mitigation is also mentioned by France. The 
UK mentions its “strong record of implementing policies that 
mitigate the release of harmful emissions into the atmosphere” 
(UK). Spain notes mitigation and adaptation in the context of 
UNFCCC. 
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As a conclusion, adaptation or mitigation are not explicitly 
noted by Germany, Italy, Netherlands, PRC, and ROK. The 
PRC uses the term “emission reduction measures” taking place 
in China.
The Security indicator is among the least-quoted issues of the 
national policies of the nine Arctic Council observer countries. 
Only France, Germany, Japan, PRC, and the UK explicitly note 
the issue (more than 5 % each). The Netherlands and the ROK 
do not refer to security.
Partly reflecting the Governance indicator, several policies re-
fer to the objective of maintaining the Arctic “as a peaceful and 
stable region” (UK) based on the maxim, “Let the North Pole be 
a pole of peace” (France). Peace and stability must be promot-
ed in the Arctic, including the security of maritime trade and 
transport, as stated by the PRC. The fostering of “peacekeeping, 
environmental protection and security in the polar regions” is 
mentioned by Spain. The Arctic states and the Arctic Council 
are identified as the appropriate bodies for promoting mutual 
confidence in the region (Italy, UK). 
There is also concern that the overlapping interests of Arctic 
states could trigger a geopolitical race for sovereignty or natural 
resources (Germany). Japan’s policy reflects the importance of 
preventing “moves to strengthen military presence in the re-
gion,” and of paying “full attention to security developments in 
the Arctic.” A few policies, such as those of Germany and the 
UK, explicitly note and discuss defence and military-security 
activities. NATO is mentioned by Germany and the UK, al-
though the military alliance has kept a low profile in the Arctic 
since the annexation in Crimea. In addition to the Arctic Secu-
rity Forces Roundtable, “there should be a bilateral approach fo-
cusing on practical objectives” (France, Germany), such as cold 
weather training exercises (UK).
All in all, concerning the global perspective, the UN Charter 
and UN Security Council are explicitly noted by PRC. 
The Safety and SAR indicator is quoted a little more than the 
Security indicator in all the policies. Safety here is primarily 
defined to mean maritime safety and thus focus on maritime 
transport and shipping (e.g., Germany, UK). There is an insuf-
ficient emergency rescue capacity (Germany). Increased eco-
nomic activities and tourism could pose safety risks for local 
communities and the environment (Netherlands, UK).
Concerning international agreements on maritime and other 
safety measures, the focus is on IMO (France, Germany, Japan, 
PRC, Spain); SAR Agreement (Germany, UK); the Polar Code 
(France, Japan, PRC, ROK, Spain, UK); SOLAS and MARPOL 
(France); the 2013 EU Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and 
Gas Operations (Italy); UNCLOS (Spain); and the goals of the 
Association of Arctic Cruise Operators of “managing responsi-
ble, environmentally friendly and safe tourism in the Arctic and 
[striving] to set the highest possible operating standards” (UK). 
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IMO X X X X X
Polar Code X X X X X X
SAR Agreement X X
Table 70. Safety 
Finally, food/water safety is not explicitly noted by the policies, 
except by Japan. 
The Economy indicator is the third most-quoted issue, as men-
tioned earlier, and occurs quite evenly in national Arctic poli-
cies. In particular, the PRC and ROK focus on economic activi-
ties in, and related to, the Arctic (more than 20 % each). 
This indicator is a broad one, as among the explicitly identified 
economic and commercial activities in the Arctic are marine 
transport (e.g., energy, cargo, tourism) and shipping, fisheries, 
exploitation of oil, gas, mineral and other non-living resources, 
energy supply, tourism, and international trade. All these ac-
tivities are poised to “bring about major social and economic 
changes, and exert important influence on the way of work and 
life of Arctic residents” (PRC). 
Concerning fisheries, the Spanish strategy is twofold: first, 
Spain confirms that it will carry out fishing activities in accor-
dance with international/national regulations, and to ensure 
the sector’s sustainability, “which includes respecting the envi-
ronment and combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing.” Second, Spain recalls that the “fishing industry must 
consider …that the management of fishery resources is an EU 
mandate… that Spain, as an EU Member State, is now a mem-
ber of the NEAFC, whose remit includes Arctic waters.” The UK 
Government, based on its experience of the Arctic, undertakes 
to “continue to adopt a science-led, precautionary and ecosys-
tem-based approach to the establishment and management of 
any new and emerging fisheries in the Arctic region” (UK 2018). 
Furthermore, companies of several non-Arctic states already 
have “political and economic interests in the Arctic” (France), 
such as Total and Engie of France, and several other French 
companies present in the Canadian, Norwegian, and Russian 
Arctic that are “bound to grow” (France); “Germany and its 
companies” as well as the European Investment Bank is men-
tioned by Germany; Eni by Italy; JOGMEC by Japan; Shell by 
the Netherlands; and the Polar Silk Road initiative by the PRC. 
Resource utilization is carried out in cooperation with the 
Arctic states, for example, to “pursue joint research… in the 
fields of resources development, cargo shipping infrastructure, 
transshipment ports, and the commercial use of NSRs”, or to 
“develop Offshore Plant Technology for Deepwater Resources 
Development” (ROK). 
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This indicator clearly notes the ambivalence of Arctic develop-
ment in the 21st century. Around “20 to 30 percent of the world’s 
undiscovered fossil fuels… are suspected to lie north of the 
Arctic Circle” (Germany). The Arctic is a region with a fragile 
ecosystem, which would “pose immense challenges, such as the 
need to mitigate the inevitable loss of biodiversity, the increased 
risk of sea pollution and the impact on the ways of life of Indige-
nous populations” (France); the rapid and significant changes in 
the region bring and provide new major economic and business 
opportunities for and in the Arctic: for example, “shipping and 
fisheries” (France) as a policy goal of several non-Arctic states, 
such as France, Germany, PRC, and the ROK. As a result of cli-
mate change “new opportunities are arising in this connection, 
for example, for fisheries, maritime routes and tourism” (Germa-
ny). At the same time as advocating “protection and rational use 
of the region,” the PRC encourages “its enterprises to engage in 
international cooperation on the exploration for and utilization 
of Arctic resources by making the best use of their advantages in 
capital, technology and domestic market,” for example, for the 
Polar Silk Road initiative. Interestingly, the UK explicitly defines 
the implementation of the initiative as having potential risks. 
The French Policy points out its “ecological ethics concerns about 
the region in its ‘Grenelle’ environment project:… “with the aim 
of protecting the Arctic environment” (France). Thus, there is the 
other side of the coin, which is the main reason why this indi-
cator explicitly includes sustainable development. For example, 
“urban sustainable development is one of Italian national priori-
ties. The approach to Arctic activities of the Italian company Eni, 
is based on key principles, such as “operations are to be conduct-
ed only during periods of the year when repercussions on the 
marine environment (in particular, on mammals) are minimal” 
and “local inhabitants have to be involved and informed” (Italy); 
there is a need “to examine how we can contribute to achieve 
sustainable development of which Indigenous peoples can see 
benefits, while protecting the foundations of traditional cultures 
and lifestyles” (Japan); “exploitation of resources in the polar re-
gions and their transport must be carried out in a stable, sustain-
able and environmentally-friendly manner” (Spain). 
Further, the Dutch polar strategy demonstrates synergy between 
the business and scientific community interpreting scientific re-
search to be important “to the Dutch business community and 
to the Dutch government.” The 2018 UK Policy looks for a bal-
ance by “promoting the Arctic as a place where economic and 
commercial development occurs in a sustainable and responsi-
ble manner… where the people of the region benefit from the 
prosperity that a changing Arctic may bring [and which] also 
supports “UK companies investing in the Arctic; making them 
aware, and connecting them to, the opportunities available” (UK 
2018). And at the same time, conservation is defined “of high 
importance but… will be maintained alongside the utilisation of 
Arctic resources” (UK 2018).
Finally, the Arctic Economic Council, established in 2014, is ex-
plicitly mentioned by Spain and the UK.
All in all, the policies of the PRC and ROK, in particular, focus 
on economic activities in, and related to, the Arctic. 
The Tourism indicator is the least-quoted issue of the national 
policies of the nine Arctic Council’s observer countries, as only 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and UK have put some em-
phasis on the issue (between 2 and 3 %). Japan and ROK do not 
explicitly include the indicator. 
New transport routes also mean new opportunities for polar 
tourism (Germany, the Netherlands). All forms of tourism in 
the Arctic, “from small expedition ships to large convention-
al cruise liners” (UK), in particular “pleasure cruises” is on the 
increase and has been booming in recent years (France, Germa-
ny). Correspondingly, tourism is defined to be a field of “spe-
cial interest” in Arctic affairs (Spain), or ‘Arctic tourism’ is “an 
emerging industry” (PRC). 
Finally, there is good reason to support “safe, responsible and 
sustainable tourism in the Arctic (UK) and despite SAR and 
the legal regimes “extra caution is required when planning all 
tourism activities and maritime operations in the Arctic” (UK). 
Further, tourism agencies and professionals, as well as tourists, 
need training and a regulatory regime (PRC). Providing sus-
tainable tourism means meeting the most strongest safety and 
environmental standards (Germany). 
The Infrastructure indicator is one of the least-quoted issues of 
the national policies of the Arctic Council’s observer countries, 
mentioned only by France, Germany, Japan, and Spain (5 % or 
more).
In all of the policies, except for Italy, infrastructure means 
marine transportation, navigation and/or shipping. Germany 
places strong emphasis on the safety of maritime transport. As 
mentioned earlier, the Spanish Polar Strategy concerns marine 
transportation and shipping, which brings a strong global per-
spective and global scale to this indicator. Aviation is not explic-
itly mentioned by any of the policies. 
The Arctic is “a laboratory for new technologies in informa-
tion and communication, robotics, automation, airborne 
systems and sensors” (France). The “development of environ-
ment-friendly polar technical equipment… [is vital] in the 
building of infrastructure for Arctic development” (PRC). In-
novation, particularly technological innovation, is explicitly 
noted by France, Italy, and the UK as an important part of this 
indicator. Investments in renewable energy and development of 
‘green’ products are mentioned by Italy. 
As a conclusion, a striking similarity between the policies is that 
they all explicitly note marine transportation, navigation and/or 
shipping, and do not note aviation.
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The Science and Education indicator is the most-quoted issue 
area in research and scientific cooperation by the national pol-
icies of the Arctic Council’s Observer countries. In particular, 
the policies of the Netherlands, ROK, and Spain focus greatly 
on scientific research in the Arctic (30 % or more): note that, 
in the case of the Netherlands and Spain, the actual focus is 
research on the polar regions.
It is suggested by many of the policies (e.g., Germany, the 
Netherlands) that research drivers are related to the environ-
ment and climate change ‘Space for science’ (Netherlands); 
fisheries (Spain). 
Traditional knowledge is explicitly mentioned only in the pol-
icy documents of the ROK and the UK.
Among the different types of research infrastructure includ-
ed are: i) research institutes—national (e.g. AWI in Germany) 
and international (e.g. IASC, EPB); ii) research stations, most-
ly in Svalbard, by France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
PRC, ROK, UK; iii) research vessels and expeditions by Italy, 
PRC, ROK, UK; iv) new technological equipment (e.g., sat-
ellites); v) scientific or science-related international networks 
and conferences (e.g., IPY by France, ASSW by Japan, Arc-
tic conferences in Berlin by Germany, Tavolo Artico by Italy, 
CNARC by PRC); and vi) research funding/funders—both na-
tional funds (e.g., NERC in UK) and international ones (e.g., 
EU Framework Programmes). 
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Education & UArctic X X X X
Table 71. Research Infrastructure 
Education in general is explicitly mentioned only by Italy and 
the UK, and UArctic (University of the Arctic) by PRC, ROK 
and the UK. 
All in all, in the Science indicator, a striking similarity among 
documents is mention of the research station in Svalbard. 
The Implementation indicator is explicitly included in the na-
tional policies of France, ROK, and Spain, but not in those of 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, PRC, and the UK. 
As a conclusion, this section shows, that based on the used 
quantitative measuring the indicator most-quoted by the na-
tional Arctic policies and strategies of the nine Observer States 
is the Science & Education indicator, followed by the Interna-
tional Cooperation and Economy indicators. The fourth is the 
new Environmental Protection indicator (composed of En-
vironmental Protection coupled with Pollution and Climate 
Change). These top four indicators accord more or less with the 
official priorities or policy goals/aims/principles of these states’ 
national policies.
Finally, at the end of this research, in a synthesis of the different 
parts of this study, the national policies of the Arctic Council 
observer states will be discussed with respect to the national 
policies of the Arctic states and the policies of the PPs on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, based on the analyses of these 
existing policies main themes will be concluded as new and 
emerging trends of Arctic governance and geopolitics. 
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How can one begin to describe, define, and interpret the reality 
of the Arctic, or even try to (re)shape its politics? There are 
many different perceptions and discourses and much mis-/dis-
information about the Arctic in the media, on the part of policy 
makers, and among researchers. Traditional images and visions 
also abound—the Arctic as a homeland for Indigenous peo-
ples, a place on the world’s margins, storehouse of resources, 
military theater of the Cold War, and environmental linchpin 
for the planet (e.g., AHDR 2004; Contesting the Arctic 2015). 
There are Arctic development success stories, such as the main-
tenance of cultural integrity, technological advances, and po-
litical and legal innovations (see, Human Development Report 
2004, esp. pp. 229–237). There are trends and megatrends, such 
as increased urbanization, dependency on financial transfers, 
and resource exploitation (Nordic Council on Ministers 2011). 
Narratives also exist on how the development and future of the 
Arctic region is being (re)constructed. 
One widespread narrative is related to development projects 
throughout the North. These are far from over; they will con-
tinue both as new and traditional economic opportunities with 
different implications for regional development. According 
to Petrov (2018, p.7), “the State has controlled the state of the 
North” in Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), in Canada, and 
in several Nordic countries. The State is “the central negotia-
tor… in the ‘hegemonic project’ of developing the frontier.” The 
bottom line of this particular narrative is “that the evolution of 
development paradigms (propagated by the State) has always 
been followed by the transformation of public policies.” 
Here, the question is if state centrism would still be the right 
recipe for the Arctic region, when development needs and de-
sires differ. Or do different (regional) development trajectories 
need to be captured, given that the pathways of different Arctic 
regions toward sustainability differ one from another? For ex-
ample, would Indigenous self-reliance in managing renewable 
resources help maintain ecological balance? Or, would a trian-
gular alliance of government, academia, and private business 
be beneficial? A successful combination of development path-
ways, determined by public policy, research, as well as econom-
ic action by the public and private sectors, is needed. Strong 
stakeholder engagement is necessary to reveal those desired 
futures. For example, the so-called “Oulu phenomenon” came 
about through the engagement of university, municipal ad-
ministration, and commercial companies (https://www.ouka.
fi/oulu/english/phenomena-from-oulu). The Arctic Circle As-
sembly (www.ArcticCircle.org), on the other hand, grew from 
bringing relevant stakeholders together for fruitful dialogues 
every year and identifying the sustainability indicators needed 
to guide decision-makers along the right pathways. 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the mainstream narrative 
of international Arctic cooperation is based on the notion of 
‘constructive cooperation.’ The Arctic States, through their 
commitment to sustainable development and protection of 
the Arctic environment, recognize the value of high geopo-
litical stability and are committed to maintaining it through 
international, mostly functional, cooperation. Behind this lie 
States’ common interests and some important prerequisites for 
international cooperation (e.g., Heininen 2018). These include 
the original nature of Arctic militarization as a means of global 
nuclear deterrence, the high degree of legal certainty, the re-
lated policies to avoid armed conflicts, and the positive stance 
regarding the regional devolution of power. Building on these 
principles, the Arctic States, supported by Indigenous peoples 
and local communities, have consciously constructed their 
own reality of post–Cold War governance and geopolitics. 
Related to this is the ardent narrative of ‘Our shared home-
land’ through which the Arctic Indigenous peoples emphasize 
self-determination, including Greenland self-governance and 
Indigenous rights. This approach is due greatly to cultural in-
tegrity. Cultures and languages have been resilient in the face of 
rapid and multi-dimensional changes, and the Arctic people’s 
consciousness of their own nationhood is reflected in a growing 
demand for self-determination and satisfaction of their rights. 
Another narrative relates to the increasing use of, and poten-
tial race for, Arctic natural resources, as the rising temperatures 
and melting sea ice expose previously economically non-viable 
sources of hydrocarbons and other minerals, fishing grounds, 
hydro power, and even fresh water (e.g., Smith, 2010). Despite 
the fact that Arctic waters will be icy or slush-covered for de-
cades, decreasing sea ice will open up new economically and 
technically viable trans-Arctic shipping routes, simultaneously 
with a growth in industrial interests. This has the potential to 
lead to growing infrastructure development, increasing pres-
sure on the Arctic ecosystem, and even to emerging conflicts 
between the Arctic States and major non-Arctic States. The 
Doomsday scenario is that the sea cover of the Arctic Ocean 
will rapidly disappear, and that most of the glaciers and per-
mafrost will melt. The significant rise in sea levels, as well as 
increasing uncertainty, will decrease human and societal secu-
rity in the Arctic and globally, in particular in coastal areas of 
developing countries and small island States. 
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Thus, the question of future development, when defining societal 
security, is not only about how to tackle resources— either too 
many or too few—but also how to resolve ethical questions, as 
well as the role of environmental protection and sustainable de-
velopment. Key questions of the global climate ethics debate, such 
as moral responsibility and distribution of burdens and benefits, 
have recently found their way into Arctic politics (Palosaari and 
Tynkkynen 2015; also Conference Statement of Parliamentarians 
of the Arctic Region 2018), as part of the Global Arctic narrative. 
There are conflicting views, ranging from support for unlimited 
oil and gas development by State-owned and private oil compa-
nies through to the proposal by international environmental or-
ganizations for an offshore oil drilling ban. There are also varying 
views regarding the extent to which stakeholders—governments, 
companies, communities, and Indigenous peoples—are respon-
sible for mitigating climate change and reducing the related un-
certainty, at a time when some are stressing economic growth and 
others are highlighting the environmental risks of exploitation. 
The new ethical questions regarding Arctic oil and gas develop-
ment have a fundamental global dimension, highlighted by an 
‘Arctic Paradox,’ namely, that global warming will open access 
to resources whose utilization will speed up the changes and the 
melting of sea ice. 
Finally, due to climate change and its implications for global 
security, there is a narrative that seeks an urgent shift in mind-
set toward political ability and the search for a new security 
paradigm for the Arctic (e.g., Climate Change and Arctic Se-
curity 2019). The narrative further holds that an issue-oriented 
change ‘from theory to action’ could be facilitated via a co-de-
sign approach involving all relevant stakeholders and based on 
open dialogue and transdisciplinarity. Instead of the ‘political 
inability’ of the Arctic states, ‘ethics’ will be applied and ‘po-
litical ability’ achieved so that strict environmental protection 
can be adopted. Stricter environmental regulations are possible, 
even to stop offshore drilling in Arctic seas; resilient solutions 
and building a ‘regional security community’ are also possible. 
However, all this calls for a holistic understanding of the state 
of the Arctic and its governance and geopolitics, and of what 
kind of policies stakeholders have adopted, and are designing, 
for the region and its future development. 
Strategies and policies are developed within the geopolitical 
context of the region, as described earlier in this study. Howev-
er, as they are generally designed to be in place for a few years, 
they cannot always account for specific events/issues of world 
politics as they develop (e.g., Ukraine) (see, Figure 3, Arctic 
Events - International Events, p. 23). However, to address the 
issues, they should be able to provide the governance structure 
that informs States’ work. This is where the Declarations of the 
Arctic Council Ministerials can provide further guidance ev-
ery two years, not only to the Council, but also to the Member 
States, the Permanent Participants, and the Observer States and 
other Observers. 
Against a background of significant multidimensional change, 
it is important, even crucial, for the Arctic States, Indigenous 
peoples organizations, and non-Arctic States to know what kind 
of perceptions, visions, and narratives there are concerning the 
region: this will give them a better understanding of processes 
taking place in, and impacting, the Arctic now and in future. It 
would also be politically useful for Arctic stakeholders, as well 
as the Arctic Council, to know more about new and/or emerg-
ing trends in Arctic governance and geopolitics that underpin 
these processes—this is the final task of our scientific study. 
Summary of Priorities of  
Arctic Policies/Strategies
All the Arctic States, except the United States of America, clearly 
declare the economy/(socio)economic development to be a pri-
ority, and hold climate change or environmental protection as an-
other priority, which is striking. All countries, except Canada and 
Sweden, state that international cooperation is a priority, which 
is relevant. As an overall conclusion, a comparison of the current 
official national strategies and policies shows economy/economic 
development, international cooperation, and environmental pro-
tection to be the overarching priorities of the Arctic States.
On the other hand, according to the coding of different indicators 
in the present analysis, the most-coded quotes are ordered as fol-
lows: Governance, the new Environmental Protection indicator 
(composed of Environmental Protection coupled with Pollution 
and Climate Change), Economy, International Cooperation, and 
the Human Dimension.
The Arctic Council chairmanship programs tend to focus on 
issues pertaining to the Environmental Protection indicator. In 
the past few years there has also been a focus on pollutants that 
contribute to climate change. As for the social aspect, there is an 
overall focus on health and wellbeing, and also on culture and/
or language protection. Gender equality shows up on the agenda 
every few years or so. Maritime safety, as a part of the Safety & 
SAR (search and rescue) indicator has also emerged as a safety 
concern over the past few chairmanship programs. 
The content of the ministerial declarations of the Arctic Council 
tend to prioritize issues around the International Cooperation, 
Governance, Human Dimension and Environmental Protection 
indicators, which have proved to be the most-quoted indicators 
over time. The declarations all mainly deal—directly or indirect-
ly—with the two main functions of the Arctic Council: environ-
mental protection and sustainable development. Under the Hu-
man Dimension indicator there is also a focus on issues related to 
ensuring the health and wellbeing of Northerners. Issues related 
to the Economy and Infrastructure indicators are also discussed, 
although not to the same extent as the others.
The policy documents of the four Indigenous peoples’ organiza-
tions, as among the Permanent Participants of the Arctic Coun-
cil, are somewhat fragmented. They do not cover all the indica-
tor fields in full detail, as their focus varies. There is a striking 
similarity in that all policy documents explicitly address issues 
surrounding the issue of Indigenous rights (individual and col-
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lective) as a part of the Human Dimension indicator (although in 
different contexts), and also those related to the Governance indi-
cator, both broadly and in detail. Moreover, the importance of the 
International Cooperation (and treaties) indicator is highlight-
ed. Unlike environmental protection, pollution and/or climate 
change are not explicitly covered by all documents. Unsurprising-
ly, all the documents emphasize the rights of Arctic Indigenous 
peoples to use/utilize the resources of their homelands and also 
the importance of ‘Traditional knowledge.’
Based on the quantitative measuring carried out in this study, 
the indicator most-quoted by the national Arctic policies and 
strategies of the nine Observer States of the Arctic Council is 
the Science & Education indicator, followed by the International 
Cooperation and Economy indicators. The fourth is the new En-
vironmental Protection indicator (composed of Environmental 
Protection coupled with Pollution and Climate Change). These 
top four indicators accord more or less with the official priorities 
or policy goals/aims/principles of these states’ national policies.
Finally, in addition to the narratives mentioned above, we pres-
ent the main themes, as new and/or emerging trends of Arc-
tic governance and geopolitics in the 21st century based on the 
analyses of the existing Arctic policies and strategies of the Arc-
tic States, Permanent Participants, Observer States, and the Arc-
tic Council chairmanship programs and declarations, as well as 
their priorities. This information is useful for policy makers and 
researchers for further discussion in the context of different im-
ages and perceptions and the dominant narratives of the Arctic 
mentioned above. 
New/Emerging Trends of  
Arctic States
1) State domination. The Arctic States dominate Arctic geo-
politics and governance, and play a crucial role in controlling 
the region. The new Arctic dynamics has been influenced by 
the involvement of Indigenous peoples and their demands, 
which has put human and social issues on the agenda, and by 
the visibly growing interest of non-Arctic states in the future 
of the Arctic. This is based on the high level of geopolitical 
stability and constructive cooperation—in this context, even 
the Ukrainian conflict has had very limited impact on Arc-
tic cooperation. Thus, the Arctic has become ‘exceptional’ 
in world politics, with State sovereignty firmly legitimized. 
 
On the other hand, the intention of Arctic States to dominate 
in the region is due to globalization and rapidly advancing 
climate change, which means better access to Arctic resourc-
es and better chances for economic activities and develop-
ment. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is 
a willingness yet to adopt globalization per se into national 
Arctic policies—there is more of an interest in accepting a 
transformation of the Arctic Council from being the leading 
regional council to becoming a leading international one. 
2) Ambivalence of Arctic development. Although the Arc-
tic States are searching for a balance between environmen-
tal protection and economic activities, and proclaim that 
there must be such a balance, there is ambivalence when it 
comes to environmental protection versus economic devel-
opment. Climate change—due to rapid changes in fragile 
ecosystems and thereby better access to the Arctic lands—is 
driving the utilization of resources and economic activities 
in the public and private sectors. There are environmen-
tal initiatives, as well as small steps, such as protected areas 
and legally binding agreements under the auspices of the 
Arctic Council, such as the SAR and Oil Spill agreements. 
 
Although one of the narratives mentioned is environmen-
tal protection and implementation of sustainability, neither 
stricter environmental regulations nor an ‘Arctic Treaty’ are 
preferred by the Arctic States. It is thus not surprising that 
most of the States focus their economic activities on the ex-
tractive resources (e.g., mining, energy). Tourism, which 
is not reflected in most of the policies has also been on the 
increase. This has created an overall sense that infrastructure 
development should support economic activities, especially 
in the shipping industry (in spite of safety concerns).
3) Science in focus. The role of science is increasing. Mainly 
due to the pressure of climate change,the Arctic States have 
learned to use, and have come to depend upon, scientific re-
search for decision-making, including international scientif-
ic cooperation. This is despite pollution and environmental 
protection not being considered a trigger or driver of policy 
in the 1990s, when the Arctic Council was established. At the 
same time, there is a growing need and general trend toward 
increasing access to educational/training programs to prepare 
Northerners for work in the natural resources sector, although 
traditionally, the improvement of educational attainment has 
been more or less neglected in the past.
4) Political inability. Mitigate or adapt to climate change? There 
is no consensus on this question in the current strategies. 
Some focus on adapting to climate change and others see ad-
aptation as a way of mitigating these changes. That said, just 
over half of the strategies identify greenhouse gases as a con-
cern and discuss ways of counteracting emissions. Again, no 
strict environmental regulations are implemented, nor is an 
‘Arctic Treaty’ proposed. Instead, there is ‘political inability.’
New/Emerging Trends of AC Chair-
manship Programs and Declarations
Chairmanship Programs 
1) Fragmented priorities. Although environmental protec-
tion and sustainable development, as Arctic Council func-
tions, are evenly presented, priorities in the Arctic are frag-
mented and based on national interests. There are a variety 
of foci, including recognition of culture, language, tradi-
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tional knowledge, wellbeing, (mental) health, and gender 
equality (although not consistently discussed). Interesting-
ly, food security is generally not a focus of the programs, 
which is surprising as access to healthy food is integral to 
health and wellbeing.
2) Ambivalence of Arctic development. The search for a bal-
ance between the environment and economy (sustainable de-
velopment) emphasizes living marine resources, blue econo-
my, shipping, and tourism. Yet, despite the consensus that the 
environment and economy must be balanced, there is little 
emphasis on international cooperation or sharing best prac-
tices in this area. This seems odd, given that what happens in 
one country can have effects in another. 
3) Transfer of pollutants. A range of pollutants—POPs, PCBs, 
mercury and radioactivity, black carbon, methane, marine 
litter and micro-plastics—are mentioned, and there are some 
interesting patterns. For instance, the earlier programs bare-
ly mention different pollutants, and it is not until Sweden’s 
chairmanship program in 2011 that there were consistent 
discussions around the different climate change pollutants. 
Maritime safety, search and rescue, as well as the Polar Code 
and SAR, are also addressed, although more consistently in 
the recent programs, suggesting that this has become a more 
pressing issue, probably as access to Arctic waters increases.
4) Research vis-à-vis education. There is not much focus on the 
purpose of research in the Arctic. Education is explicitly men-
tioned, both in terms of the University of the Arctic and forms 
of distance or e-learning. That said, there is a little discussion 
about improving attainment levels.
Ministerial Declarations 
1) Explicit priorities. The need for priorities per se and, with-
in them, a transition toward underlining human and social 
issues (e.g., mental health, wellbeing), governance (in partic-
ular Arctic Council procedure), and safety and protection of 
the Arctic Ocean (e.g., SAR Agreement);
2) Emphasis on stability. In preambles to ministerial declara-
tions since the Nuuk Declaration of 2011—and particularly 
in the 2017 Fairbanks Declaration at which Ministerial the 
foreign ministers of all eight Arctic States were present for 
the first time—the wording “Maintaining peace, stability and 
constructive cooperation in the Arctic” is emphasized. This, 
at the same time, maintains the commitment of the Ottawa 
Declaration, which established the Arctic Council, not to deal 
with military security. Despite this, the role of international 
cooperation is less emphasized in the declarations. This de-
cline in discussion around international cooperation and 
international treaties is interesting, especially as worldwide 
interest in the Arctic continues to grow. 
3) New economic activities. There is an increase in (new) eco-
nomic activities, and within them a shift toward renewables 
and bio-resources, blue economy, Indigenous food (safety), 
ecosystem-based management, and support for the Arc-
tic Economic Council as an operational body between the 
public and private sectors. 
4) Transfers of pollutants. There are transfers of pollution, 
in particular from outside the Arctic region, from radioac-
tivity (e.g., AMEC) and heavy metals to black carbon, and 
methane (as GHGs) and other short-lived climate forcers 
and micro-plastics. Other pollutants are named in specif-
ic treaties relating to the pollutant in question. While the 
declarations do address new problems as they emerge: (e.g., 
climate change pollutants and oil, starting with the Tromsø 
Declaration in 2009), there has also been consistency in 
terms of concerns about POPs and mercury also continu-
ing to be raised. At the same time, there is little discussion 
about general shipping waste and oil pollution, which links 
to the support of new economic activities.
5) Focus on science. The focus on science, rather than educa-
tion is growing, with the exception that the University of the 
Arctic is explicitly mentioned. That said, education could 
become an emerging issue, with the Fairbanks Declaration 
(2017) discussing general attainment and the Rovaniemi 
Chair Statement (2019) seeking to ensure that “Indigenous 
languages in education” are addressed. 
New/Emerging Trends of  
Permanent Participants
1) International treaties on Indigenous rights. The Permanent 
Participants seek to support Indigenous peoples and im-
plement their rights (including harvesting rights) through 
international cooperation and agreements (especially the 
UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights) and inter-
national organizations (via United Nations bodies and the 
Arctic Council). International treaties tie Indigenous rights 
into international Arctic politics through the recognition of 
Indigenous peoples as legitimate political entities and as part 
of the internationalized and (digitally) ‘connected world.’ 
2) Indigenous rights to self-determination and self-govern-
ment. ‘Indigenous rights,’ meaning individual and collective 
rights (including mental health, children’s education) are 
connected to their right to manage (their own) territory, and 
use and develop its resources: economy as a means to self-de-
termination/self-governance. Relevant here is ‘self-determi-
nation’ vis-à-vis ‘self-governing’—are these synonyms or is 
there a transition towards self-government, with Indigenous 
peoples at different stages of nation-building?
3) Focus on science. To avoid neocolonialism and the ‘green’ 
colonialism (wind, hydro, wave power, etc.), scientific find-
ings should be further produced and developed together 
and in partnership with Indigenous peoples and incorporat-
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ing (Indigenous) knowledge. Development of proper means, 
such as ‘Indigenous-led impact assessments,’ as methods 
and means for both a balance between (competing issues of) 
environmental protection and sustainable development and 
self-determination/self-governing are suggested.
New/Emerging Trends of  
Observer States
1) Arctic stakeholders. The Observer States of the Arctic 
Council are remapping and redefining their geographical 
and geopolitical position related to the Arctic region, and 
have their own definitions of the Arctic and/or its special 
features. Moreover, many of them are re-identifying their 
relationship with the Arctic, and self-identifying as Arctic 
stakeholders; this includes adopting, and even updating, 
their national policies/strategies, or other policy documents 
on the Arctic. 
2) Global Arctic. The Observer States recognize the existing 
governance structures and international agreements, as well 
as the national jurisdictions of the Arctic States and their 
(small) populations, as a way of maintaining high geopolit-
ical stability. At the same time, they are implementing in-
ternational treaties and agreements, in particular the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and 
recognizing international maritime law and globalization of 
the Arctic (a global Arctic), in order to adopt and maintain 
universal freedom and rights in Arctic Ocean governance. 
3) Ambivalence of Arctic development. The fragile Arctic 
ecosystem is undergoing significant change, where new eco-
nomic activities are becoming possible. Therefore ‘protected 
areas and/or conservation’ are deemed to be of ‘high[er] im-
portance,’ than strict environmental regulations or an ‘Arctic 
Treaty,’ with adaptation and mitigation taking a less import-
ant role. 
4) Focus on science. The Arctic as a ‘space for science’ leading 
to emphasis on research—the most quoted issue area—and 
on research stations within the region (Svalbard). At the 
same time, ‘Traditional knowledge’ is less recognized, al-
though the Observer States have committed to respecting 
the values, interests, and culture of Indigenous peoples and 
other inhabitants of the Arctic region.
New/Emerging Overall Trends
Finally, based on these lists of new/emerging trends (of Arctic 
States, Arctic Council chairmanship programs and declarations, 
Permanent Participants and Observer States), there is the fol-
lowing short list of overall new and/or emerging trends of the 
future of Arctic governance and geopolitics:
1) Ambivalence of Arctic development. Whenever a balance 
is sought between environmental protection and climate 
change mitigation vis-à-vis an increase in (new) economic 
activities for Arctic (regional) development, there is ambiv-
alence, and this is largely due to ‘political inability’;
2) State domination vis-à-vis internationalization/globali-
zation (the global Arctic). There is a new kind of interre-
lationship, and a potentially competitive one, between i) 
State domination (by the Arctic States) based on geopolit-
ical stability and (State) sovereignty; ii) internationaliza-
tion/globalization (prompted by the Observer States and 
due the growing number of Arctic stakeholders) based on 
international treaties, in particular, international maritime 
law, and iii) UN declarations regarding Indigenous rights 
and self-determination (emphasized by the Permanent 
Participants); 
3) Focus on science. The role of science is increasing due to 
the pressure of the rapidly advanced climate change and the 
ambivalence, mentioned above, between economic activities 
and environmental protection;  all Arctic stakeholders (Arc-
tic States, Permanent Participants, Observer States) are de-
pendent for problem-solving on scientific research, as well 
as international cooperation in science; 
4) The Arctic and Space: As an emerging trend is the close in-
terrelationship between the Arctic and the Space (e.g., ITC 
and digital services & security, stable satellite communica-
tion, meteorology as a new priority including the involve-
ment of the WMO) due to globalization and the rapidly ad-
vancing climate change in the Arctic and globally. 
**
These new and/or emerging overall trends of Arctic governance 
and geopolitics are linked with a few existing narratives. For ex-
ample, the ambivalence of Arctic development trend is closely 
linked with the narrative of increasing use of/potential race for 
resources and of the global climate ethics debate. The trend of 
State domination vis-à-vis internationalization/globalization is 
linked to the narratives of State-controlled development pro-
jects and high stability. The focus on science trend deals with 
the narrative of the global climate ethics debate in terms of de-
pending on science to solve ‘wicked’ anthropogenic problems; 
but it hesitates to implement the narrative of a paradigm shift. 
The final one—at this stage still a silent message—the Arctic and 
Space is another possible global approach for the Arctic, which 
has the potential to bring something new to the table. 
Conclusions: Synthesis and Trends
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Appendix 
CAN  
2009
FIN
2013
ISL
2011
DNK  
2011
NOR  
2017
RUS  
2013
SWE  
2011
USA  
2013
(%)
Human Dimension 15 9 7 8 8 12 13 5
Governance 14 13 26 18 19 6 13 18
International Cooperation 11 8 16 13 12 6 12 15
Environmental Protection 9 6 3 7 6 5 8 9
Pollution 4 2 4 5 5 3 5 4
Climate Change 4 4 3 7 3 3 7 7
Security 10 7 12 8 3 5 4 9
Safety & SAR 5 6 5 6 8 6 4 7
Economy 11 20 13 12 18 19 13 8
Tourism 1 6 1 1 1 3 3 0
Infrastructure 8 9 4 6 8 24 7 7
Science and Education 8 9 6 8 9 9 13 11
Table 72. Current Arctic State Strategy Indicators as a Percent of Total Coded Quotes 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number.
FRA
2016
GER
2013
ITA
2015
JPN
2015
NLD
2014
PRC
2018
ROK
2013
ESP
2016
UK
2018
(%)
Human Dimension 5 3 7 4 0 4 5 3 7
Governance 10 15 6 7 13 12 10 10 3
International Cooperation 13 21 14 22 8 16 17 15 15
Environmental Protection 13 7 12 7 4 12 3 5 10
Pollution 3 7 9 3 2 2 0 3 8
Climate Change 6 6 10 10 10 7 2 9 8
Security 8 5 1 5 0 6 0 2 5
Safety & SAR 7 9 6 5 1 3 8 2 4
Economy 17 12 12 10 13 22 21 10 18
Tourism 3 1 1 0 3 2 0 1 2
Infrastructure 5 6 3 5 2 4 3 9 4
Science and Education 10 7 20 23 46 10 32 29 16
Table 73. Current Observer State Strategy Indicators as a Percent of Total Coded Quotes 
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number.
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The following are among the new and/or emerging trends of Arctic governance and 
geopolitics in the early 21st century, as identified in this scientific report.
• Ambivalence of Arctic development, including ‘political inability,’ whenever a balance is being 
sought between environmental protection and (new) economic activities; 
• Focus on science, with all Arctic stakeholders being dependent on scientific research and 
international cooperation in science for problem-solving because of climate change; 
• Close interrelationship between the Arctic and Space (e.g., digital security, satellites, and 
meteorology as a new priority area) due to globalization and rapidly advancing climate  
change in the Arctic.
Using quantitative and qualitative methods, the study delivers a systematic and holistic 
analysis and synthesis of the existing policies and strategies of the Arctic States (Member 
States), Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations (Permanent Participants), and non-Arctic 
countries (Observer States), as well as pertinent Arctic Council chairmanship programs and 
declarations.
The analysis is based on coding the text of 56 policy documents. It includes a description and
understanding of how perceptions of the Arctic and its mapping have changed over time. It 
also considers how different States and Indigenous peoples’ organizations define and 
address issues around the following: the human dimension, governance, international 
cooperation, environmental protection, pollution, climate change, security, safety, economy, 
tourism, infrastructure, and science & education. For each category of the above-mentioned 
stakeholders, the findings are: i) compared within the category; and ii) discussed with each 
other category-wise. Based on these analyses, new and emerging trends are recognized and 
formulated, as a final synthesis, to describe and define the state of the Arctic in the 2020s.
This scientific report is a research activity of the Arctic Futures Initiative of the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). It is supported by the Arctic Circle Assembly 
and the Institute for Atmospheric and Earth System Research (INAR) at the University of 
Helsinki, as the major partners, and co-funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
and IIASA. 
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